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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
THE CRISIS OF SEXUALITY IN THE CHURCH 
 
 What is the content of the crisis of sexuality in the Church?1 The answer to what 
constitutes the crisis depends on the individual, institution, clergy person, or scholar one 
asks. Many outside of communities of faith suggest that the Christian Church is repressed 
and out of touch with the changing times. Some reference the scandal in the Catholic 
Church concerning the sexual abuse of children by priests. Others argue that the crisis 
stems from denying homosexuals the right to partner, to marry, and/or to be ordained into 
positions of church leadership. The inability to even talk about sex and sexuality is yet 
another possible response.  
Explicitly conservative positions target the influences of a wayward culture – 
influences that popularize recreational sex without the shelter of marriage, condone 
homosexuality, and destroy the lives of young people by encouraging sex before 
marriage. Explicitly liberal responses, especially those coming out of the academic 
context, point to the reign of patriarchy and sexism – both of which are implicated in 
racism, heterosexism, and other relationships characterized by domination or power over 
others. Still others suggest that the Church’s public and political life have failed to 
advocate for sexual freedom on par with the passion for religious freedom.2 Thus, though 
there is a consensus among religious scholars and church leaders that a crisis of sexuality 
                                                
1 When I refer to the Christian Church in this paper, I am referencing the whole of the Christian 
2 Kathleen Sands, “A Response to Marcella Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology,” in Feminist Theology, 11 
(January 2003): 179. 
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in the Church exists, there is not a consensus with regard to the nature of the crisis and 
what constitutes a faithful theological response. 
Despite the polarities in positions, I suggest that over time the Christian faith as a 
whole has maintained explicit and implicit, spoken and unspoken concerns about 
sexuality – most specifically the restriction or liberation of the sexual behaviors of 
adherents. In our current cultural context, Christians retain a reputation for being prudish 
and sexually repressed amid a society that shows little shame in its flagrant 
commodification of sex. Michel Foucault, however, warns us that silence or the 
appearance of repression in regards to sexuality belies the proliferation of discourse 
concerned with sex.3 Thus, while some communities of faith appear to ignore addressing 
sex altogether, Christian theology has constructed its own discourse on sex. In terms of 
resources, the tradition relied on the Biblical text, whose scant mention of sex and 
culturally bound sexual injunctions necessitated deft exegesis and the wisdom of ancient 
and medieval philosophy. A virtually canonical discourse on sex has been passed down 
from Christianity’s founding fathers and, with some modifications, it informs both 
Catholic and Protestant theological positions today.  
    This exploration focuses intently on the theological discourse on sex and, more 
pointedly, on the theological discourse on sexual pleasure. I contend that from the most 
influential historical Christian scholarship, to official denominational statements on 
human sexuality, to some of the most progressive Christian sexual ethics, sexual pleasure 
has significant import. I suggest that a struggle with sexual pleasure lies at the heart of 
the crisis of sexuality in the Church, and I will show that historical and contemporary 
                                                
3 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1978), 18.  
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Christian discourse on sex often hides a deep anxiety about sexual desires and the 
pleasures of sexual activity. Those reconstructing Christian sexual ethics are cognizant of 
the lingering devaluation of sexual pleasure and, subsequently, demand its reclamation. 
These scholars and institutions envision sexual pleasure as essential to a sexual ethic for 
our time. Ironically, across all of these attempts to provide moral guidance for the 
expression of human sexuality, sexual pleasure generates a degree of obsessive concern, 
embodying significant meaning as either the hotbed of sin or the key to liberation. 
 
Research Question and Thesis 
A critical reflection on sexual pleasure thus comprises the heart of this 
dissertation. From pleasure as sin to pleasure as ethical mandate, Christians interpret 
sexual pleasure as a force – positive, negative, constructed, natural, sacred, or profane – 
with which to be reckoned. How to reckon with this force has always been the dilemma. 
In other words, what shall we say is sexual pleasure’s theological significance, and what 
does this mean for our sexual activities and their role in life as a whole? With this 
problem in mind, I ask: From a pastoral theological perspective, how has sexual 
pleasure been understood and misunderstood in Christian theology and contemporary 
culture, and how might it be reclaimed in a more responsible and complex fashion?  
In this investigation, I carefully analyze the origins of prevailing Christian 
interpretations of sexual pleasure, consider relevant cultural influences of the twentieth 
century, and survey some of the most radical theological proposals of the latter twentieth 
century, to affirm that sexual pleasure for all is important and valuable. Progressive, 
contemporary Christian sexual ethics also comes to these conclusions. Still, the answers 
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to my research questions above lead me to suspect that the addition of sexual pleasure to 
contemporary Christian sexual ethics has been uncritically accepted and promoted 
without thorough attention to and consideration of the valid critiques and suggestions of 
pertinent theological, social scientific, and cultural resources. Thus, I argue that the 
current scholarship informing Christian sexual ethics 1) essentializes sexual pleasure in 
ways that are reminiscent of the tradition, 2) places an undue burden on sexual pleasure 
insofar as it must necessarily transcend the personal to the political, and 3) ironically 
reinscribes – albeit with a wider circle –sexual practices and pleasures that are 
acceptable, while delineating those which are not. Taken together, contemporary 
interpretations of sexual pleasure in contemporary Christian sexual ethics risk 
participating in the ongoing production of a sexual regime that regulates and controls 
specific sexual acts and pleasures, as opposed to the stated aim of focusing on the nature 
of the relationships in which sexual activities occur. 
 My detailed understanding of the larger problem as it pertains to sexual pleasure 
motivates the questions and argument that drive my research. The remainder of this 
Introduction, therefore, expands upon the problem of how and why Christian theologians, 
ethicists, and church leaders have insufficiently attempted, both passively and actively, to 
reckon with sexual pleasure. An explanation of my method for addressing the problem 
follows. I conclude with a brief outline of the subsequent chapters and an explanation of 
the overall significance of the project, including some limitations.  
The Problem 
 
Everyday Sexual Suffering and Spirituality 
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While responding to the “crisis of sexuality” in faith contexts has become the 
domain of formal and informal Christian sexual ethics espoused by scholars, church 
leaders, and impassioned lay people, trusted caregivers like myself often bear witness to 
the effects of the proposed sexual values and expectations. As part of this role, we 
caregivers are in a position to assess the impact of the discourse on sex emerging from 
theological contexts and to evaluate its ends with respect to physical, psychological, and 
spiritual health. As a pastoral counselor in the community at-large, I find it obvious that 
individuals suffer in their “everyday” sexual lives as a result of the Church’s 
condemnations, confusion, and mixed messages in regards to sexual pleasure.4 This 
sexual suffering and frustration often have spiritual consequences. 
In light of this dimension of suffering, my impulse was to consult pastoral 
theological resources in addition to the psychological materials that share space on my 
bookshelf. However, I was disappointed to find that pastoral theology, a theological 
discipline that focuses on the care of individuals – sensitive to human suffering, human 
flourishing, and pathways to healing – has few resources available to illuminate the 
complexities of human sexual experience. Those available were outdated, and none 
reflected significantly on sexual pleasure, a dimension of sexual experience that I found 
capable of generating both suffering and healing within the self and in relationships. My 
clinical experiences and the problematic dearth of attention to the sexual self in pastoral 
theology initially inspired my research and its pointed attention to pleasure. 
                                                
4 By “everyday” here I mean to distinguish routine sexual life from the crisis of traumatic experiences like 
sexual assault, abuse, or rape. I do not, however, imply exclusivity, as often individuals suffer for 
prolonged periods in their “everyday” sexual lives as a result of these traumas. The caregiving to which I 
am referring is not immediate crisis care related to sexual abuse, assault, or rape.    
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 As I contemplated this lacuna in my field and imagined a way forward, I realized 
that if pastoral theology aimed to offer a response to understanding the experience of (or 
lack of) sexual pleasure, exploring and critically analyzing the theological and cultural 
hopes and tensions surrounding sexual pleasure would be a necessary first step. I 
suspected that Christian sexual ethics needed a more critical understanding of sexual 
pleasure if it hoped to provide faithful sex education, combat sexual injustices, and 
improve how people of faith understand their sexual experiences from a psychological, 
physiological, and spiritual perspective. I was positive that pastoral theology, whose core 
tasks are to immerse itself in lived human experience, to interpret human brokenness, to 
contemplate avenues for healing and fulfillment, and to inform pastoral practice in 
communities of faith, pastoral counseling organizations, and the broader public, 
desperately shared this need to the same ends.  
 
Classical Theology: Pleasure as Sin 
The void that I originally found in pastoral theology prompted further 
investigation into how theology as a whole has (or has not) addressed sexual pleasure. I 
found that over the course of Christian history, sexual pleasure has been yoked to terms 
like sin, lust, procreation, and marriage. Nowhere are these associations more 
passionately articulated and systematized than in the work of Augustine of Hippo (354-
430). Though his contemporaries in the Latin West, such as Ambrose and Jerome, rallied 
against the dangers of the body, railed against the sexual impulse and its pleasures, and 
argued for the superiority of virginity and the chaste life, Augustine’s selective 
appropriations, compelling exegesis, pastoral response to his cultural context, and gift of 
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rhetoric commanded greater influence over the thought and practice of the early Church 
with respect to interpreting sexual desire and pleasure.  
For example, Augustine theologized that God originally created man and woman 
for marriage, intercourse, and procreation. Sex in Paradise was primarily the means to a 
populous, not pleasure. He interpreted the post-Fall experience of lust and sexual pleasure 
– a definitive sign of the divorce between the will and the body – as a constant and 
powerful reminder of the punishment for the original sin of disobedience to God. In his 
theological system, Augustine could go only so far as to “pardon” sex and its pleasures in 
the context of marriage when it was procreative in its intent or necessary to prevent 
fornication. Reinforcing his suspicion of pleasure, Augustine stealthily undercut his 
support for marriage by his persistent insistence that a continent life, free from the 
pleasures of sex, was preferable.  
Influential theologians who succeeded Augustine, like Thomas Aquinas, Martin 
Luther, and John Calvin, only solidified and reaffirmed the theological grounding for the 
latent suspicion surrounding sexual pleasure and more tightly bound it to sin, lust, 
procreation, and marriage. For example, Aquinas (1225-1274), rooted in Aristotelian 
philosophy, focused on the application of reason and logic to sexual life. Sex needed to 
be guided by reason and, hence, should be aimed at procreation. While he suggested the 
possibility of “virtuous” sex that included the endorsement of pleasure, he also indicated 
that reason, which sets its sights on the higher things of God, would not tend in this 
direction. He concluded that to pursue sex for pleasure was sinful; the only sexual 
pleasure that Aquinas did not consider sinful was that of married people intending to 
reproduce.  
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The Protestant reformers Luther (1484-1546) and Calvin (1509-1564), although 
arguing ardently for marriage and against clerical vows to virginity and celibacy, 
maintained that the function of marriage was to contain lust and beget children. Both 
insisted that sex and its pleasures remained a cause for shame – a sin that was overlooked 
in God’s eyes by the covering of marriage. Although the writings of other historical 
figures, such as Spanish mystic and Carmelite nun Teresa of Ávilla (1515-1582), have 
been reinterpreted in efforts to affirm the “erotic,” in their own contexts these works did 
not result in an affirmation of sexual pleasure in sexual activity.  
In the course of Christian history, it was heresy for pastoral leadership to suggest 
that sexual pleasure could have positive value as a dimension of human sexual 
experience. For example, Augustine’s contemporary Julian, Bishop of Eclanum denied 
that the sexual impulse and sexual pleasure posed a problem for married couples.5 
Sexuality was not problematic, and sexual pleasure was the “chosen instrument of any 
self-respecting marriage…acceptable in and of itself, and blameworthy only in its 
excesses.”6 Although Julian still argued that sex and its pleasures belonged in marriage 
and should not be indulged in excess, he severed their connection to sin. Nearing 70 years 
of age, Augustine continued to write against Julian and others, insisting on the ongoing 
reality of the lust of the flesh, which he maintained did not exist in Paradise. The 
“heresies” of Julian were ultimately trumped by Augustine’s assertions. Today, in some 
                                                
5 Julian, Bishop of Eclanum, was eventually exiled from Italy around 419 because of his support of 
Pelagius’ views concerning freedom of the will. Pelagius contended that Adam’s sin had not irrevocably 
weakened the will, and that Christians possessed the abilities first granted to them to follow God’s 
commands to the fullest. See Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation 
in Early Christianity, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 408-411.  
6 Augustine, Against Julian, Fathers of the Church, vol. 35, trans. W. A. Schuhmacher (New York: Fathers 
of the Church Inc., 1957), 4.2.7: 739, quoted in Brown, 413.  
 9 
theological circles, perspectives on sexual pleasure continue to reflect the weight of 
Augustine’s legacy, a fervent distrust enduring nearly two millennia.  
 
Feminist Theology: The Return of Eros 
Systematic attention to the deeply androcentric character of the whole of Christian 
theology and its symbols began in the 1970s, when feminist theologians like Carol Christ, 
Judith Plaskow, and Rosemary Ruether exposed the pervasive sexism in Judaism and 
Christianity. Feminist theological methodology prioritized women’s experiences in 
seeking to offer constructive alternatives to these traditions, including the doctrines of sin 
and God, the classic interpretation of Genesis 2-3, and the narratives of forgotten or 
demonized women in Scripture.  
With respect to sex, a feminist perspective argues that the historical dominance of 
a male-centered, heterosexual perspective in the interpretation of sexual experience – 
sexual experience that was translated into theological assertions – is partly responsible for 
“the crisis of sexuality in the church” today. For example, Augustine argued that 
nocturnal emissions, unwanted erections, and instances of impotence signified one’s 
inability to control sexual desire and tarnished the inevitable ends – orgasm. Implicit in 
these claims is the notion of an irresistible sexual impulse, the experience of ubiquitous 
lusting, and the necessary continuity and linear nature of desire, followed by 
physiological arousal, and then by sexual experience (penetrative sexual intercourse), 
culminating in orgasm.  
From a feminist perspective, our theological legacy related to the interpretation of 
sexual experience is exclusively male-centered, heterosexual, and overwhelmingly 
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negative. Given the aims of feminist theology, one would expect to find a critical 
corrective to theological reflection on sexual experience and pleasure, primarily 
generated from the particularities of the diversity and multiplicity of women’s voices. My 
initial survey of feminist theological resources (from the early 1970s through the late 
1980s) came up short of identifying any one particular work that focused exclusively on 
sexual desire or pleasure; however, a number of works contained the opportunity for 
addressing issues of women’s sexuality, and perhaps pleasure, via efforts to reimagine 
Christian love as eros.7 Proposing eros, commonly taken to connote sexual love, as a 
resource for more aptly capturing the nature of love as understood from the experience of 
women desiring and loving held promise.  
Thick feminist theological reflections on eros, however, are not plentiful; Rita 
Nakashima Brock and Carter Heyward are the only two feminist theologians who 
undertake substantial, book-length redefinitions of the philosophical concept. Drawing on 
female experience, they suggest a new way of understanding eros, one that prioritizes 
being in relationship and valuing the other and mandates participation in justice and the 
healing of all beings. God is – and has always been – part and parcel of life, the flow of 
erotic energy in our pleasures, mutual relationships, and political action. Eros theology 
provides a foundation for and supports a feminist theological agenda that demands 
resistance to relations of domination. Erotic love, newly defined, transcends sexual love, 
though sexual love remains a valid instance.  
Heyward, a lesbian feminist theologian, is the only one to delve further into 
sexual pleasure and the explicitly sexual dimension of erotic love. For her, pleasure is a 
                                                
7 Women, as well as gay men, in theological disciplines more explicitly and pointedly address sexual 
pleasure in publications after 1990, most notably in the discipline of Christian sexual ethics. These scholars 
often bridge disciplines and may not identify themselves exclusively as theologians or ethicists.  
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hallmark of all erotic love and of the experience of tapping into one’s erotic power. In 
addition to erotic love being pleasurable, Heyward emphasizes mutuality as the defining 
characteristic of all eros. Eros is mutual power in relation to others. This, she insists, is 
the essence of being human – made, destined, and capable of returning to our essential 
state of mutual relation with all of creation. Thus, the first problem that arises with 
Heyward’s sense of eros is a premium on the natural and essential nature of 
sexual/erotic/Godly love. These essentialist claims about God and human being rub 
against other feminist critiques of essentialist claims to human nature, especially when it 
comes to sexuality.  
By my interpretation, Heyward and her partner, lesbian feminist theologian 
Beverly Harrison, interpret the “sexual crisis in the church” as our inability to experience 
sexual desire and sexual pleasure in the context of mutual sexual activity. They argue that 
erotic experience has been co-opted by patriarchy and now, sexual arousal and sexual 
pleasure are contingent on the tensions generated by relations of domination and 
submission. They insist that in a patriarchal society, this paradigm of relating not only 
characterizes sexual relations, but all relations between the sexes, classes, races, etc.  
According to Heyward and Harrison, mutuality must characterize sexual relations 
that are properly erotic (both sexual and spiritual); thus, they propose the eroticization of 
mutuality as the solution to the aforementioned problem. In other words, we are charged 
with unlearning the arousal and pleasure we experience as part and parcel of all our erotic 
encounters. In my analysis, this leap from reality to Heyward and Harrison’s proposed 
solution is difficult to comprehend. In regards to sexual pleasure, their eros theology 
articulates a reality for which they offer no viable escape. Though they offer an 
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affirmation of pleasure, this scholarship begins to point to some of the complexities 
bound to the circumstances through which we experience sexual pleasure, namely 
through sexual practices that entail some arrangement of claiming or relinquishing power.  
 
Christian Sexual Ethics: Pleasure and a Passion for Justice 
A number of scholars in contemporary Christian sexual ethics make mutuality in 
sexual pleasure normative. Grounded in James Nelson’s and Carter Heyward’s premises, 
the most recent scholarship (from the 1990s into the new millennium) aims to leave 
behind a focus on the regulation and control of sexual acts and pleasures and turn its 
attention toward the nature of interpersonal relationships and the potential for pleasure to 
function as a guideline – if not the guideline – for gauging the health and potential of 
intimate relationships. For many of these scholars, personal sexual ethics must always 
motivate and concern social justice in our political life as a community. In other words, 
personal sexual pleasures should inspire a passion for social justice.   
 In progressive Christian sexual ethics, the affirmation of sexual pleasure is 
contingent on three interrelated themes. First, each text engages and affirms Nelson’s 
insistence on the importance of embodiment to theological anthropology. Second, 
Heyward’s assertion that mutuality function as a necessary quality of every relationship, 
including sexual relationships, is a cornerstone in Christine Gudorf’s and Marvin 
Ellison’s book-length proposals, as well as a feminist approach to women’s pleasure by 
Patricia Beatie Jung. For Gudorf in particular, mutual sexual pleasure is an ethical 
mandate for having “good” sex. Also championed by Heyward, the third theme – the 
necessary relationship between personal sexual experience/pleasure and a public 
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commitment to social justice – is the core implication of contributions by lesbian feminist 
philosopher of religion Grace Jantzen, Marvin Ellison, and “queer theologians” Robert 
Goss and Scott Haldeman. A move to recognize sexual pleasure as a pre-moral good, to 
demand it in all sexual relationships, and to firmly rid it of the angst generated by the 
Western Christian tradition spans all of these proposals.  
In a number of these texts and articles, the voices of marginalized groups 
centralize their own experiences to more radically connect sexual ethics to social justice. 
This is evident in contributions by Heyward (a lesbian feminist theologian), Goss and 
Haldeman (queer theologians), and Kelly Brown Douglas (an African-American 
womanist theologian). Douglas’ work stands apart, as it exemplifies the difficulty with 
affirming sexual pleasure when an explicit association with lust and sexual pleasures has 
maligned the humanity of black individuals. In addition, her use of Foucault to explain 
the disciplinary and productive nature of power, as well as the power of sexual discourse, 
begins to raise critical questions for me about the discursive power of the new claims in 
Christian sexual ethics – claims in which sexual pleasure is radically affirmed. In other 
words, the insistence in sexual ethics on sexual pleasure, mutuality in sex, or social 
justice in relation to our sexual activities may actually limit some of the sexual freedom 
for which many of these proposals so passionately advocate.  
A more critical look at contemporary Christian sexual ethics also reveals an 
implicit grounding in feminist eros theology. Thus, mutuality is the standard for right 
relating and the key to eliminating all relations characterized by domination and 
submission, including sexism, racism, heterosexism, ageism, etc. Many of these 
proposals uncritically adopt Heyward and Harrison’s solution to eroticized relations of 
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dominance and submission: the need to eroticize mutuality – to make “power-sharing” in 
sex both arousing and pleasurable. Because many of these scholars claim that the nature 
of the power exchange in sexual activity can and does translate into how one handles 
power in other relationships and, more, that the joy of power-sharing in sex ignites a 
passion for mutual relating with all of humanity and creation, justice is ultimately the 
larger framework for interpreting sexual pleasure. The relationship between mutual 
sexual pleasure and justice-making becomes an ethical expectation. This expectation 
brings me back to questions about the limits on sexual freedom these proposals reassert.  
Looking for a theologically grounded affirmation of sexual pleasure, I find these 
proposals radical and compelling; however, I am wary that where idealism abounds, 
subtle tensions fall to the wayside, and theory fails to address the lived realities of the 
here and now. For example, the whole of the discourse with respect to mutuality is 
confusing at times. There is a conflation between egalitarian relationships in which 
mutual sexual decision-making takes place and mutuality in sexual activity itself, where 
these authors argue that power differentials in this context should cease to exist and 
titillate participants. As a result, the eroticization of mutuality forgoes the possibility of 
mutual relationships in which partners agree on using power differentials to maximize 
their pleasure.  
In addition, given the analyses of prominent secular feminists, I question the 
eroticization of mutuality as the only way to affirming sexual pleasure. More so, does 
mutuality in the context of erotic desire and pleasure always involve the elimination of 
tensions? What I would call an idealized mutuality seems to arise from the uncritical 
appropriation of feminist eros theology in Christian sexual ethics. Also, the elimination 
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of tensions in the eroticization of mutuality rightly aims to thwart violence and abuse; 
however, it also attempts to eliminate risk. From a pastoral theological perspective, this 
move seems to misunderstand the complexity of our theological anthropology. Is all 
human suffering a product of social sin? And to what extent does a degree of risk 
increase sexual pleasure?  
Finally, without resisting the claim of the goodness of pleasure, I am skeptical of 
the burden placed on sexual activity and its pleasures to motivate and inflame one’s 
passion for justice. While I do not negate this possibility for some, I am not convinced 
that it should be true for all. I also think that justice-making in the context of love-making 
can take many forms some that would not be supported by Christian sexual ethics as they 
currently stand. In sum, though sexual pleasure is finally embraced in theological 
scholarship, this shift compels a more rigorous, critical analysis.   
 
Communities of Faith in a Culture of Commodities and Confusion 
Over the course of the twentieth century, America has had its share of discourses 
focused on sexuality and its expressions. It would seem that if the Church aimed to stay 
relevant amidst the shifting sands of modernism and postmodernism, it would have to 
respond to the “new” discoveries molding and shaping the understanding of sexual desire 
and pleasure emerging from beyond its walls.  
For example, in the mid-1910s, Sigmund Freud shared his ideas with large 
American audiences. Nuances and the complexity of his theories aside, Freudian 
concepts permeated the middle-class imagination, including the idea of infantile 
sexuality, family drama laden with sexual conflict, neuroses in women as a consequence 
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of repressed sexual desires, and the notion that sexual instincts permeated human life and 
affected the development of civilization.8 Historians John D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman 
argue that Freud’s writings “perhaps best symbolize the new direction that sexual 
theorizing took in the twentieth century.”9 Jeffrey Weeks adds that Freud’s work 
represented “a high point of a would-be-scientific sexology.”10  
Sexual desire (the instincts) and pleasure (satisfaction of the instincts) played a 
significant role in Freud’s shifting theoretical perspective. The sexual impulse, or libido, 
had its aim in gratification, the reduction of tension and the sensation of pleasure. But 
“sexual,” insofar as it qualified an impulse, merely meant that it arose from any number 
of bodily needs. The connections between the sexual instinct and heterosexual genitality 
were the culmination of a process, not a starting point for Freud.11 Still, D’Emilio and 
Freedman argue, “Americans absorbed a version of Freudianism that presented the sexual 
impulse as an insistent force demanding expression.”12 Although many of Freud’s ideas 
rattled Christians, his interpretations of the sexual impulse resonated with Western 
Christian traditions that viewed sex as an irresistible force in need of social, moral, and/or 
medical restraints.  
As pastoral theologian James Poling indicates, the mid-nineteenth century found 
Christian communities floundering to makes sense of and process sexologist Alfred 
Kinsey’s research. Kinsey’s work in the late 1940s and early 1950s appealed to sexual 
science, providing “facts” that demonstrated the gap between moral codes and the actual 
                                                
8 John D’Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America, (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), 223.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality and Its Discontents: Meanings, Myths & Modern Sexualities, (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 127.  
11 Ibid, 133-134.  
12 D’Emilio and Freedman, 223.  
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sexual activity of Americans. By the 1960s, sexologists William Masters and Virginia 
Johnson, who studied the biological bases of human sexual response, joined Kinsey in 
identifying the clitoris as the source of female orgasm. Did this bode well for women’s 
erotic pleasure, but also the feminist implications of these findings suggested the demise 
of the heterosexual imperative; sexual pleasure was attainable from sexual activity with 
either a man or a woman.13 In addition to these scientific contributions, political 
movements in the latter half of the twentieth century, including the sexual revolution, the 
women’s movement, and the gay and lesbian rights movement, put churches in a position 
to respond to the changing times and to perhaps rethink, or re-theologize, their official 
positions on matters related to sexuality, including sexual pleasure.  
 
Pleasure and Culture Today 
If the Christian church appears anxious or mute when it comes to affirming sexual 
pleasure, U.S. culture markets sexual pleasure in excess. If you were an alien from 
another planet and your spaceship crash-landed in New York City, it would never occur 
to you that sex and the pleasures it promises are a threat. Based on popular music and 
images, you would be amazed at all the things available that would give you the 
opportunity to experiences these pleasures – anything from toothpaste and shampoo, to 
motor vehicles, razors, clothing, beer, even chewing gum. The more sexually explicit 
images in Times Square of scantily clad lingerie models advertising for Victoria’s Secret 
would pale in comparison to the images available (in number and content) on the World 
Wide Web. You might hear murmurings that the sale of pornography is a multi-billion 
                                                
13 Ibid, 313.  
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dollar industry in the U.S., some arguing that there are more adult book stores in America 
than McDonald’s restaurants.14  
 The point is that we are hard pressed not to conclude that the majority of 
Americans work and love in a sex-saturated culture. The commodification of sex – of its 
pleasures and powers – serves desires as assuredly as it creates them. Scholars and 
industry debate the direction of this causality, but neither would deny the explicit 
principle motivation: capital. In any case, I argue that the debates in our society revolve 
less around these realities and more around the impact of this kind of marking and the 
promotion of pleasure, especially because much of the time we are not even conscious of 
the sexual messages, images, and discourses to which we are being exposed and those to 
which we are not.  
To be sure, television, movies, advertisements, and music provide a venue for 
implicit and explicit information about sexual pleasure. Sometimes these media maintain 
a hyper focus on sexual pleasure. Sex scenes are perfectly choreographed. Risk, 
emotional and physical, is a non-issue. Examples are almost exclusively heterosexual. 
Black bodies are highly eroticized. Stereotyped, gendered sex roles abound. In these 
readily available public forums, where sexual pleasure is permitted, many are exploited. 
These images are highly criticized by Christians of all stripes, as well as secular 
academics. This cultural reality, in the guise of affirmation and sexual liberation, opposes 
the vision of life-giving sexual pleasure that Christian sexual ethicists want to embrace.  
Politicians, clergy, caregivers, advocates, and scholars analyze and evaluate the 
contemporary scene. Is it harmless? Does it deform our sense of expectations when it 
                                                
14 Dan Ackerman, “How Big is Porn?” Forbes, May 25, 2011, 
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comes to sex and intimate relationships? To what extent does it normalize? To what 
extent does it liberate? To what extent does it discriminate and exploit? Is it all 
destructive or can it be creative? Does it constitute societal progress or demise? And, 
from a faith perspective, how does it square with or oppose how Christian sexual ethics 
understand sex and pleasure? 
 The dominant portrait of sexual pleasure in America is undoubtedly the antithesis 
of what Augustine was imagining as he worked out the relationship between sex and 
society at the start of the fifth century. Today, significant tension remains between the 
Church and culture. As I will demonstrate, although many mainline churches have 
adopted qualified affirmations of sex and sexual pleasure, heterosexuality, monogamy, 
and marriage reign as the safe and sanctified context for sexual expression. The media, 
however, including television, music and music videos, magazines, movies, and the 
Internet (I would add social networking and social networking tools), send confusing 
messages. For example, sex is plentiful, not always occurring between married partners, 
potentially occurring with multiple partners, with few if any allusions to contraceptive 
use or safer sex methods, and almost exclusively depicted between heterosexual 
persons.15   
 On one level our culture seems remarkably comfortable, if not overt, with its 
sexuality. But on another level it resists and restricts. We can see a commercial for 
shampoo that portrays a woman in the throws of orgasm while she washes  her hair, 
while ads for contraception – like condoms – are few and far between, if not entirely 
blocked. Pepper Schwartz adds, “Our society…injects sexual content into everything 
from baby food ads to weather reports, yet sees no contradiction in our collective blanch 
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at the idea of a sex toy being sold on the home shopping network.”16 Thus, it is not so 
simple to conclude that society is necessarily sexually liberated or sexually repressed. 
There are much larger and less obvious forces at work that contribute to what Schwartz 
calls “our sexual schizophrenia.”17 
As a caregiver, I saw first hand the tensions that exist for persons of faith – 
especially youth – trying to balance the varying messages about sex coming from the 
Church and culture. I had a teenaged counselee who made an impromptu decision to have 
sex. The religious school she attended insisted on abstinence until marriage – an approach 
that left her confused about what to do with her budding sexual desires. At the same time, 
she was convinced that everyone her age was having sex. Music, television, rumors at her 
school, and social media increased the pressure to “do it!” She felt that there were no 
viable options for her between total restriction and the extreme - intercourse.  
 Some communities of faith set themselves over and against culture when it comes 
to sexual values. Thus, the fear and angst generated about sexual matters, in addition to 
lingering faithfulness to the Christian legacy, may also be a product of cultural 
confrontation or resistance to confusion, pervasive, indiscriminant permissiveness, and 
indulgence on the part of the powers that be in society. Some faith communities 
(typically the more conservative) concentrate on the corruption of personal sexual morals, 
marriage, and family values, while other faith communities (typically the more 
liberal/progressive) focus on the sexual exploitation and abuse manifest in late 
capitalism’s commodification of sex and pleasure. Still, while those in the Church may 
fear where culture has taken us with respect to sexual pleasure, it behooves them to 
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recognize that these powerful cultural influences contribute just as much to the shape of 
their fear and anxiety as the sex-negative Christian legacy.  
 
Sex and the Church: Official Denominational Positions 
James Poling points out that by the end of the 1960s every large progressive 
church denomination had formulated and affirmed statements on sexuality. Although 
these statements criticized moralistic approaches to sex and appealed to relationships 
characterized by commitment and love as the appropriate context for sex, they 
maintained fears regarding pre-marital and extramarital sex, as well as homosexuality.18 
Forty years after these statements were formulated, I reviewed some of the old and new 
sexual statements of Christian mainline denominations, curious about the emphasis (or 
lack thereof) on heterosexual and procreative imperatives, marriage, and, of course, 
sexual pleasure.19  
 First, in almost all of the assessed statements, sex and sexuality are proclaimed 
gifts from God or, in the least, part of “God plan.”20 “Catholic teaching sees human 
sexuality as a great gift from God…,” states the Catholic position.21 Missouri Synod 
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Lutheranism identifies, “…the gift of sexuality,” and describes sex as, “…God’s beautiful 
gift.”22 The United Methodist Church (UMC) document states, “…sexuality is God’s 
good gift to all persons,” and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) 
proclaims, “Sexual love…is a wondrous gift…God’s good gift…”23 The Episcopal 
Church, in the introduction to its report entitled “The Gift of Sexuality: A Theological 
Perspective,” defines sexuality as, “…one of God’s wonderful, complex, confusing, and, 
sometimes, dangerous gifts.”24 Finally, the United Church of Christ (UCC) similarly 
states, “Sexuality is a gift from God.”25  
While sexuality [read: sex] receives substantial, explicit affirmations, sexual 
pleasure is rarely mentioned. Only the ELCA and the Episcopal Church address it 
directly. The ELCA explains, “Sexuality especially involves the powers or capacities to 
form deep and lasting bonds, to give and receive pleasure, and to conceive and bear 
children.”26 The Episcopal Church asserts, “The links between love and sexual pleasure 
testify to the way in which sexuality blesses human intimacy.”27 In both cases, sexual 
pleasure is recognized and acknowledged as valuable to healthy expressions of sexuality. 
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I have to admit that seeing explicit mention of sexual pleasure in official church 
documents was initially reassuring and positive.    
 Thus, if there has been any headway made in the Church since Augustine, it is 
that sexuality and sex are no longer interpreted as dangerous or threatening to one’s 
spirituality. They are regarded as “good” and as “gifts,” conjuring up a departure from sin 
language and a sense of something special, worthy of excitement, given for good 
purposes. Pleasure, when explicitly noted, is depicted as a blessing and part and parcel of 
the good gift of sexuality. In every case, however, these affirmations are given alongside 
qualifications and, in some cases, warnings. Here, these modern documents begin to 
resonate, to more or less an extent, with aspects of the Christian legacy.  
First, sexual intimacy is affirmed primarily and only in marriage, an institution 
defined between one man and one woman. In the more traditional statements – the 
Missouri Synod Lutherans, the Catholic Church, and the Southern Baptist Convention 
(SBC) – this arrangement is named simply as “God’s plan,” and it is determined by the 
naturalness and divine sanctioning of male-female duality and complementarity. Steering 
clear of the language of dualism and complementarity, the Episcopal Church indicates 
that God gave sex as a “means for married persons to share themselves with each 
other.”28 The ELCA, which seems to have the most developed and affirming position on 
sexual relationships, concludes, “…the greatest sexual intimacies, such as coitus, should 
be matched with and sheltered both by the highest level of binding commitment and by 
social and legal protection, such as is found in marriage.”29   
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 In addition to a marital framework, sin and danger language also remains a part of 
the discourse surrounding sex and sexuality in these documents. This is most emphatic in 
the Missouri Synod Lutheran document, which states, “Sexuality, like all aspects of our 
lives, has been disordered as a result of sin. Appetite uncontrolled by mutual love 
constantly threatens to break out in disruptive ways in our lives.” 30 Adopting Luther’s 
language, this proposal includes the metaphor of marriage as a “remedy,” the place where 
sexual appetites are controlled and disciplined and where passion is domesticated.  
We also find an allusion to the uncontrollable sexual impulse that needs to be 
contained. Pointing to the vulnerability, fragility, and complexity inherent in sexually 
intimate relationships, the Episcopal Church warns, “Disordered sexual behavior can 
destabilize human society and become a means of exploitation and damage.”31 Fallout, 
according to this document, includes high divorce rates, serial marriages, and 
promiscuity. The ELCA also addresses the complexity of human sexuality, which, 
permeated by sin, has the potential to harm and exploit. This document states, “…this 
church opposes non-monogamous, promiscuous, or casual sexual relationships of any 
kind. Indulging immediate desires for satisfaction…is to ‘gratify the desires of the flesh’ 
(Galatians 5:16-19).”32  
 The relationship between social order and proper sexual behavior also emerges as 
a great concern. The Catholic Church maintains that sex should always remain open to 
                                                
30 Missouri Synod Lutheran Church, ,” http://www.lcms.org/page.aspx?pid=685 (accessed January 28, 
2011). 
31 Episcopal Church, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/documents/theologycomreport.pdf (accessed on 
January 28, 2011).  
32 ELCA, http://www.elca.org/What-We-Believe/Social-Issues/Social-Statements/JTF-Human-
Sexuality.aspx (accessed January 28, 2011). 
 25 
procreation because it is the means to a family, “the basic unit of society.”33 In this 
precise way, sexuality channeled into the marital relationship for the purposes of 
reproduction has public significance toward the good of society. The Episcopal Church 
argues that sexual intimacy has public and social dimensions. “When healthy and well-
ordered, our sexuality and sexual expressions contribute to the health and stability of 
individuals and society.”34 For example, “mutual fidelity…protects both partners 
involved and the well-being of the social order.”35 With respect to sexuality, the ELCA 
also supports the public character of marriage, which “signals to the community [the 
heterosexual couple’s] intent to live a peaceful and mutually fulfilling life, even as they 
endeavor to strengthen the community in which they live.”36 
 As a result of the aforementioned commitments to marriage in the context of 
affirming sexuality and sex, a number of sexual relationships and sexual acts do not fall 
into the purview of affirmation or celebration. Only one of the denominational statements 
I reviewed conclusively embraces same-sex sexual relationships. The UCC, as recently as 
2005, voted to legally recognize and advocate for same-sex marriage.37 Due to the 
autonomous nature of UCC churches, however, each congregation is free to accept or 
reject the recommendations of the General Synod. The SBC, the UMC, the Catholic 
Church, and the statement issued by the Missouri Synod Lutheran Church all reject same-
sex marriage, same-sex sexual relationships, and “homo-sexual” sexual behaviors.  
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The statements from the Episcopal Church and the ELCA explain the tensions in 
the debate concerning same-sex marriage endorsement, including that any future grounds 
for support holds the expectation that same-sex couples will enter into lifelong, 
monogamous relationships. In 2009, however, both of these denominations passed 
resolutions. The Episcopal Church’s national convention voted to “give bishops the 
option to bless same-sex unions” and the ELCA’s church-wide assembly voted to “allow 
congregations that choose to do so to recognize, support and hold publicly accountable 
lifelong, monogamous, same-gender relationships.”38 Still, neither denomination appears 
to call these unions ‘marriage,’ and both expect the nature of the relationship to mirror 
that of heterosexual married couples.  
Thus, with marriage reigning as the sanctified location for sexual expression, 
these statements – even the most comprehensive and open-minded – must oppose pre-
marital, extra-marital, non-monogamous, and casual sexual relationships. Any sex 
outside of marriage, which typically refers to coitus, is not affirmed. Since gay and 
lesbian individuals are denied marriage in most cases, any sexual activity for them is out 
of the question.  
 
Sex and the Church: The Media Spotlight 
As I have already mentioned, Christians have a reputation in Western culture for a 
prudish and sheltered approach to sex. Abstinence-only education movements promoted 
by Focus on the Family, True Love Waits, the Silver Ring Thing, and The True Love 
Revolution at Harvard University, as well as a recent attempt by The Anscombe Society 
at Princeton University to establish a university-sponsored Center for Abstinence and 
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Chastity, all signal to culture that Christianity – at least the public face of Christianity – is 
committed to keeping sex and sexual expression bound to marriage and the family.39 
Most abstinence-only education and advocacy highlight the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases, the threat of unwanted pregnancy, and the inability of contraceptive 
methods to protect young people from the physical, emotional, and spiritual fallout of 
sexual activity outside of marriage.  
Though many abstinence-only programs affiliated with Christian organizations 
claim to celebrate sexual pleasure in the context of married sex, they demonize 
masturbation and neglect to discuss the mechanics of sexual pleasure, our myriad 
erogenous zones, expectations for pleasure in sexual experience, mutual pleasuring, and 
the differences in how men and women experience pleasure. It is no wonder that I have 
seen married Christian individuals and couples in my clinical practice who are confused 
and uneducated about making pleasurable love. One client who “saved herself for 
marriage” expressed anger at God, arguing that since she waited until marriage to have 
sex, she deserved a better, more fulfilling sex life. When I inquired if she had ever 
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to an “impressive” support network and “generous resources” for “homosexual” and “transgender” 
students. These students feel that an imbalance has been created by Princeton’s establishment of a Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Center in 2005. The President of the Christian Union at Princeton called 
the imbalance a “double-standard,” and prominent Princeton professor Robert George, informal advisor to 
Anscombe, argued that chaste students should not be marginalized. The proposal for the Abstinence and 
Chastity Center was rejected for a second time by Princeton’s president, Shirley Tilghman, who responded 
by pointing out that a difference in opinion, even if it is a minority, is not sufficient grounds for establishing 
a center. She also argued that centers which support women and LGBT students are responding to ongoing 
discrimination of these groups, some forms still enshrined in law. Thus, the analogy of “discrimination” 
against chaste students is “inappropriate.” See Catherine Elvy, “A Double Standard, A Lower Standard,” in 
The Ivy League Christina Observer, 9 (Winter 2010) 13-15.  
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masturbated, experimenting with herself to see what felt pleasurable, she indicated that 
she had not and that according to her faith tradition, all masturbation was a form of lust. 
In some ways, public sex education mirrors this “sex-negative” approach when it 
focuses solely on the risks of sexual activity and deprives young people of important 
knowledge about their bodies. For example, although public sex education may discuss 
contraceptive methods (something that is not part of abstinence-only approaches), 
emphasis typically falls on sexually transmitted diseases, the threat of unwanted 
pregnancy, emotional unpreparedness, and general knowledge of the male and female 
reproductive systems. Teaching about certain sex organs and their functions, like the 
clitoris and orgasm, as well as alternatives to sexual intercourse – like masturbation, 
mutual masturbation, and oral sex for example – is extremely controversial. This quiet 
distrust or fear of sexual pleasure seems like a remnant of a powerful legacy, theological 
or otherwise, that is proving difficult to overcome.  
 Affirmations of sex and sexual pleasure in Christian contexts have also been no 
stranger to the media, as selected churches have pressed back against culture with 
exuberant injunctions to indulge in sex while maintaining the status quo. In 2008, the 
media could not get enough of “sexperiments” and “sex challenges” that Christian pastors 
were issuing from their pulpits. The message on the surface cried out to America that 
Christians are talking about sex and that they and their leadership are far from prudish 
and sex-phobic. “Thou shalt have sex and lots of it,” begins the online article from ABC 
News, referring to a seven-day sex challenge that Reverend Ed Young, founder of the 
nondenominational Fellowship Church in Grapevine, TX, issued to his congregation.40 
                                                
40 Imaeyen Ibanga, “Texas Pastor: Let’s Talk About Sex,” ABC News, November 16, 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6264959 (accessed June 22, 2010).  
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The New York Times reported on the same church on its website, explaining how Young 
called for a week of “congregational copulation.”41 The article described the large bed 
placed on stage as a prop and the pastor, at times reclining on the bed with his Bible, 
stressing that “it is time for the church to put God back in the bed.”42 Young was also 
featured on ABC’s Good Morning America. 
A few months prior, the online Time article “And God said, ‘Just Do It,” featured 
Reverend Stacy Spencer, pastor of New Direction, a mostly African-American Disciples 
of Christ Church in Memphis, TN, and his challenge “40 Nights of Grrreat Sex.” The 
program, complete with daily planners directing parishioners to “worship together,” as 
well as to try a “quickie in any room besides the bedroom,” was aimed to promote more 
and better sex.43 Spencer even affirmed oral sex and role-playing. His program followed 
on the heels of Revered Paul Wirth’s “The 30-Day Sex Challenge,” which encouraged 
the parishioners of his mostly white, nondenominational Relevant Church in Tampa, FL 
to engage in some kind of sex each night for 30 days.44 Wirth was featured on CBS’s The 
Early Show.  
 The public interest and curiosity the media sought to inspire were grounded 
undoubtedly in the cultural perception that Christian discourse and sex talk make strange 
bedfellows, particularly if the talk is sex-positive. A closer look at the articles, however, 
reveals a Christian position on sex that is far from radical or new. First, the wide spread 
                                                
41 Gretel C. Kovach, “Pastor’s Advice for Better Marriages: More Sex,” The New York Times, November 
24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/us/24sex.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1313116396-
tezi+A1xvmiVtpcAA42Iaw (accessed June 22, 2010).  
42 Ibid.  
43 David Van Biema, “And God Said, ‘Just Do It’,” Time, June 26, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1818197.00.html (accessed June 22, 2010).  
44 CBS News, “Pastor Issues ‘30-Day Sex Challenge’: Wants Married Congregants to Have Sex for Month 
Straight, and Singles to Abstain,” February 20, 2008, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/20/earlyshow/living/relationships/main3850842.shtml?tag=mnco
l;lst;1 (accessed June 22, 2010).  
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availability of birth control in the 1970s put many churches in a position to embrace sex 
for reasons other than procreation. These challenges obviously embrace sex for more than 
procreative purposes when it is recommended daily for seven, 30, even 40 days. Still, 
reproduction is not completely lost on church leaders. Young added, “But the true test of 
success for this endeavor may come nine months from now…I think we better expand 
our nursery area.” The ABC article is unclear about whose sentiment the first half of this 
quote is. The second half regarding the nursery area was a quote from Young. It is 
difficult to tell here if the media are manipulating this allusion to the goal of growing the 
community of faith or if Young is simply quipping about the reality that in a 
congregation of some 35,000 worshippers, pregnancies are bound to result. 
In addition to sex enhancing intimacy with one’s partner and God, the pastors 
noted that sex could help one perform better at work, prevent an extramarital affair, and 
promote forgiveness (related to infidelities, addictions to pornography, etc.). A number of 
the pastors also admitted that the “sex challenge” effort was a response to the growing 
rate of divorce among conservative Christians, which is now on par with the national rate 
of divorce. Not surprisingly, all of the challenges were issued only to married, 
heterosexual couples in the congregations. Young emphasized that there is no shame in 
married sex; as for single congregants, he said, “I don’t know, try eating chocolate 
cake.”45 Wirth also advised his single members to abstain. Spencer’s program was only 
offered to married people. Same-sex couples were not addressed in any of the articles, 
and it is probably safe to say that these churches would not support same-sex sexual 
                                                
45 Kovach, “Pastor’s Advice for Better Marriages: More Sex,” The New York Times, November 24, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/us/24sex.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1313116396-
tezi+A1xvmiVtpcAA42Iaw (accessed June 22, 2010). 
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activity. Thus, expressions of sexuality outside of heterosexual marriage were entirely 
neglected.  
 My informal review of these “sex challenges” has a number of flaws and 
limitations. My point, however, is that the sentiments here do not differ dramatically from 
the official church documents reviewed earlier. Pleasure is affirmed, but something about 
it necessitates its containment in marriage – even though its “goodness” is no longer tied 
to procreation. Same-sex sexual pleasure – also with no attachment to procreation – is 
absent from these hardy affirmations. Divorce is feared and noted as a major impetus for 
the sex challenges, further emphasizing the churches’ strong commitments to 
heterosexual marriage and family. Young in particular alludes to the negative influence 
of culture, arguing “…we’ve allowed culture to hijack sex from the church.”46 This is a 
common sentiment in many churches, namely that culture has become so permissive that 
the Church must respond with its own discourse of reformation.  
But are sex challenges really the best way of putting theological sexual ethics into 
action? Even within the restricted sphere of heterosexual marriage, is suggesting – even 
commanding – that all couples have sex daily ethically responsible? My answer is, “No.” 
This sort of situation may not benefit women, already burdened by the double shift of 
work inside and outside of the home and/or routinely forced to participate in sexual 
activity by their spouses. Likewise, for couples recovering from hurt and betrayal, 
perhaps associated with an affair, sex may be the last step in a prolonged process of 
forgiveness. Many couples who have not been having sex for some time are more likely 
to be in need of counseling, not a sex challenge. From a pastoral perspective, this kind of 
                                                
46 Ibanga, “Texas Pastor: Let’s Talk About Sex,” ABC News, November 16, 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6264959 (accessed June 22, 2010). 
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approach assumes that the congregation’s leader is intimately acquainted with the lives of 
all of his or her parishioners and knows that he or she is not putting anyone in danger by 
recommending daily sexual activity.47 In a congregation like Young’s, with over 35,000 
parishioners, this is impossible. In sum, this form of active (albeit partial) affirmation of 
sexual pleasure in a community of faith is too problem-laden to be positive. It is yet 
another example of the need for critical resources on this front.   
Finally, one group firmly committed to issues of sexuality in the Church is the 
New York-based Religious Institute on Sexuality, Morality, Justice and Healing, directed 
by Debora Haffner. Founded in 2001, the Religious Institute has a media presence and 
describes itself as “a multi-faith organization dedicated to advocating for sexual health, 
education, and justice in faith communities and society.”48 It provides resources and 
advocates for comprehensive sexuality education, reproductive justice, LGBT inclusion, 
and abuse prevention.49 In 2010, the Institute updated their “Religious Declaration” on 
sexual morality, asking culture at large, including religious leaders, to support a sexual 
ethic focused on personal relationships and social justice, including sexual lives that 
express love, justice, mutuality, commitment, consent, and pleasure.50 The declaration 
also supports respect for the body and for the vulnerability that intimacy brings, as well 
as physical, emotional, and spiritual health. It “accepts no double standards and applies to 
                                                
47 I use both pronouns here because in each example the male pastor was openly supported by his wife, who 
participated in promoting the sex challenges.  
48 The Religious Institute, “About Us,” http://www.religiousinstitute.org/about-us, (accessed on May 30, 
2011). 
49 Internationally, the Religious Institute responds to global suffering generated by “preventable maternal 
mortality, violence against women and sexual minorities, the HIV pandemic, unsustainable population 
growth and over-consumption, and the commercial exploitation of sexuality.” The Religious Institute, 
“International,” http://www.religiousinstitute.org/about-us, (accessed on May 30, 2011). 
50 The Religious Institute, “Religious Declaration,” http://www.religiousinstitute.org/about-us, (accessed on 
May 30, 2011), emphasis mine.  
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all persons, without regard to sex, gender, color, age, bodily condition, marital status or 
sexual orientation.”51 
In its approach to educating individuals about sex and sexuality, the Religious 
Institute promotes and provides resources for people across their lifespan. It recognizes 
the presence and continual growth and transformation of sexuality from puberty through 
advanced age. It opposes abstinence-only education and programs that withhold 
information about contraception and sexually transmitted diseases. The Institute takes as 
its priority in sexual ethics the nature of personal relationships and social justice, as 
opposed to specific sexual acts and, therefore, opposes discrimination in all its forms. 
Affirming sexuality is more than affirming sex; it is affirming a dimension of being 
human that is essential to our spirituality.52  
The Religious Institute is a highly valued organization for those committed to 
more progressive Christian sexual ethics. As it is a fairly new institution, I can imagine 
that many of the ethicists explored in this project have influenced the commitments and 
conclusions of the Religious Institutes’ supporters. I am curious about if and how some of 
my critique of this body of scholarship will affect the position of the Institute. At the 
moment, “mutuality” and “pleasure” in the Declaration is either purposely left undefined, 
or their meanings are assumed. Either way, the boundaries of “pleasure” –  if any – and 
the context for “mutuality” are ambiguous.  
 
 
 
                                                
51 Ibid. See Appendix.  
52 Ibid.  
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Method: A Critical Correlation of Religion and Culture – 
Toward a Feminist Pastoral Theological Reconstruction of Sexual Pleasure 
 
This project is not a comprehensive review and critique of all cultural 
expressions, practices, and commentary regarding sexual pleasure across time. Like most 
projects, this one must contain itself, and such containment is guided by the restraints of 
time and resources, as well as the expectations and requirements of the dissertation 
process. For these reasons, I have chosen influential historical figures who, I argue, have 
made powerful and pointed contributions to the discourse on sexual pleasure specifically. 
Most importantly for pastoral theology, this project looks toward practical application. It 
will be suggestive for how pastoral theology can take up this thick description of sexual 
pleasure in the service of a comprehensive pastoral theology of sexual pleasure or sexual 
behavior. The dissertation will imagine how this research might touch the ground in 
communities of faith, public education, and other cultural outlets that heavily influence 
how we envision our sexual selves. It will not, however, develop concrete, detailed 
suggestions for caregivers. Still, it promises worthy scholarship to these ends.  
In addition to being a pastoral counselor, I identify myself as a feminist pastoral 
theologian. “A central purpose of pastoral theology is to conceptualize a comprehensive 
theological understanding of the human condition,” pastoral theologian Andrew Lester 
explains. “Pastoral theologians are interested in the physical, mental, emotional, and 
spiritual potential of humans; why things go wrong that inhibit these possibilities; and 
discovering what processes bring healing and lead to well-being.” 53 Frequently in 
pastoral theology, this kind of comprehensive theological understanding, which aims to 
interpret human brokenness, healing, and fulfillment, begins with concrete human 
                                                
53 Andrew D. Lester, The Angry Christian: A Theology for Care and Counseling, (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2003), 9.  
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experience. As Nancy Ramsay explains, pastoral theology “begins with the concrete 
particularity of experience, intends a useful response for that situation and aims to 
articulate normative dimensions of the context of care.”54 Thus, pastoral theology is 
contextual theology arising from “critical engagement in acts of care or response to needs 
posed for such care.”55 In other words, it is contextual theology that begins with the 
concrete experience of human suffering or struggle and intends a response aimed at 
healing and transformation. According to Ramsay, the purpose of pastoral theology is to 
provide resources for care, as well as to “revise and inform theological understanding on 
behalf of the practice of care and theology more generally.”56 In this way, reflection on 
experience also becomes a critical resource for revising theology itself.  
I approach the varied and convoluted interpretations of sexual pleasure with a 
pastoral theological method aimed at answering my research question and arguing my 
thesis, namely that contemporary Christian sexual ethics has uncritically accepted and 
promoted a vision for sexual pleasure without thorough attention to and consideration of 
the valid critiques and suggestions of pertinent theological, social scientific, and cultural 
resources. I justify the use of a pastoral theological approach to this dimension of sexual 
experience because sex is a universal human experience, and sexual pleasure can be a gift 
to enhance that experience. Pastoral theology prioritizes human experience and 
recognizes it as the crucial resource for understanding and responding to human suffering 
and fulfillment. It possesses a deep investment in both religious and everyday practices, 
                                                
54 Nancy J. Ramsay, “Contemporary Pastoral Theology: A Wider Vision for the Practice of Love,” in 
Pastoral Care and Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms, ed. Nancy J. Ramsay (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 2004), 157.  
55 Nancy J. Ramsay, “A Time of Ferment and Redefinition,” in Pastoral Care and Counseling: Redefining 
the Paradigms, ed. Nancy J. Ramsay (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004), 5.  
56 Ibid. 
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of which sex can be one or both. In the shift from the therapeutic paradigm to the 
communal/contextual paradigm, the guiding metaphor of the experience interpreted in 
pastoral theology has also shifted. Feminist pastoral theologian Bonnie Miller-McLemore 
has updated Anton Boisen’s analogy of the “living human document,” which was 
elaborated upon by Charles Gerkin in The Living Human Document: Revisioning 
Pastoral Counseling in a Hermeneutical Mode (1973, 1984). Miller-McLemore suggests 
a more appropriate metaphor, which accounts for the wider context – the living human 
web. The imagery of the web takes into consideration systems seen and unseen that 
impinge upon and even construct the self/subject.57 Thus, pastoral theology always 
interprets individual everyday experiences, like sex and its pleasures, within the larger 
cultural context.  
A pastoral theological approach is also justified because pastoral theology 
usefully appropriates a method that allows for dialogue and critique across interpretive 
disciplines. For me, studying and understanding sexual experience necessitates cross-
disciplinary work. Theological discourse is limited in providing the most comprehensive 
explanation for many aspects of the human condition, including our experience of 
ourselves as sexual beings. Therefore, I take seriously the contributions of other 
disciplines, like psychology, sociology, and science for example, while maintaining that 
theology can also make rich contributions to this discussion. In this project, I see my task 
as bringing theological responses into the conversation with a cultural analysis that 
includes psychology. This attention to dialogue between religion and psychology is 
where I locate my work and method in the broad field of religion and psychological 
                                                
57 See Bonnie Miller-McLemore, “The Living Human Web: Pastoral Theology at the Turn of the Century,” 
in Through the Eyes of Women: Insights for Pastoral Care, ed. Jeanne Stevenson Moessner, (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1996), 9-26. 
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studies.58 I maintain that all discourses included here are mutually dependent on one 
another for a thorough critique and for offering the best possible response when the goal, 
as it is for me, is developing a theology of care.  
Because sex and its pleasures have been the object and subject of numerous 
discourses, and not just religious discourse, the aforementioned correlational approach is 
advantageous and necessary for understanding not just individual experience, but a 
culture that is shaped and transformed by these discourses. Pastoral theology, which is 
connected to its own “institutional forms and movements of power,” acknowledges that it 
too participates in the construction of discourse that may or may not promote human 
flourishing.59 The point is that in addition to exploring the contributions and limitations 
of theology and psychology, pastoral theology must also become an object of its own 
analysis as part of the critical correlational method.  
As an academic, I am fortunate to be part of the long lineage of influential 
scholars who have developed and implemented versions of a “correlational” approach to 
the human sciences and theological disciplines. I inherited and prefer a version of the 
revised correlational method exemplified in Bonnie Miller-McLemore’s work. Tracking 
the progression of the method, Miller-McLemore explains,  
                                                
58 I am in agreement with Miller-McLemore, who defines psychology as both “a tool for the enhancement 
of the faithful care of others and as a cultural force that shapes moral ideals and spiritual hopes and hence 
requires critical evaluation.” In other words, psychological theories and techniques are interpreted as 
resources for caregiving, as well as cultural phenomena in their own right that explicitly and implicitly 
make normative claims and are, therefore, subject to critique. “Religion,” she says, “is not simply an object 
of study but rather a body of beliefs and practices about ultimate and mystical dimensions of life to be 
encountered, experienced, tried and perhaps followed.” Here, religion/theology resists objectification and is 
viewed as a dialogue partner that offers interpretations and explanations of the human condition and 
healing/transformation. Bonnie Miller-McLemore, “Shaping the of Religion and Psychology: Feminist 
Transformations in Pastoral Theology,” in Religion and Psychology: Mapping the Terrain, Contemporary 
Dialogues, Future Prospects, eds. D. Jonte-Pace & W. B. Parsons (New York: Routledge, 2001), 182.   
59 Susan J. Dunlap, “Discourse Theory and Pastoral Theology,” in Feminist & Womanist Pastoral 
Theology, eds. Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore and Brita L. Gill-Austern, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1999), 
135.  
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…pastoral theologians do not always agree on how to relate to the 
sciences…even though many...follow the twentieth-century liberal 
trajectory that runs from Don Browning and David Tracy to Seward 
Hiltner and Paul Tillich.60  
 
Though Miller-McLemore commits to a version of a correlational approach with 
“liberationist” adjustments, she reflects here on the theoretical shifts that transpire from 
Paul Tillich to those of her mentor, Don Browning. Tillich, in his correlational approach, 
held out the importance of both the Christian “message” and the “situation;” the 
“situation” (context or culture) offers questions concerning the human situation, while the 
Christian “message” provides the answers. 61 David Tracy, who argued that Tillich’s 
approach lacked a “critical” correlation of the message and the situation, revised what he 
argued was a unidirectional approach. “For if the ‘situation’ is to be taken with full 
seriousness, its answers to its own question must also be investigated critically,” Tracy 
explained.62  
Thus, Tracy asserted that the theological task should involve a critical correlation 
of the results of the investigations of the two sources of theology – “common human 
experience” and “the Christian Tradition”. He identified the former as the religious 
dimensions of everyday and scientific language and experience and the latter as the 
historical and hermeneutical investigation of classical Christian texts.63 The task of the 
critical correlation, he explains, is to  
…allow for the application of the other set of criteria to each analysis…the 
meanings discovered as adequate to our common human experience must 
be compared to the meanings disclosed as appropriate to the Christian 
                                                
60 Bonnie Miller-McLemore, “Cognitive Neuroscience and the Question of Theological Method,” Journal 
of Pastoral Theology, forthcoming. Miller-McLemore is intimately connected to this trajectory, having 
earned her doctoral degree under Browning and Tracy at the University of Chicago. 
61 Ibid. 
62 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology, (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc., 1988), 46.  
63 Ibid, 46-49.  
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tradition in order to discover how similar, different, or identical the former 
meanings are in relationship to the latter.64  
 
In other words, human experience and the Christian tradition provide both questions and 
answers to the human situation, and there can be a critical analysis of this dialogue or 
conversation. Dialogue or conversation is possible between these two sources because 
both engage limit-situations and attempt to answer limit-questions. Both limit-situations 
and limit-questions disclose, explains Tracy, “certain fundamental structures of our 
existence beyond that ordinary experience (e.g., our fundamental trust in the worth-
whileness of existence, our basic belief in order and value).”65 Such questions, for 
example, can be as common in science as they are in religion. 
Don Browning makes significant use of the mutual, critical correlation or the 
revised critical correlational method in a number of his works. For example, in Religious 
Thought and the Modern Psychologies: A Critical Conversation in the Theology of 
Culture, Browning’s title gives testimony to his goal: the application of the revised 
critical correlational method to theology and a variety of clinical psychologies. On the 
grounds that both disciplines are interpretive, he applies this method to compare and 
contrast “implicit images of the human with an eye toward discovering those perspectives 
that more adequately describe the human condition.”66 Browning takes the same 
approach to practical moral thinking in previous publications, including Religious Ethics 
and Pastoral Care and A Fundamental Practical Theology.  
                                                
64 Ibid, 79.  
65 Ibid, 93.  
66 Don S. Browning and Terry S. Cooper, Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies, 2nd ed., 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), x. Given his premise, Browning also calls this approach critical 
hermeneutics.  
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Often, those engaging in pastoral theology employ a dialogical model, according 
to which theology and psychology are brought into conversation via the critical 
correlational method. Pastoral theologian Joretta Marshall says that this method allows 
“psychology and theology to be more intricately engaged in a mutual process of forming 
and re-forming one another.”67 According to Charles Scalise, a critical correlational 
method allows for the revision and transformation of both theology and culture, as well 
as the prioritization of “lived experience,” which has already been noted as the key 
component of pastoral theology.68 These pastoral theologians and others emphasize the 
importance of the critical analysis of the strengths and limitations of each discipline’s 
perspective, effecting a “mutually critical and revisionist influence.”69 
My project adopts a revised correlational method to better understand sexual 
pleasure as interpreted by the Christian tradition, feminist theologians, and contemporary 
Christian sexual ethics. Because the psychological sciences, particularly psychoanalytic 
theory and its decedents, have contemplated the role of sexuality and pleasure in human 
motivation, growth, and attachment, psychodynamic theory is a fourth conversation 
partner due to its influential, cultural-shaping force in the twentieth century. In addition, a 
critical lens for interpreting sexual pleasure in our current context cannot do without the 
highly influential work of philosopher Michel Foucault and the subsequent analyzes of 
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secular feminists who ardently battled to decry, affirm, and complexify women’s 
potential for sexual pleasure and power in sex as it is currently constructed.  
Thus, the path to critically analyzing the inclusion of sexual pleasure and its 
qualifications into contemporary Christian sexual ethics can best be described as a 
critical correlation of religion and culture, or a mutually critical dialogue between 
historical and contemporary theological resources (including pastoral theology), 
psychodynamic psychological theory, and the critical scholarship of contemporary 
figures who focus specifically on the role of sexual pleasure in the construction of 
discourses on sexuality, the ongoing oppression of women and sexual minorities, and the 
liberation of women and sexual minorities. Insofar as this method relates to the whole of 
the pastoral theological enterprise, I concur with Miller-McLemore, who asserts, “…the 
critical correlation of religion and culture [is] an essential component of an 
adequate…pastoral theology.” 70 
More pointedly, this is a dissertation in feminist pastoral theology. It exemplifies 
a “topical reconstruction,” in which the aforementioned disciplines are applied to sexual 
pleasure, critiqued, and reformulated.71 Miller-McLemore explains that the hallmarks of 
such a project include a pastoral theological method that incorporates critical use of 
psychological and cultural resources, power analysis, explicit feminist positioning, 
pastoral or transformative intentions, and a cultural-political version of the revised 
correlational method. The first four aspects of this approach are what distinguish the fifth. 
                                                
70 Bonnie Miller-McLemore, "The Subject and Practice of Pastoral Theology as a Practical Theological 
Discipline: Pushing Past the Nagging Identity Crisis to the Poetics of Resistance," in Liberating Faith 
Practices: Feminist Practical Theology in Context, edited by Riet Bons-Storm & Denise Ackermann, 
(Louvain: Peeters, 1998), 179.  
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These four aspects also distinguish this feminist approach from Tillich’s, Tracy’s, and 
Browning’s correlational approaches.  
In my approach to sexual pleasure, I critique psychology and touch on other 
discourses from history, sociology, philosophy, and science. My approach to historical, 
feminist, and queer theology is critical. Power analysis and attention to power is a key 
aspect of my project, as is advocacy for and exploration of the experiences of women, 
ethnically different individuals, and queer persons, as well as those oppressed at the 
intersections of gender, sexuality, race, and class. The final aspect of a feminist pastoral 
theological topical reconstruction – empowerment and transformation through concrete 
pastoral practices – is a goal toward which this dissertation gestures in its conclusions, 
pointing the way toward the cultivation of practical sexual wisdom.  
 Lastly, I want to note that this dissertation is a theoretical project and, as such, I 
have not undertaken any empirical work from which to draw observations and 
reflections. However, as a caregiver, I have a wealth of experience working with 
individuals, couples, and families. They are the inspiration for this research. Thus, 
throughout the dissertation I briefly attend to some of my experience in the clinical 
context. I do not use names and markers as to the identities of these persons have been 
removed or thoroughly altered so as to preserve their privacy and my commitment to 
confidentiality.    
 
Mapping the Journey Ahead 
The process of mutual correlation between pastoral theology, the Christian 
tradition, modern psychology and cultural resources, feminist theology, and 
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contemporary Christian sexual ethics is evident in the flow of the dissertation, which is 
organized into six chapters. Chapter One assesses the problematic lack of reflection on 
human sexual experience in pastoral theology. It identifies and analyzes the scant 
scholarship available and concludes with a substantial critique of the missed 
opportunities in recent pastoral theological attempts to redeem sexual pleasure. 
Unsatisfied with these efforts, I am compelled to undertake the task myself and begin by 
looking back at the inherited Christian tradition to understand the magnitude of the 
historical legacy with respect to sexual pleasure.     
Chapter Two assesses the negative view of sexual pleasure in the Christian 
tradition. It revisits Augustine of Hippo’s interpretation of sexual pleasure and the 
theology he constructs around it. The remainder of the chapter examines the work of 
Thomas Aquinas and the Protestant Reformers Martin Luther and John Calvin, formative 
figures in the Catholic and Protestant traditions, respectively, with regards to sexual 
ethics. Although there are nuances in their arguments, pleasure in sexual experience 
remains highly problematic for all of these well-known theologians. Confident that the 
theological legacy with respect to sexual pleasure is negative, I turn to consider some 
modern discourses that have also influenced this contentious dimension of sex. 
In Chapter Three, I consider influential modern discourses that profoundly 
shaped, reinforced, or changed cultural perspectives on the role of sexuality and sexual 
pleasure. Psychoanalysis, especially Sigmund Freud’s libido theory, left a lasting mark on 
how Westerners understand sexual desire and sexual pleasure. Philosopher Michel 
Foucault, however, reinterpreted Freud’s example of a ‘science of sexuality.’ Foucault 
argued that the concept of sexuality was actually historically and socially constructed into 
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discourse that claimed that deeper knowledge about the self could be extracted from 
sexual pleasures. Foucault’s assertions became a cornerstone of sexual liberation, 
influencing feminists who questioned the role of sexual practices and pleasures in 
women’s oppression. Feminist psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin attempted to understand 
the erotic appeal of dominant and submissive roles in sex, while others fiercely debated 
the role of sexual pleasure in women’s oppression and liberation. 
I maintain that it is hard to grasp the contemporary situation with respect to 
sexuality without considering the influences of both Freud and Foucault. But I also argue 
that the critiques of feminists – particularly those engaged in the ‘sex wars’ of the 1980s 
– are invaluable for understanding the complex nature of and potentials for sexual 
pleasure. One would expect to see their influence on contemporary theological 
scholarship, especially feminist theology pertaining to sexual ethics.   
I bring this expectation to Chapter Four, in which I choose to explore the 
promising contributions of feminist eros theologies. After giving limited attention to 
eros’ philosophical and theological legacy, as well as secular feminists’ influence, I focus 
most intently on Carter Heyward’s appropriation of the erotic, the only project that 
considers sexual pleasure. While she is overwhelmingly affirming of pleasure as part and 
parcel of erotic love, Heyward is extremely critical of our proclivities to be sexually 
aroused and pleasured by the tensions generated by relinquishing power or asserting 
power over another. She argues that the tensions between dominating and submitting 
must be eliminated, and mutuality must be eroticized. Articulating a reality for which she 
offers no viable escape, Heyward opens feminist eros theology up to critique. Criticism, 
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however, has not stopped the appropriation of feminist eros theology by contemporary 
Christian sexual ethics.  
Chapter Five analyzes the inclusion of sexual pleasure into contemporary 
Christian sexual ethics. Pointing to the foundational work of James Nelson and Heyward, 
I identify three repeated themes that capture the theological prerequisites, the necessary 
qualifications, and the larger sociopolitical aims for including sexual pleasure in Christian 
sexual ethics: embodiment, mutuality, and justice. I demonstrate support for these themes 
in feminist, womanist, and queer theological scholarship. However, I use these same 
bodies of work to show points of departure from these themes, uncritical 
accommodations of feminist eros, and the deeply personal nature of sexual pleasure and 
the meanings attributed to it.  
In sum, my critique argues that including something as subjective and protean in 
meaning as sexual pleasure demands complexification. Christian sexual ethics must be 
wise to how the discourse it produces related to sexual pleasure participates in the 
production of a sexual regime that normalizes some pleasures and practices and 
marginalizes others.       
 
Significance 
This project is significant because it makes important contributions to the fields of 
pastoral theology and Christian sexual ethics and highlights the importance of and need 
for theological discourse on this issue in the broader public. First, it recognizes both 
theology’s contribution to the current state of affairs with respect to sexual pleasure 
(negative and convoluted) and its potential to offer a fuller, more informed, theologically 
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grounded understanding of sexual experience that is conversant with our current cultural 
context. In other words, my scholarship demonstrates that the theological discourse that 
has flowed from the study of religious doctrine and practice is accountable for shaping 
cultural understandings of sexual pleasure. I simultaneously empower this same 
enterprise, in a mutual, critical dialogue with the social sciences, to contribute pastoral 
theology that connects with how Christians today are experiencing and interpreting their 
own lived sexual experience.  
Those in pastoral leadership cannot ignore the presence and importance of sex to 
their congregants, regardless of age, and are in need of theoretical and practical tools for 
overcoming the uncomfortable silence. This project is a first and necessary step toward 
providing resources, not only for supporting a positive understanding of ourselves as 
sexual beings, but for understanding sexual dysfunction, as well as those experiences that 
constitute violations of our sexual integrity in a faith context.  
Second, alongside a demonstration of theology’s need for cultural resources to 
interpret sexual pleasure, this project maintains that theological discourse on this topic 
has much to offer regarding how we as a culture make meaning out of our sexual 
experiences. Firmly holding that this discourse has something to offer the community 
beyond the church walls, it challenges sex education models that forego or shun the 
reality of and desire for sexual pleasure in sexual experience and critically opposes 
portrayals of sexual pleasure that discriminate, oppress, or romanticize the complexity of 
sexual relationships and experience.  
Consequently, the project makes pastoral theological reflection on this topic 
incredibly relevant to the psychological and physical sexual health of the broader 
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community. A more complex understanding of sexual pleasure lends itself to 
comprehensive, age-appropriate sex education that incorporates positive understandings 
of bodies and sexual pleasure, alongside risk, while critically engaging popular, 
seemingly positive images of pleasure that might support abuse and discrimination. 
Finally, probing the past and present theological discourse on sexual pleasure, 
particularly the pervasive silence and fear so prevalent in the life of the Church, will 
contribute to a deeper understanding of pertinent issues related to the confluence of 
sexuality, religion, and politics. For example, how might an ethical prioritization of 
sexual pleasure in Christian sexual ethics serve to support the celebration of all sexual 
orientations, gay marriage, and the inclusion of gay and lesbian individuals in positions 
of pastoral leadership? How might certain qualifications or expectations exacerbate the 
stigma of some sexual communities? In other words, this project has the potential to 
illuminate the connections between the fears and reservations surrounding embracing 
sexual pleasure insofar as it leads to the full inclusion and celebration of a variety of 
sexual pleasures in a faith context and beyond. As a result, it will contribute to the 
ongoing discourse regarding sexuality in religious communities and our political context. 
In conclusion, a complexified understanding of sexual pleasure, attained via a 
critical correlational method that puts theology into a dialogue with a variety of 
disciplines (sociology, psychology, philosophy, and women’s studies), interprets the gap 
between academic Christian sexual ethics and the complexities and tribulations of actual 
sexual decision-making and meaning-making in sexual experience for people in 
communities of faith and beyond. As a pastoral theological enterprise in aim and method, 
its conclusions lay the groundwork for practical suggestions for leadership, caregivers, 
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and educators aiding communities and individuals to transform sex education, combat 
sexual injustices, and improve how people of faith cultivate sexual wisdom. In the service 
of the community of faith, pastoral theology has a responsibility to attend to how sexual 
pleasure has been understood and misunderstood in contemporary culture and Christian 
theology, to discover how it might be reclaimed in a more responsible and complex 
fashion, and to offer, in time, its own pastoral response. Understanding the cultural and 
theological hopes and tensions surrounding sexual pleasure is a necessary first step and is 
itself an original contribution to our field.  
On a last note, before hopes for this work become too inflated, it will be helpful 
for me to clarify some of its limitations. First, all interpretation, analysis, and response is 
limited by my own social location as a middle-class, educated, straight, 30-something, 
white female, born and raised in the northeastern United States. I make assumptions 
based on the particulars of my own experience, and I welcome feedback, correction, and 
illumination. Second, the cultural context of my analysis in this work is Western culture, 
specifically the contemporary U.S. I am not aiming to generalize my critique to other 
contexts where sexual pleasure is more or less freely or critically addressed. Third, this 
project concerns Christian theology, both the legacy of the historical Christian Church 
and the potential for contemporary theological scholarship to make positive contributions 
toward a better understanding of sexual pleasure. Recognizing that other faith traditions 
have addressed sexuality in positive ways, the dissertation does not attempt an 
understanding of sexual pleasure across religious traditions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
CURIOUS ABSTENTIONS: THE LACUNA IN PASTORAL THEOLOGY 
 
I previously mentioned that my clinical work greatly influenced and motivated 
my interest in theological interpretations of sexual pleasure. As a pastoral counselor with 
training in marriage and family therapy, I regularly worked with Christian and non-
Christian individuals distressed by self-identified “sexual struggles and issues,” including  
sexual dysfunction, sexless relationships, sexual addiction, sexual guilt, sexual infidelity, 
sexual identity confusion, and sexual abuse. In my search for guidance, I immediately 
turned to the texts in my discipline, pastoral theology, within which I discovered a 
paucity of reflection on human sexual experience, much less sexual pleasure.  
While sexual abuse has been an acknowledged concern for pastoral theologians 
and caregivers, reflection on the meaning of sexual experience, especially as a gateway to 
better understanding human needs, motivations, healing, and flourishing, is sorely 
lacking. This void regarding reflection on sex is problematic for pastoral theology 
because lived human experience is the key resource in pastoral theological method, 
distinguishing it from other theological disciplines that focus exclusively on Scripture, 
doctrines, or historical texts. I was shocked to discover that pastoral theological reflection 
on a universal human experience like sex was so limited and outdated.  
As a result, I am compelled to begin this project with a thorough investigation of 
what pastoral theology has and has not said regarding sex and sexual pleasure. Have 
pastoral theologians avoided the topic, mirroring the silence on sexual matters in some 
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faith communities? How have pastoral theologians responded to the Christian community 
and to secular culture, given revelations about human sexual activity over the course of 
the twentieth century? What have been the most recent attempts in the field to understand 
sexuality and its relationship to spirituality, and why do these attempts fall short of the 
kind of critical reflection this project demands? 
To answer these questions, I review the few resources in pastoral theology that 
attempt to reflect on sexual experience. I begin with the pastoral care movement’s 
response to the Kinsey Reports in the 1950s, in which Seward Hiltner, a formative figure 
in pastoral theology, led an attempt to quell the Christian moral backlash to Alfred 
Kinsey’s findings. Next, as the field reconsidered its focus on the individual in a 
therapeutic context, Don Browning peripherally attended to sexuality in his attempt to 
marshal a return to ethical commitments in pastoral care. Guided by five levels of 
practical moral reasoning, his case studies parsed out the conflicts and priorities that 
applied to sexual behavior. Up until this point – the mid 1980s – pastoral theological 
responses on this front gave limited attention and priority to context and yielded fairly 
traditional conclusions.       
The second half of this chapter recognizes the shift in paradigms in pastoral 
theology from an individualistic, therapeutic focus to a communal, contextualized 
approach to giving care and constructing pastoral theology. It probes and critiques the 
limited scholarship since the early nineties that addresses sex. This includes short pieces 
by reputable pastoral theologians Edward Wimberly, Carrie Doehring, and Joretta 
Marshall, who all drew heavily on prevalent themes in Christian sexual ethics to explore 
the relationship between sexuality and spirituality for African Americans, women, and 
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gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, respectively. My assessment also evaluates book-
length attempts by Andrew and Judith Lester and by Raymond Lawrence to pointedly 
address sexual pleasure within a theological framework.  
  
The Pastoral Care Movement Responds to the Kinsey Reports 
In the history of the pastoral care movement and the emergence of the academic 
discipline of pastoral theology, attention to sexuality did not accrue serious interest until 
the 1950s, following the publications of Alfred Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior in the Human 
Male in 1948 and Sexual Behavior in the Human Female in 1953. Kinsey, a professor of 
zoology and a Harvard-trained scientist, gathered detailed data from more than 5,000 men 
and more than 6,000 women regarding the details of their sexual behavior. His goal was 
to generate a reasonably representative sample of the U.S. population with respect to 
sexual life histories, providing reliable research-based data from which individuals and 
society could make informed decisions about sexual behavior.72  
Kinsey’s conclusions, which revealed the prevalence of premarital sex, 
extramarital sex, and homosexual experiences in the general population, generated a slew 
of negative responses, especially from church leaders. “Some members of the clergy 
declared that [Kinsey] was doing the devil’s work,” explains June Reinisch, a former 
director of The Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction.73 Some 
faith leaders responded to the revelations about the secret sex lives of Americans by 
                                                
72 Paul H. Gebhard and Alan B. Johnson, The Kinsey Data: Marginal Tabulations of the 1938-1963 
Interviews Conducted by the Institute for Sex Research, (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1979), 1; 
June M. Reinisch, The Kinsey Institute New Report On Sex: What You Must Know to be Sexually Literate, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), xvi. Kinsey, along with Clyde Martin, Wardell Pomeroy, and Paul 
Gebhard were all original directors of the non-profit Institute for Sex Research, established in 1947, 
affiliated with Indiana University. Kinsey died in 1956 and did not live to see the full impact of his labor. 
Gebhard and Johnson, 2.  
73 Reinisch, xviii. 
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reinforcing a strict moralism in their congregations. Pastoral theologian James Poling 
hypothesizes that the pastoral care movement took this opportunity to reflect on sexuality 
as a way of challenging the Church’s narrow moralism. Scholar-practitioners focused on 
the suffering being generated by the gap between actual sexual behaviors (per Kinsey’s 
results) and the Church’s ethical positions on sexual matters.74  
 In 1953, two texts emerged in the fields of pastoral theology and pastoral 
psychology. Seward Hiltner, one of the founding fathers of pastoral theology in modern 
America, authored Sex Ethics and The Kinsey Reports. The other text, a compilation of 
articles published in the journal Pastoral Psychology on the theme “Sex and the Church,” 
was edited by Simon Doniger and titled Sex and Religion Today. In the preface of the 
latter book, Doniger credits Hiltner, the journal’s “Pastoral Consultant,” with 
encouraging the special issue on the theme of sex and the Church. The volume also 
includes an essay by Hiltner titled “Sex – Sin or Salvation?” Lastly, Hiltner reiterates 
many of his main points from Sex Ethics and The Kinsey Reports in a smaller, more 
concise text, Sex and the Christian Life, published in 1957. Taken together, Hiltner’s 
extended attention to sex in these works signaled a response by a leading figure in the 
pastoral care movement to the turmoil generated by the Kinsey Reports.75  
 In Sex Ethics and The Kinsey Reports, Hiltner takes full responsibility for his 
reflections and, in the preface, acknowledges his personal acquaintance with Kinsey by 
thanking Kinsey for the extended correspondence that contributed to the book’s content. 
From the start, Hiltner approaches the Kinsey Reports from a theological middle ground, 
explaining that to those on the “right” his Christian view on sex will appear radical, while 
                                                
74 Poling, 117.  
75 All of these pieces preceded Hiltner’s well-known and formative disciplinary text, Preface to Pastoral 
Theology. See Seward Hiltner, Preface to Pastoral Theology, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958). 
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those on the “left” will be disappointed to find that his position does not relegate sex to 
the individual, private realm.76 Hiltner’s method of putting Kinsey’s research, as well as 
psychoanalysis, in conversation with the biblical text and Christian history, produces a 
response he hopes will diminish the increased anxiety around sex in faith communities. 
Complexifying simple moral injunctions related to sexual behavior, Hiltner attempts to 
debunk Kinsey’s findings that the role of sex in the Christian life is best captured by a 
“reproductive” imperative. Hiltner does not deny that the Christians in Kinsey’s studies 
reported such a relationship between sex and their faith; his contention, however, is that 
this view runs counter to both the biblical message and Christian history.77 Sex, he 
asserts, has more meaning than simply a method for reproduction. 
Across his writings, Hiltner also rejects the position that sex and the body are 
inferior or dirty, advocating for a “total spirit [that] includes acceptance of his [sic] 
sexuality and a right use of it.”78 He maintains a biblical view of sex as a mystery and a 
gift from God – one that “always points beyond itself…toward the revelation of our 
nature as total personal spirit.”79 Thus, he encourages the idea of an integrated body, 
mind, and spirit, an important point that is elaborated on many years later by prominent 
theologians and Christian ethicists James Nelson, Carter Heyward, and Christine Gudorf.  
 In his article “Sex – Sin or Salvation,” Hiltner focuses on negating the belief that 
the sexual impulse is uncontrollable, akin to a flood that sweeps one along in its current. 
In terms of sexual ethics, he insists, “if it is to be both Christian and relevant, it must be 
an ethic of freedom in responsibility – and no mere legalism attempting to hold the dike 
                                                
76 Seward Hiltner, Sex Ethics and the Kinsey Reports, (New York: Association Press, 1953), vi.  
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78 Ibid, 9.  
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against what it really believes is a flood.”80 Here, one sees Hiltner’s resistance to 
imposing a strict moralism in light of Kinsey’s discoveries. Rather, he advocates for an 
ethic of freedom in responsibility, which he explains amounts to the coherence of the 
sacramental, romantic, and companionable functions of sex. According to Hiltner, the 
multi-dimensional purposes of sex make it available as an aspect of the doctrine of 
salvation.81  
Hiltner explains the theological, psychological, social, ethical, and biological 
dimensions of sex as follows. Insofar as it is sacramental – or symbolic – it is a mystery 
(theological). It is a serious business in which we discover hidden aspects of ourselves 
(psychological), as well as the depths of another and potentially the depths of all other 
persons (social). Sex also holds us to a relationship between fulfillment and responsibility 
(ethical) and functions to reduce tension (biological).82 Taken together, Hiltner’s 
prospective on sex here is positive, as it is both meaningful to the self and to our 
relationships with others. It can bring a degree of satisfaction and tension reduction to the 
self, as well as a degree of responsibility for our lovers and our community.  
Each of the dimensions, Hiltner adds, requires both intensity and steadfastness.83 
A discourse on sexual pleasure emerges in the context of these qualifiers. Sexual pleasure 
is part of the biological, tension-reducing function of sex. Intensity in this dimension is 
marked by “the intense pleasure of the encounter and the orgasm,” and steadfastness 
manifests itself “in the form of physical fidelity to another.”84 Thus, sexual pleasure is 
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83 Ibid, 86.  
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good, an important – even required – part of sexual experience. Like sex, however, it is 
exclusive to the relationship in which it is enjoyed. Beyond these remarks, Hiltner does 
not make any detailed psychological or theological interpretations of sexual pleasure. His 
biological or seemingly scientific understanding of pleasure as a discharge of tensions is 
surely informed by Freudian libido theory.   
Alongside his affirmations, Hiltner reminds the faithful that human freedom 
continues to bind sex to an aspect of the doctrine of sin. Not all sex and its pleasures are 
endorsed from a Christian perspective. For example, he condemns homosexuality, 
sadistic and/or masochistic sexual activity, and promiscuous intercourse. Masturbation, 
he points out, has a developmental purpose, but should be discontinued and replaced by 
sexual intercourse with a married partner (further evidence of the impact of Freud’s 
theory of the stages of psychosexual development). Extramarital sexual relationships are 
problematic too, but he warns against judgment before obtaining full knowledge of the 
couple’s potentially complicated context. According to Hiltner, the problematic nature of 
affairs is evident in the injury incurred by partners and children, not in marriage as a 
social institution.85 In other words, affairs are bad because they harm spouses and 
children; they do not signal a fundamental problem with the institution of marriage.  
With regards to pre-marital intercourse, Hiltner’s response is initially more open-
minded. While he recognizes that the Christian view rejects this in principle, he sees the 
decision as much more complex and personal. The sacramental nature of intercourse, 
however, marks the sexual union as a “marriage;” Hiltner, therefore, encourages couples 
who are having premarital sex to make the commitment official. He assumes a traditional 
position on marriage, asserting that intercourse – the joining of two in one flesh – 
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constitutes the marital bond. Finally, he refrains from a definitive answer on forms of pre-
marital petting, including heavy petting leading to orgasm, but indicates doubt that these 
activities are always done “for the purposes of sex-discovery in its Christian 
dimensions.”86 In other words, he doubts that these activities are pursued with the intent 
of joining the sacramental, romantic, and companionable aspects of sexual activity. Thus, 
for Hiltner sexual pleasures outside of the marital covenant are questionable.   
In his assessment of how the pastoral care movement was navigating the 
moralistic backlash of the Church in light of the Kinsey Reports, James Poling argues 
that Hiltner ultimately reaffirmed the place of sex and sexuality in the enhancement of 
marriage.87 In my analysis, while Hiltner affirms many positive dimensions of sex 
according to the Christian life, including self-fulfillment and mutuality between partners, 
sexual play outside of coitus, and a number of goods outside of procreation, a subtle 
expectation and priority on marriage as the appropriate context for sex pervades his work. 
For example, pre-marital intercourse itself (which, by the prefix, seems to assume a 
forthcoming commitment) institutes a “marriage” that awaits an outward commitment 
before others. Sex that is not “pre-marital” is “promiscuous.” Hiltner seems to be saying 
that the coherence and integration of the goods of sex – intense pleasure and/or orgasm, 
discovery of the depths of the self, discovery of the depths of another, the integration of 
fulfillment and responsibility, and the deepening sense of mystery – are possible only in 
the context of heterosexual, married life.  
Thus, Poling is correct to suggest Hiltner’s priority on marriage in the guise of 
“covenantal relationality,” or the idea that what matters most when it comes to sex is 
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cultivating a capacity for love and guiding the sexual impulse in the expression and 
service of love.88 But Poling also argues that Hiltner fears that gays and lesbians, as well 
as the promiscuity of the lower classes, will threaten the stability of the family.89 After 
reviewing Hiltner’s work, my reading is more nuanced. Poling’s analysis and accusations 
of sexual injustice make Hiltner’s claims appear more pointed than Hiltner actually is in 
his assessment and comparison of Kinsey’s work and the Christian viewpoint. Hiltner 
does not affirm the celebration of homosexual lifestyles, and he warns against 
normalizing them. Also, his work is replete with Kinsey’s data, which often compares the 
sexual activities of lower class, uneducated youth with middle and upper-class, educated 
youth, and demonstrates greater promiscuity and earlier ages of intercourse among the 
former group. I concede that Hiltner’s uncritical reiterations of these differences, situated 
in the context of his priority on marriage, points one in the direction of Poling’s 
conclusions.  
 
Between Paradigms: Sex and the Ethical Dimensions of Pastoral Care 
A significant amount of time passes – thirty years – before sexuality is addressed 
again in the context of pastoral theology and care. This is mind-blowing, considering the 
sexual revolution that was occurring in the West between the 1960s to the 1980s, 
including the second wave of the women’s liberation movement and the gay liberation 
movement. During this time period, rates of sex outside of heterosexual, monogamous 
marriage increased, the FDA approved the birth control pill, homosexuality was removed 
from the Diagnostic Statistic Manual (DSM), and abortion was legalized. Still, pastoral 
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theological reflection on sex was mum. Finally in 1983, Professor of Religion and 
Psychological Studies at The Divinity School at University of Chicago, Don S. 
Browning, considered sexuality in the form of case studies while promoting the 
relationship between pastoral care and ethics. Though Browning’s main concern was to 
explicate a method and argue for its use in pastoral caregiving, one can access his 
interpretation of sexual pleasure through application of his method.  
In Religious Ethics and Pastoral Care, Browning argues that moral reflection and 
ethical guidance had been sorely neglected in pastoral care.90 Recall, for example, 
Hiltner’s opposition to the increase in legalism with regard to sex in churches after the 
publications of Kinsey’s reports. Moral guidance was not part of Hiltner’s initial 
approach to pastoral theology, and in Preface to Pastoral Theology, he actually separates 
moral theology from pastoral theology. Instead, he adds moral theology to the ‘logic-
centered’ disciplines along with biblical, systematic, and historical theology.91 Since 
moral guidance was not a function of pastoral theology, the ethical dimensions of care 
did not come to the fore until Browning’s Religious Ethics and Pastoral Care.  
Browning is sensitive to what he interprets as a cultural malaise or a growing 
amoralism in pastoral care, fostered by a cultural context that focused on the individual 
and a market-driven economy. His solution to this deficit was to marshal a return to 
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practical moral reasoning on the part of the caregiver.92 Practical moral reasoning 
involves the critical correlation of the Christian tradition and the human condition as 
understood by philosophy and/or psychology, bringing all discourses into a dialogue via 
five levels of practical moral reasoning. These levels include 1) the metaphorical (what is 
our vision of the ultimate concern, or the way the world is?), 2) the obligational (how 
shall we live?), 3) the tendency-need (what are our motivations and needs?), 4) the 
environmental/contextual (what is our context?), and 5) the rule-role (what are the 
guidelines for achieving the above levels?).93 After explaining these five levels, 
Browning applies them to two case studies, both grappling with the theological 
legitimacy of homosexuality.94 As he applies the five levels to the “dilemma,” we are 
able to see how sexual pleasure and intimacy factor into his system of moral reasoning.  
 The application of Browning’s method to the sexuality case studies reveals 
multiple flaws in his approach to practical moral reasoning. Thus, my analysis 
simultaneously critiques his method and his unhelpful contributions to pastoral 
theology’s attention to sex and pleasure. First, while Browning engages culture and 
context and identifies the human situation as the entry point for moral reasoning, context 
ultimately fails to retain the import and the creative and transformative possibilities that 
more contemporary sources in pastoral care acknowledge and defend. For Browning, a 
priority on context (level four) restricts theology (level one). Because of this hierarchical 
configuration, positioning contextual analysis at the fourth level of reflection 
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subordinates it to the visional, obligational, and tendency-need levels of reasoning. In 
addition, the hierarchy only permits unidirectional change. Thus, differences, changes, 
and even inequalities at the third and fourth levels do not change analysis at the first and 
second levels. In other words, context does not change our view of the ultimate/God, our 
notions of the way the world is, or God’s principles – the core of how we should live. 
Similarly, conflicts at lower levels – the tendency-need level, for example – are settled by 
the priorities determined at level one.  
The hierarchical, unidirectional nature of Browning’s approach opposes any 
liberation perspective that takes the position that care must start with the experience and 
context of the least of these.95 His neglect of the transformative and creative power of 
context to shape theology (level one) meets resistance from marginal voices that insist on 
the redemptive power of context (level four). For example, womanist Jacquelyn Grant, in 
White Women’s Christ and Black Women’s Jesus, claims a black Jesus in her vision of 
the ultimate one who suffers with the oppressed and struggles alongside the black 
community in its quest for liberation.96 Pastoral theologian Joretta Marshall, in 
Counseling Lesbian Partners, argues that one cannot do pastoral care with lesbians and 
emerge with a pastoral theology that does not imagine God in a different, transformed 
way.97 She suggests that counseling lesbians has much to teach practitioners about 
sexuality and God’s understanding of right relationships characterized by a covenant of 
mutuality, love, and justice.   
                                                
95 Browning fundamentally disagrees with liberation theologian Juan Segundo on this front, arguing against 
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This devaluation of context runs counter to other contemporary feminist and 
womanist resources in pastoral care, which argue that patriarchal and racist images of the 
ultimate (level one) have been detrimental to the lives of women and black individuals 
(the context at level four). In fact, this critique was so powerful that a number of these 
scholars championed a paradigmatic shift in the field – a shift from a therapeutic 
paradigm, focused on the individual, healing, and clergy has caregivers, to a communal-
contextual paradigm, centered on the community, context, liberation, and the 
congregation as caregiver.98 Nancy Ramsay points out that context and its analysis via 
sociology, gender studies, politics, etc. have moved to center stage in pastoral care today. 
Bonnie Miller-McLemore asserts that pastoral care begins with and responds to the 
experience of life in all of its complex and messy contexts. Why? Christie Neuger argues 
that context reveals difference as well as imbalances of power, two crucial considerations 
for pastoral theological reflection and response.99 For example, Carroll Watkins Ali 
insists that all pastoral theology for African Americans begins with the context of poor 
black women.100 Taken together, pastoral care and theology now acknowledge that some 
contexts can be the source of suffering (racist, sexist, heterosexist, etc.), while others 
provide resources for healing.  
The limitations of context and the hierarchical nature of Browning’s levels of 
moral reasoning affect his understanding of sexuality, sex, and sexual pleasure. In 
applying his rubric to the case studies on homosexuality, his analysis at level four 
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(context) indicates that heterosexism abounds and that communities of faith tend to shun 
homosexuals. Here, he correctly identifies a degree of suffering for these individuals. In 
fact, after thirty additional years, this suffering still pervades our cultural context and is 
part of how some conceive of the crisis of sexuality in the Church.  
Per Browning’s method, additional analysis of same-sex attraction at level three 
(tendency-needs) suggests that all human beings need love, touch, and various levels of 
intimacy. Humans also need to reproduce to keep the species alive and well. Here, 
Browning affirms human needs for physical and emotional pleasures in relationship with 
others, as well as the need for reproduction to perpetuate life. Up until this point, analysis 
at both of these levels bodes well for affirming sex and pleasure as part of moral 
reasoning.  
The needs of the “homosexual,” however, generate a conflict at the third level of 
analysis. Their need for intimacy, pleasure, and companionship are justified, but their 
inability to reproduce is problematic.101 When Browning jumps to an analysis at level one 
(the way the world is) and interprets the theological metaphor of God the Creator, he 
concludes that God shows preference for the good creation and potential for fruitfulness 
and multiplication.102 This dimension of level one shapes the priority of needs at level 
three – reproduction carries greater import than our need for physical and emotional 
pleasures.  
So, Browning’s method ultimately shows a preference for heterosexual sexuality, 
best arranged in monogamous marriage to preserve the species and ensure the proper 
rearing of children. Although he validates everyone’s need for sexual intimacy and 
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pleasure and argues that churches should welcome homosexuals, he maintains that ethical 
reflection does not support the lifestyle. Thus, in my analysis, Browning supports a very 
limited and traditional definition of sexuality, one that is bound to procreation – a limit 
that restricts individuals of all sexual orientations, subordinates sexual pleasure, and 
easily leads to a sexual ethic that focuses on acts as opposed to the nature of the sexual 
relationship.  
Posing as open but clearly not affirming, Browning’s conclusion in the case 
studies colludes with heterosexism. Interestingly, in his transition from theoretical moral 
reasoning to pastoral practice, Browning falters when trying to explicate the appropriate 
pastoral response in the case study dealing with a homosexual careseeker. While he 
concludes that a homosexual lifestyle is not in accord with our ethical obligations to our 
neighbors and ourselves, he stops short of suggesting that the caregiver subject the 
careseeker to these claims. He ironically asserts that it is not the job of the caregiver to 
moralize. Instead, the caregiver “opens the way,” or shows the way ahead, and facilitates 
a transition when the careseeker is ready.103 Is Browning indicating that at the moments 
of pastoral response, the caregiver finds herself supporting the homosexual lifestyle 
insofar as the careseeker appears to be moving toward a heterosexual orientation? His 
highly theoretical reasoning breaks down when it touches practical ground. Not only does 
this keep his pastoral “care” rather academic and impractical, but it also suggests that 
caregivers impose meaning on human experience where it should be made.  
To be sure, Browning brought with him many positive contributions to the 
discipline of pastoral theology, including the revised critical correlational method, 
attention to ethics, and a critique of psychology that revealed its religious function in 
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providing normative horizons for care and human fulfillment. He even suggested that 
moral reflection could be undertaken by congregations, pointing the way to communal 
dimensions of care. Still, while he was open to a number of the critiques made by more 
contemporary scholars in the field, he maintained his stance on sexuality and continued to 
publicly support the traditional family via his staunch support of heterosexual marriage.  
For example, in 2004, Browning co-authored an opinion piece with Elizabeth 
Marquardt in The New York Times entitled “A Marriage Made in History?” In it, they 
question the dearth of sociological data supporting the health of children reared by same-
sex parents and argue that marriage has both a religious and profoundly secular history 
“as a way to help society regulate and achieve a complex set of desires and goals: sexual 
activity, procreation, mutual help and affection, and parental care and accountability.”104 
They claim the natural fitness of heterosexual parents over sex-same parents and 
prioritize reproduction and rearing offspring as the foundational basis or ethical 
dimension of coupling. They also implicate marriage as a form of regulation and help in 
sexual activity and mutual affection.  
In sum, Browning is more of a champion of heterosexual marriage, based on a 
procreative ethic, than a supporter of sexual pleasure in its own right. As demonstrated 
above, this likely reflects his hierarchical method of moral reasoning according to which 
needs like pleasure, as well as suffering in a given context, are superseded by needs that 
have timeless, resolute theological precedence.  
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Sex and Context: Contributions of the New Paradigm 
Hiltner was a foundational figure in the therapeutic shape of the pastoral care 
movement, while Browning represented a transitional figure in pastoral theology’s shift 
from a therapeutic paradigm to the current communal-contextual paradigm.105 Inspired by 
feminist, womanist, and queer voices, the communal-contextual paradigm emphasizes 
liberation from domination, drawing attention to populations that suffer unjustly from 
racism, sexism, ageism, heterosexism, etc. Pastoral theologians reflect on pastoral care’s 
functions, which now include nurturing, empowering, resisting, liberating, justice-making 
and ecological concern, in addition to healing, guiding, sustaining, and reconciling.106 
Pastoral theological reflection ultimately makes contributions to the life of faith and 
charges congregations, including lay members, with pursuing advocacy and political 
action in addition to caregiving. Thus, the goals of pastoral theology and practice extend 
beyond the walls of the church.107 In the communal-contextual model, the audience is 
broader (speaking to church, society, and the academy) and the focus more particular 
(centered on context and diversity) than Hiltner ever envisioned. 
Curiously, after Browning’s Religious Ethics and Pastoral Care and the eventual 
paradigmatic shift in the field, pastoral theological reflection on sexual experience by 
self-identified, contemporary, pastoral theologians is scant at best. In 1994, the Journal of 
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Pastoral Theology (JPT) published a number of articles from the 1993 annual meeting of 
the Society of Pastoral Theology (SPT). The theme was timely, as scholars in Christian 
sexual ethics were making significant headway in the early nineties. The theme of the 
conference was “Sexuality and Spirituality,” and the subsequent journal issue included 
articles by African-American pastoral theologians Anne and Edward Wimberly, feminist 
pastoral theologian Carrie Doehring, and lesbian pastoral theologian Joretta Marshall.  
Each scholar brought his or her own special interests to the proposed topic; none, 
however, had expertise in sexuality or continued writing on the topic after the conference 
and publication of the journal. In addition, none of the articles focused specifically on 
sexual pleasure, obviously another disappointment for my research. A few touched on 
important themes related to sexual pleasure – themes that were addressed in great depth 
by Christian ethicists and feminist and womanist theologians, including James Nelson, 
Jacqueline Grant, Carter Heyward, and Rita Nakashima Brock.  
Both Anne’s and Edward Wimberly’s articles attend to African-American 
experience, but only E. Wimberly’s essay addresses the holistic, embodied African- 
American understanding of sexuality and oneness with the body’s rhythms and desires. 
He asserts that an African-American worldview holds spirituality and sexuality together 
as part of community and all of life.108 Wimberly also points to the “massive 
condemnation of African American sexuality that has been expressed in racism,” and the 
defamation of black sexuality continues to be used by white culture to oppress black 
people. 109 Furthermore, he implicates the connection between sexuality and racism in the 
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sexism that is present internal to the African-American community, which sadly severs 
the connection between black communities and their African heritage.  
Carrie Doehring’s piece, “Life-giving sexual and spiritual desire,” touches on 
feminist themes pertinent to a deeper understanding of sexual pleasure, including power 
and the body. According to Doehring, life-giving sexual desire resists a thirst for power 
over another and seeks to empower and enable, “where we respect our own and other’s 
power, where we can each be assertive, and where, together, we can name our 
experiences.”110 Whereas empowerment and sharing – as opposed to dominance and 
submission – define the appropriate use of power, empathy defines the appropriate stance 
with respect to boundaries between persons when it comes to sexual desire. She explains 
how an empathic, attuned posture resists sexual relating characterized by disengagement 
or its opposite, merger or over-involvement.  
Thus, according to Doehring, sexual desire that is mutually empowering and 
empathetic creates life-giving dynamics. Her work draws heavily on James Nelson’s use 
of divine Eros and Audre Lorde’s concept of “the erotic” to define this “passion for 
connection” or “empowering life force.”111 Doehring also collapses the divide between 
body and spirit and, once again, draws on Nelson to identify bodily experiences as a 
source of revelation. Lastly, she incorporates theologian Paul Tillich’s renderings of 
desire as an “essentially good longing for communion” and references this emphasis in 
feminist eros theologies.112 A reader familiar with theological scholarship that reclaims 
the erotic recognizes that none of Doehring’s reiterations here are new. Her attention to 
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sex repeats feminist theological arguments regarding power and familiar tropes regarding 
the erotic, both without any substantial critical analysis.   
Furthermore, Doehring’s overarching concerns, guided by her feminist 
commitments, are power dynamics and relational boundaries, which she seemingly 
applies to sexual desire and sexual relationships. Unfortunately, she makes this 
application without any critical analysis as to how or why sexual relationships, especially 
when it comes to sexual pleasure, complicate our understanding of power dynamics and 
relational boundaries.113 She also misses the opportunity to critically address female 
sexual pleasure and its impact on spirituality. Again, this is disappointing given the 
amount of information available that statistically demonstrates lower rates of orgasm for 
women (versus men) generally, lower rates of orgasm with intercourse for women 
(versus men), as well as the realities of anorgasmia (failure to have an orgasm), 
dyspareunia (painful intercourse), and vaginismus (painful or impossible vaginal 
penetration). 
As a pastoral theologian, Doehring turns to the psychological sciences, 
specifically object relations theory (ORT), to speculate about the influence of the 
intrapsychic world on sexual desire. She astutely recognizes that early experiences of 
primary caregivers come to shape our desires and that sexual desire may be bound up 
with feelings of dependency, hostility, and fragility.114 This is an excellent point – one 
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that she could use to raise critical questions about the malleability of sexual arousal and 
the nature of activities that generate sexual pleasure.  
Again, Doehring unfortunately stops short of indulging the complexity of sexual 
desires and pleasures when, for example, such stimulation is intertwined with the need to 
dominate or submit. Understandably, taking this step creates a tension for feminists, who 
are sensitive to power dynamics that harm women and who want to see women 
empowered sexually. I would be more appreciative if Doehring had named this tension. 
As a result, the implication in her article is, as I understand it, that some sexual activities, 
although they may provide an abundance of sexual pleasure, are neither properly erotic 
nor spiritual. Once again, activities in which stimulation and pleasure are intertwined 
with the need to dominate or submit come to mind.  
Finally, Joretta Marshall, in “Pastoral Theology and Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual 
Experiences,” insists that gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals have gifts to offer 
pastoral theology when it comes to understanding the relationship between sexuality and 
spirituality. They claim an intimate connection between spirituality and sexuality, one 
that moves beyond the individual toward the communal embodiment of these dimensions 
of personhood.115 Those in the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community also insist on 
continuing to analyze power dynamics and address the ways that power can be used in 
positive and negative ways with respect to sexual orientation. Marshall advocates for 
communal empowerment and encouraging mutual relationships as a way to transform 
institutions into gracious and just communities.116 Lastly, she points to the need to name 
institutional heterosexism, or ways in which institutions like the Church and the academy 
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silence, ignore, or deny lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons’ opportunities to “participate 
in complete and whole ways.”117 To this last point, she indicates the desires of some in 
the queer community for family, children, ordination, and a spiritual community.  
Marshall’s article is not directly about lesbian, gay, or bisexual sexual experience 
or pleasure and its spiritual dimensions; rather she argues that sexual justice should be a 
top priority for spiritual communities and faith institutions. This theme – sexual justice 
writ large – was also common in scholarship in Christian sexual ethics at the time. 
Marshall, too, draws on Nelson, as well as lesbian-feminist theologians Heyward and 
Mary Hunt, to support the need for Christian sexual ethics to focus on sexual justice. The 
thrust of her piece is that sexuality concerns more than the individual; it concerns the 
community. I would add that recognizing and affirming same-sex desire and pleasure, in 
addition to proclaiming a Christian view of sex that prioritizes pleasure over procreation, 
undergird attention to sexual justice. In other words, theologically affirming all sexual 
pleasure – not just sexual pleasure in married sex – is part of the larger goal of sexual 
justice for the queer community.  
Since the 1994 publication of the Journal of Pastoral Theology the field remained 
relatively silent on the meaning of sexual experience and its contributions to better 
understanding human needs and motivations, as well as healing and flourishing. Why? A 
colleague of mine, after reading the aforementioned section on Marshall’s piece, 
wondered if Marshall’s challenge to name institutional heterosexism could be applied to 
pastoral theology’s neglect of sex.118 In other words, like other institutions in the Church 
and the academy, perhaps the discipline of pastoral theology has been so blinded by and 
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compliant with compulsory heterosexuality that the complexities of “everyday” sexual 
lives have been taken for granted. While we have paid attention to sexual abuse, we have 
left unexplored other forms of sexual suffering in married intercourse and the traditional 
family. If we ignore that there is profound sexual suffering in the daily grind of “ideal” 
married, heterosexual intercourse, how can we possibly theorize about sexual suffering 
outside this heterogendered box? Is this not similar to the same assumption – the 
necessary goodness of the moral norm – that keeps the Church so silent about sex? In 
other words, the case is already closed.  
In 1998, Andrew and Judith Lester published It Takes Two: The Joy of Intimate 
Marriage, a text written primarily for a lay audience. In it they advocate for sharing 
power and responsibility in partnerships and conclude with an emphasis on relational 
justice, which is characterized by “seeking mutuality and reciprocity rather than 
dominance and subordination.”119 The most notable limitation of the text is signaled by 
the subtitle, which indicates the authors’ focus on a heterosexual marriage partnership. 
Thus, It Takes Two reifies the institution of marriage as the appropriate site for intimate 
relating, including sexual activity. Not only does marriage in our current ecclesial and 
political context typically exclude same-sex partnerships (as well as other forms of 
partnering), but also the language and examples in the text assume a monogamous, 
heterosexual couple. Lester and Lester take a small step, but it is hardly radical.  
In addition, Lester and Lester only include a single chapter devoted to sexual 
intimacy. They rightly advocate for broader notions of sexual encounter beyond coitus 
and broader purposes for sex beyond reproduction. They also affirm creativity and play 
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with erotic touch, mutual sexual pleasure as a norm, and the multitude of needs met 
through sexual contact – all are part of God’s gift of sexuality and each is thoroughly 
sacred. Aspects of their reflection on and response to sexual intimacy in a Christian 
context speak to a recovery of women’s sexual pleasure; however, issues related to race, 
class, and sexual orientation remain unexplored. The same can be said of Lester and 
Lester’s silence on the parameters related to creativity and play when partners move 
outside the realm of ‘vanilla’ sexual activities. Just as we saw in many of the official 
denominational statements, sexual pleasure can be affirmed, but only the safe space of 
heterosexual marriage. In this sense, pastoral theology affirms the same parameters for 
sexual pleasure as the Christian tradition.  
 
Missed Opportunities and Further Proof 
For all of pastoral theology’s neglect of sex, there is one book-length pastoral 
theological reflection on sexual pleasure. While the details of my project were coming to 
fruition, I came across the bibliographical information for a recently published text 
entitled Sexual Liberation: The Scandal of Christendom (2007). Authored by Raymond J. 
Lawrence, Jr., an Episcopal cleric and recently retired Director of Pastoral Care at New 
York Presbyterian Hospital, it focuses exclusively on how sexual pleasure has been and 
continues to be devalued and demonized by Christendom. As part of a series that 
explores the interface of religion, psychology, and spirituality, the book takes sexual 
pleasure as its primary subject, which, in the initial stages of my research, held promise 
as a valuable resource internal to my field. It contains a foreword by Don Capps, a 
notable pastoral theologian, as well as a chapter on Anton Boisen, a pioneering figure in 
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the clinical pastoral education movement. All signs indicated that this text was perhaps 
my most relevant and up-to-date resource. In fact, I worried that Lawrence had already 
addressed my research questions and concerns and that my project would lose some of 
the force of its originality.  
 After procuring the book and perusing its contents, I was disappointed (and 
selfishly relieved!). Surprisingly, the text is uninformed and retains a boorish patriarchal 
character. First, it is not academically rigorous. Like the other books in the series, it is 
intended for a lay reader or the undergraduate university student, as well as professional 
persons in the field of religion, psychology, and spirituality. The paucity of footnotes and 
textual support reflect this intent. However, this allows Lawrence to make numerous 
claims, generate hypotheses, and leverage refutations without the backing of creditable 
scholarship.  
My textual analysis reveals that Lawrence misunderstands the theological claims 
of some of the scholars he critiques. Ironically, this creates errant affirmations of 
theology that would otherwise serve to prove parts of his overarching argument! For 
example, he argues that Christianity has a history of negativity toward sexual pleasure. 
Here, I am in agreement. However, he goes on to proclaim that Martin Luther was 
“unabashedly positive about sexual pleasure,” stating that when it came to sexual matters, 
“[Luther] was far ahead of everyone else.”120 Lawrence even interprets the Reformation 
as a “sexual revolution.” A close reading of Luther’s work does not support these claims. 
As I will show in Chapter Two, the Reformers – particularly Luther and Calvin – did not 
endorse the pursuit of sexual pleasure apart from potentially reproductive, heterosexual, 
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married sexual intercourse; and even then, sexual pleasure remained a reason for shame. 
What Lawrence really has in regard to Luther is more evidence that Christianity has a 
history of negativity toward sexual pleasure.  
 The last few chapters of Sexual Liberation prove to be the most troubling and 
problematic. Here, Lawrence evaluates the “sexual disarray” of the late twentieth century. 
He argues that the great strides made by the “Sexual Revolution” – the liberation of 
women, including their ordination, and the “coming out of homosexuals” – were quickly 
followed by “a counterrevolution fueled by negative feelings about sexual pleasure 
generally, and exacerbated by radical feminism’s resentment toward men in 
particular.”121 For Lawrence, sexual harassment and sexualized violence policies 
exemplify the force of the latter. In chapter seventeen, he uses evolutionary biology to 
oppose these policies – policies, he argues, that stand in the way of male/female courtship 
rituals and unfairly target heterosexual males. He believes that sexual harassment and 
sexualized violence policies neglect the possibility that some women might “sometimes 
relish such an ‘invasion’.”122   
And Lawrence does not stop there. He also thinks that “righteous indignation” at 
adult sex with minors is “blunt and heavy-handed,”123 going on to cite forms of 
pedophilia that are permitted in other cultures. The excessive claims of the child abuse of 
“[adolescents] under the statutory threshold for adulthood” speak to a culture of 
moralists, he argues, “infected by Christianity’s ancient loathing of sexual pleasure.”124 
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Though he agrees that children should be protected from sexual predators, he 
unabashedly states, “…the cost of such protection is high.”125 If all of this is not enough, 
he negates the existence of sexual addiction, and argues that the “invention” of such a 
malady is yet another example of “the counterrevolution’s war on sexual pleasure.”126   
 In the last chapter, “Sexual Disarray in the Churches,” Lawrence identifies his 
version of the “crisis of sexuality in the church.” He argues that the definitive problems in 
faith communities with respect to sex are policies, procedures, and regulations regarding 
clergy sexual misconduct. Even liberal churches, he claims, have adopted what he calls 
“the radical feminist mantra,” or the claim that “sexual harassment is not about sex, but 
about the abuse of power.”127 He singles out Karen Lebacqz, an educator with a 
commitment to social justice issues and professional ethics, as a “counterrevolutionary” 
because she called attention to the sexual misbehavior of male clinical supervisors at the 
American Association of Clinical Pastoral Educators’ (AACPE) annual conference in 
1992. Lawrence then spends the remainder of the chapter lambasting feminist theologian 
Marie Fortune for promoting boundaries between congregants and their leaders, opposing 
dual relationships, and identifying power, as opposed to sex, as the motivating force 
behind the sexual abuse of congregants by clergy.128 Neglecting to cite even one quote 
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from Fortune’s many texts, Lawrence implicates her as a prominent force in the sex-
phobic counterrevolution plaguing churches! 
Lawrence’s critique of Fortune is outrageous, given that she is someone who has 
contributed so much of her time and efforts to stopping a multitude of abuses in all kinds 
of faith settings, including explicating the role of power in sexual abuse.129 Fortune is the 
founder of the Seattle-based FaithTrust Institute, dedicated to resisting domestic and 
sexualized violence, child abuse, and clergy sexual misconduct. She is also the author and 
editor of numerous books to these ends. Shockingly, prominent pastoral theologian Don 
Capps, who authors one of the two Forwards to Sexual Liberation, affirms Lawrence’s 
critique. Fortune is “an enemy of human sexuality who has carried the day,” claims 
Capps.130  
Is it possible that both of these scholars missed Fortune’s chapter – “The Sharing 
of Pleasure” – in her text Love Does No Harm? Proof that she is far from sex-phobic, 
Fortune declares,  
If we genuinely preach and seek to practice an incarnational theology, 
which means that we believe that our bodily selves are a good gift from 
God, then we must also affirm sexual pleasure as good and, if we so 
                                                                                                                                            
nothing to do with thinking that such liaisons would have been intrinsically destructive to the women or 
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grounded in unconscious guilt. 
129 See http://www.cpsdv.org/. See Fortune’s texts: Sexual violence: The Unmentionable Sin; Keeping the 
Faith :Questions and Answers for the Abused Woman; Is Nothing Sacred: The Story of a Pastor, the 
Women He Sexually Abused, and the Congregation He Nearly Destroyed; Sexual Abuse by Clergy: A 
Crisis for the Church; Violence Against Women and Children: A Christian Theological Sourcebook; Love 
Does No Harm: Sexual Ethics for the Rest of Us; Sexual Abuse Prevention: A Course of Study for 
Teenagers; Remembering Conquest: Feminist/womanist Perspectives on Religion, Colonization, and 
Sexual Violence; Sexual Violence: The Sin Revisited.  
130 Donald Capps, forward to Raymond Lawrence, Sexual Liberation: The Scandal of Christendom, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2007), xiii. Capps also expresses appreciation for Lawrence’s self-
reflectiveness, especially about, “being the object of the sexual advances of lonely wives when he was a 
newly ordained minister…” Capps believes that Lawrence’s acknowledgement of Lawrence’s own 
attraction proves the absence of malicious intent and debunks the arguments about ministers as sexual 
predators. Capps, xiv.  
 77 
choose, seek to share that pleasure in relationship. The ethical concern 
which this affirmation calls forth is our responsibility to attend to our own 
and our partner’s sexual needs in a context of choice, consent, and 
respect.131   
 
Here, Fortune clearly affirms sexual pleasure and encourages seeking it when desired, 
while articulating loose parameters for safety and freedom of participation. It is 
perplexing and a shame that both Lawrence and Capps ignore Fortune’s blatant 
theological affirmation of sexual pleasure and, instead, choose to interpret her extended 
attention to the dynamics of sexualized violence as “sex-phobic.”  
 Taken together, the conclusions Lawrence reaches regarding the ongoing loathing 
of sexual pleasure in Christian contexts stun me, especially in regards to his assessment 
of the impact of feminist analysis and his interpretations of sexual activity between men 
and women, minors and adults, and clergy and parishioners. He loses all sight of 
women’s voices, consent, and safety when he dismisses claims of sexualized violence 
and harassment, attributes these behaviors on the part of men to evolutionary biology, 
and criticizes policies put in place to protect victims from this kind of abuse. The second 
half of Lawrence’s book reads like a tirade against progressive feminist politics. 
Personally, it was difficult not to experience his argument as the diatribe of an old, white 
male whose pleasure [read: power] has been progressively eroded by the successive 
waves of women’s liberation. If anything, his passionate and biased interpretation of the 
ongoing repression and demonization of sexual pleasure in the contemporary Christian 
context lends credence to my argument that the topic of sexual pleasure continues to 
generate emotional and distorted perspectives.   
                                                
131 Marie Fortune, Love Does No Harm: Sexual Ethics for the Rest of Us, (New York: Continuum 
Publishing Co., 1995), 127.  
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Lawrence also walks an extremely thin line when he expresses doubt about the 
prevalence of child abuse and its traumatic effects, particularly for older adolescents. 
Again, he dismisses the suffering of individuals who are taken advantage of by trusted 
elders who use their power to victimize and abuse. Lawrence’s deep misunderstanding of 
power differentials in these examples and his intimations that these instances are founded 
on the (sometimes unconscious) sexual desires of victims are exactly the kinds of beliefs 
and justifications that perpetuate abuse in families and in faith communities. Regardless 
of what Lawrence believes, sexual abuse certainly is one dimension of “the crisis of 
sexuality in the church.”132  
In the introduction to Sexual Liberation, Lawrence claims, “There have been no 
giants in the field of sexual ethics in the five hundred years since Luther.”133 In the post-
script, he points to the late twentieth century as a time of contradictory voices and 
conflict between those supporting the “Sexual Revolution” and what he calls, “dark 
forces” and “counter-currents,” which amount to “angry male-hating factions of 
feminists,” “hysteria over an imagined epidemic of sexual abuse of children,” and 
“virulent homophobia.”134 Lawrence plainly states, “In the heat of the conflict, no major 
voice spoke with clarity of sexual pleasure as a great gift of God and that everyone was 
entitled to an ample share of it…”135  
What? First, see Fortune’s quote above. Second, contrary to what Lawrence 
claims, there have been a number of scholars invested in Christian sexual ethics in the 
late twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Many have made rich 
                                                
132 See Pamela Cooper-White, The Cry of Tamar: Violence Against Women and the Church’s Response, 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). 
133 Lawrence, xix. 
134 Ibid, 153.  
135 Ibid.  
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contributions to a loving and just approach to sexuality, including an affirmative stance 
on sexual pleasure. And many of their proposals claim exactly what Lawrence contends 
is missing from theological discourse, namely that sexual pleasure is a good gift from 
God. In fact, I devote an entire chapter to these pleasure-affirming proposals later in this 
project. Given Capps’ overwhelming applause for this text, it is a mystery as to whether 
or not he agrees with Lawrence’s claim. If so, Capps poorly represents the discipline of 
pastoral theology, which typically relies on resources in Christian sexual ethics for 
teaching pastoral care around issues related to sex and sexuality.136 
 
Stop Beatin’ ’Round the Bush…Let’s Get It On137 
Looking back to Hiltner, James Poling insists that pastoral theologians have not 
actively engaged increasing anxieties in the Church related to sexual matters since the 
1950s and 1960s. He also asserts that the pastoral care movement has failed to provide 
important leadership in the debate/crisis over sexuality in the Church. For his part, Poling 
identifies the current crisis as “confusion and resistance to the liberation movements of 
women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians.”138 Unequal power distributions that 
take the form of pervasive sexual attitudes about these groups undergird his argument. 
Put differently, the crisis according to Poling stems from failing to acknowledge and right 
the discrimination, oppression, and abuse perpetrated against women, African Americans, 
and queer individuals (and any combination of these identities) by devaluing their 
sexuality. Lawrence’s rant against and resistance to feminism politics is case and point. 
                                                
136 For example, I first encountered many of the texts in Chapter Five in a pastoral theology and care class 
at Vanderbilt Divinity School. The class, taught by Dr. Evon Flesberg in the fall of 2004, was titled, 
“Sexuality: Ethics, Theology, and Pastoral Practice.” 
137 Marvin Gaye, in lyrics to Let’s Get It On, Tamala Records, 1973.  
138 Poling, 119.  
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I do not disagree with Poling that sexual justice issues for women, African-
Americans, the queer community, and others whose sexuality has been maligned and then 
used as a tool of oppression must be a critical dimension of a pastoral theology concerned 
with suffering and thriving in these communities. Sexual justice must be a dimension of 
sexual ethics and pastoral care in faith communities, one that necessitates a communal 
response. My interest, however, still lies in the role and redemption of sexual pleasure as 
integral to both the “crisis” of sexuality in the Church, as well as its resolve. In many 
ways, the experience that concerns me is particular and individual, as I am unsure how to 
conceive of a communal dimension of sexual pleasure, especially as it relates to orgasm. 
Still, I do not doubt that sexual pleasure, however individual the focus, is firmly 
intertwined with issues of gender, sexuality, race, power, and the struggle to negotiate the 
tensions inherent in interdependent relationships.  
To his credit, Lawrence names sexual pleasure as “the best of God’s gifts to 
humankind.”139 He also asserts that all behavior, including sexual behavior, is subject to 
the biblical injunctions of love and justice, and he openly affirms and celebrates same-sex 
relationships. 140 Unfortunately, his critique of feminist figures and their theological 
resources is backwards, reasserting deeply patriarchal and sexist beliefs about sexualized 
violence and child abuse. This wayward critique blinds Lawrence to reputable 
scholarship in Christian sexual ethics that does affirm sexual pleasure.141 By neglecting 
the scholarship in contemporary Christian sexual ethics, he forfeits the opportunity to 
                                                
139 Lawrence, 154.  
140 Ibid, 153.  
141 One hypothesized reason for Lawrence’s dismissal of this body of scholarship might be its affiliation 
with and strong grounding in the feminist theological theory he so deeply opposes.   
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critically analyze it – an analysis that could deepen the complexity of what it means to 
include sexual pleasure in a Christian sexual ethic for our time. 
 I have to be honest and admit that if I am grateful to Lawrence for anything, it is 
for giving me the opportunity to conduct such an analysis on these resources, as well as 
looking with fresh eyes at how modern culture and feminist theology have contributed to 
current suspicions and affirmations regarding the role of sexual pleasure in human 
suffering and flourishing. Paying homage to one my favorite Motown artists, Marvin 
Gaye, it’s time to get it on! But before examining the fruit of the tree from which pastoral 
theology has so curiously abstained, it behooves me to assess the roots. The move to 
redeem sexual pleasure in a theological framework assumes that there are fertile grounds 
from which it must be vindicated. Therefore, it is appropriate to begin by looking back at 
the inherited Christian tradition to better understand and evaluate the intricate root system 
in which sexual pleasure remains entangled.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
ROTTEN ROOTS: THE CHRISTIAN SEX-NEGATIVE LEGACY  
 
While some faith communities remain oblivious to the ramifications of the sex-
negative dimensions of their theology, the suffering I have encountered in the clinical 
context as a pastoral caregiver has been impossible to ignore. Working primarily with 
women, I identified sexual issues at the core of almost every case in which I provided 
pastoral care. I saw many women who had been sexually abused, one of them by a 
minister in the church in which she served. There was a high school student from a 
religious family who regularly bemoaned the dearth of helpful sex education (an 
“abstinence only” approach coupled with a biology class formed the extent of the sexual 
education curriculum). Her parents, who had serious sexual issues of their own, 
approached sex talk with considerable anxiety. Eventually, this young girl made an 
impulsive decision to have intercourse. Overburdened by the shame and guilt of having 
given in to sex, she spent a significant amount of time in my office discussing her 
subsequent drug use and depression.  
The pain was no less severe in other cases. A client was on the brink of suicide as 
she came to grips with her unshakable attraction to women. She was married with 
children and dreamed of being a pastor. Though the female priest at her church referred 
her to me and supported her in private, the priest did not publically affirm same-sex 
relationships or the ordination of gay and lesbian individuals. My client was extremely 
angry at her denomination, confused, depressed, and at times suicidal. Her religiously 
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conservative parents, who she firmly believed would disown her if she divorced her 
husband and embraced her attraction to women, exacerbated her anxiety about her 
complicated situation. I also counseled an evangelical woman who was guilt-ridden for 
having had two children out of wedlock. She missed attending her church, but insisted 
that she still had a strong personal faith. She wrestled with staying in a neglectful 
relationship with the father of one of her children because she desired to be married, 
arguing that “getting married and being a family was best for [her] children.”   
As a pastoral caregiver for these women, I regularly faced the suffering, 
depression, guilt, shame, confusion, sadness, anger, hurt, pressure, and hopelessness 
wreaked by theological positions that sacrifice physical, psychological, and spiritual well-
being on the altar of tradition. At times, all of these women (including the young woman 
mentioned in the Introduction) felt cut-off, shunned, or abandoned by God. They either 
feared how their churches would perceive them, felt too deeply wounded to return to 
church, or both. The experiences of these women seem to support Christianity’s sex-
negative reputation in our culture.  
Pastoral theology reflects on and, in turn, informs the practices of the Church, as 
well as myriad forms of caregiving in faith contexts, including pastoral care and 
counseling. It takes very seriously the lived experience of those receiving care and 
considers this lived experience a crucial source for constructing pastoral theology. Before 
turning to reflection and deeper analysis, however, pastoral theology responds to the 
suffering to which it bears witness. An informed pastoral response to the suffering I 
encountered in my clients is influenced by many factors, including an historical 
investigation and critical analysis of the sources that form the Church’s attitude and 
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official positions regarding sex. In the Introduction, I argued that contemporary Christian 
individuals and their collective communities of faith inherited a long struggle with 
anxieties and fears involving sexual pleasure. My counseling experiences buttress this 
contention. In the interest of more fully understanding what I regard as “lingering 
discomfort,” this chapter explores a number of questions. What are the theological roots 
of this angst? Which theological traditions explicitly or implicitly influence many of the 
mainline denominational positions, especially interpretations of sexual pleasure? How do 
these traditions shape discourse on sex, marriage, and family? Is our legacy entirely sex-
negative? 
To answer these questions, I turn to four highly influential theologians whose 
sentiments on sex have shaped the course of Catholic and Protestant approaches to sexual 
ethics in the Church, as well as in our political life and community. First, Augustine of 
Hippo garners the most attention for contributing to a negative view of human sexuality, 
and, as I will show, to the skeptical, distrustful, and disparaging view of sexual pleasure. 
His influence in this area of theological reflection is immense and foundational to both 
Catholic and Protestant interpretations of sexuality. For these reasons, I devote a large 
portion of this chapter to the analysis of his work.  
In the second half of this chapter, I address the work of Thomas Aquinas, who is 
well known for his teachings on natural law as well as his articulation of the role of 
reason and logic in Christian theology. His writing has had considerable influence on the 
Church’s teachings about sex, particularly sexual ethics in the Roman Catholic Church. 
Adopting an Augustinian interpretation of original sin, Aquinas follows Augustine’s lead 
in shunning sexual pleasure, while adding a premium on reason as the framework for his 
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sexual ethics.  I conclude with Martin Luther and John Calvin, pivotal figures in the 
Protestant Reformation, who argued passionately against the denigration of marriage, as 
well as professing and honoring vows to celibacy and virginity. They, too, have earned 
their place in Christian history as contributors to the understanding of human sexual life, 
its relationship to spirituality, and how it fits into the greater purpose and meaning of our 
lives. Some even argue that Luther’s and Calvin’s affirmations constitute pro-sex 
theological assertions.  
Theologizing some 800 to 1,100 years after Augustine, Aquinas’, Luther’s, and 
Calvin’s arguments hold promise as correctives to Augustine’s conclusions about sexual 
pleasure. Sadly, although there are positive nuances in their theological arguments, 
pleasure in sexual experience remains highly problematic overall. Taken together, the 
works of these men perpetuated a theological insistence on some troubling aspect of 
sexual pleasure, reinforcing the negative interpretation of sexual experience that has been 
passed to future generations of Christians.  
 
Saint Augustine of Hippo: Doctor, Doctor, Gimme the News… 
 Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430) is generally regarded as one of the most 
influential theologians in Christian history. I maintain that he is particularly influential in 
regards to how sexual pleasure is understood or constructed, and subsequently 
reinterpreted, in the development of Christian doctrine and practice.142 Compared to other 
patristic scholars, Augustine writes at length in a number of his works about 
                                                
142 My exploration of all four theologians will focus on their work as it appears in textual form, not on 
practices or accounts of practices generated by their theological claims. 
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concupiscence, sex, and sexual pleasure.143 He is widely known for his Confessions, in 
which he appears to write explicitly about his own sexual experiences.144 His marked 
attention to articulating the theological significance and meaning of the sexual dimension 
of human life – including his keen use of rhetoric to “reveal” his own sexual struggles – 
earned him a certain authoritative voice on the issue. His articulation of a Christian 
understanding of the institution of marriage has exerted comparable influence. Embracing 
sexual intercourse necessitated a validation and thorough explanation of the origin, place, 
and purpose of Christian marriage. Scholars argue that the intensity and endurance 
through the centuries of Augustine’s systematic insight into sexual morality and marriage 
have earned him the moniker “Doctor of Christian Marriage.”145 One could also argue 
that these contributions are critical to his prominent role in Christian theology as a whole.    
 Although Augustine has been influential, many scholars across theological 
disciplines (especially those with an affinity for sexual ethics) are critical of his teachings 
regarding sex and marriage, as well as his broader theological assertions regarding 
original sin and concupiscence, the theology upon which his conclusions regarding sex 
and marriage are contingent. Catholic theologian David Kelly asserts that while 
Augustine’s contribution of an anti-sex sentiment is clear and universally recognized, the 
extent to which anti-sex biases in certain strains of theology have been influenced or 
reinforced by Augustine’s teachings remains contested.  
                                                
143 Such works include autobiography, apology, exegesis, dogmatic, and moral exposition and controversy 
with his adversaries. 
144 Psychologists of religion and others with a background in modern psychology, particularly 
psychodynamic theory, have a field day with Augustine’s “confessions” about his raging sexual impulses, 
his complicated relationship with his mother, his absent father, his struggles with women and special male 
friends, and his agonizing journey to understand and ultimately live a life devoted to God. 
145 Todd A. Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, The Sexual Person: Toward a Renewed Catholic Anthropology, 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 29. 
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In Just Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics, Catholic Christian 
ethicist Margaret Farley points out that although Augustine writes eloquently about 
Christian marriage, his valuation of sex is a different matter entirely. Even in marriage 
with procreative intent (according to Augustine), sexual intercourse contains an evil 
stain.146 Any degree of moral goodness in the act is related to procreation. In The Ethics 
of Sex, ethicist and Aquinas scholar Mark Jordan explains that Augustine’s influence on 
Christian sexual morality is strong, but ambivalent. For all of his affirmations of the 
goods of marriage, Augustine still asserts that celibacy is preferable. Jordan points out 
that Augustine, who restricts sex to the institution of marriage, also restricts sex within 
marriage. Sex in marriage for procreative purposes is the only justified sex, leaving no 
justification for the pursuit of sexual pleasure in its own right.147 Historical theologian 
Margaret Miles claims that Augustine’s identification of the unique religious significance 
of sexuality reaches to our time. She, like Jordan, surmises that Augustine’s influence is 
ambivalent.148  
Are the ends in Augustine’s work unavoidably sex-negative? What nuances and 
complications exist? What was at stake for him? How does he reach his conclusions? 
Finally, is there anything salvageable in the service of claiming the goodness of sexual 
experience and pleasure? The following subsections take up these questions by returning 
to selected primary texts and welcoming insight and criticism from scholars of 
Augustine.  
                                                
146 Margaret A. Farley, Just Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics, (New York: Continuum, 
2008), 41.  
147 Mark Jordan, The Ethics of Sex, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 109-117.  
148 Margaret Miles, “The Body and Human Values in Augustine of Hippo,” in Grace, Politics and Desire: 
Essays on Augustine, ed. Hugo Meynell, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1990), 62.  
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I argue that although Augustine permits sexual intercourse and, subsequently, the 
sexual pleasure that he imagines is part of each and every procreative sexual act, sexual 
pleasure is not upheld as a good in its own right. Marriage, the only relationship that 
allows for sex, has “goods,” but pleasure is not one of them. I demonstrate that 
Augustine’s negative theological interpretation of sexual pleasure is firmly grounded in 
1) a male-centered interpretation of sexual impulses, sex, and sexual pleasure and 2) his 
interpretation of original sin and its punishment. Regarding the latter point, shame is 
always inextricably bound to sexual arousal, sexual acts, and sexual pleasures, even those 
tempered for procreation.  
 
Confessions: Methinks He Doth Confess Too Much?! 
Augustine is passionately compelled to juxtapose human sexual life and a life of 
faith devoted to God. At the time he wrote Confessions (396), he was in a different 
position than that of the ascetic layman he was ten years prior and had different 
expectations pressing upon him.149 As the bishop of Hippo in Northern Africa, he was 
responsible for building up and unifying the community of faith there, a role with 
significant authority and pressure. During this time, the place of marriage and sex in the 
lives of faithful Christians became a pressing theological concern to which he had to 
respond. The Catholic Church in Northern Africa was fracturing, suffering from schism, 
and religious differences and disagreements were undermining the family, the basic unit 
of society. Augustine saw the possibility of enhancing concord among adherents by 
validating aspects of Roman society, including marriage and the hierarchical family.150 
                                                
149 Brown, 388. 
150 Ibid, 399.  
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Thus, a number of his writings aimed at a faithful rendering of marriage and sexual 
intercourse to these ends.  
Personally, however, Augustine had sacrificed his own sexual life in devotion to 
God and believed that conversion and renouncement of sexual life ultimately set one free 
to serve the Church. In addition to supporting the aforementioned social structures, 
Augustine also likely desired to speak to those in the Christian community like himself. 
As a result, his writings theologically justify sex and marriage, while maintaining a 
priority on chastity. In Confessions, he uses his gifts as a writer and rhetor to further this 
agenda, skillfully using the “story” of his own life as an example and tapping into what 
he assumed was a universal struggle with lust.  
Considering Augustine’s position as bishop and his assumptions about the 
universal tyranny of lust, we must take seriously that Confessions is not a strict 
autobiography in the way the modern world understands the genre of ‘autobiography.’ 
Confessions intends to be persuasive, both in the genuineness and praise of Augustine’s 
own character and the nature of a life devoted completely to God. Early church historian 
Henry Chadwick, in his “Introduction” to Confessions, identifies the text as a polemical 
work, “at least as much about [Augustine’s] self-vindication as an admission of 
mistakes.”151 He calls it “a prose-poem addressed to God, intended to be overheard by 
anxious Christians and critical fellow-Christians.”152 Peter Brown, prominent scholar and 
biographer of Augustine, argues that the text attends to the hopes for the self and society 
of a distinct group, even aiming to form such a group, namely Catholics of ascetic 
                                                
151 Henry Chadwick, introduction to Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), ix. 
152 Ibid. Chadwick goes on to give context, including pressure for Augustine to respond to those who 
distrusted him and those curious about his adoption of an ascetic life. 
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experience who have come into positions of power and leadership in the Catholic 
churches in Africa and Italy.153 The point is that Augustine has multiple motivations for 
telling his story in Confessions. It is a thoroughly theological text. Though he could not 
possibly have had our current context in mind, I am still most interested in the story he is 
telling about human sexuality.154 
Confessions is a chronicle of the tug of war between a human’s will to serve the 
spirit and the will to serve the flesh. It begins with an account of adolescence, a time 
when strong sexual urges emerge and beg to be indulged. “At one time in adolescence I 
was burning to find satisfaction in hellish pleasures. I ran wild in the shadowy jungle of 
erotic adventures,” Augustine recalls.155 Though the expectation was that sexual 
experimentation would eventually be quelled in a marriage commitment, Augustine 
imagines that such a commitment would be impossible on the account of sexual appetites. 
“Even so, I could not have been wholly content to confine sexual union to acts intended 
to procreate children, as your law prescribes, Lord,” he confesses. In other words, 
Augustine claims that the sexual appetite is interested in more than just traditional 
intercourse for the sake of reproducing. He may be referring here to other kinds of sexual 
                                                
153 Brown, 388.  
154 “Sexuality” is a modern concept typically used to capture the erotic dimension of human life, the 
experience of the sexual self, one’s gender expression, and/or the nature of one’s sexual attraction to others. 
It acquires a broader definition in contemporary sexual ethics. Sexuality, however, in the ways that we 
understand it, was not a concept familiar to patristic and medieval theologians. Historian, Thomas Laqueur, 
suggests that “sexuality” prior to the late 18th century could be conceived of as a “one-sex” model, a 
hierarchical spectrum in which masculinity grounded one pole and femininity the other. See Thomas 
Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1990), 5-6. French philosopher, Michel Foucault, famously argues that sexuality is a socially 
constructed phenomenon. He refuses any suggestion that sexuality is a “natural given” or an “obscure 
domain” containing secret knowledge. Foucault attempts to show that since the 17th century power, 
operating in and through a number of discourses, has been successful in creating the construct that today 
seems so essential to our very being and identities – sexuality. He feels that he has proven the relationship 
between sexuality and the elements of a social construction to be essential. See Michel Foucault, The 
History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol.1, (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 105. 
155 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 24. 
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activity or having sex more frequently than is necessary for conceiving a child. Either 
way, his point is that pleasure is the motivating factor, and he finds it impossible to find a 
container for his sexual appetites of which God would approve.  
The battle with lust continues into young adulthood, as Augustine avoids a 
commitment to formal marriage and instead pursues a career as an orator and teacher of 
rhetoric. During this time, his sexual energy is channeled into a committed relationship 
with a woman who is referred to in secondary texts as a concubine. He explains,  
In those years I had a woman. She was not my partner in what is called 
lawful marriage. I had found her in my state of wandering desire and lack 
of prudence. Nevertheless, she was the only girl for me, and I was faithful 
to her. With her I learnt by direct experience how wide a difference there 
is between the partnership of marriage entered into for the sake of having 
a family and the mutual consent of those who love is a matter of physical 
sex, and for whom the birth of a child is contrary to their intention – even 
though, if offspring arrive, they compel their parents to love them.156  
 
In his explanation of his relationship, Augustine admits to loving this woman and being a 
faithful partner, meaning that he was monogamous in his sexual relations with her. His 
ability to sustain a physically intimate relationship with a single partner – a relationship 
that lasted 13 years – is interesting, considering his own perception that rampant lust 
could not be contained or controlled. Augustine explains that it is the intention behind 
their sex that keeps it from being a “marriage,” namely that they enjoyed sex for pleasure, 
perhaps engaged in a variety of sexual experiences outside of intercourse, and did not 
intend to have children.157  
Although aspects of his recollection of his relationship are warm, Augustine’s 
tone is self-condemning. He connects the start of their relationship with a degree of 
                                                
156 Ibid, 53. 
157 Though he does not mention it here, Augustine and his partner did have a child; however, they likely 
took precautions to avoid conception. 
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immaturity and regret. He was motivated by lust and believes his decisions were 
conditioned by a lack of foresight and misplaced longing. While the relationship was 
meaningful for him, it does not soothe his growing anxieties about the importance and 
requirements of a virtuous spiritual life.  
As time passes, pressure for Augustine to marry and improve his social status 
mounts. Simultaneously, he is intrigued by the ability of some of his friends and 
acquaintances to set aside sex and marriage for the pursuit of friendship and wisdom. In 
consideration of this lifestyle choice, he bemoans, “Fettered by the flesh’s morbid 
impulse and lethal sweetness, I dragged my chain, but was afraid to be free of it.”158 The 
attachment to sex makes the idea of giving it up seem impossible. Similarly, feeling 
“stuck fast in the glue of this pleasure,” he continues to imagine that marriage, given its 
limitations and stipulations regarding sex, could not satisfy insatiable sexual desire.159 
Compelled, finally, by his mother’s relentless petitions, he agrees to marry. With 
Augustine’s new commitment to a formal marriage, his lover is sent back to Africa. “The 
woman with whom I habitually slept was torn away from my side because she was a 
hindrance to my marriage…As I was not a lover of marriage but a slave of lust, I 
procured another woman, not of course a wife,” he grieves and shamefully admits.160 
Though Augustine indicates great sadness at the loss of his lover, he cannot pass any 
substantial amount of time without sex.161 Because he must wait for his bride-to-be, 
sexual desires must be satisfied by sleeping with another woman. He is constantly 
                                                
158 Augustine, Confessions, 106-107.  
159 Ibid, 107.  
160 Ibid, 109. 
161 This unnamed woman, by Augustine’s admission, returns to Africa to live out her life as celibate 
woman.  
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reminding his reader of the power of the bondage to lust, a chronic anxiety universalized 
in his theological works to come. 
The climax of Confessions occurs in book eight, in which Augustine’s spiritual 
search and longing face off with his attachment to sexual desire and pleasure in a quasi-
mystical experience. He reveals to his reader how God delivers him from “the chain of 
sexual desire.”162 From this point forward, he dedicates himself to a continent life. He 
does not take a wife, renounces sexual activity completely, abandons his secular career, 
and is eventually baptized as a Christian. He initially hopes to live in a community of 
men devoted to chastity and wisdom, but is ordained instead and becomes a Catholic 
bishop in the North African seaport of Hippo Regius for the remainder of his life.  
The content of Confessions, especially Augustine’s account of his struggle with 
sexual desire and the lure of the pleasures of sexual activity, includes theological 
reflections on sex and marriage. Sexual encounters are both pleasurable and highly 
problematic. Augustine is enticed and disgusted. Sex keeps him from true friendship and 
distracts him from the pursuit of wisdom.163 However, even more abhorrent than keeping 
him from true friendship and distracting him from the pursuit of wisdom, his lust keeps 
him from being a faithful Christian. His choices related to sexual activity – sex outside of 
                                                
162 While contemplating his struggle in a garden in Milan, Augustine is tormented and tempted by the 
voices of “his old loves,” seduction and lust. Before him appears a vision of a dignified and chaste woman, 
Lady Continence, who invites Augustine to release his anxiety and take the leap of faith to trust in God. 
Overcome with emotion, Augustine hears another voice imploring him to open the scriptures, where he is 
confronted with Rom. 13:13-14 - “Not in riots and drunken parties, not in eroticism and indecencies, not in 
strife and rivalry, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts.” Upon 
reading the verses, he explains, “a light of relief from all anxiety flooded into my heart. All the shadows of 
doubt were dispelled.” Augustine, Confessions, 153. 
163 As modern readers, if we take Augustine’s prose at face value, his lust does not seem particularly 
abnormal. Miles suggests that the language he uses to describe his relationship with sexual desire and 
pleasure (chained, in bondage, being tied, fettered by the flesh, etc.) is suggestive of addiction. For 
Augustine it is compulsive. Miles asserts that Augustine so struggled with sex that it felt impossible for him 
to fathom an integrated sexuality – he could not enjoy with freedom and gratitude that which felt so 
difficult to control. Miles, “The Body and Human Values in Augustine of Hippo,” 61.  
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marriage and participation in non-procreative sexual acts – are unacceptable Christian 
practices in the late fourth century. In addition, there is considerable pressure from his 
influential mother to conform, to save his soul, and to be baptized.164 Given his 
experience and context, Augustine most likely has to reconcile his sexual appetites with 
his impending faith commitment.  
Why not marry? Recall Augustine’s own doubts that sexual desires could be 
tempered for the specific conjugal duty demanded in marriage. I argue that there are 
other, less obvious reasons. In Confessions, Augustine subtly portrays marriage as a 
lesser option. He reports that his mother, in his early adolescence, did not force him to 
consider marriage to contain his sexual drive. Instead, she hoped that he might forego 
marriage altogether to serve the Church or enjoy a successful career, both of which she 
felt might be impeded by a wife.165 Later, Alypius, Augustine’s friend and companion 
during his conversion experience, warns that taking a wife restricts the hope of men 
communing together in carefree leisure for the love of wisdom – a desire of Augustine’s 
that comes up numerous times throughout Confessions.166 Higher callings, whether they 
are constituted by a successful secular career, the pursuit of wisdom with like-minded 
male friends, or a life committed to the Church, all surpassed the import and duties of 
marriage. Whether marriage creates a sexual conundrum or proves to be an unsuitable, 
lesser option, Augustine must and does give up sex for God.167 The persuasive element of 
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165 Augustine, Confessions, 28.  
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 95 
his text encourages others to use his life as an example or perhaps view it as the exemplar 
of Christian devotion.  
I agree with Peter Brown that there is a tension in Confessions. Augustine 
grapples with sexual desire, sexual intercourse, and sexual pleasure as both dynamics of 
human social relations and serious problems for the individual human will.168 Brown is 
convinced that the text communicates to its reader “the views on the relationship between 
sexuality and society which Augustine had come to adopt in his middle age.”169 A 
number of these views are advanced in writings subsequent to Confessions. Here, his 
self-condemning, sometimes confusing, negative sentiments about sexuality become 
clear, concretized, and powerfully theologically grounded.  
 
Excavating Augustine’s Theology of Sex and Orgasm 
As previously discussed, Augustine’s reflections on sexuality and marriage in 
Confessions identify sexual desire as an irresistible force. The pursuit of sexual pleasure 
is incompatible with a faithful Christian life. The duties of marriage are a distraction from 
the pursuit of wisdom and the things of God.  However personal these sentiments seem, 
Augustine makes similar claims that become more generalized and explicit in his 
subsequent writings.170 In these works, one finds more substantial theological reflection, 
moral declaration and instruction, and (if we are sympathetic!) pastoral guidance on how 
to understand and best live with our inescapably sexual selves.  
                                                
168 Brown, 388.  
169 Ibid, 388.  
170 See On the Good of Marriage, On Holy Virginity, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, City of God, 
and On Marriage and Concupiscence.  
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Responding to some of the severe criticism leveraged against Augustine, Kelly 
stresses that Augustine has a “deep desire to see people free, to see them rise above 
themselves, to see them empowered with the Holy Spirit and with the grace of Christ 
which is love, come to the full humanity which is their destiny in Christ.”171 In other 
words, he argues that Augustine’s intent is pastoral; it aims to be healing and salvific, and 
it is firmly grounded in his Christology, soteriology, and beliefs about nature and grace. 
Although I will not attend to the entirety of Augustine’s doctrinal positions, pointing out 
some of these connections is important. His writings on sex and marriage are contingent 
on his interpretation of human nature and original sin, which are best understood in the 
context of his doctrines of God, Christ, salvation, and grace. Recognizing Augustine’s 
good intentions, however, should not blind us to the implications of his theological 
conclusions.  
  The heart of the following exploration is to determine how Augustine understands 
the purpose of sexual pleasure or the theological meaning for its existence in sexual 
experience. What gives it the troubling quality we see in Confessions? When one begins 
exploring Augustine’s works with these questions in mind, she finds that there is no 
simple answer.  
First, if Augustine’s Confessions holds some truth, one must keep in mind that the 
eventually continent theologian struggled more with his own sexual impulses than any 
other fleshly desire. He interpreted these desires and experiences as an obstacle to a 
relationship with God and a life of service to God. Second, not only is understanding 
                                                
171 David F. Kelly, “Sexuality and concupiscence in Augustine,” The Annual Society of Christian Ethics 
(1983): 84. Kelly argues further that while Augustine has a pastoral goal to help others live fully and to 
illustrate the beauty of Christian marriage, his conclusions with respect to sexual pleasure and desire in 
carnal concupiscence tarnish human sexuality with “implications of evil and corruption.” Ibid, 82. 
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pleasure contingent on Augustine’s theological doctrine of original sin, but it is also tied 
to a developed theology on the institution of marriage, part of Augustine’s broader 
understanding of God’s intentions for society. Augustine distinguishes life for the human 
race pre- and post-Fall, a distinction that must be kept clear. As a consequence of original 
sin, God’s full intentions for creation cannot be realized. Finally, the challenge is 
exacerbated by Augustine’s creative skills as a gifted writer and master of rhetoric. While 
he seemingly creates possibilities for sex and pleasure in some moments, there are always 
qualifications, problems, and worrisome possibilities and concessions that keep sex and 
pleasure from receiving whole-hearted affirmation.   
In the subsections that follow, I trace Augustine’s claims on the origin of sin and 
its relationship to and consequences for understanding the body, marriage, sex, and 
sexual pleasure. First, how does he conceive of human nature and sexual life before 
original sin? Do marriage, sex, and sexual pleasure have a place in Paradise? Second, 
how does Augustine understand original sin and its implications? How does original sin 
affect sexuality? Third, how does Augustine claim we are called to live with respect to 
our sexuality, given the reality of original sin? What should a life devoted to God look 
like?   
 
Sex in Eden? 
In Book XIV of City of God, Augustine’s description of life and human nature 
pre-Fall is interwoven and often juxtaposed with his description of life and human nature 
post-Fall. In Paradise, before sin, Adam and Eve loved and found full satisfaction in God. 
They loved one another, and they always enjoyed what they loved. They peacefully 
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avoided sin and, as a result, had no experience of sorrow, mental distress, or bodily 
discomfort.172 The human will, mind, and body were all in perfect accord – human nature 
absolutely and in all its parts obeyed the will. Augustine explains, “For though [Adam] 
could not do all things in Paradise before he sinned, yet he wished to do only what he 
could do, and therefore he could do all things he wished.”173 He describes here a form of 
blissful ignorance. Still, the original humans did all that they wished, and they flourished. 
Augustine also points out that in this original state, the body was free of corruption. He 
intends to be clear that the nature and substance of the physical body are not the source of 
the forthcoming burden on the soul.174 It is not the flesh that causes sin. 
Regarding marriage, Augustine is a defender of its ordained existence in Paradise. 
He understands it as part and parcel of the fabric of the society originally created by God. 
At the very start of De bono coniugali, translated On the Good of Marriage, Augustine 
states that God intended and created, as a great and natural good, the social dimension of 
human nature and a capacity for friendship. He further explains that the bond of blood 
relationship holds this capacity for relationship together, so it follows that “the first 
natural tie of human society is man and wife.”175 This bond is described as consisting of 
fellowship, friendship, or concord. City of God provides further evidence of this original 
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intention, in which Augustine explains that Adam was not deceived by the serpent’s 
temptation, but yielded to Eve “by the drawings of kindred,” that “man could not bear to 
be severed from his only companion.”176 Brown, in his analysis, stresses the priority of 
friendship for Augustine (over against sex) as the bedrock of the marriage relationship in 
Paradise. He points to Augustine’s On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, where 
Augustine finds Adam eating of the forbidden tree not out of sexual temptation from his 
spouse, but out of amicali benevolentia, “out of the good nature of a friend.”177 Taken 
together, the original intent of marriage in Paradise was chiefly characterized by concord 
or friendship, “an expression of the primal and enduring nature of men and women as 
ineradicably social beings, created by God for concord.”178  
In addition to the presence and good of marriage in pre-sin Eden, Augustine 
argues that Adam and Eve were called to fulfill God’s injunction to be fruitful and 
multiply. If marriage was the first natural tie of human society, the union of society in 
children is a consequence.179 “They were created male and female, with bodies of 
different sexes, for the very purpose of begetting offspring, and so increasing and 
multiplying, and replenishing the earth; and it is great folly to oppose so plain a fact,” 
Augustine explains.180 Here Augustine says quite a bit. He suggests that God created two 
beings, male and female, with sexed bodies, created in a complementary fashion, for the 
purpose of reproducing and filling the earth with offspring. The reality of begetting 
children as part of God’s intention for humanity and part of the movement toward the 
City of God necessitated sexual intercourse in Paradise. Interestingly, if Adam and Eve 
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had not sinned, Augustine speculates, generations of bodies would still have come into 
existence through sexual intercourse, and the population would have increased to a point, 
perhaps aging, but free from the sting of death.181 Sexual intercourse, therefore, was part 
of God’s original plan, an ordained activity between man and woman for the purpose of 
procreation.  
It is a consequence of the primal couple’s first sin that the reproductive act 
becomes infected with the disease of lust. Since Adam and Eve did not have children 
prior to their expulsion from Eden, the question remains as to whether or not they 
actually had sex in Paradise. Augustine accepts the possibility with important 
qualifications. First, if they had engaged in sexual activity, the sexual acts would not have 
been passionate or desire-driven. He explains, “The man, then, would have sown the 
seed, and the woman received it, as need required, the generative organs being moved by 
the will, not excited by lust.”182 In other words, the will would have exhibited perfect 
control over the genitals, without lust, similar to the ease with which we use our will to 
control other body parts, like using our feet to walk, for example.183 Although Augustine 
is not outwardly denying the existence of pleasure or something akin to an orgasmic 
experience in Paradise, he consistently reminds us that the possibility of such pre-Fall 
delight would have been in perfect concord with the will and completely controlled.  
Augustine ventures even further to suggest that control over the genitals in sex, an 
act devoid of passion and calmly conducted, would have occurred without corrupting of 
the integrity of the body. He believes that semen would have entered the womb of the 
woman with the integrity of the female genital organ being preserved, “just as menstrual 
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fluid can be emitted from the womb of a virgin.”184 I argue that this “supernatural” 
description of the sexual act and reproduction in Eden is not only what might have been, 
but also a fantastic ideal for Augustine, cloaked in a thoroughly male-centric 
interpretation. In other words, it conveys his wish of the possibility of sex without 
penetration – for men the possibility of a reproductive act without physical pleasure. The 
linkage of pleasure and penetration points to his gendered interpretation.   
In sum, from the turn of the fifth century to the end of his life, Augustine 
passionately argues that God created Adam and Eve as physical human beings, endowed 
with sexed bodies that were intended for the building up of society. The growth of God’s 
society, or City, necessitated physical intercourse, childbirth, and child rearing. There is, 
consequently, a preordained “naturalness” to all facets that contribute to the building of 
the City of God. For this reason, Augustine approves of marriage and sexual intercourse 
for the purpose of procreating. He also maintains that prior to the Fall, any version of 
sexual desire was always preceded by friendship and coincided perfectly with the 
conscious will, which had yet to be distorted by sin. He never speaks of sexual 
intercourse as an end in itself in Eden. In Paradise, sex was primarily the means to a 
population, not pleasure. It was always bound to reproduction as part of God’s intention. 
Though Augustine argues that sexual pleasure, particularly orgasm as we know it, bears 
the mark of sin, it is questionable as to whether or not he believes that sex in Eden would 
have been pleasurable. His hypothetical ideal of non-penetrative, reproductive sex, 
however, suggests that sex in Eden does without pleasure.  
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Original Sin is Not Sex, But Sex Testifies to Original Sin 
According to Augustine, post-Fall sexuality must be understood in the context of 
his theology of original sin. For Augustine, the cornerstone of the original sin committed 
in the Garden of Eden is disobedience - Adam and Eve partaking of the fruit of the tree 
from which God forbade them to eat. The condition of the possibility of disobedience 
was pride, what Augustine describes as a “craving for undue exaltation” in which the soul 
abandons God as its end and, as a result, becomes an end in itself.185 To recognize that 
the original sin consisted of the first humans’ disobedience to God is to see that the sin 
itself was not of a sexual nature. Eve did not use sex to get Adam to eat from the 
forbidden tree, nor did the snake tempt her sexually. Subsequent to this act of 
disobedience, as Augustine reiterates in a number of his works, God issues a fitting and 
just punishment, namely that man [sic] becomes abandoned to himself to suffer hard and 
miserable bondage – his own disobedience to himself. Put another way by Augustine, 
“The punishment for not willing what could be done is willing now what cannot be 
done.”186 Man’s own disobedience to himself becomes manifest in the reoccurring 
experience in which the mind and flesh are no longer capable of being controlled by the 
will. As a result, the mind is disturbed, and the body suffers, grows old, and dies. The 
soul also suffers and is affected by the sensations of the flesh, both pain and pleasure.187  
The disjuncture between the human will and the flesh has profound negative 
implications for human life – in Augustine’s case, most especially for sexual life and 
experience. He explains that after the Fall,  
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[pleasure is] preceded by a certain appetite which is felt in the flesh like a 
craving, as hunger and thirst and that generative appetite which is most 
commonly identified with the name lust, though this is the generic word 
for all desires.188  
 
Augustine uses the term ‘concupiscence’ to capture the experience of desire, or lust, that 
enters human experience after the Fall. Although he recognizes that lust can have any 
number of objects, he is most captivated by and concerned with sexual lust.189 He literally 
means arousal of the genitalia, which cannot necessarily be moved or restrained by the 
will. This arousal is indicative of the mark of original sin and its due punishment. 
Augustine offers concrete proof that the will and the flesh have lost their primal harmony 
in unwanted, mentally unprovoked erections popping up at inopportune times, and/or the 
opposite – failure to produce an erection when it is most desired.  
And then there is orgasm – further, more intense evidence of the fractured 
harmony between the will and flesh. On the lustful excitement of the genitals and orgasm, 
Augustine says,  
And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward 
members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with 
a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that 
the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So 
possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is 
consummated, all mental activity is suspended.190  
 
Here, what the postmodern reader might interpret as a truly embodied sexual/spiritual 
experience Augustine interprets as the epitome of disorder. Not only is the entire body 
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possessed, compelled by desire and rendered helpless, but also the mind is caught up and, 
at the moment of climax, mental activity ceases to function altogether. For Augustine, the 
height of sexual pleasure, orgasm, is the exemplar in all of human experience (save 
death) of the will’s inability to control the mind and the body.  
Turning back to Eden, Augustine further explicates the problematic, shameful 
nature of division between the will and the body, so profoundly and powerfully evident in 
sexual experience. Before sin, Adam and Eve communed unashamed in their nudity. 
“Not yet did lust move those members without the will’s consent; not yet did the flesh by 
its disobedience testify against the disobedience of man,” Augustine explains. 191 When 
Adam and Eve were stripped of grace as a fit punishment for their disobedience, 
however, “there began in the movement of their bodily members a shameless novelty 
which made nakedness indecent: it at once made them observant and made them 
ashamed.”192 In essence, Augustine points to the first sign of the punishment for sin as 
the arousal of Adam’s and Eve’s genitalia, which provoked awareness and shame, and 
compelled them to immediately cover their “private parts” with fig leaves.  
The awareness of their nudity and the uncompelled movement of body parts 
opened the first couple’s eyes to a deeper realization about their state of affairs, namely 
their ability to discern between “the good they had lost and the evil into which they had 
fallen.”193 Their body parts moved without will and their minds were aware and ashamed 
of their nakedness. Augustine argues that proof of the shame that remains part and parcel 
of sexual desire, intercourse, and pleasure is readily observable across all times and 
places. For example, peoples of all nations routinely cover their “shameful parts.” 
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Despite the pleasure it may bring, fulfillment of sexual urges and acts requires darkness 
and secrecy, and always occurs out of the public eye.194 In his interpretation, all sex is 
implicated. Even conjugal intercourse, which he sanctions for the begetting of children, is 
never a public affair. Lust and shame go hand in hand with all things sexual.  
In sum, Augustine’s contention with sexual desire, intercourse, and pleasure, 
along with their strong connection to carnal concupiscence, arises from his interpretation 
of the post-Fall state of humanity. It is the distortion of the will that marks humanity’s 
fall from grace. As a result of their disobedience, man and woman lost their “primal 
harmony of body and soul;” sexuality and death, the consummate separation of body and 
soul, stand like bookends on the human life as proof of this reality.195 Brown argues that 
the disjunction between the will and the body, most potently experienced by Augustine in 
unwanted erections, orgasm, and impotence, moves Augustine to position sexuality 
irremovably at the center of the human person.196 Although concupiscence infused 
everything post-Fall, including friendship, marriage, etc., sexual desire and pleasure hold 
particular prominence for him. They point directly to the single, decisive event in the 
soul, humanity’s first sin. After the Fall, sexual activity and pleasure can only exemplify 
a sullied shadow of the once paradisiacal, carefully controlled, and perfectly willed 
sexual urge and activity.  
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The Doctor’s Prescription 
Augustine’s personal solution to lust was a commitment to continence for the 
duration of his life. But in his new role as bishop, he committed to healing the broken 
unity of the Church in Africa by affirming existing aspects of Roman society, including 
marriage and the family. His exegesis of Genesis (described above) embraced marriage, 
intercourse, childbirth, and childrearing as God’s intention for humanity, as opposed to 
the fallout of original sin. According to Brown, Augustine set out to reassure good 
Catholic Christians that “the marriages on which their whole society was based were not 
merely the result of a regrettable accident.”197 Even so, Augustine still had to contend 
with lust. His challenge was to advise Christians on the options for how to live with 
respect to their sexuality, given the reality of original sin.  
In On the Good of Marriage, written in 401, Augustine produces what some hold 
to be the most complete patristic consideration of the duties of married persons.198 The 
thrust of Augustine’s argument is that marriage is good on three fronts: it produces 
offspring, it provides for fidelity between spouses, and it constitutes a sacrament. He 
begins by asserting what has previously been discussed, namely that marriage between a 
male and female is good and affirmed by Scripture, as are the fruit of marriage, children. 
He adds that marriage is good not only because it produces children, but because of the 
natural companionship and eventual charity between the two sexes. It is this 
companionship that preserves marriage as couples get older, past their childbearing ages.  
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Marriage and procreation, however, also serve the good of harnessing and 
tempering lust. Augustine explains,  
Marriage has also this good, that carnal or youthful incontinence, even if it 
is bad, is turned to the honorable task of begetting children, so that marital 
intercourse makes something good out of the evil lust. Finally, the 
concupiscence of the flesh, which parental affection tempers, is repressed 
and becomes inflamed more modestly. For a kind of dignity prevails 
when, as husband and wife they unite in the marriage act, they think 
themselves mother and father.199 
 
In other words, marital intercourse excuses any sexual indiscretions or excess because 
children can be conceived and born. Intercourse makes something good – children – out 
of unavoidable lust. Augustine does not state, however, that intercourse or lust is ever 
transformed. It is as if they are permitted for the good of begetting children. In addition, 
he intimates that the presence of children, who consume time, energy, and physical and 
emotional resources, also serves to curb the couple’s appetite for sex. The goal appears to 
be for couples to transition from the immature role of lovers to the more mature, anti-
erotic roles of mother and father.200  
 The prescription thus far is for men and women to marry and to channel their lust 
in the service of procreation, contributing to building up the society of God. Any sex 
outside of marriage is a serious sin. Fidelity, or faithfulness, is the second good of 
marriage and consists of the rights that spouses have over the bodies of their partners. 
Fidelity expects monogamy and forbids adultery. It consists of conjugal chastity, or a 
sexual relationship in marriage that always aims toward procreation. Augustine explains 
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that concupiscence in marriage, associated with fidelity, becomes a means of begetting 
chastely.201  
Interestingly, fidelity is not owed only for procreation, but also for protecting 
spouses from adultery and fornication. Here Augustine approaches the topic of sex for the 
purpose of pleasure. He explains that having sex for purposes other than procreation is 
not permitted because of marriage, but because of marriage it is pardoned.202 In other 
words, marriage is not a license for pursuing pleasure in sexual activity. Sex for pleasure 
is not celebrated or encouraged. Why is it pardoned? Augustine continues,   
There is mutual service, in a certain measure for sustaining each other’s 
weakness, for the avoidance of illicit intercourse, so that even if perpetual 
continence is pleasing to one of them, he [sic] may not follow this urge 
except with the consent of the other.203  
 
It is pardoned because choosing not to have sex creates the potential to subject one’s 
partner to illicit intercourse, adultery, or fornication. Simply put, spouses should not deny 
each other the pleasures of sex and risk succumbing to unpardonable sexual temptation. 
Augustine sums things up this way: sex for procreation has no fault; sex with a spouse for 
the purpose of satisfying lust alone, as part of marriage fidelity, is a venial sin; and, 
fornication and adultery are mortal sins.204 
 The third good of marriage is sacrament, which seems to take into consideration 
the concord, friendship, or fellowship bond that Augustine views as being a positive side 
effect of marriage. Sacrament here is manifest in the indissolvable permanence of the 
bond between partners. In fact, Augustine indicates, “…the bond of fellowship between 
married couples is so strong that, although tied to the purpose of procreation, it is not 
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loosed for the purpose of procreation.”205 In other words, once married, spouses are not 
permitted to leave one another, even if the purpose is to have children with someone else. 
Similarly, adulterers and adulteresses are also not permitted to marry again. Spouses 
cannot commit adultery even if they mutually consent, and remarriage before death is not 
acceptable. As a sacrament, the conjugal bond, a symbol of something greater, remains 
intact.206 Even when married men and women are separated, they remain wedded. 
Obviously an antagonist of divorce, Augustine maintains that the marriage bond is only 
loosed by the death of a spouse.207 
 For all of the “goodness” Augustine ascribes to marriage, there is still a better 
way of coping with the impediment of sexuality. In On the Good of Marriage, he 
skillfully affirms marriage and sexual intercourse for the purposes of procreation, while 
continually reminding the reader of more laudable options – abstinence in marriage, a life 
of continence, or a commitment to virginity. He explains to spouses that abstaining by 
mutual consent from sexual intercourse before the “ardor of youth cools” is better – “a 
matter of praise to refuse beforehand what one is able to do.”208 He really wants for 
spouses to choose continence in their marriage. When he discusses fidelity, he concludes 
that although intercourse in marriage for the purpose of having children is not faulted, 
“continence from all intercourse is certainly better than married intercourse…”209 
“Though marriage and continence are two goods,” he says, “the second is better.”210 If 
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the reader glossed over these points earlier on, later in the text he reasserts, “Marriage 
and virginity are, it is true, two goods, the second of them is the greater.”211  
Augustine emphasizes again and again that nuptial chastity (sex for procreation 
only) is good, but abstinence in marriage, a life of continence, and virginity are all better. 
Continence allows for freedom from the duties of procreating, satisfying the conjugal 
debt with a spouse, and the bond of a permanent relationship. This freedom allows one to 
be spiritually subject to Christ alone, which Augustine says is better and holier. It is 
especially good and holy if this freedom is used to “think about the things of the Lord and 
how they may please God.” 212 In sum, though marriage is good and contributes to the 
building up of society, it is better, even holier, to remain continent and free to better serve 
the Lord. Ironically, Augustine says that, ultimately, “…it is better not to marry, since it 
is better for human society itself not to have a need of marriage.”213 Although at some 
level he is aware of the improbability, he still fantasizes that if everyone would abstain, 
the City of God would be filled and the end of time hastened.214 
 
No Pardon for Pleasure  
When all is said and done, is there anything salvageable in the service of claiming 
the goodness of sex and sexual pleasure in Augustine’s work? A cursory read of On the 
Good of Marriage, for example, indicates that sex is necessary for procreation, one of the 
goods of marriage. We know from Augustine’s other writings, including his exegesis of 
Genesis and City of God, that marriage, children, and intercourse are part of God’s 
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intention for humanity. It is tempting to conclude on these grounds that sex is good. But 
recall that the reality of original sin has corrupted the purity of the will and intention in 
the sexual act. Augustine explains that, with the influence of wisdom, the best of which 
we seem to be capable is to regulate the mind and reason to bridle lust. Lust, therefore, is 
corralled for the purpose of propagating offspring.215 The ends appear to half-heartedly 
justify the means. Still, despite one’s best efforts, shame is always inextricably bound to 
sexual arousal and acts, even those aimed at procreation. Lust, with respect to the sexual 
impulse, stands apart for Augustine. The genitals, more so than any other body part or 
emotion, are so completely subject to the rule of lust, that in every sexual act, we should 
remain ashamed.  
A close examination of these texts demonstrates that sexual pleasure is not among 
the goods of marriage. Augustine plainly states at the start of On the Good of Marriage 
that “children are the only worthy fruit of sexual intercourse.”216 It is hard, given this 
statement, to attribute anything good and worthy to sexual pleasure. Sex that is pursued 
for pleasure is pardoned only insofar as it occurs in marriage for the purposes of guarding 
against illicit forms of intercourse. But affirmation is different than permission, which is 
quite different than pardoning. To pardon the pursuit of pleasure in intercourse is to 
excuse or forgive it as a crime or wrongdoing. Furthermore, concupiscence, in this case 
sexual lust, though it can be channeled in intercourse toward procreative ends, remains 
lust. Pleasure motivates lust. Augustine assumes that sex cannot help but entail a “violent 
acting of lust.”217 He claims that sex necessarily involves a certain amount of “bestial 
motion” which is always shameful. Such an ever-present longing in sexual desire for 
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sexual intercourse makes it difficult to imagine the perfectly controlled, placid sex act in 
Eden that he describes. Lust (and the subsequent pleasure) is so bad that we should wish 
to be able to beget children without it.218  
Orgasm, the climax of sexual excitement, is especially problematic for Augustine. 
Recall his lament that lust takes control of the whole person, both emotions and body, 
resulting in pleasure that is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. The pleasure is so great 
that all mental activity is suspended. Outside of death, orgasm is the genuine, palpable 
experience of the dissociation of the will (our ability to control) and our body’s response 
(the uncontrollable). For Augustine, it is precisely orgasms that should sadden us, as they 
remind us of our profound alienation from God and ourselves. It follows that such an 
experience is unimaginable in Eden, explaining Augustine’s conjecture that reproduction 
could have been possible via intercourse that lacked penetration. His perspective, 
undeniably male-centered, cannot allow for an activity like penile penetration, which 
generates such forbidden, dissociative pleasure. Whatever pleasure Augustine’s Edenic, 
non-penetrative intercourse had the potential to produce, it is not the sexual pleasure with 
which we are familiar today. It is more akin to whatever pleasure one might experience 
when the feet follow the command of the will to walk.219 
Finally, as I have noted throughout, Augustine’s theological interpretations of 
sexual pleasure have their roots in the particularities of male sexual experience. Women’s 
sexual experience and any contribution it might make to a theological rendering of sex 
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and sexual pleasure are neglected. As a result, Augustine universalizes numerous 
assertions about sexual experience that do not necessarily follow for women and perhaps 
for some men.  
First, Augustine claims that the sexual urge is uncontrollable. It literally possesses 
him at times so that he feels incapable of denying it. While this might resonate for some, 
there are many who recognize that while our minds and bodies may indicate a desire for 
sexual contact, we are perfectly capable of restraint (and, in most cases, ethically and 
legally required). Second, he continually links sexual intercourse and orgasm. For him, 
pursuing the sexual urge or desire to its pleasurable end necessarily leads to orgasm. 
Sexual pleasure is orgasm. Lust, sex, and sexual pleasure are bound together in a linear 
fashion that is not reflective of all sexual experience. Third, he conflates sexual 
intercourse, sexual pleasure, and the possibility of reproduction. If no contraceptive 
methods are employed in intercourse, orgasm for men can be linked to reproduction 
insofar as male orgasm is routinely paired with the ejaculation of semen.  
The whole of sexual experience for women, however, is more complex.220 For 
women, orgasm does not necessarily follow the desire for it; orgasm or pleasure is not 
always an inevitable outcome of sexual intercourse; sexual pleasure consists of more than 
achieving an orgasm; and, the relationship between orgasm/pleasure and reproduction is 
doubtful.221 Finally, suggesting that the sexual urge is uncontrollable only harms women 
by justifying rape and other forms of sexualized violence.   
Augustine, therefore, does not speak for all when he assumes that desire/lust 
                                                
220 I will return to this point later in the dissertation. There is a tension for feminists between recognizing, 
for example, the complexity of women’s orgasm and the proclivity to problematize or overdetermine it.  
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orgasm is not related to the release of sex cells as it is in male ejaculation.  
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results in pleasure or that sexual pleasure is always a dimension of sexual intercourse and 
reproduction. His focus on unwanted erections and unexpected impotence further 
exemplifies this unreflective androcentric focus, as does his interpretation of Genesis, 
which finds moving genitals as proof of the divide between the will and the flesh. What 
exactly does he suggest visibly “moved” on Eve that necessitated covering? Because the 
penetration of intercourse is so tied to pleasurable orgasm for men, Augustine has to 
argue for ideal sex in Paradise that allows for fertilization without penetration. This point 
ignores the reality that many women did and do conceive via sexual intercourse without 
the experience of orgasm.  
In sum, sexual pleasure is interpreted as a problematic moral and theological issue 
for Augustine. It has strong negative connotations given its necessary relationship to lust. 
It bears all reminders of a broken relationship within the self and with the Creator.  
Sexual pleasure for its own sake is a disgrace, pardoned only in marriage. In this context, 
however, it remains a shameful dimension of good, the ends (procreation) to which it is 
necessarily bound. When separated from the procreative pursuit, it is pardoned only 
insofar as it keeps partners from worse sexual sin. Individuals have a responsibility to 
channel sexual desire and pleasure into married, procreative intercourse, but reap no 
redemption for pleasure itself in the process. It is a necessary yet unavoidable evil, and it 
is always shame-laden. Undergirding Augustine’s sexual ethic is a preference for 
chastity, married or otherwise, which at least liberates Christians from participating in sex 
and sexual pleasures. Despite efforts to claim the goodness of marriage and conjugal sex, 
Augustine cannot attribute goodness to sexual pleasure. If there is any sentiment toward 
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these ends, it remains ambiguous and conflicted and cannot be used in the service of 
affirmation. 
 
Saint Thomas Aquinas:  
It's Natural; It's Chemical (let's do it); It's Logical; Habitual (can we do it?)222 
 
 Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), an Italian priest in the Dominican order, is one of 
the most important religious thinkers of the Middle Ages. As a key figure in scholastic 
theology, the major intellectual force of the medieval period, he was committed to 
articulating the role of reason and logic in Christian theology.223 His most famous work, 
Summa Theologiae, concerns itself in comprehensive scope with the central aspects of 
Christian theology and the rigorous analysis of doctrinal questions. Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologiae, II-II contains his exploration of questions of sexual morality – perhaps the 
fullest such treatment in the medieval period – which became foundational for formal 
Catholic sexual ethics.   
In Just Love, Farley argues that Aquinas’ contribution in the area of sexual ethics 
was less about innovation and more about clarity. According to her, Aquinas implicates 
sexual passion in the disordering of human inclinations that results from original sin; 
however, it is only evil insofar as it is freely chosen.224 She points out that he also offers 
rationale for the procreative norm already affirmed in the tradition – one being  
…the Augustinian argument that sexual pleasure, in the ‘fallen’ human 
person (as the result of original sin), hinders the best working of the mind. 
It must be brought into some accord with reason by having an overriding 
value as its goal.225  
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Farley identifies continuity from Augustine to Aquinas, the latter affirming sexual 
pleasure’s negative affects on rational thought and the need for pleasure to have 
reasonable ends.  
Catholic Professor of Religious Studies John Giles Milhaven, in an essay devoted 
exclusively to Aquinas and sexual pleasure, argues that Aquinas’ moral appraisal of 
sexual pleasure is central to his whole sexual ethics. The heart of Milhaven’s essay 
argues that Aquinas’ problem with pleasure stems from the quality and amount of 
knowledge it provides to the participant. Milhaven contends that Aquinas “fails to accord 
more than a minimal, negligible kind of knowledge to sexual experience.”226 Sexual 
pleasure provides no rational knowledge; thus, there is no virtue in pursuing it as an end 
in itself.  
For me, determining a definitive and coherent position on sexual pleasure in 
Aquinas’ work is challenging.227 Like Augustine, Aquinas seems to create possibilities 
for affirmation in some places, only to generate skepticism elsewhere. Augustine’s voice 
in these sections of the Summa is present – literally cited throughout – an authoritative 
standard with which Aquinas engages and to which he responds. This “dialogue” 
between the two theologians is a constant reminder to the contemporary reader of the 
enduring influence of Augustine’s thought, particularly on topics related to sex and faith.  
I argue that while Aquinas is not entirely “anti-sex,” appropriate sex is very 
limited in expression, occurs in moderation, and is always questionable with respect to 
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the soul’s intentions. Sexual pleasure, especially in abundance, is suspect even in the 
most rightly-ordered sex act between married persons. It is irrational for pleasure alone to 
be the intended purpose or end of sexual intercourse. The experience of sexual pleasure 
ultimately has spiritual consequences and is precisely what keeps the soul from its 
virtuous peak, a virginal status. I also find that Aquinas continually implicates sexual 
pleasure throughout his discussions on virginity, married sex, and various forms of what 
he calls lechery, a category of sexual activities for which the goal is sexual pleasure. 
 
The Inconsequential Importance of Pleasure 
 In the Summa, II-II, before a more extended section on the nature of lust and its 
connection to sin, Aquinas reinforces Augustine’s position on the crowning virtue of 
virginity among various forms of chastity, including conjugal chastity, ordinary chastity, 
and holy widowhood.228 His view of virginity sets the tone for a less-than-positive 
perspective on sexual pleasure. Virginity garners top honors because, in this state, the 
soul, guided by right reason, chooses to continually abstain from sexual pleasure, 
allowing the virgin to freely devote herself to contemplating truth and spiritual matters. 
Aquinas remarks, “…the observance of continence is spiritual…consisting of the will’s 
purpose to abstain from sex-pleasure.”229 Consequently, he explains that virginity is not 
necessarily contingent on bodily integrity or the experience of sexual pleasure. On the 
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latter point, Aquinas insists that orgasm, a sensory pleasure, is only the material in which 
the moral act is at work. It is the intension of the will (the form) that ultimately 
determines the moral integrity of the act, and reason supplies what makes an act moral.230 
This premise allows for “unintended” experiences of sexual pleasure, as a result of “sleep 
or because of some outside force to which the mind does not consent…or from some 
infirmity,” without compromising a virgin’s sexual status.231  
Freely choosing to participate in sexual activity for the purpose of pleasure or 
even for procreation, however, constitutes a loss – the loss of a state of being unaffected 
by sexual pleasure in will and body. Aquinas makes provisions. It is possible, subsequent 
to the loss of virginity in material and form, to be restored; however, restoration is 
possible in form only. Once sexual pleasure is experienced, the material (the bodily) 
dimension is irretrievable. A vow, as in Augustine’s commitment to chastity, can be 
taken to confirm a soul’s resolve to abstain from sexual pleasures. Still, virginity sets 
itself above this kind of chastity because it exemplifies the “perfection of being wholly 
untouched by sex-pleasures.”232 
 In his discussion on virginity, Aquinas simultaneously minimizes and emphasizes 
the significance of the experiences of sexual pleasure and orgasm. Pleasure is both of 
little consequence and great importance! On the one hand, Aquinas minimizes its import 
by arguing that it is not determinative of virginity. Continence is a spiritual matter, a 
decision of the soul, guided by right reason that tends toward the contemplation of truth 
and godly matters. Sexual pleasure that is had without the intention of the will does not 
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jeopardize this spiritual orientation. When virginity is lost, it is not pleasure that is 
implicated, but the will’s free choice.  
On the other hand, what makes virginity the highest virtue with respect to chastity 
is freedom from having had the experience of sexual pleasure, as well as continual 
abstinence from sexual pleasure. So even though sexual pleasure is not the cause of the 
loss, the subsequent experience of it has spiritual consequences. Similar to Augustine’s 
position, we can read sexual pleasure here as an obstacle to divine things and closeness to 
God.233 Virginity is best, more so than conjugal chastity, widowhood, or chastity chosen 
after a period of sexual activity, because a virgin has never been distracted (or 
permanently affected/infected?) by sexual pleasure. Thus, before we even arrive at a 
discussion in the Summa about sex or sexual pleasure specifically, Aquinas defines one of 
the most virtuous paths in Christian life over against sexual pleasure. 
  
No Rhyme or Reason for Pleasure 
Sex and sexual pleasure go hand in hand for Aquinas, as they did for his 
theological predecessor. If sexual pleasure is problematic, the goodness of sex must be 
equally suspect. Aquinas’ overall position on what constitutes permissible sex parallels 
Augustine’s. He embraces sex between married persons for the purpose of procreation, 
but remains wary, even in this context, of sexual pleasure. One can see the ongoing 
complication that of the implicit assumption of the male perspective – the continual 
linkage of intercourse and sexual pleasure. Pleasure is taken for granted as part and parcel 
of sexual experience. Similarly, this perspective assumes that if one intends it or desires 
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 120 
it, one experiences it. There is no discussion regarding those whose intention it is to 
experience sexual pleasure, but then once engaged in sexual activity, do not.  A similar 
linkage is made elsewhere between sexual pleasure and procreation. Both examples are 
ignorant of many women’s sexual experience, where sexual pleasure does not necessarily 
accompany intercourse, nor does it contribute to or inhibit reproduction. 
On multiple occasions in the Summa, II-II, Aquinas makes use of the following 
quote from Augustine’s On the Good of Marriage: “What food is for the health of the 
individual, that intercourse is for the health of the race.”234 Aquinas reasons that some 
people must and do marry. Logically, sex is for the body’s good insofar as it is used for 
its purpose, namely fruitfulness. Procreation is the reasonable end for sexual activity, 
Aquinas argues. Sexual anatomy and their biological function reasonably testify to these 
ends.235 Still, Aquinas stresses that this choice is not meant to overshadow the chaste life, 
which is for the good of the soul and intends a life of contemplation on the things of 
God.236 For Aquinas, as it was for Augustine, married sex, which is oriented toward the 
growth of the human world, is a lesser good. His position rests in the philosophical 
assertion that acts of the soul are superior to bodily deeds.237 But right reason, which is 
aimed at procreation, justifies intercourse in marriage. “Thus intercourse,” Aquinas 
concedes, “may cast down the soul from the peak, but not from virtue itself.” In other 
words, married sex for procreation is not the soul’s noblest or best choice; however, it is 
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not without virtue, for virtue is on account of right reason, and reproduction is a 
reasonable end for sexual intercourse.  
Does sexual pleasure affect the virtuous nature of married sex? Aquinas oscillates 
in his response. Recall that sexual pleasure is only the material of the moral act. In this 
sense, as Farley has argued, it is not intrinsically problematic or evil. It is the intention of 
the soul, the ends toward which it aims, that matters. Aquinas, therefore, makes the claim 
that “the abundance of pleasure in a well-ordered sex act is not inimical to right 
reason.”238 In other words, the amount of pleasure in a sex act aimed at procreation does 
not pose a barrier to the goal or end. It also does not make the act sinful.  
In my reading, however, Aquinas remains skeptical about the subsequent impact 
of the experience of sexual pleasure on right reasoning. He flatly argues, “…the pleasures 
that most unloosen the human spirit are those of sex.”239 Still, pleasure in a well-ordered 
sex act does not pose a problem for virtue, even though reason’s free attention to spiritual 
things must be suspended during the pleasurable experience. This last point is important 
and should not be lost on the reader. According to Aquinas, reason cannot attend to 
spiritual things and pleasure simultaneously.240 Sexual pleasure so powerfully absorbs 
the mind that one becomes incapable of attending to spiritual realities. Again, as he did in 
his prioritization of virginity, Aquinas implicates sexual pleasure as an obstacle or 
imposition to the spiritual, or to God. Not only does sexual pleasure pose such an 
obstacle, but also to choose it is an unreasonable goal in and of itself. If the appetite for 
sexual pleasure alone is what moves a spouse to participate in sexual activity, one’s 
moral compass is called into question. This leads me to suspect that Aquinas understands 
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the experience of pleasure to have a subsequent impact on one’s ability to reason 
appropriately in the future. Perhaps the experience of sexual pleasure makes one more 
inclined to pursue sexual experience to these ends – clearly not a reasonable reason for 
sex, according to Aquinas.  
Aquinas’ problem with sexual pleasure, namely that it cannot be controlled or 
regulated by reason (and perhaps that it interferes with future attempts at right reasoning), 
is grounded in Augustine’s interpretation of original sin. He explains,  
That sexual desire and pleasure are not subject to the sway and moderation 
of reason is part of the penalty for original sin, for, as appears from 
Augustine, by rebelling against God we deserved to have our flesh in 
rebellion against our reason.241  
 
His stated position is that there could be a significant amount of pleasure in a rightly 
ordered sex-act, and this is permissible given that it is guided by reason. I argue, 
however, that given his interpretation of the punishment for original sin and the 
unmanageable nature of orgasm, Aquinas is skeptical that reason would aim itself at 
pleasurable excess.  
Milhaven points to Aquinas’ understanding of the value of sensory knowledge, 
particularly the knowledge available through the pleasures of sex, food, and drink. 
Aquinas argues that these are the lowest sorts of sense pleasures because they contain a 
minimal degree of knowledge – knowledge that has no intrinsic goodness worth the 
consideration of rational man.242 Milhaven captures Aquinas’ devaluation of sexual 
pleasure, stating, “The crucial reason for sexual pleasure’s lack of intrinsic value is that it 
has in it nothing resembling rational knowledge…it is grounded in pure sense knowledge 
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that has no share in reason.”243 Taken together, not only does reason fail to control sexual 
pleasure, but it has nothing to gain – no rational knowledge – by virtue of pursuing it. In 
sum, Aquinas leaves us with a tension. On the one hand, he affirms sex in marriage for 
procreation without the brand of sin. Sexual pleasure is permitted insofar as it is an 
inevitable part – and never a goal – of this well-ordered sex act. On the other hand, 
Aquinas indicates that reason, which values rational knowledge and sets its sights on 
participating in the knowledge of higher things and ultimately God, would resist sexual 
pleasure, even in a rightly ordered sex act.  
 
Sinning Unreasonably: The Pursuit of Pleasure 
Given Aquinas’ position on sexual pleasure and its fractured relationship to right 
reason, his conclusions regarding sexual activity wholly aimed at pleasure are not 
surprising. Sexual activity pursued for pleasure is sinful. Lechery is the name for the 
category of activities for which the goal is sexual pleasure – “the greatest there is to the 
sensory appetite, and therefore highly desirable,” he says.244 A sexual act is considered 
lecherous on account of its nature or the conditions under which it occurs. But what is of 
most concern to Aquinas is the objective of the act, which ultimately gives it its character.  
Pursing sexual pleasure as an end in itself, according to Aquinas, is a disordered 
objective. Pursuing sexual pleasure defies right reason, and right reason guides moral 
sexual choices because it follows “the natural pattern of sexuality for the benefit of the 
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species.”245 Aquinas argues for basic principles of sexuality, which he claims are 
determined by nature. There is a natural order to human copulation with regards to 
partner, organs, and posture, as well as an ordained end – reproduction. Furthermore, 
because God is the ordainer of nature, and the plan for nature comes from God, violating 
the plan for nature constitutes an affront to God.246 An affront to God breaches the 
reasonable plan for life, “which requires that things be fittingly ordered to their ends.”247 
A breach that confuses the appropriate fit of means (sex) to ends (reproduction) is sinful. 
It follows that engaging in sex acts for purposes other than procreation – for the goal of 
sexual pleasure – is sinful. Aquinas introduces yet another tension: sexual pleasure, while 
not intrinsically problematic, becomes morally problematic insofar as it is freely chosen 
and pursued.  
For Aquinas, as it was for Augustine, procreation is the only natural, justifiable, 
and reasonable end for sexual intercourse. Sexual pleasure, insofar as it distracts the mind 
from spiritual pursuits and eludes the control of reason, must have this overriding value 
as its goal.248 Aquinas calls any sex act that is incompatible with generation, regardless of 
its potential for pleasure, an “unnatural vice.”249 Among the unnatural vices that Aquinas 
cites are 1) masturbation (the sin of self-abuse, or unchaste softness), 2) bestiality, 3) 
sodomy (male with male and female with female) and 4) genital contact other than 
penile-vaginal intercourse in the missionary position (or disregarding the natural style of 
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intercourse, regarding the proper organ or “according to other beastly and monstrous 
techniques”).250  
The procreative norm also dictates other principles, guided by right reason, given 
the priority on fruitfulness. Recall that marriage is the acceptable and sanctified context 
for sex, chiefly for the purpose of begetting and properly raising children. Consequently, 
fornication and adultery, even if the sex acts are rightly ordered toward and open to 
procreation, are contrary to right reason because they harm the possible illegitimate 
offspring.251 “The sin of fornication,” Aquinas explains, “is against the good of the 
species because it handicaps the person to be born.”252 In the case of adultery, the choice 
wrongs both the child who has the potential to be born out of the adulterous relationship 
and the existing offspring of the violated marriage(s).253  
Taken together, procreation far surpasses pleasure as the reasonable end for 
sexual acts. This verdict eliminates all sexual activity that is not procreative in nature, 
regardless of the amount of pleasure available. The focus on childbearing and 
childrearing is so important that Aquinas condemns sex outside of marriage and adultery 
on the grounds that children born of these relationships suffer as a result of their 
illegitimacy. Condemnation of the pursuit of pleasure in these cases is lost under the 
intense focus on the procreative dimension.  
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Perpetuating the Legacy 
In sum, according to Aquinas, it is the intention of the soul that ultimately 
determines moral or virtuous sexual activity. So while the state of virginity, for example, 
may seem more virtuous, one needs to look to the true intentions behind the will to 
remain chaste. The application of reason to sexual life is also of importance. Sex needs to 
be guided by reason and, hence, rightly ordered. For Aquinas, this means that sex should 
be aimed at procreation, in accord with the natural order ordained by God. In the context 
of this kind of sex, there could be a significant amount of pleasure, permitted that it is 
guided by reason. But Aquinas is skeptical that reason would aim itself at such excess. 
After all, reason fails to exert control over sexual pleasure and is wholly suspended 
during orgasm. Sexual pleasure also fails to provide any modicum of valuable rational 
knowledge, the only knowledge that aids in the participation of godly things. So while 
Aquinas suggests the possibility of virtuous sex that includes the endorsement of 
pleasure, he seems to indicate that reason, which sets its sights on the higher things of 
God, would not tend toward these ends.  
In addition, when the pursuit of sexual pleasure constitutes the primary objective 
of the sexual act, the priority on right reason is intentionally disregarded. Sexual pleasure 
cannot be the proper end to a sex act. To pursue pleasure is sinful. According to Aquinas, 
the only sexual pleasure that is not considered sinful is that of married persons intending 
to reproduce. Still, because sexual pleasure interferes with spiritual matters, sex must be 
avoided on holy days and during time devoted to spiritual activity and worship.254 
Because sex must be tied to procreation, sexual activity is also limited to penile-vaginal 
intercourse. Those acts that forgo procreation (masturbation, sex using the wrong body 
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parts, sex with someone of the same biological sex, and bestiality) are problematic, 
regardless of the degree of sexual pleasure they offer.  
One could argue that Aquinas is not entirely “anti-sex,” but that appropriate sex is 
very limited in expression, occurs in moderation, and is suspect with respect to the soul’s 
intention. Sexual pleasure, especially in abundance, is questionable even in the most 
rightly ordered sex act between married persons. Pleasure in a sex act cannot be the 
intended purpose or end of the experience. In addition, Aquinas alludes to the ongoing 
effects of having experienced sexual pleasure. To experience sexual pleasure with 
intention has spiritual consequences and is precisely what keeps the soul from its virtuous 
peak. Thus, sexual pleasure remains a suspicious moral and theological issue.  
 
Martin Luther: … Waiting for You to Justify My Love.255 
German priest and theologian Martin Luther (1484-1546) – instigator of the 
Protestant Reformation, author of the infamous “Ninety-five Theses,” and father of the 
doctrine of justification by faith alone – is also known for his fervent endorsement of the 
institution of marriage, as well as his sharp critiques of vows of celibacy and virginity. 
His focus on marriage, children, and the family in his sermons and treatises challenged 
the reigning Christian ideal of celibacy.256 Luther also practiced what he preached. He 
was a Catholic priest, who five years after the beginning of the Reformation married an 
ex-nun whom he helped escape from a convent. Thus, unlike Augustine and Aquinas, 
Luther married and participated in the conjugal duties of matrimony.  
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Given Luther’s shift from previous thought and practice, and his pushing back 
against the Catholic Church, we might expect that Luther embraces and affirms sexual 
pleasure. Do his attempts at “reform” alter the sex-negative legacy inherited from 
Augustine and the Catholic tradition? Does Luther interpret sexual pleasure as a moral 
and theological issue? Is his perspective on sexual experience any broader than the male-
centered perspective that dominates the tradition up until this point?  
Like those of his theological predecessors, Luther’s positions on sex and sexual 
pleasure are not always clear. He says different things to different audiences. Some 
believe that he is pro-sex. Recall Raymond Lawrence’s recent work Sexual Liberation: 
The Scandal of Christendom, in which Lawrence argues, “Luther reveals himself to be 
unabashedly positive about sexual pleasure.”257 Farley offers a more nuanced view, 
explaining,  
According to Luther, sexual pleasure itself in one sense needs no 
justification. The desire for it is simply a fact of life. It remains, like all the 
givens in creation, a good so long as it is channeled through marriage into 
a meaningful whole of life, which includes the good of offspring.258  
 
Farley finds that sexual pleasure for Luther can be “good” if it is directed via the 
appropriate relationship toward its necessary ends. She adds that both Luther’s and 
Calvin’s positions on marriage are not dependent on the procreative ethic, an emphasis 
we have already seen in both Augustine and Aquinas.259  
Contrary to both Lawrence and Farley, Jordan is convinced that old theological 
suspicions of married sex reappear in Luther’s work. Jordan argues that Luther’s 
affirmations of married sex and its pleasures are “Edenic;” a careful look at Luther’s 
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work shows that although sex in marriage can be excused, it is not intrinsically good.260 
Lust remains lust, and it must be confined and guarded against in moderation.    
I argue that a close reading of Luther’s works on marriage reveals that sexual pleasure 
remains suspicious and tainted. One of the reasons that marriage is so revered is that it 
creates a “safe space” for sexual activity, which saves the faithful soul from fornication, 
lest one has been blessed with the “gift of chastity.” Thus, Lawrence, who titles his 
chapter on Luther “The Reformation as Sexual Revolution,” makes a weak argument 
when he says that Luther was unabashedly positive about sexual pleasure. Supporting his 
claims with anecdotal stories about Luther, as opposed to primary source material, 
Lawrence confuses Luther’s injunction to “pay the conjugal debt” with a priority on 
pleasure. I interpret Luther’s injunction as a call to reproduce and to protect against worse 
sexual sin, like adultery.  
Regarding Farley’s claims about the Reformers freeing themselves from the 
procreative ethic in their positions on marriage, I find this to be truer of Calvin’s position 
than Luther’s. Luther states that procreation is the chief end and purpose of marriage. 
Reproduction and childrearing in marriage function as safeguards against sinful lust. I 
will show that while Luther allows for some amount (we are unclear how much) of 
married sex for other purposes, the primary role of intercourse is still reproduction. Also 
contra Farley, my reading of Luther does not conclude that sexual pleasure is good. The 
desire for it is a fact of life, but a sad one! Calvin, whose positions are similar to Luther’s, 
openly reminds Christian adherents that the lust and disorder associated with sexual 
pleasure remain reasons for shame around the sexual act. In sum, with all of his lauding 
of the estate of marriage, Luther, like his predecessors, is relatively sex-negative and 
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pessimistic about sexual pleasure. Without any recognition of its gendered construction, 
it is morally problematic if not carefully contained and regulated.   
 
On the Goodness of Marriage and the Impulse to Multiply 
 Luther writes both his Sermon on the Estate of Marriage (1519) and his treatise 
Estate of Marriage (1522) before his marriage to Katharina von Bora in 1525. At this 
point, he had been serving as a parish priest in Wittenberg for years and had dealt with 
many practical problems regarding the marriage relationship. As a sacrament, marriage is 
laden with a multitude of rules and restrictions. Luther’s instructions on the married life 
and his explanation of the “gift” of celibacy seek to point out flaws in Catholic doctrine 
and papal law. After 1523, his emphasis focuses on marriage’s function as “a school for 
character,” crucial to cultivating obedience to God and important human virtues.261  
Marriage, according to Luther’s interpretation of Genesis 2:18-24, is created and 
directed by God. It consists of the creation of man and woman by God, woman being 
brought to man by God, man accepting the chosen woman, and the two uniting for the 
purposes of companionship and children.262 In his Sermon on the Estate of Marriage, 
Luther claims that marriage breeds the highest form of love between persons, a love 
reflective of God’s love for and relationship with humanity. Against the assertion that 
marriage constitutes a lesser consolation for the incontinent, Luther argues, “…marriage 
and everything that goes with it in the way of conduct, works, and suffering is pleasing to 
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God.”263 Marriage, according to Luther, should never be avoided, shunned, or looked 
down upon. It is an institution created by and ultimately pleasing to God.  
 Luther’s reverence of marriage rivals theological claims up to this point that 
uphold the spiritual superiority of chastity and a life committed to continence. Any 
suggestion that one could take a vow of his or her own accord to remain celibate offends 
him. With respect to celibacy, he argues that only a small number of people, “not even 
one in a thousand,” received a “special grace” from God which allows these persons, 
“equipped for marriage by nature and physical capacity,” to remain voluntarily 
celibate.264 As a result, he looks with dismay on the validity of all cloister vows and 
encourages priests, monks, and nuns to forsake these vows unless they determine that 
they have been the recipients of the “special grace” of continence.  
Is one estate ultimately better than the other? Luther claims,  
One should not regard any estate as better in the sight of God than the 
estate of marriage. In a worldly sense celibacy is probably better, since it 
has fewer cares and anxieties…the celibate may better preach and care for 
God’s word…In itself, however, the celibate life is far inferior.265  
 
Here, Luther admits that the celibate life allows one to focus on religious and spiritual 
practices that serve the community of faith. The estate of marriage, however, possesses 
greater significance in that God, who finds pleasure in its works and sufferings, ordains it 
for the majority of people.  
 God’s divine ordinance to marry is so powerful that Luther makes marriage a 
necessity, not an option. This point is clearly articulated in Luther’s treatise The Estate of 
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Marriage. The imperative based on God’s command to “Be fruitful and multiply” 
[Gen.1:28] implies that marriage is a natural and necessary thing, not a matter of free 
choice or decision. Luther also argues that part of our created nature is the impulse to 
multiply. He writes, “It is a nature and disposition just as innate as the organs involved in 
it…God does not command man or woman to multiply…but creates them so that they 
have to multiply…for this is a matter of nature and not choice.”266 The significance of 
this passage is that Luther asserts that sex is not only natural, but also inevitable.  
All persons who are not blessed with the gift of continence inevitably experience 
a powerful and strong urge within themselves to “produce seed and multiply.”267 Luther 
even warns that attempts to restrain oneself (apart from the receipt of special grace) result 
in physical illness that renders the body unhealthy and sickly. For example, Luther 
suggests that fruitful women are found to be healthier, cleaner, and happier!268 It follows, 
then, for Luther that the God-ordained estate of marriage is the only appropriate context 
for this procreative drive. Without marriage, persons will inevitably and unavoidably 
commit sexual sin. Luther’s advice to those who find themselves unsuited for the celibate 
life is to “strike out in God’s name and get married.”269 
 
Distorting the Edenic Ideal: Marriage as Precarious Prophylactic 
 Given Luther’s positive and insistent perspective on the estate of marriage, it 
might be difficult to imagine any strong condemnation of sexual activity. In parts of his 
discussion on marriage (like those mentioned above), Luther indicates naturalness in 
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relationship to the sexual drive. He also sees the sexual union of heterosexuals as 
symbolic of the great mystery of the union of the divine and human natures of Christ as 
well as the unified body of Christ and Christendom; hence, the sacramental nature of 
marriage.270 Like his theological predecessors, however, Luther indicates that the Fall of 
humankind has left its mark on human nature, implicating what had once been a pure and 
holy dimension of human coupling. The marital relationship is irreversibly corrupted. 
Luther explains, “And now [i.e. after the Fall] the desire of the man for the woman, and 
vice versa, is sought after not only for companionship and children, for which purposes 
alone marriage was instituted, but also for the pursuance of wicked lust…”271 Sexual 
desire becomes a motivating factor in partnering and distorts the purity of married love. 
Sexual desire pursues the pleasures of sex.  
It is important to distinguish between Luther’s explanations of 1) the “natural” 
aspect of the sexual drive that is tied to an impulse to procreate and 2) the sexual drive – 
lust – that is tied to the pursuit of sexual pleasure. My close reading reveals that Luther 
does not indicate that the pursuit of sexual pleasure is natural and God-ordained in the 
way he explains the drive to procreate. These are different drives. Lust perverts the 
original sexual drive and corrupts married love. Prior to Adam’s and Eve’s sin, married 
love was “the loveliest thing,” because it desired to have “the beloved’s own self 
completely,” explains Luther.272  Now, although each partner desires to have the other, he 
or she also seeks to satisfy this desire with his or her spouse.  
Luther maintains that the strength of this desire – the temptation of the flesh – is 
impossible to resist unless one has received the special grace from God mentioned above. 
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The result is two-fold. First, there is more incentive to marry for those who have not 
received the gift of chastity. Second, the estate of marriage now serves an additional 
function – to counteract the sin of lust. Together, these points dispel the idyllic portrayal 
of marriage that some find in Luther’s work and help us to better interpret his position 
with regards to sex and sexual pleasure.  
If marriage is preordained as the context for sexual activity and reproduction, it 
takes on additional significance post-Fall with the onset of lust and the inflammation of 
desire. The urge to satisfy one’s sexual desire with another person (bad and distorted) 
must be reconciled with the natural inclination for sexual intercourse and reproduction 
(good and God-ordained), as well as with the symbolism of sexual union (the mystery of 
God and man united in Christ and Christ and Christendom as one body). Luther insists 
that marriage is the only context that can cover over the sin of lust in sex. Without it, the 
sex act is cause for damnation. He explains, “…the wicked lust of the flesh, which 
nobody is without, is a conjugal obligation and is not reprehensible when expressed 
within marriage, but in all other cases outside of the bond of marriage, it is mortal sin.”273 
In other words, marriage is the safe zone for sexual intercourse. Without marriage, there 
is no grace to cover over the wicked lust that accompanies all sex acts. The result is 
fornication, and one’s salvation is at stake! Luther insists that fornication destroys the 
soul, consumes the body, and corrupts the flesh and blood, nature, and the physical 
constitution.274  
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In addition to protecting the individual, marriage, Luther argues, insofar as it 
shields against fornication, “benefits whole cities and countries, in that they remain 
exempt from plagues imposed by God.”275 In addition to jeopardizing the body and soul 
of the individual, fornication incites divine retribution on communities and nations. In a 
famous quote from his Sermon on the Estate of Marriage, Luther likens marriage to “a 
hospital for incurables, which prevents them from falling into graver sin.”276 With the 
reality of lust, the estate of marriage takes on metaphorical significance as a container for 
sexual impulses and a guard against fornication.  
Like Augustine and Aquinas before him, Luther theologizes that sex is 
permissible only in the context of marriage. Still, marriage is not a license for an 
“anything goes” mentality when it comes to sexual activity. Lust is cause for a number of 
sexual restrictions and warnings. Luther advises spouses to “behave properly in marital 
obligations,” so that lust of the flesh does not incite “those things” common to the world 
of brute beasts.277 One can assume that Luther is referring to sexual positions or perhaps 
to maintaining monogamous relationships. He pointedly addresses the latter in his 
insistence on faithfulness or fidelity in marriage. “In fidelity,” he says, “God sees to it 
that the flesh is subdued so as not to rage wherever and however it pleases…”278 In other 
words, sharing one’s bed with a single partner helps to exert some control over lust.   
In an ironic twist reminiscent of Augustine, Luther prescribes sexual intercourse 
in marriage (the conjugal duty) as a remedy for the lure of fornication – not for the joy of 
sexual pleasures, as Lawrence suggests. Luther explains,  
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Although Christian married folk should not permit themselves to be 
governed by their bodies in the passion of lust, as Paul writes to the 
Thessalonians [I Thess. 4:5], nevertheless each one must examine himself 
so that by his abstention he does not expose himself to the danger of 
fornication and other sins.279  
 
Here, married individuals are called to be vigilant over their sexual activity. They should 
not indulge themselves in the pleasures of sex to excess, but they also must be wary of 
their decision to abstain, lest lust moves them to any number of fornications, adultery, 
and even other sin. Marriage contains lust and excuses it in the eyes of God; however, 
lust retains its power and must continually be checked and moderated. Marriage permits 
sexual activity, but does not abolish one’s susceptibility to fornication and sexual sin. The 
threat is ever-present. 
 
Pleasure’s Parameters 
Finally, Luther includes a brief word about sexual pleasure, admitting that 
monogamous marriage “permits even more occasion than is necessary for the begetting 
of children.” 280 Amen! He gives permission for sexual intercourse that has some other 
ends besides procreation, namely for pleasure and enjoying one’s spouse. It is my guess 
that Luther is hinting at pleasure here because he never actually says that sex is permitted 
for the purposes of pleasure alone. To “permit” is a far cry from instruction to “joyfully 
affirm.” Furthermore, he immediately follows this concession with a firm injunction that 
“man should control himself and not a make a filthy sow’s sty of his marriage.”281 If the 
reader feels any relief, she is immediately checked by the need to limit the occasions of 
sex sought for pleasure alone for fear of corrupting or dirtying the marriage commitment.  
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How much sex is permissible for pleasure alone? One cannot be sure – only that 
too much or too little creates a context for fornication and disgracing the marriage 
covenant. To further complicate things, in his conclusion to the Estate of Marriage 
treatise, Luther emphasizes that although the institution of marriage is God’s work, and 
although God excuses lust-laden intercourse by God’s grace,282 the Fall irretrievably 
corrupts the flesh and blood so that sex, infused with lust, remains sinful, while God, via 
grace, “preserves in and through the sin all that good which he has implanted and blessed 
in marriage.”283  
It is no accident that this is the last sentence of Luther’s treatise on marriage. His 
endorsement of sex is highly qualified and cautionary. Sex cannot be separated from sin, 
lust, or marriage. A place for pleasure is tenuous. Contrary to Farley’s assertions, I find 
no statement of its goodness and no helpful guidelines for its pursuit apart from 
reproduction. My findings more closely corroborate Jordan’s conclusions. Even within 
the confines of marriage, sex and its pleasures, inextricably bound to lust, pose more 
threat than good. Sex is somewhat redeemed through procreation; pleasure, however, 
receives no such salvation.   
Finally, Luther’s theological reflections on sex and marriage assure that sexual 
pleasure recedes far into the background of celebrated Christian practice and experience. 
For example, a third way that the estate of marriage counteracts lust (in addition to its 
sacramental nature and the necessity of fidelity) is the production of offspring. Luther is 
clear that reproduction is “the end and chief purpose of marriage.”284 Thus, I am unclear 
how Farley concludes that marriage according to Luther is not dependent on a procreative 
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ethic. Luther asserts that married partners should not only reproduce, but should rear their 
children to praise, serve, and honor God. Raising children well in a spiritual sense is just 
as important, if not more important, than simply producing them. Properly rearing 
children is so important that it invokes salvation. Luther says, “For bringing up children 
properly is their shortest road to heaven;”285 and, “In all the world this is the noblest and 
most precious work, because to God there can be nothing dearer than the salvation of 
souls.”286 In other words, parents are implicated in creating a spiritual foundation for their 
children to cultivate their faith, and, hence, receive God’s grace.  
By explicating childbearing and childrearing as the end and chief purpose of 
marriage, and emphasizing the latter duty, Luther effectively eclipses the sexual or erotic 
dimension of marriage. Human beings flourish in marriage because 1) sex and pleasure 
are contained in such a way that fornication is avoided and 2) the structure of authority 
imposed by the family, alongside proper childrearing, increases obedience to God and the 
realization of human virtues. Flourishing in the marital relationship, or any relationship 
for that matter, is never tied to sexual pleasure.  
In the spirit of Augustine and Aquinas, Luther shows glimmers of hope that the 
marital relationship will in time become chaste. In the conclusions of his Sermon on the 
Estate of Marriage, he contrasts the blessed nature of a marriage properly regarded with 
the pitiable and dangerous condition of a marriage not properly regarded. He explains,  
And to him who bears these things in mind the desire of the flesh may 
well pass away, and perhaps he could just as well take on chastity as the 
married state. The young people take a poor view of this and follow only 
their desires, but God will consider it important and wait on him who is in 
the right.287  
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Luther shows his cards for only a moment, indicating that those who truly understand the 
noble estate of marriage eventually move beyond the need for intercourse. This 
“spiritually mature posture” is one that God embraces and for which God waits. The path 
toward this type of conjugal continence may embrace sex for a time, but ultimately 
moves beyond lust and the procreative drive. The marriage bond is preserved, but sexual 
activity and its pleasures are left behind.  
 
Perpetuating the Legacy 
In sum, I have established a number of points with respect to Luther’s positions 
on marriage, sexual activity, and sexual pleasure. Sex outside of marriage is a mortal sin. 
The drive to procreate and sexual desire both make having sex an inevitable fact of life. 
This fact demands marriage from those who have not received the gift of chastity. 
Marriage is the only context endorsed by God for sexual activity. Sex in marriage is still 
sinful; however, God’s grace covers the sinful aspects in such a way that God’s ordained 
purposes for marriage are not disgraced and come to fruition.  
Still, sex in marriage requires a number of regulations. Since marriage is ordained 
between men and women, it follows that sex should occur only between men and women; 
sex in various positions (like animals) is not permitted; sex must be monogamous; too 
much sex beyond what is required for procreative purposes is problematic, while 
abstaining in such a way that could lead to fornication and other sin also raises concern. 
The proper rearing of offspring, best aided by the hierarchical structure of the family 
system, exemplifies the end and primary import of marriage. These ends are part of how 
marriage counteracts the sin of lust. The hope remains, however, that in time, couples 
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who take seriously the significance of marriage will honor God and their relationship by 
refraining from intercourse entirely.  
Luther’s arguments with respect to marriage, sex, and sexual pleasure do not 
differ in drastic ways from the historical legacy set in motion by his Catholic 
predecessors. His affirming position on marriage shifts its significance from lesser virtue 
to a sacramental norm, ordained by and pleasing to God. But marriage is still not an 
option; it is compulsory given the reality of lust and the impulse to procreate. Marriage is 
a good in that it contains raging lust by limiting sexual experience. This aspect of 
marriage is not foreign to Augustine’s and Aquinas’s theological proposals. Luther’s 
position that sex is only permissible in marriage also has historical precedence. I maintain 
that it is difficult to argue that Luther is positive about sexual activity. It is a necessity, 
one ordained by God, but tainted by the effects of original sin. His assertion that 
“intercourse is never without sin”288 mirrors Augustine’s conclusions regarding sex and 
lust. Only Aquinas differs on this point, concluding that well-ordered sex in marriage is 
without sin.  
For Luther, sexual pleasure, the product of the conjugal act of which wicked lust 
is always part and parcel, is hardly affirmed. It bears a negative moral weight that is 
immovable and enduring. He obscurely permits pleasure outside of procreative intent, the 
only major difference among the theologians discussed thus far. Still, he heavily qualifies 
sexual pleasure with limitations and warnings that would seem to make celebrating it or 
enjoying it difficult. Lastly, Luther shows no evidence that his interpretations of sexual 
desire and pleasure are based on anything other than male sexual experience. Lust 
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inevitably moves one to fornicate, and pleasure is always part and parcel of sexual 
intercourse. 
 
John Calvin: Marriage & Moderation to Combat Fornication 
 John Calvin (1509-1564), a French theologian who went on to pastor churches in 
Geneva and Strasbourg, was one of the most important systematizers of Protestant 
theology in the 16th century.289 Best known for his work Institutes of the Christian 
Religion, he was a leader of reform in Geneva and eventually opened the Genevan 
Academy, which educated youth according to Calvinist principles. Like Luther, after 
breaking with the Roman communion, Calvin took a wife, Idelette de Bure. Many of his 
theological reflections on marriage, sex, and the problem with sexual pleasure parallel 
Luther’s thoughts. They also firm up my consensus that views on sex and sexual pleasure 
coming out of the Protestant Reformation did not alter the prevailing sentiment that sex in 
a post-Fall world was irretrievably tainted. Without the proper safeguards, the fruit of 
lust, sexual pleasure, was detrimental to one’s physical, emotional, and – most 
importantly – spiritual well-being. 
 Calvin joins Luther as a key figure who stresses the import and theological 
significance of marriage, alongside a lingering pessimistic view of human sexuality. Both 
men bequeathed these sentiments to future generations of Protestant Christians. Lawrence 
makes scant use of Calvin, with whom he juxtaposes Luther in an effort to bolster his 
argument that Luther radically endorsed sexual pleasure. Calvin, he argues,  
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…kept relatively bloodless in his posture toward sexual pleasure, 
prioritized his work over sex and marriage and was scandalized by people 
who sought sexual relations past their childbearing years.290  
 
Farley, who reports on Luther and Calvin in tandem, suggests that Calvin also viewed 
marriage as a “corrective to otherwise disordered desires” and believed “that whatever 
guilt remains in sexual desire and activity is ‘covered over’ by marriage and forgiven by 
God.” 291  While she suggests that Calvin is more optimistic than Luther about controlling 
sexual desire, she points out Calvin’s lingering anxiety that permission for sex in 
marriage could “nonetheless itself offer provocation to uncontrolled passion.”292  
Jordan argues that Calvin, despite his pro-marriage stance, really believed that a 
Christian grows “toward a life after sex” – a better life is a life beyond sex.293 In accord 
with Farley, Jordan highlights Calvin’s instance that marriage does not grant general 
permission for sexual indulgences, including lustful thoughts. When sex is “prayerfully 
sought, properly performed, and temperately lived in marriage,” marriage prevents the sin 
of lust from being imputed before God.294 Though the Reformers praise marriage, Jordan 
wittily (and correctly!) points out that “the nicest things said about marriage are said 
precisely not about married sex.”295 None of these scholars finds Calvin to be particularly 
positive about sex or sexual pleasure. 
My reading of Calvin is mostly in line with the aforementioned interpretations. 
Calvin, like Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther, only permits sexual relations in the context 
of marriage. If one has not been gifted with the ability to remain chaste, Calvin argues 
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that marriage is the remedy for the temptation to fornicate. Though lust in marital 
intercourse remains, and is always a reason for shame, marriage keeps this sin from being 
recognized and judged before God.  
I am not sure that Calvin is more optimistic about controlling sexual desire, as 
Farley suggests. Calvin focuses intently on the importance of moderation with respect to 
sexual activity in marriage. In fact, he argues that immoderation, including indulging 
lustful thoughts, constitutes adultery within the marriage. As Luther believed, the threat 
of lust remains, though marriage covers it when a couple’s sexual life is conducted with 
sobriety, purity, and honesty.  As for Jordan’s argument that Calvin ultimately advocates 
for a life beyond sex, I argue that Calvin is more exemplary of this position in his own 
personal life than in his writing. With respect to the question of sexual pleasure, I 
begrudgingly agree with Lawrence. Though Calvin does not focus on sex for procreation 
the way that Luther does, he also does not affirm sex for the purposes of pleasure. 
Calvin’s intense focus on moderation and restraint in marriage dashes any hopes that 
sexual pleasure might be positively endorsed.  
 
Marriage as Metaphorical Fig Leaf 
 Calvin takes the opportunity to expound upon sexual sin, chastity, marriage, and 
sex in his exegesis of Deuteronomy 5:18, the seventh commandment, “You shall not 
commit adultery.” Like Luther, Calvin argues that any sex or union outside of marriage is 
accursed in God’s sight. He says, “Let us not delude ourselves, then, when we hear that 
outside of marriage a man cannot cohabitate with a woman without God’s curse.”296 
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Furthermore, Calvin equates sexual relationships outside of marriage to an animal 
existence, imaging that without marriage, human beings, like “dumb animals,” would 
have indiscriminate sex with whomever they came across.297 This kind of fornication, 
Calvin argues, is sin committed in the body, as opposed to outside the body, which is 
especially heinous because the body is the temple of the Holy Spirit and a member of 
Jesus Christ. If anyone is unconvinced that fornication is not a great and mortal sin, 
Calvin points to the punishment of death listed in tenth chapter of Corinthians as proof 
that God does not tolerate sexual immorality and seeks retribution for fornication. We 
have already seen God’s retribution for sexual immorality as a theme in Augustine’s and 
Luther’s writings.    
 How does one avoid fornicating? The answer is marriage or a life of continence, 
though neither is necessarily an option! Like Luther, Calvin rails against the Catholic 
Church and the papacy’s claim that the highest virtue is not to marry. He argues that 
virginity and continence are not options available to all through the commitment to a 
vow, but rather gifts of “special grace.” He explains, “The Lord affirms that continence is 
a special gift of God, one of a kind that is bestowed not indiscriminately, not upon the 
body of the church as a whole, but upon a few of its members.”298 Living a sex-free life is 
not a choice, but a gift bestowed by God upon a select few. Here, Calvin maintains the 
virtuousness of the continent life, while criticizing the Catholic Church’s position that 
priests, monks, and nuns be required to take vows of celibacy and reject holy marriage. 
So perverse is this edict, he claims, that “beastly abominations have emerged,” and Rome 
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has “infected the world with detestable sodomies” in this “fight against nature.”299 In 
other words, he claims that such vows oppose God’s ordained order and result in same-
sex sexual activity among the priests, monks, and nuns respectively.300 Implicit in these 
charges is the unstoppable nature of the sexual drive, which is moved to express itself – 
even in same-sex relations – when the special grace of chastity has not been granted.    
Without the gift of chastity, the solution to the temptation to fornicate is marriage. 
Like Luther, Calvin argues, “Therefore, the Lord sufficiently provided for us in this 
matter when he established marriage, the fellowship of which, begun on his authority, he 
also sanctified by his blessing.”301 Marriage is thus created, ordained and made holy by 
God. “Marriage is called [a] covenant with God…God presides over marriages…God 
himself wants to maintain marriage, since he has ordained it and is its author,” he 
expounds.302 The point that God ordains the institution of marriage could not be clearer.  
Calvin explores the significance of the metaphor of Christ’s relationship to the 
Church, reflected in heterosexual marriage, in his sermons on the Epistle to the 
Ephesians; however, the metaphor of marriage as “remedy to keep us from plunging into 
unbridled lust,” prevails in his discussion regarding adultery.303 Marriage, due to the 
power of lust, becomes a necessity to all those who find themselves no longer able to 
observe celibacy. It is the “sole remedy with which to resist unchastity.”304 Though 
interpreted as a champion of marriage, Calvin’s discourse on marriage in this context is 
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300 Mark Jordan argues that later Protestants equated Catholic clergymen to sodomites, assuming that 
sodomy followed naturally from unnatural arrangements for mandatory celibacy in all male and all female 
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301 Calvin, The Institutes, 405.  
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304 Ibid, 407.  
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replete with the language of 1) “illness” to explain the wanton condition of the temptation 
of the flesh, and 2) “remedy” to prescribe the cure, the marital contract. 
 How does marriage transform sex, which without it would lead to damnable sin 
and God’s retribution? Calvin is clearer than Luther on this point. Like his predecessors, 
Calvin identifies the problem as that “broken nature which we have incurred from 
Adam.”305 Our broken nature, which divorces will from flesh, cannot help but participate 
in “immoderation of the flesh,” in this case both sexual desire and sexual activity. But 
that which would normally constitute a vice, provoking shame, as well as God’s wrath, is 
“covered, and hidden, and not brought into judgment” by marriage.306 In other words, 
God does not remove the vice. God neither dispels desire for sexual intercourse, nor does 
God recognize the inclination and/or activity as sin or sit in judgment of it.  
Still, Calvin reminds us that although marriage covers over the sin of lust, one still 
ought to feel ashamed. Sexually intimate relationships are still disgraceful, even if they 
are not judged so before God. Calvin explains, “The mantel of marriage exists to sanctify 
what is defiled and profane; it serves to cleanse what used to be soiled and dirty in 
itself.”307 In sum, marriage hides the filth of sex, sexual longing, and sexual pleasure. But 
to peer beneath or behind the covering reveals a dimension of human experience that is 
unacceptable to God and worthy of shame.  
 
Cheating with One’s Spouse: The Perils of Pleasure 
 Not only must sex and its pleasures be confined to marriage, but also they must be 
contained within marriage. Whereas Luther at least alludes to the possibility that 
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marriage allows for some sex that is not particularly aimed at procreation, Calvin’s 
intense focus on moderation and restraint dashes any hopes that sexual pleasure might be 
positively endorsed. Again, the notion of excess pleasures provokes high levels of 
anxiety. In his sermon on Deuteronomy, Calvin warns, “For all immoderation is 
unlawful. For example, when a man wants to enjoy too much license, and a wife the same 
with her husband, there is no reason for them to make their home into a bordello.”308 
Here the admonishment against “enjoying too much license” is strong. Too much sex, sex 
in the wrong position, or sex with the wrong body parts reduce a holy relationship to that 
of a prostitute and her customer. When lust is not bridled, the estate of marriage is 
comparable to a whorehouse.  
Similarly, in the Institutes, Calvin cautions couples “not to pollute marriage with 
uncontrolled and dissolute lust,” pointing out that even though “matrimony covers the 
baseness of incontinence, it ought not for that reason to be a provocation thereto.”309 His 
advice is to live in marriage with sobriety, purity, and honesty. He makes his discussion 
about the regulation of sex in marriage appropriate to his discussion on adultery by 
linking the two. Lacking sexual restraint and propriety in marriage makes one an 
adulterer in relationship to his own spouse.310 Though marriage covers the sinful aspects 
of married sex, it only provides limited protection. The dangers of sexual temptation and 
excess within and outside of the marriage are causes for increased vigilance and 
regulation when it comes to one’s sexual desires and activities.311 
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Finally, I identify two places where Calvin does not seem to commit in the ways 
that Luther does. The first is the lack of a procreative imperative. At the conclusion of his 
sermon on Deuteronomy 5:18, Calvin warns Christians that “if they should be 
responsible for children” they should feed and provide for them because God “accepts 
that service.”312 Here, Calvin is not focused on the role of childbearing and childrearing 
as parts of the excuse for sexual activity, as a requirement of marriage, or as part of the 
marital bond that counteracts the sin of lust. The second difference is that in the 
selections reviewed for this project, Calvin does not insist that in time, married partners 
should cease their sexual activity and live chastely together. The example of his own life, 
however, would give reason to believe that Calvin held such a conviction. He married a 
widow with grown children. When she died seven years later, he chose not to remarry, 
presumably because the sexual temptations of his flesh were extinguished. This would be 
reason to support Jordan’s argument that Calvin’s personal life reflected his belief and 
stance that ultimately Christians grow toward a life after sex.313  
   The final word on sex for Calvin is never positive and remains mired in the 
language of restraint and moderation when paired with marriage. The sexual relationship 
between spouses is always under scrutiny and necessitates strict policing of the self, 
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including one’s thoughts and actions, as well as the quality and quantity of sexual 
experiences. There is an obsessive focus on moderation in Calvin’s thought regarding 
sex. Though he is relatively mute on the specific dangers of sexual pleasure, his focus on 
the temptations of the flesh and lust, and the dire need for containment and restraint, 
points to the residue of the negative portrayal explicated by Augustine. Both Calvin and 
Luther are profoundly influenced by Augustine’s interpretation of original sin and its 
impact on human sexuality. I imagine that any focus on sexual pleasure for Calvin would 
be akin to immoderation. Because pleasure is so tied to lust, we can only speculate on the 
descriptive words Calvin might employ – soiled, dirty, defiled, profane – words he uses 
to describe intercourse. Undoubtedly, sexual pleasure would have been a moral 
problematic.   
   
The Legacy: Love it or Leave It 
 The Christian tradition has earned its sex-negative reputation. Contemporary 
Christians – both Catholics and Protestants – are faced with the dilemma of accepting 
these theological interpretations, leaving them behind, or finding some middle ground or 
fresh interpretation for shaping Christian sexual ethics today. Given this history, a 
number of things are at stake. For example, when the Church clings to a sex-negative 
approach to human sexuality, it fails to respond in helpful ways to cultural change and 
challenge, including its responsibility to answer the perennial question necessarily bound 
to the ethical project, “How shall we live in light of change?” It renders itself incapable 
of being self-reflective and self-critical, unable to see how theological assertions have 
been harmful and discriminatory when it comes to understanding sexuality. This negative 
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legacy continues to undergird a number of theological arguments related to human 
nature, the body, gender, coupling, sex, and sexual pleasure that present ongoing threats 
to sexual justice. The ignorance of women’s pleasure and the opposition to same-sex 
eroticism are only two examples.  
In addition, although these traditional assertions may not constitute the 
theological positions of all faith communities, they remain deeply woven into the fabric 
of our culture. One could argue that although the average person in the U.S. has never 
read Augustine’s primary texts, and although she is unfamiliar with his writings on 
marriage and concupiscence, remnants of his theology continue to exert cultural influence 
that is no longer expressed as explicitly theological. Thus, this chapter also provides a 
degree of insight into latent and manifest cultural sentiments regarding sexual pleasure.  
In sum, relieving sexual suffering, attending to sexual ethics, engaging in critical 
reflection on theology, honoring commitments to justice, and understanding and being 
conversant with culture all encompass pastoral theological commitments. Given the 
endurance of this sex-negative legacy, it behooves pastoral theology to press forward, 
either leaving it entirely behind or turning to fresh theological interpretations to creatively 
manage our hopes for a faithful theology of care and the cultivation of sexual wisdom 
illuminated by our faith.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
INCITING VICTORIA’S SECRET: SEXUAL PLEASURE AND CULTURE  
 
 In a recent correspondence with a male friend and colleague, who also happens to 
be a pastor, Jovan*314 asked me if there was a correlation between clitoral stimulation in 
masturbation and the inability of a woman to have an orgasm from penile-vaginal 
intercourse. He found it hard to believe that his new partner, Victoria*, by her own 
admission, could only orgasm with clitoral stimulation and had never climaxed during 
sex. Jovan’s question and claim intrigued me. First, I was struck by his concern that too 
much masturbation would decrease the likelihood of a female climaxing during 
intercourse. Second, I was confused by why he did not believe Victoria’s claims about 
her own sexual pleasure. And third, it became clearer to me over the course of the 
conversation that it was very important to Jovan that Victoria climax during intercourse 
when and if their relationship progressed, and that he perceived this kind of orgasm to be 
distinct from and superior to orgasms generated by clitoral stimulation.  
 After responding to his inquiry about female sex organs and erogenous zones, I 
left the conversation discovering, yet again, that female sexual pleasure still seems so 
mysterious to some. Freud’s influence loomed large in the background of Jovan’s 
assumptions. For example, in his essay The Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes, 
Freud describes a little girl’s penis envy as “the discovery of the inferiority of the 
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clitoris.”315 He also argues “…it appeared to me that masturbation [was] further removed 
from the nature of women than of men…masturbation…is a masculine activity.”316 More 
so, “…elimination of clitoral sexuality is a necessary pre-condition for the development 
of femininity.”317 In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud adds,  
When erotogenic susceptibility to stimulation has been successfully 
transferred by a woman from the clitoris to the vaginal orifice, it implies 
that she has had adopted a new leading zone for the purpose of her later 
sexual activity.318 
 
Taken together, Freud theorized that the clitoris – an atrophied penis – was an inferior 
organ and that the pre-condition for a girl to become a woman was to replace her inferior 
clitoral pleasures with those of her vagina. Masturbation was a male activity and ceased 
in the female after her pleasure center was shifted from the clitoris to the vagina. 
I was also aware, however, that sexologists have debunked Freud’s conclusions 
about female sexuality, suggesting that 1) masturbation actually helps women get in 
touch with the sensations that please them, 2) the clitoris is far from inferior with its 
concentrated cluster of nerve endings capable of producing intense pleasure, and 3) the 
clitoris actually consists of a much larger network of internal nerve endings and blood 
vessels and is capable of producing pleasurable sensations in the areas and organs 
surrounding the external head of the clitoris. Feminists have attacked Freud for devaluing 
female sexuality and pleasure and for reifying the priority on reproductive intercourse. 
For example, feminist philosopher Nancy Tuana reminds readers how, in relocating 
female pleasure to the vagina, Freud perpetuated the perceived purpose of properly 
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Books, 1962), 87.  
 153 
channeled female pleasure to be heterosexual reproduction.319 Furthermore, she argues, 
Freud indicated that repressed female clitoral sexuality increases male desire – “quite a 
modern trope.”320  
Despite additional scientific discovery and generous criticism, I still detected the 
remnants of Freudian theory in Jovan’s assumptions – proof of Freud’s enduring 
influence on cultural assumptions about sex and gender. Furthermore, it fascinated me 
that psychological theory and cultural expectations about sex and pleasure took 
precedence over the traditional stance of Jovan’s Christian faith on these matters. To both 
of these points: Jovan’s concern about female masturbation was not related to sin. It was 
related to Victoria being unable to make the transition from clitoral orgasms (in 
masturbation) to vaginal orgasms (in intercourse). Also, having sex for pleasure in a 
dating relationship was not guilt inducing for Jovan. In fact, he was troubled by the lack 
of pleasure! Instead, Jovan was fixated on the existence of two types of orgasms, even 
after I explained the physiology and the contested nature of vaginal orgasms. He assumed 
that female orgasm during intercourse – like his own sexual pleasure in intercourse – was 
a given (he did not believe Victoria), and he obviously felt that female orgasm during 
intercourse was important – a goal to which he was determined to contribute. From 
Jovan’s perspective sexual pleasure in intercourse was prized, even though other forms 
of sexual activity were most pleasurable for Victoria.   
My main point here is that other, more recent thinkers have influenced 
contemporary interpretations about sexuality and sexual pleasure. In a moment, I will 
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argue that Freud, the father of modern psychology, offers the next major cultural 
conception of sexuality, perhaps even replacing the dominance of aspects of the negative 
Christian legacy. Next, I will introduce French philosopher, Michel Foucault, who 
critiqued both the Christian tradition and modern psychology for their excavation of 
sexual pleasures to reveal deeper truths about the self. Though his name is not as 
culturally recognizable to lay people, his thought is central to arguments that recognize 
the socially constructed nature of sexuality over sexual essentialism. Foucault’s concerns 
about sexual pleasures and their relationship to oppression and liberation lead me to the 
battle between secular feminists as to how women should interpret and, thus, respond to 
the substance of their sexual desires and pleasures. I end with the work of feminist 
psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin, whose insightful attempts to explain why we accept, 
perpetuate, and are aroused by relationships of domination and submission provide 
valuable insights into the complexities and tensions in all sexual pleasures. 
Although this chapter functions as a temporary hiatus from theological reflection 
on sexual pleasure, it does so to demonstrate the sizable impact of modern psychology on 
constructing the sexual subject, in effect enforcing the centrality and significance of 
sexuality to human life. I suggest that this reality contributes to why communities of faith 
continue to fear and, thus, restrict sexual pleasure to (and assume it in) married, 
heterosexual, penile-vaginal sexual intercourse. Foucault’s work, however, signals a 
significant turning point in cultural understandings of sexuality and the role that pleasure 
has and continues to have in shaping sexual identities and norms. Secular feminists, 
informed by Foucault, concern themselves specifically with the role of sex and sexual 
pleasure in women’s lives, struggling to determine to what extent sex functions as a site 
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of oppression and/or possible liberation. As I work toward the conclusion of this project, 
I will argue that the summation of their interpretations is no less threatening to faith 
communities than Freud’s. If Freud confers the dangers of unrestrained sexual impulses, 
these scholars challenge the legitimacy of heterosexual, married intercourse. Still, Freud, 
Foucault, and the feminists make contributions regarding to the understanding of sexual 
pleasure that are crucial to the consideration of its inclusion in Christian sexual ethics.     
 
Sigmund Freud’s Science of Sexuality 
Sigmund Freud, a key founder of modern psychology, is among the most 
revolutionary and enduring contributors to modern understandings of the human 
condition. In fact, cultural critic Philip Rieff argues that Freud’s “analytic attitude,” 
inclusive of his psychoanalytic theories, replaced the dominant Christian worldview for 
Americans in particular. “Religious man [sic]” – whose commitments to the doctrine of 
right, salvific life, and ‘loving one’s neighbor as thy self,’ – gave way to “the 
psychological man [sic]” of the twentieth century.321 The latter personality type 
relinquished all doctrine, devotion to an ideal as the standard of good living, attempts to 
hierarchically reorder his instincts (superior/inferior, good/evil), and the protective, 
childish fantasy of having access to “some saving place where meanings reside.”322 In 
Freud’s theoretical frame – a “severe and chill anti-doctrine,” argues Rieff –
psychological man accepts the “sovereign and unresolvable basic contradictions” that 
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comprise “the singularly complicated human being that he is.”323 In other words, man 
learns tolerance for the ambiguities that “constrict him into a unique personality.”324 
The condition of Freud’s conflicted and ambivalent “psychological man” was 
initially theoretically (and according to Freud scientifically) grounded in a pervasive 
understanding of sexuality, which permeated life from birth to death and constituted the 
driving force that shaped personalities, gave rise to mental illness, and ultimately fostered 
the growth of civilization. Together, his theories left an indelible mark on how 
Westerners understand sexuality, sexual desire, and sexual pleasure. Although new 
schools and theories of personality development and pathology have challenged 
traditional psychoanalysis and the primacy of the sexual drive, Freud’s ideas and his 
Freudian-isms remain part of our cultural imagination and vocabulary. He put sexuality at 
all life stages back into popular conversation and culture. For example, notions of 
unconscious life (that we are not “masters of our own domain”), repressions, slips of the 
tongue, transference, and the drama of the Oedipus complex are familiar and 
recognizable ways that lay people, not just psychotherapists, interpret psychic and sexual 
life in relation to everyday experience.    
Freud, who began his career as a medical doctor before developing an interest in 
psychology, suggested that repressed sexual desires from childhood, buried deep in one’s 
unconscious, played a profound role in personality development. Sexuality took a central 
role in the conflict at the center of mental process, especially the cause of neuroses.325 
Freud’s concept of the sexual instinct, the energetic impulse that seeks pleasure or 
satisfaction, grounded his psychological theory as well as his theory of culture. In his 
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latter writings, Freud elaborated on and amended his theory about the relationship 
between sexuality and the growth of civilization. He proposed a duel-instinct theory 
comprised of the sexual instincts – understood in the widest sense as Eros, or life instincts 
– and the death instincts, manifest in aggression and aimed at destruction.326  
In the next two sub-sections, I will implicate Freud in shaping cultural skepticism 
with respect to sexual desire and pleasure, while clarifying his scientific understanding of 
sexuality and his sense of the ultimate goals for our in-born impulses. The first sub-
section will cover his enduring theory of sexuality, including the role of the sexual 
impulse and its crucial place in personality development and mental illness. The second 
sub-section will cover the relationship between sexuality and the development of 
civilization, including Freud’s use of Eros. 
 
Tyranny of the Libido: Freud’s Theory of Sexuality 
 Up until this point, the scholars addressed in this project, primarily philosophers 
and theologians, have used methods that implicitly or explicitly draw on human 
experience. Though a number of them attempt to make essential claims about the nature 
of the human condition, their approaches are not “scientific” in a modern sense. Today, 
the discipline of psychology, a social science, is situated somewhere on the 
methodological continuum between the physical sciences and the humanities. Some 
approaches attempt to be more scientific, undertaking quantitative analysis and striving 
for statistical significance in an effort to predict human behavior. Other schools must 
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settle for theory and practice that is more heuristic in nature and ultimately judged by its 
usefulness.  
 Freud, who wrote and practiced in the first half of the twentieth century, firmly 
believed that his theory of psychoanalysis was best understood as a scientific 
discipline.327 He grounded this argument in the premise that scientific research consisted 
of the objective observation of and data collection from things human and nonhuman. 
This approach yielded rational knowledge, including theories and concepts, which could 
be equated with “truth,” the correspondence of careful observations of reality, or the real, 
external world.328 Uncovering “truth” by investigating patterns and establishing the 
reliability and validity of these patterns was the aim of scientific work.   
Freud insisted that psychology was a “specialist science” and claimed that “…the 
intellect and the mind are objects for scientific research in exactly the same way as any 
nonhuman things.”329 He saw psychoanalysis as a branch of science that took the human 
mind as its object of observation, available to the analyst in the form of the analysand’s 
symptoms, dreams, slips of the tongues, free associations, and/or jokes. “Its contribution 
to science lies precisely in having extended research to the mental field,” he explained.330 
It followed that his methods in psychoanalysis were grounded in the appropriation of 
scientific methods. As a “specialist” science, he argued that psychoanalytic investigations 
were objective and no more bias than any other scientific research, as both demonstrated 
                                                
327 Psychoanalysis is 1.) a procedure for the investigation of mental processes which cannot be accessed by 
other means, 2.) a method, based upon this investigation, for the treatment of neurotic disorders, and 3.) a 
collection of psychological information/theory gleaned from this method, which is gradually accumulated 
into a new scientific discipline. E. R. Wallace, “Psychoanalysis,” in The Dictionary of Pastoral Care and 
Counseling, ed. R.J. Hunter (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990), 972. 
328 Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, 211.  
329 Ibid, 196.  
330 Ibid, 197.  
 159 
connections without imposing an agenda or taking sides.331 Freud’s claim to science and 
its objectivity was a step in legitimating his discoveries about the sexual drive and its role 
the mental health of individuals. Insofar as psychology was a “science,” it spoke to the 
truth about the human mind, its energies, and its workings. 
 
The Structural Theory of the Mental Apparatus 
 Freud argued that observation and interpretation, typically taking the form of case 
studies, revealed the conflict-ridden nature of the human psyche. Though his theory of 
the mind shifted over time, he eventually committed to a “structural model.” He 
elaborates on this model in The New Introductory Lectures (1917/1933) and The 
Question of Lay Analysis (1926), explaining the key components involved in mental life: 
the id, the ego, and the superego. His immediate concern is the relationship between the 
id and the ego, whose struggle is instigated by bodily needs (hunger and love, for 
example). A need, which takes the form of a drive or instinct, fills and energizes the id – 
an imposing, obscure, un-conflicted, unconscious dimension of the mental apparatus – 
and demands satisfaction of the need. When the need is extinguished, tension in the 
system is reduced, and pleasure is the identifiable sensation; alternatively, the 
consequence of any increase in this tension produces unpleasure. Freud calls the mind’s 
regulation of pleasure and unpleasure the “dominance of the pleasure principle.”332  
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Next, Freud asks us to imagine the ego (literally, “I”) as the “external, cortical 
layer…of the mental apparatus (of the id) which has been modified by the influence of 
the external world (reality).”333 In this way, the ego, which tends toward self-
preservation, negotiates between the drives of the id and the demands, objections, or 
approvals of the external world. It can become conscious, but primarily remains 
unconscious. The chief function of the ego is to “tame the id’s impulses,”334 and, 
ultimately, to pursue one of two possible routes. On the one hand, the ego can modify the 
drive, adapting it to the demands of reality. On the other hand, it can make changes to 
reality, creating conditions to make the satisfaction of the drive possible.335 As the ego 
increasingly faces these negotiations, the “pleasure principle” is replaced by the “reality 
principle.” Psychological health, according to Freud, is dependent on the ego exercising 
its influence over all the parts of the id, where the absence of opposition characterizes the 
relationship between the two. 
 Conflict, however, between the ego and the id is inevitable. Freud contends that 
this opposition is more likely when the ego is less differentiated from the id, immature, 
and less capable of negotiating between the id and the external world. Thus, conflict in 
the psyche is typical of the first years of childhood. Unfortunately, mishandled conflict 
during this period in life sets the stage for neurosis or varying degrees of mental 
disturbance in adulthood. Freud explains that when the feeble ego experiences an 
instinctual demand from the id, one that it cannot control and perceives will generate a 
trauma in the face of the external world, the ego withdraws from the id, leaving it to its 
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own devices. The ego “institutes a repression of these instinctual impulses.”336 As a 
result of being repressed, the impulse in the id becomes isolated and inaccessible to the 
ego.  
The inaccessibility of the instinctual impulse, however, is problematic. This is 
because the instinct itself is a form of energy and retains its force in isolation from the 
ego. In an effort to be satisfied, it “produces psychical derivatives…tears away from the 
ego; and finally it breaks through into the ego and into consciousness in the form of an 
unrecognizable distorted substitute, and creates what we call a symptom,” Freud 
explains.337 Neurosis, therefore, has its origins in early childhood, when the ego, 
undeveloped and powerless, deals with the conflict between the id and the external world 
by siding with the external world and repressing the id’s impulse. The impulse becomes 
inaccessible to the ego before making its appearance in one’s consciousness as a 
symptom or symptoms characteristic of neurosis.   
  
What’s Sexuality Got to Do With It? 
In Freud’s structural theory, conflict among various parts of the mental apparatus 
and neurosis are intimately connected to sexuality. In fact, he positions sexuality at the 
center of the conflict that plagues the mental process, especially regarding neuroses. He 
argues, “…factors from sexual life play an extremely important, a dominating, perhaps 
even a specific, part among the causes and precipitating factors of neurotic illnesses.”338 
How exactly? The instincts that fill and energize the id are sexual impulses. Thus, it is 
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from these sexual impulses that the infantile ego must institute repressions.339 Freud often 
refers to the sexual impulse or urge as libido, whose ultimate goal is the reduction of 
tension that is experienced sensuously as pleasure. Among his boldest claims is the 
suggestion that sexual impulses do not arise initially with the onset of puberty, but are 
part and parcel of life from birth onwards.  
Children, Freud explains, undergo a complicated process of development with 
respect to the sexual impulse, passing through psychosexual stages that mark their 
psychological development. In the first five years, libidinal energy is focused on 
erogenous zones on the body, moving from the mouth in the oral stage, to the anus in the 
anal stage, to the genitalia in the phallic stage. Libido then lies dormant for a period of 
time before returning to the genitals with the onset of puberty. Transitions from one stage 
to the next are marked by the conflict between the ego and the id, creating at each stage 
the potential for repressions.340  
According to Freud, the ego, as it differentiates itself from the id, must bring the 
sexual, pleasure-seeking impulses of the id into greater accord with the age-appropriate 
demands of the external world. This developmental process culminates when libido is 
harnessed in the service of reproduction in a heterosexual partnership. Fixations and the 
negotiations of conflict at each of the previous stages, however, still contribute to the 
development of various personality characteristics.341 Thus, Freud implicates the sexual 
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anal stage by withholding her feces will develop an anal-retentive character. 
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impulse – arising from any number of bodily needs – in both personality development 
and the formation of neurosis as a consequence of repression.  
In his article, “My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of 
Neuroses,” Freud reiterates his claim on the importance of somatic processes as the 
essence of sexuality and how the constitutional dispositions of children should be 
recognized as “polymorphously perverse.”342 Put differently, he draws attention to the 
importance the body and its needs, suggesting that young children experience pleasure 
via various parts of the body (mouth, anus, genitals), and that multiple objects hold the 
promise of providing pleasure. Freud also speculates that normal sexual functioning 
actually depends on certain aspects of the libido becoming repressed “under the primacy 
of the genital zone in the service of the reproductive function.”343 If the libido is not 
directed in this way, perversion or neurosis would result.344 Taken together, Freud claims 
that overly repressed or overly indulged sexual impulses contribute to psychoneuroses. 
“The nature of these maladies,” he emphasizes, “lies in disturbances of the sexual 
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344 Perversions, Freud explains, are caused by excessive or obsessional libidinal tendencies, while neuroses 
are caused the severe repression of libidinal tendencies. Freud, “My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality 
in the Aetiology of Neuroses,” 7.  
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processes, of those organic processes which determine the development and form of 
expression of the sexual craving.”345 
 In 1905, this theory of sexuality, typified by sexual stages and the development of 
personality traits, replaced Freud’s “seduction theory.” In the latter he had suggested that 
psychoneuroses, such as hysteria and obsessions, were a result of the repressed memories 
of actual sexual abuse or traumas in early childhood. After this theoretical shift, he 
argued that repressed memories were actually the patient’s own “phantasies of 
seduction,” an attempt to defend against the sexual activities the individual practiced as a 
child.346 It was not so much the experience of sexual stimulation experienced as a child 
that contributed to neurosis, as how the child responded – whether the ego instituted a 
repression or not. Later theorists would question and fiercely debate Freud’s new 
interpretation of repressed and recovered memories of sexual abuse or trauma. 
In his own time, Freud’s assertions were radical and met with significant 
resistance. The suggestion that from birth, children possessed a “sexual” life, sought to 
have their “sexual” impulses satisfied through attention to and manipulation of various 
body parts, and experienced “sexual” fantasy in relationship to their parents scandalized a 
culture that was emerging from the strict sexual moralism that typified the Victorian era. 
His explanation that repressed sexual desires constituted the secret roots of neurotic 
illness, buried deep in a part of the mind that was inaccessible to conscious, rational 
thought – the unconscious – felt threatening. His appraisal of human nature, conflict 
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ridden and continually subject to the ongoing tensions between sexual impulses and the 
demands of society and its authorities, was not positive.  
But despite the criticism and backlash, Freud persisted. In the decade subsequent 
to 1905 he published three more case histories, as well as papers on technique to establish 
the legitimacy of psychoanalytic method, and defied the bounds of his specialization by 
authoring papers on religion, literature, sexual mores, biography, sculpture, prehistory, 
and more.347 As Peter Gay puts it in the “Introduction” to a number of Freud’s works, 
“Freud took all of culture as his province. He was realizing the program he had outline 
for himself in his youth: to solve some of the great riddles of human existence.”348 
 
Freud’s Legacy 
 Freud’s initial claims have multiple resonances for the goals of this project. On a 
positive note, he demonstrates a notable affirmation of the body and its needs. Sensuous, 
bodily pleasure, driven by the sexual impulse, is natural and innate. More so, the 
satisfaction of some of these impulses is critical to healthy psychological development. 
Freud also viewed these sexual impulses as lifelong and unbound to any particular 
developmental stage. Children, therefore, are sexual creatures insofar as they desire 
various kinds of body pleasure, obtained through the use of self, others, and objects. 
Thus, sexuality in childhood is defined broadly and does not focus entirely on genital 
sexuality.  
Also, “sexual” impulses or instincts in and of themselves do not refer directly to 
the drive for genital sexual pleasure. “Sexual” merely means arising from any number of 
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bodily needs, just as the pleasure sought refers to tension reduction. The point is that 
Freud’s understanding of sexual instincts and pleasures is broader than how we currently 
conceive of sexual drives and pleasures – an intense focus on genital sexuality. Freud 
concedes, however, that these drives and pleasures are channeled into genital sexuality 
for the purposes of procreating. Although he speculates about the negative impact on 
mental health generated by the external impingement of “civilized sexual morality,”- the 
cultural emphasis on abstinence until marriage, monogamy, and procreation, sanctioned 
by religion, medicine, and every authority – he eventually concludes that these ends are 
essential for more intensive and productive cultural activities.349  
It is my contention that Freud’s theory of sexuality offered the next major cultural 
conception of sexuality, perhaps even replacing the dominance of aspects of the negative 
Christian legacy. In addition to the positive concepts he presented/argued for, Freud also 
determined that the sexual impulse, though natural, ultimately necessitated a degree of 
restriction – a sentiment common in the Christian tradition. However, instead of being 
sinful in its origins, Freud viewed sexual desire and its quest for pleasure as natural and 
constitutive of personality development. Also, the problem for Freud was rooted more in 
negotiations with the external world and its demands – society, civilization, and religion 
– than in the internal disordering of the will and the flesh prompted by mortal 
disobedience to God. Thus, problems in the negotiation of the sexual impulse 
subsequently signaled psychological illness as opposed to a moral deficiency. In other 
words, sexuality was no longer implicated in morality, but became an issue of health and 
sometimes implied a problem with society and religion rather than with the individual.  
                                                
349 See Sigmund Freud, “’Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness,” in Sexuality and the 
Psychology of Love, ed. Philip Rieff, (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1963). 
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Taken together, with respect to lingering angst regarding sexual desire and its 
pleasures, Freud’s theory up until this point indicates that the force of the pleasure 
principle is a powerful one, one that necessitates a strong ego, guided by appropriate 
demands of the external world, to implement restrictions in efforts to realize the reality 
principle. Though no longer an issue of sexual immorality, expressions of neuroses and 
perversions implied mental illness and the repression of sexual impulses. While there are 
ways – per Freud’s psychoanalytic methods – for dealing with this, the need for properly 
channeling sexual impulses and the pleasures they seek is essential.  
 
Culture, Science, and the Bonds of Community: Freud’s Eros 
 In addition to understanding mental disturbances and conducting therapeutic 
interventions, Freud developed a great interest in the relationship between individual 
psychological processes and the progress of civilization. Because sexuality was central to 
his rendering of the human condition, it also played a prominent role in the state of 
civilization. In “‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness,” Freud explains 
that civilization is founded upon the suppression of instincts, with the suppression of the 
sexual instincts being no exception. He contends that sexual instincts are capable of being 
“sublimated:” the process of exchanging an original sexual aim for another, which is no 
longer sexual but psychically related, without diminishing in intensity.350  
Again, Freud insists that the sexual instinct does not originally serve the purposes 
of procreation, but seeks pleasure.351 Consequently, pleasure is the original ends to the 
sexual impulse. This is an interesting inversion of the predicament found in the Christian 
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legacy regarding pleasure, namely that the original impulse is to procreate, an impulse 
that after the fall is sullied by the desire for pleasure. Freud explains that the pressures of 
the external world eventually relegate the sexual instincts to the genitals and guide them 
into the service of procreation. Furthermore, any excess found useless for reproduction is 
“in favourable cases diverted to sublimation.”352 Freud asserts that energy available for 
cultural development comes at the cost of the suppression of  “so-called perverse 
elements of sexual excitation,” or those impulses unfit for the purposes of procreation.353 
In other words, sexual energies that are unfit to be channeled into procreation must be 
suppressed into the service of cultural development.  
Published in 1908, Freud spends the bulk of “‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality and 
Modern Nervousness” implicating the imposition of “civilized” morality in the increase 
in neurotic disorders. He argues that cultural insistence on a limited space for the 
expression of the sexual drive, namely monogamous intercourse in the context of 
legitimate matrimony for the purpose of procreation, in addition to tabooing all other 
sexual activity, only leads to an increase in neurotic symptoms and renders individuals 
less likely to contribute in positive ways to society. Put differently, the social sanctioning 
of limited sexual expression arrests the availability of libidinal energies that might 
otherwise be sublimated and channeled in ways that foster the growth of the community.  
In my reading, Freud tries to strike a balance between the need for a degree of 
sublimation for the benefit of society versus societal restrictions that increase the risk of 
repression, thus increasing the likelihood of neuroses, and ultimately do a disservice to 
the energy available for cultural development. Although he urges reform of the strictures 
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imposed by “civilized” sexual morality, he cannot manage to get beyond the sexual norm 
of the priority on heterosexual marriage. In this sense he supports the containment of the 
sexual impulse and its pleasure not unlike the theologians in Chapter Two. However, 
while the latter are more concerned about fornication and moral sin as a consequence, 
Freud focuses on the detriment to the advancement of culture, particularly the scientific 
enterprise.  
But Freud does not claim congruence with religious thought. In fact,  to his 
concern regarding detriments to the advancement of culture, he infamously implicates 
religion, insisting, “religion alone is to be taken seriously as the enemy.”354 Because 
scientific advancement holds the key to advancement in civilization, religion is 
problematic because it not only rivals science in the quest for knowledge, but it claims to 
offer that which science cannot – comfort and assurance of happiness. Grounded in 
illusion, which is based on emotion and the fulfillment of wishful impulses, religion, 
according to Freud, so tightly binds sexual expression that it arrests the availability of 
libidinal energies that might otherwise be sublimated and channeled in ways that foster 
the growth of the community. 355 Thus, religion represses both important sexual energies 
and intellectual truth. The risk in giving religion the power to contribute to knowledge is 
individual or group psychosis, which Freud claims leads to a future full of illusion.356  
 
 
                                                
354 Freud, The Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, 198 
355 Applying psychoanalytic theory to religion, Freud hypothesizes that “religion is an attempt to master the 
sensory world in which we are situated by means of the wishful world which we have developed within us 
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356 See Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1961), and Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents. 
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The Shift in Drive Theory 
Elaboration on his theory of instincts and on the relationship between instincts 
and culture (both culture’s role in restriction and its need for sublimated sexual energies) 
eventually forces a shift in Freud’s drive theory. His introduction of the concept of 
narcissism, as well as curiosity about repetitious destructive human behavior, leads him 
to a duel-instinct theory that made its debut in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). 357 
Freud admits that he could no longer overlook the reality of non-erotic aggressiveness 
and destructiveness.358  
Consequently, Freud no longer posits the primary conflict at the base of libido 
theory as being between the ego-instincts for self-preservation and the sexual instincts 
directed towards objects. Instead, he argues that a portion of the ego-instincts is libidinal; 
sexual instincts, therefore, operate in the ego. Freud then proposes “two essentially 
different classes of instincts: the sexual instincts, understood in the widest sense as Eros, 
and the aggressive instincts, whose aim is destruction.”359 Eros compromises the instincts 
that seek to preserve life, while the death instinct, manifest in aggression, seeks a return 
to an earlier, inorganic state. Freud hypothesizes that the death instinct could be turned 
out toward the external world, expressing itself as aggression, or, if restricted, it could be 
turned inwards, increasing self-destruction. Drawing heavily from biology and life on the 
cellular level, he now attributes libido to individual cells, and so the sexual instincts 
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constitute Eros, “which seeks to force together and hold together the portions of living 
substance.”360  
In the shift to a dual-instinct theory, Freud argues, “The phenomena of life could 
be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing actions of [Eros and the death 
instinct].”361 So although the sexual instincts are now distinct from destructive impulses, 
conflict still remains characteristic of both the human condition and civilization. More 
often than not, Freud suggests that the two instincts are “alloyed with each other” to more 
or less degrees. This indicates that most Eros contains some degree of the destructive 
instinct.   
The phenomena of sadism and masochism serve as “excellent examples” of a 
mixture of these two classes of instincts. Sadism, Freud explains, is the term for the 
experience of sexual pleasure that necessitates the pain and humiliation of the sexual 
object. In this case, the aggressive instinct is turned outward, away from the ego toward 
the sexual object. Masochism describes the experience of sexual pleasure as the pained 
and humiliated object oneself, occurring when the aggressive instinct is turned around 
upon the subject’s own ego.362 Freud contends that normal sexual relations contain some 
“admixture” of both sadism and masochism.363 All instinctual impulses, he argues, 
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contains some mixture of Eros and the death instinct. His recurring point is that the 
phenomenon of life proceeds from parallel or opposing activity between the two.364  
 
The Cost of Community: Unavoidable Malaise  
The shift in Freud’s theory of instincts eventually extends to his assessment of the 
tension between the individual and society and to his hypothesis about the reason for 
pervasive malaise and unhappiness. His view of the human predicament is pessimistic, or 
realistic, depending on the appeal of his theory. In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud 
reminds his readers that the road to satisfaction or happiness imposed on us by the 
pleasure principle cannot be fulfilled. Instead, we must seek other paths, either 
independent of the external world or altering the world to suit our wishes.365 He also 
reminds us that the regulations of civilization have been cause for much hostility, and in 
some cases, neuroses.  
Freud defines civilization as  
…the whole sum of achievements and the regulations which distinguish 
our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes 
– namely to protect men [sic] against nature and to adjust their mutual 
relations.366  
 
The first entails the threat of natural disaster and the reality of death, both of which 
should be the domain of science, as opposed to religion and its illusory claims to comfort 
and assurances of happiness. The second of the two deals with the regulations of social 
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relationships, in which case civilization calls for the primacy of the community over the 
individual.  
According to Freud, individuals are expected to sacrifice their instincts and their 
liberty for the cultural claims and aims of the group.367 Recall his claims that energy used 
for the growth of civilization is withdrawn from sublimated sexual energy. Thus, 
civilization implements tight controls over the expression of the sexual instinct by 
limiting it to heterosexual genital love, further restricted by insistence upon legitimacy 
and monogamy.368 Freud explains that civilization does not permit sex as a source of 
pleasure in its own right and tolerates it only for purposes of reproduction.369 Even 
though everyone does not abide by these sexual regulations, it is this “attitude” on the 
part of society that holds claim to such power.      
 In addition to issuing strict regulations on sexual relationships, Freud adds that 
civilization demands that “aim-inhibited” libido be channeled in to the service of binding 
community members together in friendship. “Civilization,” he says, “is a process in the 
service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals…families…races, 
peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind.”370 This regulation is 
primarily prompted by the individual’s inclination to aggression and the threat that 
aggression poses to society. Freud argues that to establish bonds and relationships that 
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run contra to “man’s true nature,” civilization necessitates the restriction of sexuality and 
the encouragement of friendships.371  
When Freud steps back from these ruminations, he is not surprised that, given the 
sacrifices required of both the sexual and aggressive instincts – even in efforts to thrive in 
community with others – human beings experience a great deal of unhappiness in life. 
After all, the intensity of any pleasure is mild compared to the satiation of raw sexual 
impulses. According to Freud, we suffice to trade a degree of this happiness for security – 
protection from the wrath of nature, as well as from our own neighbor. He concludes that 
the evolution of civilization over time can be captured by the struggle between Eros and 
Death, between the life or sexual instinct and the death instinct, as it works itself out in 
the human species.372 
 
Lasting Implications 
 Freud’s theory about the necessary relationship between sexuality and culture 
established deep roots in the West. Again, there were subtle resonances with the Christian 
tradition, which also attributed the well-being of society to sexual restraint and 
containment. Adherence to the sexual mores assured protection from divine retribution. 
But Freud’s theory shows no allegiance to a social order committed to growing the City 
of God in numbers or avoiding divine wrath. He is concerned that neither individuals 
(with respect to health) nor civilization can prosper without a degree of sublimation, 
rightfully put to use by creative endeavors that increase rational knowledge, solving 
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scientific problems, and discovering truths, as well as efforts to establish bonds and 
relationships in community with one another. For Freud, there is a very real and present 
danger in pursuits – like religion – which deny these realities and insist on the attainment 
of higher moral standards and saving grace.  
 Philip Rieff notes the appeal of Freudian theory to Americans in the twentieth 
century. He argues that the presuppositions of psychoanalytic therapy encouraged the 
attitude that “man [sic] can be made healthier without being made better – rather morally 
worse. Not the good life but better living is the Freudian standard.”373 In other words, 
psychological health was no longer bound to morality. Freud had revealed the helplessly 
conflicted nature of the human condition from which there was no escape. Humanity 
needed to accept this plight, “resign [itself] to living within [its] moral means, suffer no 
gratuitous failures in a futile search for ethical heights that no longer exist – if they ever 
did.”374 “Freud,” Rieff indicates, “proclaims the superior wisdom of choosing the second 
best.”375 We recognize and have peace with our lack of capacity for genuine altruism, as 
according to Freud, we commit to community for our own security in the face of our 
neighbors’ aggression. Rieff argues that Freud, having revealed the nature and limits of 
human consciousness, intended these sentiments to be liberating. This new ideal, 
psychological man, was “an individual free in the sobriety and modesty of his egoism” –  
an ideal that America already had in Sigmund Freud, insists Rieff.376 
 A seemingly clear or analyzed conscious, however, does not unleash the fullness 
of the sexual impulses. Both the sexual and aggressive instincts retain their power. 
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Searching for a strong advocate in Freud for sexual pleasure in sex comes up short. Even 
though libido theory affirms the need and desire for sexual (bodily) pleasure and places it 
in the context of psychological development, civilization necessitates parameters, 
guidelines, and rules for the indiscriminant sexual impulses at the core of the self. 
Attention to this dimension of human life is dire –a question of health for the individual, 
safety for the community, and progress for society.  
 Subsequently, the next major cultural conception of sexuality offered no modicum 
of sexual freedom. As sociologist Pepper Schwartz explained in 2000,  
Indeed, [change] would be possible…if we really freed ourselves from the 
still-lingering power of the Freudian-based belief that sexuality must be 
constrained to committed relationships (e.g. marriage) to assure men’s 
involvement with their biological children and to maintain a civil 
society.377 
 
Schwartz, like many others, points here to the endurance of Freud’s work with respect to 
sexuality and its pleasures – to his emphasis on the cultural import of monogamous 
marriage (however much it diminishes our pleasure), reproduction, and maintaining the 
social order. Other feminists offer additional critiques of how Freud’s assumptions about 
women and women’s sexuality in these theories have served to minimize their sexual 
pleasure and even suggest their moral inferiority. 
 
Foucault on Pleasure and the Social Construction of Sexuality 
 Just as Freud’s contributions constituted a major source of new theory on 
sexuality in the early twentieth century, the work of French philosopher Michael Foucault 
has had a considerable influence on modern thinking about sexuality in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Foucault questioned the assumption that “sexuality” was naturally 
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central to the human condition – a fundamental dimension of our personhood, capturing 
our preferences and desires, our desirability, our identity, our sexual activity, and our 
sense of ourselves as normal or abnormal. He wondered how sex had become, “the truth 
of our being.” In the course of his “genealogical” approach to sexuality, Foucault 
recognized the centrality of pleasure to what he concluded was a construct composed of 
social and historical sexual discourses.378 His work on sexual pleasure is essential for 
moving this critical conversation beyond the legacies of the Christian tradition and Freud. 
In his own time, Foucault had witnessed the growth of the “science of sex,” which 
sought to ferret out the truth of sex from its many guises, including infantile sexuality, 
relations between the sexes, hormones and chromosomes, the nature of the “sexual 
instinct,” and the etiology of sexual perversions.379 Freud, along with his contemporary, 
Havelock Ellis, a British physician and psychologist, were followed by influential figures 
in the scientific study of human sexuality, or sexology. Alfred Kinsey and his infamous 
Kinsey reports “propelled sex into the public eye in a way unlike any previous book or 
event had done.”380 The press provided them with ample publicity, protected by the “aura 
of science” that surrounded the studies.381 Though this science enhanced knowledge 
about human sexual behaviors, it also proceeded to rigorously scrutinize sexual 
difference and obsessively categorize sexual perversions. The result, according to 
historian and sociologist Jeffrey Weeks, has been a “more or less coherent body of 
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assumptions, beliefs, prejudices, rules, methods of investigation and forms of moral 
regulation, which still shape the way we live our sexualities today.”382 
 
Confessing Unto Thee: Christianity and the Multiplication of Sexual Discourse 
Throughout his famous text, A History of Sexuality, Foucault probes the marked 
change in societal beliefs about sexuality since the start of the 17th century. His “history” 
amounts to a search for instances and transformations of discursive production with 
regards to sex, the production of power, and the propagation of knowledge. Contrary to 
the popular sentiment that society suffers from a repressed, silenced sexuality, solidified 
by the Victorian bourgeoisie, Foucault argues that discourse on sexuality in the last three 
centuries has actually exploded and multiplied.  
Curious as to how sexual desires and pleasures first acquired language, Foucault 
implicates the Christian tradition in the production of a mechanism for multiplying 
discourses on sex, or, as he puts it, “passing everything having to do with sex through the 
endless mill of speech.”383 He points to the practice of confession, ritualized in the 
sacrament of penance, as a seminal source in the transformation of sexual desires and 
pleasures into discourse. In Foucault’s account, the confession of the flesh continually 
increased, particularly as a result of the Counter Reformation in the mid-sixteenth century 
to the mid-seventeenth century, which emphasized the rules of self-examination and 
heavily weighted the importance of penance in spiritual practice.384 Christians were told 
to confess their sins of the flesh in full, meaning that everything had to be told, including 
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thoughts, desires, pleasures, and longings. Confession, thus, entailed verbalization of not 
only acts but also the smallest stirrings of desire.  
This “Christian pastoral,” according to Foucault, not only succeeded in turning 
desires and pleasures into discourse, but also aimed to transform desires and pleasures 
themselves in the process. Subsequently, in addition to Christian adherents mastering and 
detaching from the flesh, confessing desires also effected spiritual reconversion, or 
“…turning back to God, a physical effect of blissful suffering from feeling in one’s body 
the pangs of temptation and the love that resists it.”385 In other words, reorienting one’s 
self in pursuit of God through the practice of confession yielded the convergence of 
pleasure (the experience of the love of God) in pain (the experience of the temptations of 
the flesh). Taken together, there was a spiritual and moral benefit attached to the practice 
of revealing sexual longings, acts, and pleasures, despite the pain.  
In the imperative to confess, the technique also suggested divulging something 
akin to a secret, a dirty and dangerous one, deeply buried within the self. Foucault argues, 
…by making sex into that which, above all else had to be confessed, the 
Christian pastoral always presented it as the disquieting enigma: not a 
thing which stubbornly shows itself, but one which always hides, the 
insidious presence that speaks in a voice so muted and often disguised that 
one risks remaining deaf to it.386 
 
Foucault’s assessment of confession takes sexual temptation in the Christian life to be a 
threat in the slyest and sneakiest of ways. Looking back, prior to the Counter-
Reformation, one finds theological support for the extraordinary problem of lust and 
sexual pleasure, as well as the dangers they posed and the disguises they assumed. 
Pertinent examples include Augustine’s reasoning for why orgasm is so problematic, the 
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theme of God’s retribution for sexual sin that runs through this patristic and medieval 
theology, and the constant reminders that Christians should not be fooled and allow 
marriage to be an excuse for indulging sexual desires and pleasures. With a Foucauldian 
lens I can consider how this theology, integrated into a spiritual practice, actually gives 
language to, or produces, that which it seeks to control.   
 
Producing the Truth About Sex 
 Foucault also argues that the Christian technique of confession and its 
preoccupation with sex was co-opted by “other mechanisms.” The emergence of a 
political, economic, and technical incitement to talk about sex had analysis and 
classification as its aims – not only to condemn or tolerate, but also to manage. “Sex was 
not something some simply judged; it was a thing one administered,” he explains.387 It 
needed to be “inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, made 
to function according to an optimum.”388 Here, Foucault suggests that not only did these 
“other mechanisms” use the confessional technique to judge, but also to organize and 
regulate sexual activities in such a way that the majority might flourish. The adoption of 
this technique and its assumptions resulted in a multiplicity of discourses, produced by 
various mechanisms, operating within different institutions.389 
Foucault sees the production of discourse on sex at work in nineteenth century 
medicine, and credits it, along with the rise of Protestantism, with de-ritualizing and 
delocalizing confessional practices. With numerous ways of accumulating this discourse, 
individuals are now asked about the details of all the pleasures that are part of the sexual 
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act. This data is amassed, eventually forming “a great archive of the pleasures of sex,” 
and a system of classifications.390 Thus, Foucault asserts that the “production of truths” 
formally elicited from sex through confession was co-opted by science and subject to the 
rules of scientific discourse. For example, mixing confession with the examination of 
symptoms and the use of questionnaires, hypnosis, memory recollection, and free 
association made it amenable to the scientific standard of observation.     
Freud and his “specialist science,” the psychoanalytic institution, are among the 
culpable for Foucault. Recall that Freud uses the scientific method of observation and 
data collection to study the human mind and understands his conclusions to be 
thoroughly scientific, providing rational knowledge, insight, and approximate truths 
regarding more or less adaptive personality development shaped by the flow and 
repression of sexual energy. His curative method of psychoanalysis cannot escape 
participation in what Foucault calls the scientia sexualis, or the slowly developed 
discursive practice that is sexuality.391 Scientia sexualis is grounded in the belief that 
there is deeper truth or knowledge about the self to be extracted from one’s sexual desires 
and pleasures. For Foucault, Freud is but one figure in the progressive formation of the 
“interplay of truth and sex” that has developed since the nineteenth century.392   
 
The Scientia Sexualis Versus An Ars Erotica 
Modern society is the first to embark on the ambitious project of unearthing the 
truth about sex and mastering sexuality: the scientia sexualis. Foucault points out that this 
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approach to sexual pleasure is contrary to how other historical societies have approached 
the truth of sex – with an ars erotica, or erotic art. He explains, 
In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a 
practice and accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered in 
relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by 
reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in relation to itself; 
it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific 
quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul.393   
 
In other words, in an ars erotica sexual pleasure is a means to an end in itself. One gains 
knowledge about sexual pleasure, its contours, varieties, etc., through the experience of 
sexual pleasure itself. There is no imposed, external means of evaluation. This posture 
toward pleasure opposes the goals of the scientia sexualis, namely to determine 
pleasure’s moral value or its usefulness.  
Also unlike an ars erotica, scientia sexualis assumes sex’s elusiveness and 
pervasiveness and, therefore, must implement a number of techniques, in the spirit of 
Christian confession, to encourage desires and pleasures into speech. With the added help 
of interpretation, hidden truths about the self can be extracted from the truth told about 
sexual pleasures. The scientist, or psychoanalyst, is the interpreter of confessions, or the 
master of truth, Foucault argues.394 The scientific enterprise subsequently orders and 
categorizes these pleasures and desires, guided by the rule of the normal and the 
pathological, resulting in the establishment of a world of perversions and peripheral 
sexualities, like the “homosexual,” for example. Ultimately, the masters of truth make a 
contribution to an ordered system of knowledge. These ends also oppose those of an ars 
erotica in which knowledge about sexual pleasures is transmitted from masters of 
eroticism (the keepers of the secret) to their disciples.  
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Furthermore, Foucault suggests that a new kind of pleasure was created in the 
midst of this discursive production. “Pleasure in the truth of pleasure…of discovering and 
exposing it, the fascination of seeing it and telling it…of luring it out in the open – the 
specific pleasure of the true discourse on pleasure, he explains.”395 Put simply, those in 
charge of eliciting and interpreting sexual pleasures came to find pleasure themselves in 
the process. Thus, Foucault proposes that modern society has created its own form of an 
ars erotica in the scientia sexualis, relishing the pleasure of seeking out the truth about 
sex from the details of sexual behaviors and their pleasures.  
 
Producing Power 
Still, more is produced besides discourse, new pleasures, and new knowledge. 
Those in charge of inciting, coaxing out, and categorizing come to possess power over 
that which they create. This power does not repress. Rather, it comes into being through 
the creation of various forms of knowledge and this knowledge’s subsequent 
dissemination through public discourse. Families, schools, churches, and other social 
institutions transmit this discourse, which has already been organized into what kind of 
behavior is normal and what kind is abnormal. In this way, Foucault claims, “Discourse 
transmits and produces power; it reinforces it…”396 Put differently, discourse establishes 
norms in society and, in the process, identifies all those who do not constitute the norm.   
When it comes to discourse on sexuality, rather than power being the force that 
struggles to subdue and control the stubborn drive of sexuality, sexuality itself functions 
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as “an especially dense transfer point for relations of power.”397 In other words, power 
can be leveraged over others using discourse on sexuality to shape how they and others 
view their sexuality. At the same time, discourse can also legitimize sexualities that are 
marginalized. Foucault gives the example of medical and legal discourse in the 
nineteenth century, which proliferated discourses on the species and subspecies of 
“homosexuality, inversion, pederasty…[which] made possible a strong advance of social 
controls into this area of ‘perversity’.”398 Here, these institutions used discourse to create 
distinctions and then assert power and control. However, as Foucault points out, “…it 
also made possible the formation of ‘reverse’ discourse: homosexuality began to speak on 
its own behalf, to demand legitimacy….often in the same vocabulary, using the same 
categories…”399 Thus, through sexuality, power also legitimizes or reinforces that which 
it has created.    
 
Foucault’s Legacy 
Taken together, Foucault argues that the multiplication of discourses on sex, 
drawn from experience of desire and sexual pleasures, produces new pleasure, 
knowledge, and power. These observations – this new knowledge – needed to be 
integrated into a scientific knowledge that effected therapeutic healing.400 It had to be 
understood within the context of health and illness, for example. The truth of sexual 
pleasure needed to be rationalized. Just as Aquinas and the Greeks before him had 
emphasized, desires and their pleasures must tend toward logical ends. And so the 
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science sexualis ordered and categorized their observations and, guided by the rule of the 
normal and the pathological, established of a world of perversions and peripheral 
sexualities, ultimately contributing to an ordered system of knowledge.   
In sum, - and we could say against and because of both the Christian tradition and 
Freud – Foucault argued that far from innately central to human thriving or demise, 
sexuality, or the slowly developed discursive practice that is sexuality, is a historical, 
social construction, or a product of individual or group choices and decisions which 
effectively constructs our reality. As a construct, a product of social and historical forces, 
he suggested that sexuality was also a conduit of power, power that could not only 
discipline, but also produce. While in an ars erotica sexual pleasures function as an end in 
themselves, in a scientia sexualis they are encouraged into speech, become part of a 
discursive practice, and are organized and categorized to create subjects whose very 
subjectivities are founded on these pleasures.  
At this point, Foucault has given us a theory for the ways in which sexual pleasure 
has been used to create discourses on sexuality that shape and reshape the sexual regime 
in society across time. Dissimilar to the discourses on sexual pleasure reviewed thus far, 
Foucault seems to suggest an innocence to pleasure, a meaningless that gains its force, 
meaning, value, legitimacy, purpose, and moral or immoral currency through discourse. 
Is his final contribution to this conversation the recognition that sexual pleasure is 
somehow “pre-discourse”? And if so, how does this (or not) get us any closer to thinking 
about the place of sexual pleasure in sexual ethics? 
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Sexual Pleasure: Resource for Resistance or Mechanism for Oppression? 
 
 
Escaping the Inescapable: Pleasuring Our Way Out of Sexuality 
  
 When it comes to sexual pleasure specifically, Foucault is not always clear as to 
the extent to which it too is shaped, molded, and affected over time by discourse and the 
transfers of power that occur in this process. Mark Vernon, a journalist and former priest 
in The Church of England, has written the post-script for selected essays on religion and 
cultural authored by Foucault, but edited and published after his death by Jeremy 
Carrette. In the post-script, Vernon gets at my questions about sexual pleasure through 
his interpretation of Foucault’s refusal to publically address his own sexuality – to “come 
out” as a gay man. Vernon argues that Foucault’s resistance to proclaiming his sexuality 
actually served to support Foucault’s own argument that discourse about sexuality 
ultimately shapes, controls, and determines our pleasures. Vernon sees Foucault’s choice 
to refrain from identifying himself as a gay man as an effort to liberate himself from 
sexuality, as opposed to liberating his sexuality.401 Put differently, Foucault’s choice was 
“...not to ‘come out,’ but to find a ‘way out’ of sexuality,”402 demonstrating that he 
neither opposed liberation nor sex, but the discursive practice that is sexuality.   
According to Vernon, sexual pleasure holds the key to a Foucauldian way out. 
Citing a discussion with Foucault from April 1983, Vernon argues that Foucault wants to 
liberate pleasure from the matter of its control. Vernon says that Foucault makes a 
distinction between desire and pleasure: the former “is already pathologised,” and as 
such, declaring one’s desires only serves to declare one’s classification according to the 
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science of sex.403 Pleasure, however, remains unchanged, “imposing no intrinsic 
limitations upon the self.”404 The way out of sexuality for Foucault, Vernon argues, 
becomes a creative endeavor – literally creating new pleasures – a “polymorphous 
perversity”405 – to free one’s self from science’s “norms” for doing sex. If this sounds 
familiar, recall that Freud used a similar phrase - “polymorphously perverse”406  – to 
describe the constitutional dispositions of children, who experience pleasure via various 
parts of the body (mouth, anus, genitals), just as multiple objects hold the promise of 
providing pleasure.  
For example, Foucault offers sadomasochism (s/m) as an option. When 
participants in s/m experiment with relational dynamics that resist socially constructed, 
stereotypical roles, they open themselves up to inventing new forms of sexual activity 
that do not reflect traditional constructions of pleasure.407 In effect, Vernon argues that 
Foucault “desexualized,” or, in the least, “degenitalized” sex.408 In Vernon’s reading of 
Foucault, pleasure is central in finding a way out contemporary constructions of sex and 
sexualities. Thus, it seems that while erogenous zones and various acts are under the 
sway of discourse, sexual pleasure pre-discourse is available for discovery. 
Not surprisingly, the meaning of Foucault’s assertions about s/m and pleasure 
have been debated, even as his broader argument regarding sexuality’s historical 
construction have found favor. Some address inconsistencies in his work with regard to 
pleasure and sexuality. For example, American philosopher Judith Butler points out that 
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Foucault makes contrary claims when considering sexual pleasures. On the one hand, 
Butler argues that In A History of Sexuality Foucault maintains that no dimension of 
sexuality exists outside of the complex interactions of discourse and power.409 Given that 
the body itself is determined within a discourse in the context of power relations, this 
would lead one to believe that even the experience of sexual pleasure is already 
determined. On the other hand, in the same text, Butler calls attention to Foucault’s 
allusions to pleasures that are prior to the imposition of regulatory strategies.410 This 
sounds similar to the creative pleasures that Vernon argues Foucault suggests are 
attainable through practices like s/m, materializing unscathed by any specific discourse 
and power exchange.  
Butler is an opponent of the latter position, pointing out that if Foucault maintains 
a “multiplicity of pleasures” that are unaffected by discourse and power, then  
[he] invokes a trope of prediscursive libidinal multiplicity that effectively 
presupposes a sexuality ‘before the law,’ indeed, a sexuality waiting for 
emancipation from the shackles of ‘sex.’411  
 
Put another way, Foucault would be arguing for an essential dimension of sexuality 
buried beneath layers of discursive and institutional historical practices. Butler’s point is 
that this argument for sexual pleasure does not square with Foucault’s other assertions 
that “a recourse to a sexuality before the law is an illusory and complicitious conceit of 
emancipatory sexual politics.”412  
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Thus, per Butler’s analysis, Foucault’s other contentions maintain that the 
possibility of a dimension of sexuality – like sexual pleasure – that is somehow prior to 
the social construction of sexuality and its reinforcements is a fantasy of those who 
believe that sexuality can be liberated from the very discourses that constitute it. For 
example, coming out as a lesbian and claiming a lesbian identity does not liberate one’s 
sexuality. To the contrary, doing so actually reinforces the existence of a lesbian sexual 
identity, a category constructed to differentiate individuals based on sexual preferences.    
Elsewhere in her text, Gender Trouble, Butler herself argues that in the process of 
shaping the gendered subject, pleasures have also been constructed. In other words, 
because social discourse shapes gender norms, and participating in the performance of 
gender determines one’s sex, we must admit that in performing, our material bodies are in 
fact shaped by social discourse. She argues that pleasure centers like the penis, vagina, 
and breasts are parts of the body that have “become conceivable foci of pleasure precisely 
because they correspond to a normative ideal of a gender-specific body.”413 In other 
words, these stereotypical erogenous zones/organs are animated to fit the overarching 
regime that organizes gender-specific organs, roles, and desires. While this assertion does 
not negate the experience of sexual pleasure for men and women, it does negate the 
innate purpose of these organs to elicit pleasures, just as it negates the natural numbness 
of other parts of the body to erotic stimulation.  
If sexuality is indeed a social and historical construction, founded on knowledge 
extricated from desires and pleasures and coming to function as a conduit of power 
capable of disciplining bodies and producing sexual identities and societal norms, then 
these kinds of critical inquiries into sexual pleasure – considering its role in maintaining 
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discriminatory sexual regimes or existing as a resource for a way out of the structure of 
sexual discourse itself – are important. To what extent have sexual pleasures too been 
constructed by the multiple (often gendered) discourses that shape the body and 
determine the norms for sexual practices? Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality stimulated 
examination into the social regulation of sexuality: “the forms of control, the patterns of 
domination, subordination and resistance which shape the sexual.”414 Feminists in the 
1980s, convinced that sex was a site of the routine reinforcement of women’s 
subordination to male dominance, seized on sexual pleasure to debate its complicity and 
its promise.   
 
The Feminist Sex Wars: 
Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Chains and Whips Excite Me415 
 
Modern feminism has railed against the androcentric, patriarchal, sexist, 
heterosexist, racist, and classist character of the current sexual regime, one that supports 
female subordination, violence against women, and compulsory heterosexuality. Women 
have demanded recognition of their rights over their own bodies, “re-posing questions 
about consent and reproductive rights, desire, and pleasure.”416 In many areas of daily 
life, feminists argued for change – pointing to sexuality as a site where power was being 
used to regulate and control, while simultaneously constructing the female subject, 
including her sex roles, her sexual desires, and most likely her sexual pleasures. Agreeing 
that patriarchy and its institutions had profoundly effected (if not wholly constructed) sex 
and its norms, feminists concerned with the politics of sexuality and sexual ethics began 
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to take sides as they contemplated how to move forward with sex and sexual pleasure 
given the current state of affairs. 
Feminist discourse on sexual pleasure is crucial to the goals of this project for a 
number of reasons. The various positions on sex and pleasure testify to the difficultly – 
even among scholars with similar goals of fighting sexism and empowering women – of 
interpreting sexual pleasure and trying to place it within a framework for sexual ethics. 
The feminist debates also concern the “extreme sexual experiences,” like prostitution, 
pornography, and s/m practices, situations that Christians typically demonize or ignore in 
their discussion of sexual ethics. Lastly, secular feminists debating and writing about 
pleasure are contemporaries of many of the feminist theologians and Christian ethicists 
who address the need for reformation of the Church’s approach to sexuality and sex. 
Consequently, there is an expectation of dialogue. In other words, feminist theologians 
writing about sex and sexual pleasure should be aware of and in conversation with 
secular feminists writing and theorizing about the same.  
 In the 1980s, “second-wave” feminists began debating the role of sexuality in the 
oppression and liberation of women. Prostitution, pornography, and s/m were topics 
related to sexual practices that generated intense debate among the feminists participating 
in these “sex wars.” The “war” metaphor assumed the division of these feminists into two 
camps: The “radical feminists” and the “pro-sex feminists” or “sex radical feminists.” 
Stereotypically, the former viewed sex as a source of women’s oppression with nothing 
to recover or reclaim, while the latter understood sex as a source of power and pleasure 
for women. Sociologist Wendy Chapkis, however, argues that feminist thinking on the 
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subject of sex was much more complex, including diverse positions within these two 
camps and some arguing for a third camp altogether.   
 Drawing on sociologist Steven Seidman’s work in Embattled Eros: Sexual 
politics and ethics in contemporary America, Chapkis parses out the various positions in 
the ‘sex wars’ in the following way. Those referred to as “radical feminists” – the first 
camp – breakdown into roughly two groups: “pro-positive sex feminists” and “anti-sex 
feminists.” Pro-positive sex feminists, like Gloria Steinem and Susan Griffin, hold that 
some sexual practices – those that entail love, a commitment, trust, and mutual sexual 
pleasure – are possible when an eros free from the distortions of patriarchy is uncovered. 
The opposite of this “positive” expression of sex is “its violent articulation in 
pornographic objectification.”417 Pro-positive sex feminists argue that sexuality may be 
able to be reclaimed from patriarchy, but that this is contingent on the complete abolition 
of pornography and prostitution. And even then, sex may have to look very different than 
what is commonly recognizable to us as sex.  
 Under the same umbrella of “radical feminists” is the anti-sex group, who insist 
that sex as we know it must be abolished. Catherine MacKinnon, for example, is well 
known for her argument that sex is male domination, and because sexuality is socially 
constructed, gendered from the ground up, there is no essential sexual being underlying 
the corruption of patriarchy. She rejects suggestions from the pro-positive sex feminists 
that a natural eros preexists or persists despite male domination. Simply put, sex is 
constituted by male domination and, thus, the practice of sex itself must be discarded. 
Anti-sex feminists, like Andrea Dworkin and Sheila Jeffreys, understand s/m, prostitution, 
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and pornography to be obvious signs of sex as male domination and argue that this reality 
concerning all sex has been eclipsed.418  
 Pro-sex feminists or “sex radical” feminists - the second camp – compose the 
pole opposite the radical feminists described above. Chapkis, per Seidman, also divides 
this camp into two groups: the “sexual libertarians” and the “sexual subversives.” The 
radically individualistic sexual libertarians feminists reverse the image of sex that the 
anti-sex feminists maintain. Chapkis points out that both groups understand pornography 
and prostitution as a reality, and both maintain that the overarching framework here is 
one of power.419 Their point of departure, however, concerns who ultimately holds the 
power in these sexual transactions. Sexual libertarians argue that it is women, not men, 
who should see sex as the source of their greatest power, as opposed to a source of 
oppression and abuse.420 Camille Paglia – a well-known sexual libertarian and critic of 
Foucault – rivals Dworkin and MacKinnon, arguing that in sexual relationships it is 
women who rule and control and men who demonstrate weakness by paying for sex for 
example. For sexual libertarians, consent is the measure of an “ethical” sexual encounter, 
and because sex has no inherent meaning and derives its meaning from its context, 
individuals themselves are the judges of their sex.       
 Feminists who consider themselves sex radicals, but oppose this libertarian 
position, remain troubled by the denial of power and privilege that structure sex. They 
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situate sex in a culture of male domination and concede that sex is constructed by this 
culture.421 Thus, they are cognizant of and take into consideration the impact of the social 
and political context of sex. They distinguish themselves from radical feminists, 
however, by asserting that sex is not fully determined by patriarchy. Carole Vance, in 
Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, explains that attention must be given 
to both the patriarchal structure of sexual life and women’s choice and agency to 
determine what pleases them. With this in mind, this group of sex radical feminists sees 
sex as a site of struggle, neither inherently liberating nor repressive. Theirs is a vision of 
political struggle from within a culture of male domination that places power and 
pleasure at the heart of sexual discourse. They advocate for more than just consent in 
erotic ethics – they favor a subversive approach.  
 Subversive sex radical feminists “resignify sexual language and practices through 
using them in unintended ways.”422 For example, Pat Califia argues that lesbians have 
been able to liberate and change the meanings of sexual vocabulary, like the word “dyke” 
for example. Califia also insists that the meaning of sexual language and practice is 
context dependent. In her article, “Feminism and Sadomasochism,” she explains how her 
sexual experience in s/m sexual activity is framed by a superseding egalitarian 
relationship, mutual negotiation about the rules of play, the intent to enhance sexual 
pleasure, and safety concerns. Far from sexual assault, with the intent to damage or harm, 
Califia explains how s/m play uses dominant and submissive roles toward “the most 
significant reward for being a top or bottom…sexual pleasure.”423 Thus, s/m practices in 
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her context maximize her agency and her pleasure, as opposed to hurting her and 
rendering her powerless.       
 Taken together, the main disagreement between the radical feminists and the sex 
radicals when it comes to the politics of sexuality and sexual ethics does not concern 
whether structures of gender inequality construct and enact sex. Both agree that the 
historical construction of sexuality has produced a sexist social order that profoundly 
implicates sex. The difference rests in the extent to which patriarchy has determined sex 
and its pleasures. Whereas radical feminists see the extent of determination as absolute, 
sex radicals see sex as an opportunity to either destabilize power or reinforce it. For this 
latter group, practices like s/m, prostitution, pornography, and other dissident sexual 
practices are much more complex than wholesale exploitation and can be used in 
subversive ways to assert a woman’s choice and agency, as well as to enhance her 
experience of pleasure. Thus, sex radical feminists, like Gayle Rubin, resist subjecting 
sexual pleasure to extrinsic criteria and argue that oppression on the basis of gender is 
distinct from oppression on the basis of sexual practice.424  
 
Domination, Submission, and the Psychological Substance of Erotic Pleasure 
 The unconscious and its indiscriminate sexual impulses had been exposed. The 
thoroughly essential nature of sex, gender, sexuality, and even desires had been 
questioned and rejected. And now the roles and goals of sex in the lives of women were 
being scrutinized and revised to liberate and reveal the political dimensions of even the 
most personal and intimate aspects of women’s lives. Female sexual pleasure was a hot 
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topic for radical and sex radical feminists. This issue of pleasure was made more complex  
because the ubiquitous relational dynamic between the sexes – that of domination and 
submission – extended to the bedroom, marrying sexual arousal and pleasure to both the 
experience of dominating or submitting to one’s partner(s). So pervasive were these roles 
in eliciting pleasures not even sex-same partners were immune. For example, some 
radical feminists pointed to the existence of butch-femme roles and s/m practices in the 
lesbian community, arguing that both amounted to compliance with patriarchy and the 
habituation of women to abuse and domination in sex as in all areas of life.425      
 In 1983, an edited text, Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, was 
published, containing writings by a number of influential pro-sex feminist thinkers. 
Among them was feminist psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin, whose article “Master and 
Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination” bracketed the condemnation of gendered 
power dynamics in sex, and instead took an exploratory, psychoanalytic approach to 
understanding the relationship between power dynamics and sexual excitement. She is 
interested in the cultural association of sexual dominance with men and sexual 
submission with women and chooses to analyze sadomasochistic sexual relationships and 
fantasies with the assumption that they are the most intense expressions of dynamics that 
run through all relationships of arousal. When it comes to women’s sexual experience, 
Benjamin is convinced that erotic pleasure is intrinsic to their participation in s/m sexual 
relationships, including assuming the submissive role.   
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Between Freud and Benjamin: Sexual Stimuli in Psychodynamic Theory 
  Part of what Benjamin argues in “Master and Slave” and later in her book, The 
Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (1988), is that 
women’s complicity as typically submissive partners (to more or less degrees) in sexual 
relationships is less about objectification and victimization and more about a deeply 
rooted motivation that is bound to erotic pleasure. Her claim is much more complex than 
it appears on the surface and stands in a long line of critiques of classical psychoanalytic 
theory, which challenge Freud’s claims to pleasure as the primary motivation of the 
libidinal or sexual drive. Over the course of the nineteenth century, these critiques were 
so strong that they provoked a theoretical shift (one of many) in psychodynamic theory. 
Collectively known as object relations theory (ORT), these proposals properly concerned 
themselves with how object relations, or the nature of relationships with real or 
internalized objects and/or primary caregivers, determine libido. 
 Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell define ORT, in its broadest sense, as theories 
or aspects of theories that “…[explore] the relationship between real, external people and 
internal images and residues of relations with them, and the significance of these residues 
for psychic functioning.”426 In other words, these theories concern the influence of actual 
experiences with or interpretations of real people or objects on psychological 
development. Brian Dines and Angelina Perrett add that ORT “treats relations with 
objects, rather than the expression of instincts, as the basic preoccupation of 
                                                
426 Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 12. It is important to note that Greenberg and Mitchell also identify the 
complicated nature of the term ORT, which is often used to describe various connotations and denotations 
in a number of contexts. The term is attached to theorists who do not necessarily agree with one another, 
and not all self-identified object relations theorists recognize other object relations theorists as such. For the 
sake of simplicity, the remainder of this chapter will use ORT to situate the theorists to come unless 
otherwise specified. I will be attentive to drawing out distinctions as progress.   
 198 
psychoanalytic thinking and clinical work.”427 Thus, one way that ORT distinguishes 
itself from Freudian classical analysis is by theorizing about the development of one’s 
personality from interactions between the self and objects, as opposed to the satisfaction 
or repression of instincts. Because children commence relating to their environment 
immediately after birth, object relations theorists move their primary analysis from 
Freud’s Oedipal stage of development (3-5 years of age, with a focus on the mother, 
father, child triad) to pre-Oedipal experiences, particularly those occurring between the 
infant and its primary caregiver.428  
 As the satisfaction or repression of libidinal instincts began to take a back seat to 
the primacy of interactions between the self and objects/people, theorists gravitating 
toward ORT also began to question the drive for pleasure as the primary impetus for 
acting upon an object/person. What then was the impetus for the drive? How did this 
translate into adult sexual life? And, finally, mostly importantly for my work, what role 
was pleasure left to play in our sexual experiences and to what extent did it determine the 
shape of our intimate relationships and our sexual practices?  
W. R. D. Fairbairn is a key figure in the shift in psychoanalytic thinking from 
pleasure-driven human beings to the human being driven by the need for connection.429 
                                                
427 Brian Daines and Angelina Perrett, Psychodynamic Approaches to Sexual Problems, (Philadelphia: 
Open University Press, 2000),  58.  
428 Many ORT theorists retain aspects of Freud’s drive theory and the importance of Oedipal conflicts, but 
they hypothesize that psychosexual development begins at earlier stages in the infant’s development. 
429 Greenberg and Mitchell argue that although Melanie Klein’s work begins a transition from Freud’s 
classical drive/structure model to a relational/structure model, Fairbairn “provides the purest and clearest 
expression of the shift from the drive/structure model to the relational/structure model.” Greenberg and 
Mitchell, 136, 151. Greenberg and Mitchell acknowledge Klein’s work as a key transition to work like 
Fairbairn’s. They also site Harry Stack Sullivan’s “interpersonal psychiatry,” in addition to Fairbairn, as a 
definitively transitional figure between models. Contemporary ORT theorist David E. Scharff finds 
Fairbairn’s theory the most helpful for understanding attachment and the psychological processes unfolding 
in infancy that ultimately impact adult sexual relationships. In The Sexual Relationship: An Object 
Relations View of Sex and the Family, Scharff draws extensively on the nature of primary emotional bonds 
and how sexual relationships both reflect the internal world of individuals and influence these worlds, He 
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In Becoming Attached: First Relationships and How They Shape Our Capacity to Love, 
Robert Karen, a former child psychotherapist, argues, 
Fairbairn was the first to argue that what Freud had underestimated in all 
this was the need for other people. [Fairbairn] argued that libido, or sexual 
energy, was not pleasure-seeking, as the classical theory held, but person-
seeking.430  
 
In other words, Fairbairn’s claims departed from classical theory because he did not view 
attachment as secondary to the infant’s use of objects as a vehicle for reducing libidinal 
tensions, satisfying impulses, and providing pleasure. Instead, Fairbairn saw attachment, 
or relation-seeking, as primary in the infant’s development, and ultimately key to its 
survival.431 Subsequently, Fairbairn claimed that motivation in both infancy and 
adulthood did not result from the quest for bodily pleasures, but from the “search for and 
maintenance of contact with others.”432      
Fairbairn’s shift in understanding the workings and aims of libido and the 
function of pleasure altered psychological renderings of human motivation and, 
subsequently, perspectives on the origins of illness and mental health. Human motivation 
could now be envisioned as the search for and maintenance of relations with other 
individuals. Fairbairn characterized development as a gradual move from “infantile 
dependence” to “mature dependence,” marked by a “transitional” stage in-between. He 
                                                                                                                                            
also makes use of Bowlby, Mahler, Klein and Winnicott. See David Scharff, The Sexual Relationship: An 
Object Relations View of Sex and the Family, (London: Routledge, 1982). 
430 Robert Karen, Becoming Attached: First Relationships and How They Shape Our Capacity to Love, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 39. Karen attends to Fairbairn in the context of explaining 
Fairbairn’s importance to the work of attachment theorist John Bowlby. 
431 Greenberg and Mitchell, 156.  
432 Ibid. Fairbairn’s contribution is distinguished from Klein because although Klein argued that objects 
were built into impulses from the start (as opposed to being added to impulses secondarily), she still posited 
the ultimate aim as pleasure – the object served as a means to an end. Fairbairn also argued that the object 
was built into the impulse from the start; however, he proposed that “the main characteristic of libidinal 
energy is its object-seeking quality. Pleasure is not the end goal of the impulse, but a means to its real end – 
relations with another.” Greenberg and Mitchell, 154.  
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intentionally choses “dependence” to describe this mature posture as opposed to 
independence because, he said, “a capacity for relationships necessarily implies 
dependence of some sort…characterized neither by a one-sided attitude of incorporation 
nor by an attitude of primary emotional identification.”433 Fairbairn held that 
relationships always necessitate a reciprocating other, one whose response we are 
dependent on for relationship without imposing ourselves entirely or identifying too 
strongly with the other. The important point here is that relationship is a bi-directional 
process. Not only does it take two active individuals to participate in a relationship, but it 
also requires reciprocity.  
In light of Fairbairn’s proposal, the origins of mental health issues arise from 
complications in relationships with others (or internalized others/objects), as opposed to 
conflicts over pleasure-seeking impulses or instincts derivative of the death instinct. The 
need, at baseline, is for contact, and often children (and the adults they become) will go 
to great lengths to satisfy this need. For example, if a child gains pleasure from an 
exchange with her parent, she will participate in activities with the parent. But if the 
parent neglects the child, or offers painful and unfulfilling contact, the child persists – she 
does not turn away. She needs the parent, and, as a consequence, will integrate her 
relations with the parent “on a suffering, masochistic basis.”434 She will hold out hope for 
a satisfying response from her parent, internalizing the parent, who is both exciting and 
depriving. She will cling to this hope/internalized object to avoid abandonment, her 
greatest fear. As this little girl becomes a young woman, she will choose love objects that 
will ultimately fail to meet her needs. Devotion to these “ancient internal attachments” 
                                                
433 W. Ronald D. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of Personality, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
LTD, 1952), 145.  
434 Greenberg and Mitchell, 173.  
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result in sorrow and suffering, and change continues to be thwarted by reluctance to 
betray these attachments.435  
Fairbairn greatly influenced attachment theorist John Bowlby. Bowlby’s 
conceptual model is similar to Fairbairn’s commitment to a relational model over Freud’s 
drive model. In fact, Bowlby, who Peter Fonagy claims was among the first to recognize 
that “the human infant enters the world predisposed to participate in social 
interaction,”436 appropriates aspects of Fairbairn’s theory. For example, Bowlby explains 
that behaviors in infancy such as crawling, calling, babbling, smiling, clinging, following, 
and non-nutritive sucking all serve to keep the baby feeling secure, cared for, and 
attached to the mother. This perspective runs contrary to an interpretation of these 
behaviors as driven by instinct and motivated by pleasure. In Bowlby’s model the child is 
driven by the need for attachment and motivated by security.437 Whether the initial goal is 
generated by a biological need for proximity or a psychological need for safety and 
security, participation on the part of the primary caregiver(s) in providing for the child’s 
biological and psychological needs is paramount for healthy development. Bowlby adds 
that healthy development is frustrated when the child experiences the primary caregiver 
as inconsistent, anxious, or unreliable. Similarly, early object loss or implicit and explicit 
                                                
435 Ibid, 174.  
436 Peter Fonagy, Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis, (New York: Other Press, 2001), 7.  
437 Karen, however, stresses in his summary of Bowlby’s work that many of these behaviors are originally 
aimed at survival, as opposed to creating love or emotional functioning in later life, but they eventually 
“coalesce to form a broad mosaic of attachment behavior.” Karen, 96-98. Fonagy, in a similar vein, points 
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her,” he explains. Fonagy, 8. Here, Fonagy draws attention to Bowlby’s concept of the physical goal, which 
eventually becomes a psychological goal related to connectedness to a caregiver.   
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threats of abandonment by a parent (or loss of security) all contribute in important ways 
to anxieties and insecurities about attachment in future relationships.438  
 Recognizing the unconscious nature of both competing claims, what more can be 
said about pleasure if motivation in both infancy and adulthood does not result from the 
quest for sexual pleasures but from the search for and maintenance of contact with 
others? How plausible does this seem? Fairbairn retained a prominent role for pleasure in 
his theory, but it is pleasure insofar as it relates to feelings of connectedness and survival. 
Remember, for Fairbairn, pleasure is a means to an end and not simply an end in itself, as 
drive theory might suggest. Erogenous zones, because of their biological capacity to 
produce pleasures, become “pathways to the object” or channels for attachment to and 
relations with significant objects.439 This may be just as true of genitalia in adulthood, as 
with the breast/mouth relationship in infancy.440  
Fairbairn’s work gives us a reason for making connections between sensuous 
pleasure and attachment in infancy, as well as in adulthood. Recall his claim that the 
nature of relationships with objects determine libido.  He explains,  
…the function of libidinal pleasure is essentially to provide a sign-post to 
the object. According to the conception of [fundamental] erotogenic zones 
the object is regarded as a sign-post to libidinal pleasure; and the cart is 
thus placed before the horse.441  
 
In other words, theory that proposes that objects serve the purposes of the libidinal drive 
for pleasure misunderstand the proper order of things, namely that bodily pleasures 
function to establish sought after connection with others, both in infancy and across the 
                                                
438 Scharff, 17.  
439 Greenberg and Mitchell, 157.  
440 Greenberg and Mitchell suggest in their assessment of Fairbairn’s work, if “healthy maturity is a 
capacity for a rich and intimate mutuality with another, then the genitalia offer themselves as perhaps the 
most intense and felicitous medium for such exchange.” Ibid.  
441 Fairbairn, 33.   
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lifespan. However, Fairbairn also argues that activities that serve pleasure as an end in 
itself are defensive, a way to cope with the failure to make connections with others. 
According to Greenberg and Mitchell, Fairbairn asserts that pleasure seeking without 
regard for relations with objects marks a “breakdown in the more basic search for 
pleasurable relations with an other…reflective of a deterioration of natural (object-
related) libidinal functioning.”442 If this is true, relationships with objects or others that 
are motivated primarily by pleasure and not by connection signal a problem with the 
“natural” ends for the drive.  
It would seem to follow that any form of attachment rooted in sexual pleasure as 
opposed to a sense of security and connectedness, would fail to blossom into the trust and 
love that characterizes the “norm” for healthy sexual relationships between adults. It is 
not hard to see how this “problem,” with its requisite details, could easily be framed as 
pathology, and in adulthood would constitute a sexual dysfunction, compulsion, 
addiction, or paraphilia. In this theoretical framework, to pursue sex with another for the 
purposes of sexual pleasure is problematic or abnormal. It is psychologically unhealthy.  
These claims bring a few important points to mind. First, one can see how this 
theory, applied to adult sexuality, could create a discourse on sexuality elicited from the 
motivations and pleasures of the sexual experience itself. Foucault might point out the 
subsequent categorization of those for whom pleasure is the primary motivation, and 
those for whom it is not. The deployment of this discourse of sexuality would indicate the 
impropriety of the former and the appropriateness of the latter. Also, the priority on 
pleasure in Freud’s drive theory and the priority on connection in Fairbairn’s work, raise 
the question as to why persons cannot be both pleasure and person seeking! In fact, this is 
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something that Freud, if we look closely at his theoretical shift to Eros – the life instincts 
– tries to work out and understand. ORT, which understands pleasure as a side effect of 
the desire for connection or security, seems to miss this important dimension of why we 
do some of what we do. Being motivated by pleasure in ORT retains a negative 
interpretation.  
These claims are also reminiscent of the spiritual detriments and dangers of 
pursing sex for pleasure articulated by the theologians in the last chapter. I have seen this 
same sentiment alive and well in faith communities today. For example, a couple I was 
seeing for pre-marital counseling in my clinical practice relayed the experience of 
discussing the lack of sex in their relationship with their pastor. The pastor passed no 
judgment on the couple for their pre-marital sexual activities. When the busy clients told 
the pastor that they sometimes had sex quickly to release tension and feel better about the 
fact that they were having less sex, the pastor encouraged them to be intentional about 
making time for “making-love.” The pastor explained to them that their “quickies” were 
not “love-making” and that only the latter satisfied God’s intention for sex, a time to be 
intimate that is intentional and focused on connection and drawing partners closer 
together. The pastor also warned that continuing to use sex this way would lead to greater 
intimacy problems for the couple. In this case, sex for the pleasure of tension (and guilt) 
release was not properly spiritual; it is not God’s intention for sex.  
 In sum, the importance of relationships and the social nature of human beings 
move to the forefront in ORT. Pleasure falls to the wayside. I would argue that is part of 
what has made ORT so advantageous for scholars in other fields for whom the essentially 
social nature of human beings is paramount to arguments for social justice and living in 
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just relationships in the context of community. As we will see in the next two chapters, 
this is especially true for feminist theologians and sexual ethicists when devising 
frameworks for sexual ethics that include pleasure. What they fail to take into 
consideration is the way that Jessica Benjamin develops and complexifies the tensions 
and paradox inherent in our sociality and their necessary relationship pleasure.   
 
Necessary Tensions: The Pleasure in “The Two of Us” 
In “Master and Slave,” Benjamin calls our attention to the sexual images (for her 
the porno news stands in the early 1980s) that surround us, typically depicting women 
aroused by and taking pleasure in submitting to another in a sexual scenario. Women, she 
says, “in the bonds of love.” But Benjamin suggests that in reality this slave is not always 
a woman, nor is she always heterosexual. Rather, “the fantasy of erotic domination 
permeates all sexual imagery in our culture.”443 S/M is erotic domination in its most 
explicit form – a controlled and ritualized form of violence, which combines love with 
desires to control and submit. Although s/m is expressed in sexual fantasies and in 
institutionalized, voluntary sexual practices, Benjamin insists that “this fantasy flows 
beneath the surface of ‘normal’ adult love.”444 Without denying the influence of culture, 
Benjamin suggests that the origins of these desires and their pleasures lie in the 
experiences of early infancy, bound to a yearning for mutual recognition.445  
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Intersubjective theory: the balance within and the recognition between 
Benjamin begins where the other object relations theorists begin, with the first 
bond or interactions between the child and her primary caregiver, typically the mother. 
She focuses on two developmental tasks, assertion and recognition. She argues that 
assertion of the independent self and recognition of the other’s independence, together in 
a delicate balance, affect the state of a self that is aware of the distinctiveness of other 
selves.446 From birth, the mother experiences her child as belonging to her, though no 
longer part of her. Though the child is dependent, she is still separate from the mother 
and has her own destiny. Language akin to ‘mutual recognition’ between infant and 
mother is common in research that explains this bond, including ‘emotional attunement,’ 
‘mutual influence,’ ‘affective mutuality,’ and ‘sharing states of mind.’447  
Benjamin distinguishes her theoretical perspective from Margaret Mahler’s 
separation-individuation theory and other British object relations theorists (including D. 
W. Winnicott), both of whom insist that the initial state of the mother-infant bond is 
characterized by an undifferentiated (or symbiotic) unity.448 Instead, Benjamin finds 
resonance with Daniel Stern, a psychiatrist and psychoanalytic theorist best known for his 
text, The Interpersonal World of the Infant (1985). Stern argues that the infant is never 
totally unified with the mother and, from birth, has an innate capacity “to be interested in 
and to distinguish itself from the world of others.”449 Benjamin nuances the 
developmental tasks after birth, arguing,  
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…the issue is not only how we separate from oneness, but also how we 
connect to and recognize others; the issue is not how we become free of 
the other, but how we actively engage and make ourselves known in 
relationship to the other.450 
  
In other words, from its first breath the baby does not struggle to separate from its 
mother, but is figuring out how to engage, how to be recognized as an independent 
subject, and how to recognize others in their own subjectivity. 
Thus, Benjamin’s view is intersubjective, drawing together the notion of an 
active, social infant, who responds to and distinguishes between others, as well as the 
value and need of the self for self-cohesion.451 The intersubjective view maintains that 
individuals grow in and through relationships with other subjects. The other is also a 
subject. The organization of the psychic world focuses on the subject’s relation to another 
subject, as opposed to an object. “The intersubjective view, as distinguished from the 
intrapsychic, refers to what happens in the field of the self and other,” explains 
Benjamin.452 Put differently, the intersubjective is concerned with the relationships 
between active subjects, as opposed to relationships with internalized objects. The 
intrapsychic view, however, is still of great importance, and Benjamin considers both 
views complementary views of the psyche.  
Benjamin asserts that intersubjective theories share the central importance of 
recognition to self-development. A person comes to a sense of her own subjectivity in the 
presence of another who recognizes her acts, feelings, intensions, existence, etc. 
“Recognition is the essential response,” explains Benjamin, “the constant companion of 
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assertion…Recognition is, thus, reflexive; it includes not only the other’s confirming 
response, but also how we find ourselves in that response.”453 In other words, subjectivity 
is dependent on recognition – not only the other’s recognition of me as a subject, but also 
my recognition of the other’s subjectivity, which is in fact the condition of my being 
recognized in the first place.  
For Benjamin, the key to individual subjectivity and being in relationship is the 
need for mutual recognition, the need for both recognizing and being recognized. As a 
consequence, in the first bond the infant, in time, must recognize the mother as a subject 
in her own right. This idea departs from much psychological theory that posits the mother 
as an object who satisfies needs, an object of attachment, and/or an object of desire. Thus, 
Benjamin attempts to explicate a theory to interpret how the capacity for mutuality 
evolves, insisting that from the beginning there are always at least two subjects.454 In this 
way, she distinguishes herself from Stern’s intersubjective view, which describes a 
moment in which the infant recognizes the other’s subjectivity. Incorporating, but 
expanding this understanding, Benjamin claims a spectrum of intersubjective 
development, inclusive of Stern’s decisive moment.  
However, the need on the part of both child and mother to self-assert and 
recognize the other – the development of the capacity for mutual recognition – is not 
without its tensions. Neither is the ongoing process of mutual recognition, which extends 
into adulthood. On the one hand, Benjamin explains that the ideal balance between 
assertion and recognition allows for one to be either fully absorbed by or fully receptive 
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to the other – to be together (dependent) or alone (independent).455 The negative cycle of 
recognition, on the other hand, makes the feeling of being alone (free) contingent on 
destroying the other, or the feeling of being connected (dependent) contingent on 
surrender to the other.  
Consequently, there is a paradox embedded in the aim of mutual recognition, one 
that strikes at the heart of the need of the self for the other. Benjamin explains,  
…at the very moment of realizing our own independence, we are 
dependent upon another to recognize it. At the very moment we come to 
understand the meaning of ‘I, myself,’ we are forced to see the limitations 
of that self. At the moment when we understand that separate minds can 
share the same state, we also realize that these minds can disagree.456  
 
This paradox brings about a struggle for control. We want to assert ourselves, but require 
the other to meet our need for recognition. Thus, a vision of recognition between equal 
subjects gives rise to the need to sustain the tension between contradictory forces – our 
need for both recognition and independence. The frustrating irony is that the subject is 
outside our control and yet we need him/her. Benjamin argues that the decisive problem 
in development remains recognizing the other. Establishing the self necessitates 
recognition by the other, but achieving such recognition means acknowledging that the 
other exists for himself and not just for me.457    
 This struggle between assertion and recognition in childhood is a “painful and 
paradoxical fact,” explains Benjamin.458 The child’s struggle for autonomy is confounded 
by the need to be recognized as independent from the very people on whom she is 
dependent. This is the paradox of recognition. One way out of this tension is to assert 
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one’s self without recognizing the other’s subjectivity. I assume that the other is 
dependent on, controlled, and possessed by me. This denial of dependence is the problem 
of domination. If I continue to assert myself without recognizing the subjectivity of the 
other, the tension necessary in the dance of mutual recognition begins to break down until 
I am alienated and isolated – independent, but with no one to confer my subjectivity.  
 
Destruction, survival, and pleasure  
Benjamin uses British object relations theorist D. W. Winnicott to elaborate 
further the problem of and resolution to recognizing the other. Her primary source is his 
essay, “The Use of an Object,” in which the ability to “use an object” is dependent on 
having destroyed it. In Winnicott’s theory, to “use an object” means that it “must 
necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of 
projections.”459 In other words, by using of an object, the child, for example, is able to 
experience the object or other as having an independent existence outside of the child. 
The object is real. But using objects is dependent on having developed a capacity for 
such. Winnicott identifies the development of this capacity as part of the shift to the 
reality principle.  
As a theorist whose proposals are replete with paradox, Winnicott suggests that in 
childhood, the road to the ability to use objects, or to be in relationship with real others 
and things, first requires the object’s destruction. In fact, Winnicott argues that the child 
is “all the time destroying [the object] in (unconscious) fantasy.”460 But how is it that 
destroying the object makes for its subjective existence? Benjamin usefully interprets, 
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“Winnicott is saying that the object must be destroyed inside in order that we know it to 
have survived outside; thus we can recognize it as not subject to our mental control.”461 
The object must survive its demise in the internal world if it is to come to exist in external 
reality. This paradox informs Benjamin’s paradox of recognition: in surviving 
destruction, the object (let’s say Mom) not only becomes real, but having been affected, 
confers existence of the child. The self makes a difference. Without survival, if the 
object/mother is completely negated, the child herself is negated. “For then there is no 
one there to recognize us, no one there for us to desire,” sums Benjamin.462  
Per Winnicott’s theory about the transition to using objects, Benjamin suggests 
that the child actually experiences the survival of the object as pleasurable.463 To the 
child’s delight, existence of the other outside of the child’s control confers the child’s 
own existence. Benjamin interprets Winnicott’s theory to suggest a revision in the 
psychoanalytic concept of reality. Recall that for Freud the “reality principle” replaces 
the “pleasure principle” as the ego increasingly negotiates between the id and the external 
world, thus, quelling full satisfaction of the id’s self-gratifying impulses. In Benjamin’s 
intersubjective view, the “reality principle” is really a “positive source of pleasure, the 
pleasure of connecting with the outside, and not just a brake on narcissism or 
aggression.”464 In other words, the child enjoys discovering that there is a world outside 
of her-self that confers her subjectivity.  
Both child and caregiver are now capable of mutual recognition and assertion. 
They can be attuned to one another, which reintroduces the idea of pleasure as pleasure 
                                                
461 Benjamin, Bonds of Love, 38.  
462 Ibid, 39.  
463 Ibid, 38.  
464 Ibid, 41, emphasis mine. As a consequence, reality is discovered as opposed to imposed on the ego by 
the pressures of the external world.  
 212 
in being with the other. For example, Benjamin argues that when the baby crawls away 
from her caregiver to explore some toys, and then turns back to make a connection with 
her caregiver, she is not only checking to see that her caregiver is still there (security), but 
looking to see if the caregiver is sharing her feelings of excitement, fear, etc. generated 
by the exploration. This sense of sharing feelings not only reassures the child, but “it is a 
source of pleasurable connection.”465 Benjamin’s analysis emphasizes that in this way we 
matter to one another. 
In sum, the roots of personality development and the nature of human 
relationships, read through the lenses of Benjamin’s intersubjective theory and aspects of 
ORT, seek to modify a thoroughly intrapsychic approach like Freud’s. Benjamin upholds 
the value of needs gratification and soothing for establishing the reliability of the 
caregiver; however, she maintains, “being with the other cannot be reduced to the 
experience of being regulated by another.”466 Recognizing that Freud’s drive theory has 
been amended already by both ego psychology and ORT, she argues that these 
approaches do not fairly address the active, reciprocal, and mutual nature of the exchange 
between infant and caregiver – the paradoxical balance between assertion of the self and 
recognition of the other.467  
Recognizing the other is a constant reminder of difference and a continual 
awareness that this difference is what makes it possible to be with another – for there to 
be “the two of us.”468 Thus, Benjamin’s insights reshape how we think about the “threats” 
of internal and external processes. In Freud’s classical psychoanalytic theory, “threats” – 
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that the desire to remain attuned can result in submission to the other’s will.  
466 Benjamin, Bonds of Love, 46, italics in original.   
467 Ibid.  
468 Ibid, 47, italics in original.  
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of the demands of society, religion, etc. – ultimately leave the individual in a state of 
unhappiness, malaise, and discontent. For Benjamin, the relationship between the 
individual and external reality is no longer one characterized by domination, but rather 
one that actually provides the condition for freedom.469  
 
Now the pain is for pleasure…470 
One of Benjamin’s primary goals is to understand domination, the dynamic 
between dominant and submissive roles, and the reason why some individuals voluntarily 
submit to erotic domination, attempting to achieve freedom through slavery and release 
via submission of control.471 In her pre-Oedipal theory of development, Benjamin alludes 
to the correlation between attunement in the pre-Oedipal phase of life and mutual 
recognition in adult erotic life. She explains, 
In erotic union we can experience that form of mutual recognition in 
which both partners lose themselves in each other without loss of self; 
they lose self-consciousness without loss of awareness. Thus early 
experiences of mutual recognition already prefigure the dynamics of erotic 
life. 
 
Put differently, just as intimacy between the mother and child must balance the tensions 
between assertion and recognition as the child gains awareness of the external world and 
differentiates herself from other selves, intimacy between mature adults balances the 
same tensions between self-assertion and other recognition, the “oneness of harmonious 
                                                
469 Ibid, 48. Benjamin wonders about Freud’s creation of a place for the instinctual force of Eros as an 
effort to resist the pervasiveness of the struggle for control between the individual and culture. Whereas the 
intersubjective view offers a theory of the need for recognition, growth in relationship, mutuality and 
pleasure in attunement, she argues that Freud’s Eros, as a life force that aims to create unities for the 
benefit of community, “fails to have a place in psychic structure.” Ibid. Benjamin’s argument against Freud 
on this point would be strengthened by some elaboration on this claim or a footnote that goes beyond 
simply citing the entirety of Civilization and Its Discontents. Though I must also confess that in my read, 
Freud’s own elaboration on the origins and role of Eros is not always clear.  
470 Rhianna, in lyrics to S&M, Def Jam, 2011. 
471 Benjamin, Bonds of Love, 52.  
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attunement and the ‘two-ness’ of disengagement.472 The presence of this dynamic tension 
makes mutual recognition a continually evolving process – a balancing act, as opposed to 
a linear trajectory of development. The scales can tip one way or the other, meaning 
partners can overemphasize one need or the other, as long as the tension is sustained.  
Adult sexual love provides an opportunity to reenact and work out the conflicts 
between assertion and recognition that began during that early period in life characterized 
by intense intimacy and dependence.473 As in infancy, the site of control/assertion and 
abandon/recognition is the body. Benjamin tracks the breakdown of tension between self-
assertion and recognition in one of its most recognizable forms – adult, erotic domination 
and submission. In the fantasy of erotic domination, subjugation takes the form of 
violating the other’s body or physical boundaries. Benjamin explains that this violation 
becomes a way of representing a struggle to the death (hopefully in metaphor) for 
recognition.474 Simply put, in sadomasochistic fantasies and relationships, submission 
becomes a pure form of recognition, while violation/domination becomes a pure form of 
assertion. In this relationship, the dominant partner continues to assert his desire for 
independence, while the submissive partner, who longs to be recognized, settles for 
submission (including physical pain) rather than face the psychic pain of loss and 
abandonment.  
                                                
472 Ibid, 50. Winnicott, in his essay “The Capacity to Be Alone,” in Playing and Reality, draws an analogy 
between the child who is learning to be alone by the experience of being alone in the presence of another 
and the experience adult partners have after satisfactory intercourse. Just as the child takes pleasure in this 
form of disengagement for a time, partners can enjoy being alone alongside their partners in the post-coital 
moment, enjoying solitude that is free from ‘withdrawal’ – “a defensive organization implying an 
expectation of persecution.” According to Winnicott, the enjoyment of being alone in the presence of 
another is an experience of health, and the capacity to be alone is a sign of emotional maturity. Winnicott, 
29-31.  
473 Benjamin, Bonds of Love, 51.  
474 Ibid, 55.  
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Pure domination presumes a subject already caught in omnipotence, unable to 
experience another’s subjectivity because of some previous breakdown of the tension 
between self and other. Numbness characterizes this experience – an alienated form of 
differentiation. This partner seeks to “recreate the tension through distance, idealization, 
and objectification, and risks repeating the original breakdown unless and until the other 
makes a difference.”475 Recall Benjamin’s application of Winnicott’s theory of ‘use of an 
object’: Destruction is a way of differentiating the self. Thus, she explains  
…the controlled practice of sadomasochism portrays a classic drama of 
destruction and survival. The thrill of transgression and the sense of 
complete freedom for the sadist depend on the masochist’s survival.476 
 
In other words, controlled s/m practice relives the drama of destruction and survival that 
ultimately, with much pleasure, confers subjectivity – that one is in fact independent and 
makes a difference. The sadist can experience this survival as love. Without survival, 
there is the elimination of tension – deadness, numbness, and the exhaustion of sensation. 
Just as the desire to break through to the other captures sadism, so the desire to be 
discovered underlies masochism.477 And just as sadism is associated with failed 
childhood destruction (the parent with no boundaries), masochism is associated with 
failed destruction of another kind. The child herself, by way of punishment or withdraw, 
does not survive. As Benjamin explains, this hidden self longs to be recognized – to be 
reached, penetrated, found, released – “a wish expressed in the metaphor of violence as 
well as in metaphors of redemption.”478 Strikingly, in a complementary fashion, which 
                                                
475 Ibid, 68.  
476 Ibid.  
477 Ibid, 72.  
478 Ibid, 73.  
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obscures mutuality, the masochist’s desire to experience her authentic self with another 
parallels the sadist’s desire to get outside himself into a shared reality.479  
From her analysis, Benjamin emerges with a number of important points. First, 
the aforementioned dynamics at work in s/m relationships or fantasy not only constitute 
domination, but are also the dynamics that make mutuality possible – the tension between 
self-assertion and recognition. Second, “the dynamic of destruction and survival is the 
central pattern of erotic union.”480 Furthermore, it is the source of our pleasure. Recall 
Freud’s insistence that Eros and the aggressive instinct often are alloyed together; thus, 
Eros is not totally free from aggression. Benjamin argues that what makes sexuality 
erotic is “the survival of the other with and despite destruction.”481 Eros plays with 
fantasies of power and surrender. “The idea of destruction reminds us that the element of 
aggression is necessary in erotic life,” Benjamin explains. “[It] is the element of survival, 
the difference the other can make, which distinguishes erotic union, which plays with the 
fantasy of domination, from real domination.”482 
So what is Benjamin really concluding here about sex and pleasure? Erotic 
pleasure is intrinsic to participation in s/m sexual relationships, including assuming the 
submissive role. Both partners seek to break out of their own isolation – to be recognized 
and to recognize the other. They seek to renew the tensions that confer subjectivity and 
relationship. But balancing this tension is also true of all sexual union where the tensions 
inherent in mutual recognition are the source of sexual pleasures. The elimination of this 
tension in real domination amounts to the destruction of the other. Benjamin alludes to 
                                                
479 Ibid. 
480 Ibid.  
481 Ibid.  
482 Ibid, 74.  
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pleasure in annihilation of the other as perversion. My reading of this is that this  kind of 
relationship  amounts to abuse.    
Benjamin’s psychological explanation of mutual recognition as a critical 
developmental task provides valuable insight into understanding the nature of sexual 
desire and sexual pleasure, especially as it reveals the complexity, tensions, and paradox 
inherent in maintaining intimate relationships across the lifespan. Also, by demonstrating 
the similarities between our desires at play in s/m relationships and in “normal” erotic 
union, she blurs the hard lines that culture draws between abusive and oppressive sexual 
relations, recreational sexual relations, and loving sexual relations. She also troubles the 
notion of mutuality as a static state. Rather, mutuality is dynamic, involving the constant 
negotiation of tensions between self-assertion and recognition. 
 
Freud, Foucault, and the Feminists: Crucial Considerations 
 Freud’s theory of sexuality was culture shaping. Foucault’s critique of sexuality 
was culturally deconstructive. The feminists’ debates in the “sex wars” wrestled with the 
deconstructive move to contemplate a way forward for sexual life, sexual pleasure, and 
the potential availability of power to those whose subjectivities were systematically 
dominated and denied. Benjamin considered these same aspects of the current sexual 
regime from a psychodynamic perspective, but considered the reasons why subjectivities 
might be systematically surrendered voluntarily and why the fantasy of dominating and 
submitting possessed such thrilling pleasure for participants. She also suggested, with a 
psychological lens, that all erotic union negotiates a similar tension as participants strive 
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to mutually recognize one another. Without the necessary polarization observed in s/m 
fantasy, the balance between self-assertion and recognition is always at play.      
I have suggested that these cultural discourses – even if indirectly – have 
contributed to why communities of faith continue to fear and, thus, restrict sexual 
pleasure to (and assume it in) married intercourse. Freud reinforced the ubiquity of the 
sexual impulses. Foucault questioned the instinctiveness of prevailing norms that 
Christianity held so dear. The feminists explicitly questioned and even condemned the 
priority on married, heterosexual, reproductive, “vanilla” sexual intercourse – the 
Christian gold standard. In true psychoanalytic fashion, we could hypothesize the 
Christian response – especially by the Christian right – has reacted to the anxiety and 
tumultuous emotions generated by the current cultural climate with a reaction formation, 
or defensively insisting even more passionately on compulsory heterosexuality.   
At this point, it makes sense to return to theological discourse, to see where in the 
midst of cultural upheaval concerning sexual norms and sexual pleasure theological 
scholarship considers the critical discourse explored in this chapter. I suggest that we 
might find such considerations initially in emerging feminist theological scholarship, 
forging its way on the scene in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 219 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
TO EROS IS HUMAN: SEXUAL PLEASURE AND FEMINIST THEOLOGY483 
 
 At the end of Chapter Two I concluded that Christianity’s theological legacy 
related to the interpretation of sexual experience is androcentric, heterosexual, and 
overwhelmingly negative. Any suspected dualism between the flesh and the spirit was 
reinforced theologically and perpetuated, whether Augustine and his successors intended 
this or not. Sex and its pleasures were tied firmly to the body, nature, and experience in 
the material world and divorced from spiritual pursuits, investment in rational 
knowledge, and the things of God. Christianity inherited and preserved the gendered 
nature of this split – women were associated with the material and men with the 
spiritual.484 Either sex could choose (per Augustine and Aquinas) or be chosen (per 
Luther and Calvin) to devote his or her life to spiritual pursuits, requiring mandatory 
abstinence from the bodily pleasures that “most unloosen the human spirit.”485 The pain 
of this renunciation promised far greater pleasure on the spiritual plane of existence.  
 Though roughly 1,600 years have passed since Augustine wrote Confessions, I 
contend that any significant opposition to the dominance of a male-center interpretation 
of human sexual experience in theology does not occur until the dawn of feminist 
                                                
483 “To Eros Is Human” is the name of a “discontinued” shade of nail polish by OPI, a manufacturer of nail 
products for salon professionals. Described as a raspberry red shimmer, it was part of OPI’s Greek Isles 
Collection. Despite my vast collection of OPI, I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Leanna Fuller, who 
discovered the polish during a pedicure. The name captures the essence of feminist theological 
interpretations of eros.  
484 For example, Galen – an extremely influential second century physician and philosopher ,who was 
greatly shaped by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics – claimed females had less heat and vital spirit, and 
embodied the essence of the material, while men possessed great capabilities in succeeding in the spiritual 
realm. See Brown, 10.  
485 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 191.   
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theological reflection in the latter half of the twentieth century. As a result, I look to these 
resources in search of critical works related to women’s sexual experience, specifically 
the experience of sexual pleasure. To my surprise, my initial survey of feminist 
theological resources (from the early 1970s through the late 1980s) came up short of 
identifying any one particular work that focused exclusively and extensively on sex, let 
alone sexual pleasure. A small number of works, however, contained the opportunity for 
addressing sexual pleasure through efforts to reimagine Christian love as eros. 
Commonly taken to connote sexual love, a revision of eros sounded promising as a 
resource for more aptly capturing the nature of love as understood from the experience of 
women desiring and loving.  
As part of a project with explicit feminist positioning, this chapter explores 
feminist eros theologies for how sexual pleasure is articulated and embraced from a 
women’s perspective. I am attentive to if and how feminist theologians engage the 
concerns of secular feminists embroiled in the “sex wars.” Assuming that eros retains a 
dimension of sexual love, I also critically evaluate how these scholars validate sexual 
love and articulate it theologically.  
Because of its association with sexual love, eros has a contentious history in the 
Christian tradition. Therefore, the first section in this chapter briefly attends to the history 
of eros that is eventually subject to re-visioning by feminist theologians. I begin with 
Plato’s Eros, which permeated the ancient world as Christianity was gathering coherence. 
Next, I fast-forward to the twentieth century, to Swedish, Lutheran bishop and theologian 
Anders Nygren. Nygren critically compared the Platonic concept of Eros and the 
meaning of Christian agape, concluding that they were fundamentally opposed kinds of 
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love, and that agape was worthy of being untangled from the Eros of ancient Greco-
Hellenistic thought. Lastly, I address how Paul Tillich eventually countered Nygren. 
Tillich, a highly influential Protestant theologian, argued that agape and eros were not 
irreconcilable and that, although the differences between these expressions of love should 
not be ignored, both point to qualities of a love that is ultimately one. Tillich was one of 
the first modern Christian theologians to write affirmingly and extensively on eros.  
After giving limited attention to these important philosophical and theological 
legacies, I hone in on the use of eros and “the erotic” in feminist theology, including its 
formative resource – black feminist poet, Audrey Lorde. Although Rita Nakashima Brock 
develops a Christology of erotic power, I am compelled to concentrate almost exclusively 
on Carter Heyward’s work, as she is the only feminist theologian who brings her 
understanding of eros to bear on sexual relationships and sexual pleasure. Her new way 
of understanding eros prioritizes being in relationship and valuing the other and mandates 
participation in justice and the healing of all beings. The sacred, Eros, is part and parcel 
of all of life, the flow of erotic energy in our pleasures, mutual relationships, and political 
action. Sexual love is no longer subordinated to other expressions of love, and sexual 
pleasure is not only affirmed, but also charged with an ethical purpose.  
After drawing out themes in these new definitions of eros, my final section 
critically evaluates the implications of feminist eros theology for sexual pleasure. I will 
show how feminist eros provides a substantial corrective to the sex-negative legacy in the 
Christian tradition, even as it falls short of providing a viable – if not impossible – way 
forward for sexual pleasure and its relationship to ethics.   
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Philosophical & Theological Legacies: Plato, Nygren & Tillich 
 
Plato’s Eros 
Plato’s Symposium contains the most celebrated discussion of eros in the 
literature of classical philosophy. His reflections on eros undergird aspects of 
Augustine’s thought and have proven influential to theological explorations of and 
distinctions between various forms of love, including Anders Nygren’s comparison of 
agape and eros and Paul Tillich’s doctrine of the erotic. Thus, the importance of Plato’s 
thought to theological renderings of eros and to the debate concerning various forms of 
love in the Christian tradition cannot be underestimated.  
Plato’s interpretation of eros comes to the reader through a dialogue between 
Socrates and the wise prophetess, Diotima, in the Symposium. What our modern context 
takes to be constitutive of sexual love or desire has a more complex meaning in the 
Symposium and includes, but transcends, sexual desire. First, Diotima’s teaching covers 
the being and nature of the demigod, Eros.486 When Socrates inquires about the role of 
Eros in human life, Diotima defines the demigod’s activity as cultivating and animating a 
desire for the possession of the beautiful, the good, and the true. She explains, “ ‘All 
desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love…love maybe 
described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good’.”487 Eros love, 
                                                
486 He is “ ‘A great spirit, and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal…He 
interprets between gods and men…he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and 
therefore by him the universe is bound together…through Love all the intercourse and converse of gods 
with men…is carried on.’ ”(202e-203b) Diotima bolsters her explanation by recounting Eros’ origins as the 
child of Poros (Plenty) and Penia (Poverty), resulting in a nature that is neither mortal or immortal…never 
in want and never in wealth…a mean between ignorance and knowledge. Plato Symposium 203b-203e.  
487 Plato Symposium, 205d-206a. 
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therefore, desires the beautiful or the good. The gain to the individual in possessing the 
good/beautiful is happiness, and the desire is to possess this good/beauty interminably.  
Diotima also teases out a hierarchy related to the object of longing as it pertains to 
Eros. Not only does Eros animate and guide human beings’ sexual drive, but it also 
motivates their yearning for wisdom and spiritual beauty.488 At the lowest stage, the lover 
desires the beloved because the beloved is physically beautiful. But this lower form of 
Eros fails to endure as the lover becomes aware that others, in addition to the beloved, 
also possess physical beauty. Because Eros yearns for the everlasting possession of 
beauty that brings happiness, the lover eventually recognizes that the beauty possessed by 
the beloved will fade. Upon this realization, other kinds of beauty appear superior to 
physical beauty and hold greater promise – the beauty of the soul exemplified in moral 
virtue and intellectual excellence, for example. To avoid becoming attached to lesser 
beauty, which cannot provide enduring happiness, the lover must progress to the next 
level where more substantial beauty constitutes the basis for love.489 But further 
reflection on the desire to possess superior forms of beauty reveal that this sort of beauty 
also perishes, as the beloved will eventually die, taking her most admirable traits with 
her.  
Eros continues to guide the soul upward through ascending stages of love. 
Diotima explains that the pinnacle of Eros is desiring that object which is perfectly 
beautiful or good – Absolute Beauty, the highest level of ascent. Having ascended to such 
heights with the help of Eros, the soul “ ‘bringing forth and nourishing true virtue will 
                                                
488 Alexander Irwin, Eros Toward the World: Paul Tillich and the Theology of the Erotic, (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1991), 41.  
489 Alan Soble, “Classical Sources,” in Eros, Agape, and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love, ed. 
Alan Soble, (New York: Paragon House ,1989), 42. 
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properly become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may,’ ” she 
explains.490 The height of Eros, therefore, is the love of absolute, everlasting beauty, or 
the divine. Sexual love is not a dimension of this level of Eros. Thus, Eros guides a 
journey to happiness that begins with love of one beautiful material being, leads to love 
of all material beauty, progresses to love of one immaterial form of beauty, then all 
immaterial beauty, and culminates in love of Absolute Beauty.491 As one ascends this 
love ladder, Eros is implicated in the pursuit of philosophical wisdom and virtue. Insofar 
as Eros empowers the pursuit of wisdom, it participates in human rational activities.  
 Still, sexual love and its pleasures retain a place in Plato’s treatment of Eros. 
Sexual love, provoked by physical beauty, is the lowest stage. However, it is still 
meaningful and gives an individual his first glimpse of the “Beautiful.” Alan Soble, an 
American philosopher who studies the philosophy of sex, suggests that “…because the 
response to [physical beauty] is sexual, it is a powerful perception that induces a further 
search for Beauty.”492 In other words, the Eros fueled by sexual desire and attraction 
functions as the starting point and impetus for glimpsing Beauty and beginning the 
journey toward higher levels of loving. Progression up the ladder, however, necessitates 
leaving sex and the material world behind. Pursuing wisdom and virtue, a rational 
pursuit, must rise above sex and its pleasures. Thus, one can conclude that the pursuit of 
the sensual pleasure is irrational because the gains of wisdom or virtue are impossible.  
In sum, Plato’s Eros holds a place and a value for sexual romantic love and desire 
(also called Vulgar Eros), while subordinating it to higher forms of Eros love (also called 
                                                
490 Plato Symposium 212a. 
491 Farley, 172.  
492 Soble, 44.  
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Heavenly Eros).493 Sexual love, however, is a stage to be outgrown as one cultivates a 
yearning for wisdom and spiritual beauty. This emphasis on resignation of the 
sexual/material/lower in favor of the pursuit of the spiritual/higher is a philosophical 
position that heavily influenced theologians like Augustine and Aquinas and their 
expectations for sexual life.  
  
Nygren’s Problem 
Anders Nygren, a Swedish, Lutheran bishop and theologian, is best known for his 
work, Agape and Eros. This work, published in the early 1930’s, fueled an ongoing 
debate on the relationship between agape and eros, especially among Protestants 
throughout the twentieth century. His goals in the text are to investigate the meaning of 
the Christian idea of love and trace the shifts that it has undergone in the course of 
history.494 He is especially concerned with the influence of the Platonic conception of 
Eros that permeated the ancient world when the Christian understanding of agape was 
taking shape.495 Nygren’s directs his critique at how Christianity has attempted to express 
itself in Platonic terms, a “problem of Eros and Agape,” which he argues challenges the 
whole of Christian history. His investigation of the content of both Eros and agape lead 
him to conclude that the two forms of love are really two different, irreconcilable types of 
love. This conclusion distances Eros from any association with divine and Christian love, 
agape.496  
                                                
493 The distinction between Vulgar Eros and Heavenly Eros is explained in the Symposium by Pausanias. 
494 Anders Nygren, trans. Philip S. Watson, Agape and Eros, (London: S.P.C.K., 1953), 27.  
495 While Nygren agrees with Friedrich Nietzsche that the idea of Christian love functioned as a 
“transvaluation of all ancient values,” he questions the impact over time of the ancient scheme of values, 
wondering whether Agape was “bound to lose something of its original force.” Ibid, 30.  
496 Nygren asserts that although the Greek word agape precedes its use in the New Testament, he is 
concerned with its development as the fundamental motif of Christianity found in the synoptic gospels, the 
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Though fundamentally opposed, Nygren argues that the comparison between eros 
and agape can be made around the nature of the fellowship between humanity and the 
Divine and the formative influence on ethical life. Eros is an upward movement of 
humanity’s way to the Divine, whereas agape is a downward movement of God’s way to 
humanity. The fellowship with the Divine initiated by eros is dominated by humanity. 
Thus, continuity exists between the Divine and humanity that allows humanity to draw 
near to the Divine. The fellowship between God and humanity typified by agape, 
however, is centered in and initiated by God. The chasm between God and humanity is 
absolute, bridgeable only by God, who makes fellowship possible when out of God’s 
agape God reaches down to humanity.  
In further contrast, as far as eros is acquisitive love, agape is giving; eros is 
egocentric and agape is unselfish; eros recognizes value in its love object and loves it, 
whereas agape loves first, thereby creating value in its object. In sum, Nygren denies any 
value judgment between the two loves, emphasizing his demonstration of difference in 
type as opposed to difference in value.497   
Nygren’s point is that agape, not eros, is the only love that constitutes God’s love 
for humanity – the standard for Christian love. God does not desire or want. God is not 
motivated to love by any value inherent in humanity. God cannot ascend higher. 
Conversely, eros, not agape, captures only humanity’s striving toward God, “human 
                                                                                                                                            
Pauline epistles, and the Gospel and First Epistle of John. These same scriptures, however, fail to be a 
resource for betting understanding eros. Although the oral tradition that eventually becomes the Christian 
New Testament was reiterated in and gathered coherence during a time when eros was part of the cultural 
milieu, this particular Greek word for love does not appear in the canonical Biblical texts. It is agape that 
appears as the kind of love that best captures both God’s love for humanity and the expectation for loving 
one’s neighbor. Jesus features prominently as someone whose teachings, life experiences, and death 
demonstrate the nature of agape love. Many know that agape is traditionally used to describe the ideal for 
Christian love, analogous to God’s love. Intended to be imitated, it is characterized as unconditional, 
unselfish, and self-sacrificial.  
497 Nygren, 210.  
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want and need seeks for satisfaction in the Divine fullness.”498 While he concedes that 
man [sic] can love other things besides God, insofar as he does only this, he “chooses the 
lower instead of the higher and cheats himself of the highest satisfaction.”499 Agape 
cannot describe humanity’s love for God because love for God is never unmotivated or 
spontaneous; it is always first and foremost awakened by God’s love.  
Additionally, Nygren argues that eros is essentially self-love and leaves very little 
room for neighbor love. He recalls the egocentric character of eros and reminds his 
reader that any love toward the neighbor is really directed at the dimension of the 
neighbor that participates in the beautiful or good. Ultimately the neighbor is left behind, 
a “stepping-stone to higher things.”500 Agape, conversely, has no place for self-love. It is 
the source of neighbor-love; it is “God’s own Agape which seeks to make its way out into 
the world through the Christian as its channel.”501 Finally, because God bridges the gulf 
between God’s self and humanity, God excludes all human choice as a basis for 
divine/human fellowship. Christian love, modeled on God’s love for humanity, is 
captured only by agape. Though Nygren resists calling a Christian adherent’s subsequent 
love for God agape, he also insists that humanity comes to love God (through God’s 
agape) in a way that does not resemble eros’ egocentric, acquisitive character. This love 
for God must be expressed with different words that convey its quality of self-surrender 
as response to Divine love.502 With this distinction, Nygren definitively separates out 
Plato’s Eros from Christian love. God’s love is agape; God’s agape is the basis for 
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501 Ibid, 218.  
502 Ibid, 219.  
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divine/human fellowship; God’s agape prompts a love for God in return that is not eros, 
but something more akin to self-surrender.    
 What is Nygren’s assessment of the place and importance of sexual love in the 
distinctions he makes between eros and agape? According to him, although it may be 
tempting to simply equate eros with sex and sexual love, and agape with heavenly love, 
such a distinction does not do justice to the fullness of Plato’s Eros. Recall that Eros is a 
movement from vulgar Eros to heavenly Eros, from a sensual (sometimes sexual) 
attraction to beauty in the material world, to a love for Ideas and all immaterial beauty, 
culminating in love of Absolute Beauty. Nygren suggests that beauty in the sense-world 
serves to awaken eros in the soul so that the soul might look beyond the material beauty 
and ascend towards that which is the very essence of eros.503 Can we take this to mean 
that Nygren understands sexual desire and sex to have a place in eros, so long it we move 
beyond it? Here, he is not so clear.  
Elsewhere in Agape and Eros Nygren explains that eros, directed upwards as it 
longs and strives for the heavenly world, is different from sensual love, which drags the 
soul downward and binds it to the material world.504 In this instance, he appears firmer in 
his distinction between sexual love and eros. Later, he indicates that Plato’s Dialogues 
contain a difference in tone with respect to the relationship between the sense-world and 
the super-sensible, but he is not persuaded that Plato intends to overcome this sharp 
dualism. Nygren concludes that the appropriate interpretation is that eros, insofar as it 
strives for the spiritual, does not affirm the material world but “is itself a form of flight 
                                                
503 Ibid, 173.  
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from the world.”505 Again, it seems fair to suggest, therefore, that sexual love and its 
pleasures have some degree of value, but only in so far as they awaken us to or remind us 
of the supersensible, the divine, Absolute Beauty.  
In sum, Plato’s Eros for Nygren does not see sex as an end in itself, nor does 
sexual love have a spiritual dimension. It is not even necessarily essential to the spiritual 
pursuit, as nowhere does Nygren suggest that vulgar Eros necessarily precedes heavenly 
Eros. When it does, vulgar Eros is meant to be discarded and transcended. Sexual desire 
is not compatible with or comparable to spiritual desire. With respect to Christian agape, 
Nygren maintains that human sexual desire or vulgar Eros have no place. If this were the 
case, he says, “the problem of Eros and Agape would be easily solved.”506 In addition, he 
claims that sexual desire has no place in a discussion of love in a religious sense, not in 
the context of agape or eros. For Nygren, the problem of eros and agape actually stems 
from the perceived similarities and syntheses between heavily Eros and Agape. Vulgar 
Eros does not pose a threat for Christian Agape. These conclusions leave one wondering 
how Nygren understands sexual desire and pleasure in the Christian life if it stands so 
definitively outside of the standard for Christian love.  
 
Tillich’s Love in Unity 
 As Nygren’s claims were taken up in the years to come, the antithetical 
relationship he posited between agape and eros endured. By the 1950’s, even in more 
liberal Protestant theological circles, agape and eros retained an antagonistic relationship. 
This included the radical difference between Christian love and sexual love, as well as 
                                                
505 Ibid, 179, italics in text.   
506 Nygren, 51. 
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the hierarchy of the former over the latter. Sexual desire and pleasure had no spiritual 
dimension, just as Christian love retained an asexual quality. During this time Paul 
Tillich, one of the most influential Protestant theologians of the twentieth century, argued 
for a relationship between human erotic love and divine agape that opposed Nygren’s 
conclusions.507 Tillich asserted, first and foremost, that agape and eros were not 
irreconcilable and that, although the differences between these expressions of love should 
not be ignored, both pointed to qualities of a love that is ultimately one. If Christian love 
had up until this point been defined by agape to the exclusion of eros, he was suggesting 
that eros maintained an important, if not essential role in understanding the form and 
content of Christian love – a multidimensional unity of agape, eros, philia, and 
epithymia.  
 In Eros Toward the World: Paul Tillich and the Theology of the Erotic, Alexander 
Irwin argues that eros plays a central and critical role in Tillich’s thought. Irwin asserts 
that far from an aside, Tillich discusses the theme of the erotic frequently and in detail in 
a large number of his writings. “[Eros],” Irwin explains, “is a concept of central 
importance to Tillich’s understanding of human embodiment and selfhood, creativity, 
ethics, and the religious impulse.”508 Eros is a divine-human power, a longing to connect 
and to overcome estrangement between persons, fractures between persons and the 
world, and alienation from God. Irwin explains, 
…[Tillich’s eros] a form of love in which a broad range of what have 
traditionally been described as ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ types of experience – 
love for God, communal ties and cultural creativity, communion with 
                                                
507 “Tillich does not mention Nygren by name in his more important discussions on the quality of love, but 
his language makes perfectly clear to whom his criticisms are addressed,” explains Irwin. Irwin, 23. 
508 Ibid, 3.  
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nature, libidinal desire and sexuality – are brought together in a 
nonhierarchical constellation.509 
 
In other words, Tillich collapses any hard distinctions and hierarchies between 
different “types” of love, including sexual love.  
Because one of the goals of my project is to target discourse on sexual 
pleasure in the Christian tradition, and because I contend that discourse on eros 
presents an opportunity to understand trends in the affirmation or condemnation 
of sexual love, desire, and pleasure, I concentrate specifically on Tillich’s 
understanding of the place of sexual love in his larger scheme for explicating 
eros. He emerges as a defender of sexual love, who wants to distinguish it from 
eros, while maintaining its essential relationship to both eros and agape.  
 Tillich begins his text, Love, Power and Justice (1954), by firmly opposing the 
necessary distinction between agape and eros prevalent at the time in public 
discussion.510 As opposed to “types,” he writes about the “qualities” of love, which he 
claims are present to a more or less degree in every act of love. While distinguishing the 
qualities of love – epithymia (or libido), philia, eros, and agape – he also establishes their 
relationship to one another. In explaining his ontology of love, he describes love as the 
drive toward the unity of the separated.  The drive toward unity, or the hope for reunion, 
“presupposes separation of that which belongs essentially together,” he explains.511 
Separation assumes a unity, so that estrangement necessitates the quality of having been 
                                                
509 Ibid, 17.  
510 Love, Power and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications is a compilation of lectures 
Tillich gave as the Firth Lectures in Nottingham, England, and as the Sprunt Lectures in Richmond, 
Virginia. In this small text, Tillich attempts a basic ontological analysis of the three concepts – love, power 
and justice – addressing their structural relation to each other and their common root in the nature of being 
itself. He follows this analysis with application of the unity of these concepts in personal relations, group 
relations and in relation to God (the ultimate relation, or being-itself).  
511 Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, (hereafter: LPJ) (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 25.  
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at one time a unity.  “Love,” Tillich says, “manifests its greatest power there where it 
overcomes the greatest separation.  And the greatest separation is the separation of self 
from self.”512  Here, he explains that love is at its strongest when it is able to overcome 
the most radically separated beings, namely individual persons, who, though radically 
estranged, are bearers of the most powerful love. The act of love brings the estranged 
together. Grounded in this ontology of love, he asserts that love is one, driving toward the 
reunion of the separated.  
 Because Tillich foregrounds eros, he takes great care in deconstructing the 
confluence of the erotic and the sexual/libidinal common in popular language. In the 
development of Christianity, he maintains that the reduction of eros to the sexual was 
already at work in the creation of the New Testament, best evidenced by it exclusion. He 
claims that there are two different qualities of love undergirding this confusion – 
epithymia and eros. These qualities, however, are not entirely independent of one 
another. Epithymia, a Greek word for desire, is traditionally considered the lowest quality 
of love, identified with physical, sensual self-fulfillment and the desire for sexual 
pleasure.513 To the argument that epithymia seeks pleasure as its ultimate ends, Tillich 
counters,  
[All living beings] desire food, movement, growth, participation in a 
group, sexual union, etc.  The fulfillment of these desires is accompanied 
by pleasure. But, it is not the pleasure as such which is desired, but the 
union with that which fulfills the desire.514   
 
In other words, epithymia or pure physical desire is driven primarily by the desire to 
overcome separation; pleasure, when this desire is fulfilled, is the necessary outcome as 
                                                
512 Ibid, 25.  
513 Ibid, 28. 
514 Ibid, 29, emphasis mine.  
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opposed to the motivation. This understanding strikes me as very similar to critical claims 
in ORT at the time, which insisted that libido was primarily person-seeking, not pleasure-
seeking.  
Tillich concedes that both pleasure and pain are the consequences of fulfilled and 
unfulfilled desire respectively, but a life that follows this pleasure-pain principle perverts 
love’s ultimate goal – “union with that which is separate from it, though it belongs to 
it.”515 He defines epithymia as the “normal drive towards vital self-fulfillment…which is 
not lacking in any love relation.”516 More so, it is a quality of love that is part and parcel 
of every love relation. Epithymia is recognized as the desire for union to which pleasure 
is secondary. Here one finds an affirmation of sexual pleasure, but one that does not 
affirm sexual pleasure as an end in itself. Recall that this resistance to sexual pleasure as 
an end in itself is a theme in Aquinas’s view of sensual pleasure and similar to ORT’s 
modifications of Freud’s drive theory. Sin is the consequence of pursuing pleasure as an 
end in itself in Aquinas’ system, while mental illness was indicated as the consequence 
by object relations theorists like Fairbairn.  
                                                
515 Ibid, 29.  
516 Ibid, 30. Tillich has a very intriguing section in Systematic Theology, Volume Two, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957 ), 51-54, in which he returns to “concupiscence” to properly distinguish 
between libido as a dimension of man’s [sic] existential predicament and libido as a dimension of love in 
man’s essential nature. He cites this confusion as cause for the ambiguity of the Christian attitude toward 
sex. First, he argues that Freud’s explication of libido, “the unlimited desire (endless, never satisfied 
striving) of man to get rid of his biological, especially sexual, tensions and to get pleasure form the 
discharge of these tensions,” fits with the Christian interpretation of man’s predicament – his estrangement 
– which seeks pleasure through other beings. However, Tillich argues that Freud’s analysis is insufficient 
from a theological perspective, which must also account for human being in light of his essential nature or 
created goodness. In this essential relation to self and world, libido is not concupiscence. Libido, united 
with love, is directed toward a definite subject with whom it wants to unite. It wants the other being, as 
opposed to seeking pleasure through the other being. This is libido as love, not libido as concupiscence. 
Recall that for Freud, libido is only creative in so far as it is repressed or sublimated – no creative eros 
includes sex. Tillich says this much, without the next logical step – namely that sexual experience that truly 
seeks the other has creative potential. The point that he does drive home is that libidinal desire, as part of 
our essential nature, is not concupiscence, but love.  
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 The second quality of love undergirding the confusion of eros with the sexual is 
eros itself. Tillich shows frustration that the effort to demonstrate dissimilarity between 
agape and eros has been exacerbated by the identification of eros and epithymia. 
“Certainly,” he says, “there is epithymia in every eros. But eros transcends epithymia. It 
strives for a union with that which is a bearer of values because of the values it 
embodies.”517 Thus, eros transcends yet includes epithymia. Upholding the classical, 
Platonic meaning of eros, the values that Tillich has in mind include beauty and truth, 
which are embodied in nature, culture, and the divine.518 “Love drives towards union with 
the forms of nature and culture and with the divine sources of both,” he says.519 With this 
definition of eros, he affirms the erotic impulse in Christian life.  
Tillich is most adamant about eros toward God, insisting that without eros, love 
toward God is impossible to comprehend, dissolving into obedience, which is not love. 
Perhaps “obedience” was the word that Nygren was looking for when attempting to 
describe a love for God that is not eros, but something more akin to self-surrender. 
Tillich exclaims, “Without the desire of man to be reunited with his origin, the love 
toward God becomes a meaningless word.”520 In sum, Tillich suggests that eros captures 
and helps us to experience and understand humanity’s love for God. Without it we are 
unable to make sense of the nature of our fellowship with the divine. In a tradition that 
has long held agape as the sole essence of divine/human fellowship, Tillich’s inclusion of 
eros is radical. 
                                                
517 Tillich, LPJ, 30.  
518 Tillich is greatly influenced by and draws from Plato’s classical Eros, identifying the erotic as a unique 
and important force in human life. “Eros,” he says, “has the greatness of a divine-human power. It 
participates in creation and in the natural goodness of everything created.” Ibid, 117. 
519 Ibid.  
520 Ibid, 31, emphasis mine.  
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 Taken together, epithymia and eros are distinct, yet always in relationship to one 
another; they are qualities of love that strive to overcome separation. Tillich’s 
suggestions indicate that sexual desire (and its subsequent pleasure) are not evil insofar as 
they seek reunion and resist using the other as primarily a means for pleasure.521 His 
discussion does not posit a hierarchical ordering of eros and epithymia. The latter is not a 
lower quality of love, though the former transcends it. All eros necessarily contains 
elements drawn from libidinal dimension of life; however, the erotic is not identified 
exclusively with these elements.522 In other words, eros can include sex, but is itself more 
than sex. Eros motivates many other human experiences where the drive to overcome 
separation is the motivating force.  
When these concepts begin to get murky for me, I think of epithymia as the 
embodied passion, or the desire for physical reunion, moving in eros, and eros as the 
desire motivated by value as the basis for the desire for union.523 Eros, for Tillich, ties 
together what has traditionally been thought of as higher and lower forms of love (sexual 
love and seeking after the divine, for example), as well as the human experiences and 
feelings that accompany them.  
 Finally, what is the relationship between agape and epithymia in Tillich’s 
ontology of love? First, understanding agape requires acknowledging that the other 
qualities of love – epithymia, eros, and philia – contain ambiguities of self-centeredness. 
Agape “…enters from another dimension into the whole of life and into all qualities of 
                                                
521 Ibid, 117. 
522 Irwin, 7.  
523 Tillich says, “…in abbreviated form: Love as libido is the movement of the needy toward that which 
fulfills the need. Love as philia is the movement of the equal toward union with the equal. Love as eros is 
the movement of that which is lower in power and meaning to that which is higher. It is obvious that in all 
three the element of desire is present.” Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume One, (hereafter: ST 1) 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 280, italics in original.  
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love…[it] cuts into the libido, eros, and philia qualities of love and elevates them beyond 
the ambiguities of their self-centeredness,” contends Tillich.524 In Systematic Theology, 
Volume I, Tillich explains agape as the love that transcends the other three, “namely, the 
desire for the fulfillment of the longing of the other being, the longing for his [sic] 
fulfillment.”525 Agape is the dimension of love, originating in God, which grounds each 
quality of love in care for the fulfillment of the other, moving the desire for union beyond 
self-interest alone.526 Agape is the ultimate criterion for love.  
I deduce that Tillich imagines agape as God’s love that enters into the human 
experience of loving, including sex, and transforms it, perhaps completes it, and grounds 
it in concern for the fulfillment of the other. Recall, according to Tillich, that libido is 
good in itself, “a normal drive towards vital self-fulfillment.” This desire is corrupted 
insofar as it seeks only pleasure and bypasses the center of the other person, indicating its 
separation from the other qualities of love. Based on Tillich’s understanding of agape, I 
surmise that sexual desire, as an example of epithymia, contains agape as that dimension 
of love that allows desire for the other to be wholly centered on union with pleasure as a 
natural consequence.527  
Unfortunately, I have no choice but to “surmise” on these conclusions. Despite his 
focus on eros and his consideration of a place for sexual love in religious life, Tillich 
steers clear of talking explicitly about sexual experience in his work. The fear and anxiety 
that surrounds talking about sex, so common in the Christian legacy, comes to mind 
                                                
524 Tillich, LPJ, 33, 116.   
525 Tillich, ST 1, 280, emphasis mine.  
526 In addition, Tillich affirms that agape in its traditional sense, as opposed to the other three qualities of 
love, extends itself independent of the characteristics of the other. Agape also affirms unconditionally and 
is universal with respect to its attention to the other.  
527 Irwin, 118. Also see pages 99-120.  
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immediately. Were there still risks and doubt about expounding on this practice 
theologically? Irwin suggests that Tillich’s avoidance of sex in his writings on eros 
reflects Tillich’s own anxieties about his ongoing sexual indiscretions in his private life. 
He was unfaithful to his spouse, Hannah Tillich, who published a memoir after his death, 
From Time to Time. The memoir exposed his sexual indiscretions and the great suffering 
they caused Hannah and his family. Irwin connects Tillich’s personal shortcomings to 
gaps in his theological system. “The broken connection between eros and justice in 
Tillich’s private life points to a rupture in the theologian’s intellectual vision of the 
erotic,” Irwin claims.528  
 Finally, how is agape shaped by epithymia? Irwin finds that desire as an erotic 
element in relation to God must remain part of theological vocabulary for Tillich. Even 
though agape as it originates in God consists of pure, disinterested, and unambiguous 
love, which is neither attracted nor repulsed by its object, Tillich asserts that this 
experience is always external to the realm of possible human experience and 
comprehension.529 This reality makes it impossible for us to imagine God’s agape 
without passionate, erotic elements. Agape as desire points the way to a new form of 
fellowship between human beings and God, suggestive of a dynamic interdependence 
characterized by erotic passion. 530  
 
 
 
 
                                                
528 Ibid, 118. 
529 Ibid, 80.  
530 Ibid, 81.  
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The New Eros in Feminist Theology 
First published in 1960, feminist theologian Valerie Saiving’s article, “The 
Human Situation: A Feminist View,” reminded readers that Christian love, defined as 
agape, consisted of unbounded self-giving and self-sacrifice. Agape was considered a 
virtue and often juxtaposed with the sin of pride, an attempt to overcome the anxiety 
aroused by the human condition. Saiving, however, pointed out that gender roles 
differentiated the “human situation” for men and women. The feminine dilemma was 
opposite that of the masculine. Women, especially mothers, were all too familiar with 
agape’s self-sacrificial, self-transcending love. Contrary to being prideful, Saiving 
suggested that women sinned by surrendering their selfhood.531 Since her article many 
feminist theologians have considered the detriments and complexities of traditional 
agapic or self-sacrificial love for women.532  
But if not agape, how should the feminist perspective explain the substance of 
Christian love? In the late 1980s, a few feminist theologians who sensitive to how a 
theological priority on self-sacrifice encouraged the submission of women attempted to 
redefine Christian love by revisiting and redefining eros and the erotic. For example, one 
entry point was to reformulate the doctrine of God based on new metaphors for the 
sacred. In Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (1987), feminist 
theologian Sallie McFague explored three new models of God fitting for our current 
                                                
531 See Valerie Saiving, “The Human Situation: A Feminine View,” in Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist 
Reader in Religion, eds. Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow, (San Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 
1979), 25-42. 
532 For example, Rita Nakashima Brock, in her constructive proposal for eros, rejects agape entirely on the 
basis of its unidirectional, dispassionate trajectory. Bonnie Miller-McLemore has explored the complexities 
of self-sacrifice in “Generativist, Self-Sacrifice, and the Ethics of Family Life,” in The Equal Regard 
Family and its Friendly Critics: Don Browning and the Practical Theological Ethics of the Family, eds. 
John Witte, Jr., M. Christian Green, and Amy Wheeler, (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 2007), 17-41. 
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context.533 Recognizing that the metaphor of ‘God as Lover’ might provoke resistance to 
attributing the qualities of passion, desire, and eroticized longing to God, she encouraged 
readers to consider what it would mean for God to passionately desire creation. The 
model of ‘God as Lover’ prioritized eros and attributes for God that ran counter to the 
classical characteristics of agape love and its disinterested, unmoved, self-sacrificial 
subject. McFague used Tillich’s eros – the love that desires union with the valuable – to 
flesh out this metaphor.  
McFague’s model had theological and ethical consequences for humanity. For 
example, ‘God as Lover’ meant that God needed the world, and God’s need for us 
demanded our response.534 God’s eros was paradigmatic for humanity. It emphasized the 
importance of bodies; therefore, attention to the survival of all beings was paramount. 
McFague argued that attention to all bodies “undercuts the heavy anthropocentrism of 
traditional Christian theories of redemption.”535 Thus, justice in this model stretched 
beyond the need for care in human relationships to care for the cosmos. Salvation was 
understood in an ecological, evolutionary context. In other words, reunion required 
integration of all the parts of the organism, or McFague’s overarching metaphor of ‘the 
world as God’s body.’536 Helpers (or lovers), she said, “work to restore right 
relationships, proper balance among the parts.”537 Finally, McFague suggested that eros 
                                                
533 Weary that traditional metaphors for God, such as King, Father, and Lord, have been unhelpful and 
destructive, not only to women but to the creation as a whole, McFague employs a metaphorical theological 
methodology to suggest a number of new models. She argues that models need to tested, tried, and 
evaluated, as this approach to theological reflection is heuristic, limited, and always strives to be timely. 
The goal of metaphorical theology is to find better models, while understanding that no single model will 
ever capture the one and only truth about God. 
534 Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age, (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1987), 134.  
535 Ibid, 147.  
536 Ibid, 69-78.  
537 Ibid, 148.  
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in the service of healing emphasized resistance to wounding or harm done to bodies, as 
well as identification with those who suffer. To act in ways that God does as a lover 
means to “work toward healing the world’s divisions and the freeing the world’s 
oppressed.”538  
Whereas McFague’s brief attention to eros was part of a larger project that 
supported metaphorical theology, other feminist theologians devoted entire projects to 
redefining Christian love as eros. In an ongoing effort to address the explicit and implicit 
sexist, racist, and heterosexist assumptions in Christian theology, they creatively 
expanded upon the theological importance of the theme of erotic love. Similar to 
McFague, they strongly emphasized the relationship between eros and concrete justice-
making in interpersonal relationships. Unlike McFague, they left Plato and Tillich behind 
to develop their own definitions for eros based on women’s experiences of desiring and 
loving and used these experiences as primary sources for doing theology. Erotic power 
fostered connection, was found in concrete, mutual relationships – including sexual 
relationships – and was necessarily morally motivating.  
 
Eros in Secular Feminism: Lorde’s Influence 
 Secular feminist discourse on eros was a valuable source for feminist eros 
theologians. Recall from Chapter Three that feminists in the “sex wars” who appealed to 
eros fit into the “radical feminist” camp. They comprised the subgroup that Wendy 
Chapkis referred to as the pro-positive sex feminists. These feminists argued that some 
sexual practices – those that entailed love, commitment, trust, and mutual sexual pleasure 
– were possible when an eros free from the distortions of patriarchy was uncovered. 
                                                
538 Ibid, 153.  
 241 
Adrienne Rich, Susan Griffin, and Haunani-Kay Trask, for example, offered 
interpretations of eros that had significant appeal for feminist theologians. The most 
influential interpretation, however, was that of black lesbian feminist poet, Audre Lorde. 
Sandra Friedman and Alec Irwin assert, “Audre Lorde has served as a touchstone for 
almost all womanist and feminist writing on the erotic.”539 Indeed, Lorde’s small essay, 
“Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,” is a foundational source from which two 
feminist theologians, Rita Nakashima Brock and Carter Heyward, construct theological 
projects that center feminist eros.  
In “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,” Lorde suggests a fresh, dynamic, 
empowering, and ultimately relational understanding of the erotic. She is inspired to offer 
a corrective to “vilified,” “devalued,” and “purely sexual dimensions” of the word, which 
have promoted female inferiority and aroused contempt for and the suspicion of women. 
Imploring all women to forgo its suppression, she calls for them to embrace the erotic, 
the “power which rises from our deepest and no rational knowledge.”540 This power is 
deeply connected to both sensation and feeling, as well as subsequent satisfaction – a 
“lifeforce of women; of that creative energy empowered, the knowledge and use of which 
we are now reclaiming in our language, our history, our dancing, our loving, our work, 
our lives.”541 For Lorde, the erotic is no longer bound to the sexual, but is a resource for 
women to draw on in all areas of life. It is bound to deep fulfillment and prompts the 
desire for satisfaction.  
                                                
539 Sandra Friedman and Alec Irwin, “Christian feminism, eros, and power in right relation,” in Cross 
Currents, 40 (1990): 388.  
540 Audre Lorde, “Uses of the Erotic: The erotic as power,” In Weaving the Visions: New Paradigms in 
Feminist Spirituality, eds. Judith Plaskow and Carol Christ, (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1989), 
208. This article was originally published in 1984.  
541 Ibid, 210.  
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 According to Lorde, the erotic serves a number of important purposes. It lessens 
the threat of difference between individuals as they share in the joy of a common pursuit 
together; it widens and draws one’s attention to her capacity for joy and satisfaction 
outside of that which has been socially and culturally prescribed (marriage, god, an 
afterlife); and, as a function of the latter, it puts one in touch with her deepest cravings 
and a desire to resists settling for the “convenient, the shoddy, the conventionally 
expected, or the merely safe.”542 Lorde contends that when women begin to attend to 
their deepest feelings and longings, they will fail to be satisfied and will be moved to 
resist the suffering, self-negation, despair, depression, and self-denial fostered by the 
suppression of their erotic power. This recognition prompts the pursuit of genuine change 
in individual lives and in the world.  
Finally, the erotic facilitates mutuality in relationships with others. Lorde 
explains,  
…when we look away from ourselves as we satisfy our erotic needs in 
concert with others, we use each other as objects of satisfaction rather than 
share our joy in the satisfying, rather than make connection with our 
similarities and our differences.543  
 
In other words, she is adamant that erotic power facilitates genuine sharing that resists 
using others as objects to satisfy our own needs, as well as allowing ourselves to be used. 
The erotic makes mutual pleasure and connection between individuals possible.  
 Given that Lorde’s short piece is a mainstay in the development of eros in 
feminist theology, I want to point out a number of notable points before moving on. First, 
the primal nature of erotic power is implicit in Lorde’s description. The erotic is pre-
                                                
542 Ibid, 210-211. Lorde, who does not identify as a theologian, talks about eros as a “life-force.”  She 
images eros in non-theistic ways and says that eros does not have to be called “god. Lorde, 211; Friedman 
and Irwin, 393. 
543 Lorde, 212.  
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existing, essential to womanhood, unexpressed, unrecognized and, ultimately, repressed 
by the self and oppressed by male models of power. It is not socially constructed, but 
rather what women fundamentally possess and how they are meant to relate at their 
deepest level. It is good and uncorrupted despite is repression or suppression. Being in 
touch with one’s erotic power cultivates the desire for more of the good that erotic power 
promises.  
Second, although it has been used to define sexual experience – “relegated to the 
bedroom alone,” says Lorde – I deduce from Lorde’s essay that the erotic maintains a 
role in deepening sexual experience for women, perhaps calling them to tap and express 
their repressed sexual desires. Maybe eros calls them to demand pleasure in sexual 
experience! I would even argue that given the imperative that erotic power should 
facilitate genuine sharing with others and resist the objectification of self and other, 
Lorde would advocate for erotic sexual encounters that promote mutual joy and 
satisfaction in ways that distinguish these feelings from their illusory, hollow 
counterparts. If this is the case, I wish she had communicated it. 
Lorde, however, does not indulge my desire as it would defeat one of the main 
points of her essay: the experience of the erotic is pervasive, available to women as a 
resource in all areas of life, and should not be confined to the sexual arena alone. By 
bracketing off sexual experience in this piece, she aims to disassemble women’s 
association with the purely sensual/sexual, perhaps a necessary move given the 
objectification and abuses women have suffered as a result of such affiliations. In 
addition to enlarging the scope of erotic power and its pleasures, she also suggests that 
sexual pleasure bears no qualitative difference in comparison to the deep satisfaction and 
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joy that permeates all creative endeavors. The two differ only in quantity.544 In other 
words, one might experience more (or less) pleasure in the context of sexual activity, but 
the pleasure is not distinct or set apart from the pleasures obtained from satisfying other 
creative hopes for the self or the community. With this claim, pleasure in sex loses a 
degree of its distinctiveness.  
 This leads to a third point, namely the nature of those experiences that oppose, 
repress, or deny the power of the erotic. Lorde is critical of the association of the erotic 
with sensation and, hence, the pornographic. For example, she says, “Pornography is a 
direct denial of the power of the erotic, for it represents the suppression of true feeling. 
Pornography emphasizes sensation without feeling.”545 She also labels the objectification 
of others or the self, to the detriment of sharing and feeling toward mutual satisfaction 
and joy, as “pornography and obscenity – the abuse of feeling.”546 Taken together, those 
who refuse the consciousness of feeling, at any time, are reduced to the pornographic, the 
abused, and the absurd.547 Insofar as the erotic for Lorde is that which connects sensation 
and feeling, aids women in opening themselves up to a source of power and knowledge, 
and is itself the substance of mutual connection that deepens the power and knowledge of 
those in relationship, pornography and abuse constitute its absence. This suggests that 
sexual experiences and pleasures that do not consist of a mutual connection that deepens 
the power and knowledge of those in relationship are not properly erotic; they are 
pornographic and abusive. Thus, sexual experiences and their pleasures are either erotic 
by Lorde’s definition or pornographic.  
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 Finally, insofar as erotic power promotes resistance to suffering, self-negation, 
despair, depression, and self-denial, it prompts the pursuit of genuine change in the 
world. Though she does not go into any great detail, Lorde’s meditation on the erotic 
points toward its connection with healing, political action, and justice – not just for 
individual women, but for all women. Remember, erotic power is unmistakably good; it 
resists the bad and opens one up to the greater needs and goods for the self and the 
community. I would add that when it is at work in relationships, even in the face of 
difference, erotic power supposes a harmony of needs between the self and others that 
can be met in truly mutual relationships.  
Again, I cannot overstate the importance of Lorde’s work to feminist eros 
theology. All of the qualities she attributes to the erotic – its essential, positive character, 
its meaning beyond the explicitly sexual, its pornographic antithesis, and its orientation 
toward justice and mutual satisfaction – are crucial to feminist theological interpretations 
of eros.  
  
Reclaiming Eros: Grounds for Revision & New Theological Meanings 
 A year after McFague’s Models of God, feminist theologian Rita Nakashima 
Brock, a Japanese-Puerto Rican immigrant American, published Journey’s By Heart: A 
Christology of Erotic Power (1988). Her entire project focuses on a new interpretation of 
eros to offer a feminist Christology. Her goal is to radically de-center the symbol of 
Christ, a symbol she identifies as a major problem for feminist theology. Especially 
sensitive to the dimensions of Christology that perpetuate patriarchal family structures 
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and abuse, her feminist Christology provides sources for healing for women and children 
affected by abuse, including sexual abuse.  
Brock argues that the patriarchal family holds prominence among the institutions 
complicit with, influencing, and being shaped by theological assumptions. As a result, 
she places the family and its relational matrix at the core of her critique and constructive 
proposal. She maintains that her focus on the family stems from a baseline conviction 
that we are relationship-seeking beings, who in the processes of bonding and separating 
from primary caregivers, learn to love, lose, co-exist with others, flourish, and grow.548 
The reality of erotic power serves as the basis for this claim and the key for constructing 
a new Christology. 
 To explain her understanding of eros, Brock first makes a distinction between two 
forms of power. First, there is power that is socially constructed - the hierarchical power 
arrangements characterized by dominance, control, and power over. Second, there is the 
power that we are born with, what she calls erotic power. Erotic power is not the eros of 
contemporary culture, equated with lust and sexuality. Rather, it is  
The fundamental power of life, born into us, heals, makes whole, 
empowers and liberates. Its manifold forms create and emerge from heart 
[the true self], that graceful, passionate mystery at the center of ourselves 
and each other…the power of our primal interrelatedness …involving the 
whole person in relationships of self-awareness, vulnerability, openness 
and caring.549  
 
                                                
548 Rita Nakashima Brock, Journeys By Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power, (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 1988), 4. Brock’s theological anthropology rejects notions of sin connected to self-
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be healed.” See Brock, 6-7.  
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Eros grounds and springs from the centered or true self and is characterized by openness 
to the world and one’s full range of inner feelings. This posture differs from the need to 
dominate or control others, as well as the impulse to lose the self in the needs and 
feelings of others. Brock reiterates that this true self “is the root of intimacy and 
connection, and springs from and enhances erotic power.”550 Participating in safe, 
enduring, nurturing relationships with others is a lifelong process that nurtures erotic 
power. Brock says, “[Erotic power] is a relational source of our vulnerability and 
connectedness to the world…Erotic power creates and sustains connectedness…intimacy, 
generosity, and interdependence.”551 It also fuels caring and healing in our relationships 
with others. 
Brock explicitly points to Lorde’s influence in her work, and one can see that 
Brock’s description of erotic power is replete with the themes I pointed in Lorde’s essay. 
Erotic power is innate, “born into us.” It is the substance of our “primal interrelatedness.” 
It is good and works toward justice – it “empowers and liberates.” Like Lorde, Brock is 
adamant about moving eros beyond it equivalent to lust and sexuality. She agrees with 
feminist Haunani-Kay Trask, who sees the feminist articulation of eros as “moving well 
beyond the identification of passion and love with genital sexuality to a sense of the body 
and a power that cherishes life in its multiplicities of feelings and forms.”552 While Brock 
focuses on the need for attention to the sensual and its role in reclamation of the body, the 
erotic in her text is much more than just sexual love. 
 Unfortunately, just as Lorde does, Brock steers clear of indulging the sexual 
dimension of eros from a woman’s perspective. She too wants an understanding of eros 
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unencumbered by the eros of contemporary culture, the lust of a male-dominant 
society.553 Because Brock’s work centers on sources for healing for women and children 
affected by abuse, including sexual abuse, one could see a reason for excluding 
discussion about the sexual dimension of eros. The sexual abuse of women is guided by 
power arrangements characterized by dominance, control, and power over, not mutuality 
inspired by her definition of erotic power. And, like Lorde, Brock is more concerned with 
pointing to sexual experiences that are not erotic by her definition.  
In her book, Casting Stones: Prostitution and Liberation in Asian and the United 
States, Brock and Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite protest again prostitution, which 
exemplifies the anti-erotic or anti-sexuality, the absence and antithesis of the erotic.554 
They explain, “… the sex industry at work is strikingly devoid of any feeling, especially 
something so mutually compelling as desire. And it is markedly devoid of any healing, 
integrating experience of human sexuality, beauty, or passion.”555 Brock and 
Thistlethwaite argue that sexual abuses and experiences like sex work do not contain 
erotic elements because – per the feminist redefinition of eros – feelings, mutual desire, 
healing, and the integration of sexuality, beauty, and passion properly belong to true 
erotic experience. Like Lorde, Brock and Thistlethwaite contend that sexual experiences 
that are not erotic by this definition constitute the anti-erotic.  
Taken together, Brock’s work is not a resource that deals positively with the 
sexual dimension of eros from a woman’s perspective. She avoids it completely. Brock, 
like Lorde, also simplifies sexual experiences into those that are properly erotic and those 
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that are pornographic or anti-erotic. Thus, they deny the experience of “true” erotic desire 
and pleasure in acts and experiences that are ‘pornographic.’ Having reviewed the many 
positions on sex and pleasure in the context of feminism’s “sex wars,” I am struck that 
there is little room in Brock’s theology of the erotic for the complexity of erotic 
experience, including pleasure. Are there not experiences and pleasures that is neither 
healing nor abusive? Also, given the personal and context dependent nature of sexual 
activities and desires, it is strange to interpret and impose meaning on sexual experience 
and pleasure that may have a very different interpretation and meaning for the consenting 
participants. Because Brock’s subjects in Casting Stones are prostitutes, I am left 
wondering about erotic pleasure in the context of poverty. Brock’s one dimensional 
interpretation of eros makes this analysis impossible.   
 
Carter Heyward’s Eros 
When it comes to feminist eros theology, any elaboration of the erotic in so far as 
it pertains to positive sexual experiences and pleasure is left to Carter Heyward. 
Heyward’s approach to the erotic and the theology she constructs around it must have 
amounted to going rogue when it came to theologizing about sex in the theological 
disciplines. Her redefinitions in light of her theological understanding of eros are so 
unique that she includes a glossary at the end of her text Touching Our Strength: The 
Erotic as Power and the Love of God, which explains to her reader what she means when 
she uses words like sex, sexuality, eros, and god.   
While McFague converses with Plato’s Eros and is greatly influenced by Tillich’s 
theology of eros, feminist eros theologians like Brock and Heyward do not appropriate 
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Tillich’s thought in their innovative recovery of eros. In fact, Heyward cites Tillich as a 
“paradigmatic modern liberal,” and argues that he fails to take into consideration the 
social and relational basis of both human and divine Being. As a result, she claims that he 
does not recognize “the theological significance of the material, embodied, and economic 
grounds of human being.”556 This has profound implications for human and divine 
participation in concrete acts of justice making, something Heyward positions at the core 
of her explanation of erotic power. Subsequently, she criticizes Tillich and liberal 
Christianity for its complicity in the face of sexism, heterosexism, racism, and any other -
isms. While she shuns both the content and consequences of Tillich’s theology as a 
whole, Heyward ironically neglects to critique his use and assessment of eros in her own 
treatise on the erotic. The reader is left wondering if Irwin is correct when he argues that 
Tillich’s use of eros is often neglected. Or perhaps Heyward does not find Tillich’s 
attention to eros compelling enough to overcome the implications of his theological 
system as a whole. 
 In any case, within a year of the publication of Brock’s Journey by Heart, Carter 
Heyward, a lesbian feminist Christian priest and educator, published Touching Our 
Strength: The Erotic as Power and the Love of God (1989). At the time, Friedman and 
Irwin claimed that this text represented “the most thorough and challenging discussion of 
eros in the Christian feminist/womanist literature.”557 That same year, Heyward 
published two other essays – “Sexuality, Love, and Justice” and “Pain and Pleasure: 
                                                
556 Carter Heyward, Touching our Strength: The Erotic Power and the Love of God, (San Francisco: Harper 
& Row Publishers, 1989), 64, italics in text. In other words, Heyward disagrees that a God who remains 
free from the possibility of relationality, material need, and sensuality is able to constitute our “ground of 
being.” Tillich’s conception –God above God – distances the divine from the realities of human struggle, 
including, she adds, “the passions, problems, and confusions of human sexuality.” Ibid, 67. 
557 Friedman and Irwin, 391.  
 251 
Avoiding the Confusions of Christian Tradition in Feminist Theory.” Both essays 
pointedly applied her understanding of “the erotic” to sexuality, including sexual 
experience and pleasure.558 Like Brock, Heyward remains in the Christian tradition (she 
prefers “christian”), while calling for 1) serious critiques of how Christian symbols, 
doctrine, and practice have been shaped by the dominant ideology of Western culture, 
and 2) accountability for how they have perpetuated the patriarchal ideals manifest in 
sexism, heterosexism, and racism. As part of the tradition of feminist liberation theology, 
Heyward’s work seeks radical change in and transformation of theology, doctrine, and 
symbols that promote violence and abuse and support relationships between individuals 
and social groups that are characterized by dominance and control.  
While Brock’s text focuses on Christology, Touching Our Strength is a text 
committed to constructing a sexual theology that holds together sexuality, spirituality, 
and the struggle for justice. Heyward’s concept of the “erotic” is the glue the binds these 
themes together, as well as the power that makes them possible. Hers is a new way of 
thinking theologically about human nature in relation to the human predicament, as well 
as what heals us and move us toward flourishing – all goals of pastoral theology. Unlike 
Brock, Heyward also reflects more explicitly on the political nature of power. In the 
context of her larger hope for recognizing and embracing erotic power, she offers a new 
and provocative way for thinking about sex and understanding sexual pleasure. 
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Heyward’s Critique: Sexuality, the Sadomasochistic Shape Society, and Sex 
For Heyward, caring and healing as it relates to erotic power is a function of our 
sexuality, the medium through which we participate in and grasp the erotic. Because 
erotic power motivates justice-making, our sexuality - as Heyward defines it - holds the 
key to liberation. To make sense of these claims, one must understand how the distortion 
of our sexuality has prevented us from living into the fullness of our humanity. 
First, Heyward rejects sexual essentialism, the claim that our sexual relations, 
including our sexual feelings, are natural, inevitable, universal, and biologically 
determined. Instead, drawing on Foucault, she maintains that historical forces shape our 
sexual feelings and experiences. She argues, like Brock, that relationships in our society 
are rooted in the dynamics of control and subjugation, fueled by the need for the 
possession of power over the other. Since no experience of power, sexual or otherwise, is 
intrinsic to a person or relationship, experiences of power-in-relation are socially 
constructed.559 Sexuality, she argues, is a social construction, and as such, has become a 
site where power-over is used to control and abuse, especially in a capitalist economy.  
According to Heyward, relations in general that are characterized by dominant 
and submissive participants cultivate alienation, a feeling of being lost to one’s self and 
others. She contends that when individuals and groups of individuals strive to possess 
power-over each other, freedom becomes more important than justice.560 Those with 
power-over experience alienation as a natural construction of reality and take significant 
steps to preserve their illusion of freedom.561 They possess what Heyward calls “alienated 
power,” a power that is not shared, but strains to be possessed. The counterpart to 
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alienated power is “alienated powerlessness,” a shared experience of massive resignation 
and collective depression, a social force that dashes hope and saps creative energies.562 
Injustice, manifest in the violence and abuse, is the tragic consequence of this 
sadomasochistic way of relating. In fact, Heyward refers to this larger cultural ethos as 
“sadomasochistic” because alienated powerlessness makes our vision for relating feel 
limited to either positions of domination or submission.563 Hover, just because we feel 
limited in modes of relating does not mean that we are powerless to choose differently. 
This illusion is crucial to Heyward’s solution to the problem of sadomasochistic 
dynamics.  
 Unfortunately, alienated power profoundly shapes sexuality. Feminist theorists 
have demonstrated that what we have come to accept as “normal” human sexuality is 
male gender domination posturing as the norm. Sexism, for example, is a structure of 
alienated power, a disconnection between men and women fostered by men’s control 
over women’s lives and sexuality. According to Heyward, sexism supports ideals and 
norms for heterosexual romantic love, marriage, family, traditional values, the authority 
of traditional religious teachings, the stability of the social order, and the security of the 
nation.564 Heterosexism, she argues, is a logical extension of sexism. In order to control 
women’s sexual activity, men must impose their own – they must always be and stay on 
top, and every man must do his part to preserve the this hierarchy, lest men risk the 
crumbling of the aforementioned institutions as they know and benefit from them.  
 Although this construction of sexuality has ramifications for life outside of 
explicitly sexual experiences, the sexual sphere is a powerful and often private venue for 
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the abuse of women and for experiences devoid of pleasure. It is also a dimension of life 
where the distinction or tension between pleasure and pain can be blurred, confused, or 
conflated. In “Pleasure and Pain,” Heyward and Beverly Harrison assert that the larger, 
cultural dynamics of sadomasochistic relating shape sexual desire and pleasure. In this 
article they pay brief homage to secular feminists on both sides of the sex wars. Heyward 
and Harrison, like feminists on both sides of the sex wars, argue that the play between 
dominating and submitting in sexual relationships largely serves to enhance the pleasure 
of both men and women in our society – the latter traditionally learning to take pleasure 
in the experience of submission, surrender, or pain.  
As theologians, Heyward and Harrison critically implicate the Christian tradition, 
which historically made pleasure chiefly available through pain. They trace the history of 
the influence of dualistic anthropology that positioned the higher (spirit, male, light, 
good) over the lower (flesh, female, dark, evil) and encouraged spiritual practices that 
necessitated pain (in form of the denial of the sensual pleasure) for attaining the pleasure 
of salvation. 565 Though not nearly as explicit, they also argue that modern Christian 
theologies maintain these dynamics through a gender hierarchy that encourages women 
to live for others and to find pleasure in continual self-sacrifice.  
The thrust of Heyward and Harrison's argument in “Pleasure and Pain” is that, at 
the level of personal erotic experience, the difference between what hurts and what is 
pleasurable has become difficult to discern. They explain,  
Physiologically, the line between pain and pleasure is at times a fine one. 
It is not surprising that human beings learn a psychological preference for 
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an eroticism that is tinged, if not with pain, with tension that is close to 
pain.566  
 
As a consequence, erotic experiences that generate sexual desire and pleasure necessitate 
tension – the tension between possessing and being possessed or the need for a split 
between the self and other. In other words, in our culture sexual experiences are erotic 
precisely because of this tension. Heyward and Harrison argue that it is difficult not to 
imagine the loss of this tension as the diminishment or elimination of erotic power, 
sexual desire, or sexual pleasure.567 Put differently, we can only conceive of and 
experience sexual desire and pleasure as it relates to the titillating tension between 
possessing and being possessed. 
 
Heyward’s Erotic Power: Mutuality, Sharing Power, and the Sacred 
 Heyward’s corrective to this restrictive and alienated notion of sexuality and 
erotic sex is a new understanding of erotic power and its sacred character. She insists on 
breaking down the tensions that inhibit mutual power sharing and dissolving the 
“pernicious dualisms between sex and God, sexuality and spirituality, body and spirit, 
and pleasure and goodness.”568 Heyward’s proposal requires rethinking our sexual 
relationships, our friendships, and what it really means to be “lovers.” In the process of 
claiming the centrality of the erotic, she collapses any distinction between agapic, philial, 
and erotic love, arguing that love is at once both human and divine. Finally, she insists 
that the flow of erotic power as love has an essential relationship to justice, a relationship 
that implicates all sexual experiences in the pursuit of justice.  
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 In Touching Our Strength, one of the premises of Heyward’s project is that  
preferences for ‘sadomasochistic’ power relations stem from a deep fear of mutuality. 
“Fear of mutuality,” she explains, “is the fear of our intrinsic interrelatedness, the fact 
that literally I am nobody without you.”569 She claims that human beings are inherently 
relational – beings who become persons, grow, and change as persons, and even die as 
persons in and through relation.570 Heyward also indicates that our intrinsic 
interrelatedness can be the source of our growth or our demise. A growth-fostering 
relationship is mutual, while a relationship that lacks mutuality fosters disconnection and 
leads to alienation.571 Here, Heyward sounds remarkably like Jessica Benjamin, but 
without the detailed depth psychology to back up her claims.   
Thus, mutual relationships are the growth fostering, egalitarian opposite of 
sadomasochistic relationships. It follows for Heyward that the “erotic” is our embodied 
yearning for mutuality, the desire in every part of our being that seeks relationships that 
foster our own growth, as well as the growth of those with whom we are in relationship. 
“Mutuality,” she explains, “is sharing power in such a way that each participant in the 
relationship is called forth more fully into becoming who she is – a whole person with 
integrity.”572 Taken together, erotic power is an incarnate desire to share power and grow 
together as persons. Misguided notions and fear of the erotic, including those perpetuated 
by the Christian tradition, contain, she insists, a fear of facing our longing for mutual 
relationships based on our essential interrelatedness.        
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 Heyward’s understanding of erotic power is deep and full, infusing and shaping 
every dimension of her theological anthropology and her understanding of the divine, as 
well as the substance of human/divine fellowship. She expounds,  
The erotic is our desire to taste and smell and see and hear and touch one 
another.  It’s our yearning to be involved…in each other’s sounds and 
glances and bodies and feelings. The erotic is the flow of our senses, the 
movement of our sensuality, in which we experience our bodies’ power 
and desire to connect with others. The erotic moves transpersonally among 
us and also draw us more fully into ourselves.573 
  
In this passage, the sensual and material nature of eros comes to the fore. Reminiscent of 
Lorde, the erotic for Heyward is the desire to connect physically, emotionally, and 
spiritually with other individuals. Each dimension of connection bears equal importance. 
Embodied connection is no longer frowned up, but assumed. Similar to Brock’s 
description, the erotic “moves transpersonally,” in the creative space of “play” between 
our own subjectivity and the other.  
Like both Brock and Lorde, the erotic for Heyward celebrates embodiment, as 
well as incorporating, yet moving beyond explicitly sexual desire, activity, and 
pleasure.574 “Eroticism is my participation in the universe…the deepest stirring of our 
relationality, our experience of being connected to others.” Heyward declares.575 Thus, 
true erotic power craves connections and relationships that are mutual, where power is 
shared and openness to equality exists in all relationships. Mutuality for Heyward is not 
simply reciprocity, but an experience with the other that calls one forth into a full and 
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whole sense of being. It is empowering. “To speak of the erotic,” says Heyward, “…is to 
speak of power in right relation.”576 
In a profoundly theological move, Heyward asserts that to speak of the erotic is 
also speak of God, the Sacred, the divine, or love. The erotic is sacred power. “God is our 
power in mutual relation.  It is with and by this sacred power that we are able to nurture 
relationships as resources of growth as co-creative women and men,” she explains.577 For 
her, God or the Sacred, makes mutual, life-giving relationships possible. God is love, the 
power and sustainer of mutual relations, and is embodied literally when we participate in 
mutual relationships with others. “Insofar as we do this, we ‘god’ (verb),” she says.578 
Similar to Brock, the Sacred for Heyward is no longer “above,” but in and in-between. 
This understanding of the divine does not bind experience of the sacred to Christian 
experience exclusively; rather, the sacred takes various forms and images and is felt most 
personally in the struggle for mutuality. Thus, the erotic provides a window onto the 
spiritual, or as Heyward puts it, it is “the root of our theological epistemology,” or the 
basis of our knowledge and love of God.579 Eros, as opposed to traditional agape, is 
central to being, doing, and living out Christian theology and ethics.  
  
Heyward’s Passion: the Erotic and Justice 
Recall that Heyward’s overarching aim in her eros theology is to construct a 
sexual theology that holds together sexuality, spirituality, and the struggle for justice, 
claims that she indulges in her essay, “Sexuality, love and justice.”  Having explicated 
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her take on the first two concepts, I now turn to the third, and its necessary political 
dimensions.  
Leaving behind the popular cultural notions of love as sweet, sappy, warm and 
fuzzy feelings, Heyward insists that love “is not a ‘feeling’ that precedes right-
relation…we act our way into new feelings, new emotions, new ideas. The act is love. 
The act is justice. Good feelings about love and justice may come later.”580  Here, love is 
justice in the form of doing and being intentional about living in and into mutual and just 
relationships with others. Where there is no justice, there is no love. We are, Heyward 
suggests, fundamentally called to be “lovers” in the world.581 Drawing from her own 
experience as a lesbian, deprived of the symbols and categories used to express romantic 
love, she argues that it is the “special privilege of lesbians and gay men to take very 
seriously, and very actively, what it means to love.”582 Her claims rests on the fact that 
lesbians and gay men have no other word to express their relationships with others than 
that of “lover.”  
A passion for justice, according to Heyward, is the basis for rage against 
injustices couched in love and for compassion for our own participation in injustices.583  
Because the love of God – the erotic - is manifest in mutual, right relationships with 
others, she urges that political, economic, educational, business, and religious structures 
that do “not support love, justice, mutuality, and cooperation in human life should be 
undone.”584 Heterosexism, for example, is one among many forms of discrimination that 
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must be torn down.  In sum, Heyward claims that loving, insofar as it is “erotic” – 
exemplary of God’s love and the power of right relationship – is a revolutionary act.       
 
Heyward’s Climax: The Erotic and the Redemption of Sexual Pleasure 
 Whereas Lorde and Brock refrain from addressing the explicitly sexual dimension 
of erotic power, the erotic as articulated by Heyward contributes to a discourse on sexual 
pleasure and the Christian sexual ethics that dictate its affirmation. First, Heyward 
redefines sexuality as “our embodied, relational response to erotic/sacred power.”585 In 
other words, sexuality is the character of our response when we participate in affecting 
mutual relationships and justice. Though we often associate sexuality with our genitals, 
our response does not necessarily need to involve sharing genital pleasure. “Sexuality is 
expressed not only between lovers in personal relationship, but also in the world of an 
artist who loves her painting or her poetry, a father who loves his children, or a 
revolutionary who loves her people,” she explains.586 This broad understanding of 
sexuality and the potential for great satisfaction in response to the erotic parallels Lorde’s  
contention that sexual pleasure bears no qualitative difference in comparison to the deep 
satisfaction and joy that permeates all creative endeavors. Heyward suggests that this 
kind of participation involves embracing difference as we look toward common strengths, 
shared vulnerability, and relational pleasure. She cautions, however, that such efforts do 
not necessarily avoid pain, as the desire for mutuality is almost always punished in a 
social order characterized by domination and alienation.  
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 Out of this broad redefinition of sexuality, Heyward defines sex as “touching 
toward one another’s genitals,” or stimulating another physically out of our embodied, 
relational response to our erotic power.587 She claims that love-making (in all its forms) 
should always be justice-making. Sexual activity, if it is truly erotic, moves toward the 
mutual sharing of power in relation. She argues that sex, 
 …generates more energy…for passionate involvement in the movements 
for justice in the world…turns us simultaneously into ourselves and 
beyond ourselves. In experiencing the depths of our power in relation as 
pleasurable and good, we catch a glimpse of the power of right relation in 
larger, more complicated configurations of life together. Good sex 
involves us more fully in the struggle for justice – as, or with, people of 
color, women, differently abled people, ethnic and religious minorities, 
elderly people, and other earthcreatures.588  
 
For Heyward, the mystical quality of sex has necessary ethical dimensions. The 
experience of mutual relating in sex generates a pleasure that stimulates a desire for 
sharing power with and supporting equality for every person and every living thing. 
With no less of a mystical framework, Heyward addresses orgasm specifically. 
She proclaims, “Sexual orgasm can be literally a high point, a climax in our capacity to 
know, ecstatically for a moment, the coming together of self and other, sexuality and in 
other dimensions of our lives.”589 In other words, orgasm is an intense, momentary, 
epistemological event, in which the ontological reality of the interconnectedness of the 
body-self, the world, its creatures, and the divine is glimpsed. In this case, sexual 
pleasure is the medium for this thoroughly embodied and mystical experience, which 
profoundly shapes our ethical responses to others and the world.  
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The significance of orgasm for Heyward is a complete inversion of Augustine’s 
interpretation of climax. Whereas she interprets orgasm as the pointed experience of 
synthesis and union with the self, the other, and God, he underscores it as the epitome of 
disconnection and alienation within the individual, between persons, and from God. For 
Augustine, sexual pleasure is a moral problem. Whereas for Heyward, not only does 
erotic sex participate in mutual sharing and connection between partners, but it inspires 
and motivates participation in the lives of others to tear down unjust structures that 
support domination and control at all levels of human social relations. Orgasms motivate 
political action. For Heyward, the experience of sexual pleasure sparks an impulse to 
action that recognizes the need for justice, mutually in relationships, and ethical 
responsibility. Although sex represents only one dimension of our sexuality, it carries 
significant potential, almost expectation, that it motivate participation in overcoming the 
alienation that exists between all beings. Ironically, both Augustine and Heyward 
attribute significant importance to sexual pleasure and exemplify a degree of insistence 
and vigilance as to the ends of our sexual pleasure.     
Contrary to Augustine and her theological predecessors, Heyward is exceedingly 
affirming when it comes to sexual pleasure. She argues that understanding sexuality 
historically makes it possible to consider sexual pleasure as good and morally right, 
without the need for justification. At the same time, we must remain aware of the 
sadomasochistic shape of our context, what she calls “a praxis of alienation,” and the 
ways that it shapes our capacity for sexual pleasure. This is a very significant dilemma. 
Recall that Heyward and Harrison argue that in our culture the tension between 
dominating and submitting in sexual activity is eroticized. Both men and women find 
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pleasure in their respective roles in this sexual dynamic. For Heyward and Harrison, this 
is problematic pleasure. But given this dilemma, how does one unlearn this experience of 
sexual desire and pleasure? 
For Heyward and Harrison, the way out of the eroticization of the tension between 
the self and other in sex is participating in the “full eroticization of mutuality.” In “Pain 
and Pleasure,” both scholars commit to this possibility. In arguing for the full 
eroticization of mutuality, they prove themselves to be the only feminist eros theologians 
in my review to engage secular feminist in the “sex wars.”590 In fact, they fiercely oppose 
movements in feminist theory that encourage women to claim their personal power, 
arguing that a commitment to a woman’s self-possession continues to “reflect a dualistic 
apprehension of embodied power and thus an erotic split.”591  Heyward and Harrison 
insist,  
…the erotic split is the ground upon which we learn to feel as pleasurable 
or sexually stimulating that which in fact is the source of much pain to us: 
our alienation from one another, as people who have difficulty feeling 
power by sharing it…it is rare in this culture to experience power when 
shared as genuine power because we are inured to perceiving as powerful 
anything...that does not appear ‘over against’ us or someone else.592 
 
In other words, they argue power differentials in sexual relationships, although 
pleasurable, leave us alienated from one another and block our ability to experience 
sharing power as sexually stimulating or erotic.  
Thus, Heyward and Harrison oppose feminist theory that encourages women to 
take control of their sexual experiences and pursue their own personal pleasure because 
doing so only succeeds in supporting the bias that personal pleasure is realized in 
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independence from the other. They oppose any kind of erotic activity and pleasure that 
thrives on an exchange of power, regardless of the gender roles. Continuing to support 
the dichotomy of either belonging to self or to other only perpetuates the association of 
the erotic and its pleasures with the tension between the self and other.  
 Against any notion of individual personal empowerment, Heyward and Harrison 
stand by the full eroticization of mutuality. What constitutes a real erotic sexual 
experience is shared power, where the tension between self and other possession 
dissipates and ceases to be a titillating factor and source of pleasure. Tension must be 
eliminated. On this point, Heyward and Harrison criticize “individual feminists,” who 
continue to insist on the need for relational tension. Depending on the version of 
“Pleasure and Pain” one is reading, it is more or less clear that they are criticizing Jessica 
Benjamin. Against Benjamin, they contend that if good sex is fated to bear the mark of 
the tension between self-possession and other-possession, then it will most likely be rare, 
found only when a delicate balance between the two is struck.593 Good sex in the context 
of Heyward and Harrison’s fully eroticized mutuality, however, lacks the quality of 
balance. Its aim is not an exchange of power or a matter of reducing or resolving 
emotional and physical frictions and tensions. Rather, good sex and its pleasures are 
sensuously empowering and contribute to the well-being of both partners, simultaneously.  
Heyward and Harrison insist,  
The pleasure of sex is its capacity to enhance sensuality; the full-body 
orgasm feels good because it increases a sense of well-being, of integrated 
bodily integrity. The pleasure in making love comes from experiencing 
one’s own sensuous empowerment while being present to that of one’s 
lover. Good sex involves a simultaneous enhancement of one own and 
one’s lover’s well-being. Good sex does not involve simply one partner 
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giving and the other receiving, one empowering and the other being 
empowered.594  
 
Put differently, real erotic sex fails to be moved by the roles of controlling or submitting. 
It is moved by and made pleasurable by the experience with one’s lover – the experience 
of being more profoundly connected to our sensuous selves, which cultivates a greater 
sense of well-being. Heyward and Harrison argue that both partners experience this at the 
same time while touching and being touched. They insist that as long as what brings us 
pleasure in our sexual relationships is an exchange of power, sex binds us to “the zero-
sum experience of personal power in which one person’s gain is another’s loss.”595 More 
so, they warn us that continuing to participate in this kind of sexual relationship leaves us 
open to being stimulated by having power leveraged over us, as well as exerting power 
over others. This kind of sex is ethically problematic.  
 As I have stressed already, Heyward’s final word on sexual pleasure in the 
context of her foundations for sexual ethics is a positive one. Her sentiments stand in a 
striking opposition to Christianity’s negative legacy. Orgasm no longer points directly to 
that which has gone awry in the fellowship between humanity and God, and sexual desire 
and pleasure are no longer inherently problematic. Heyward argues that the pleasurable 
nature of sex is never a reason to judge it as wrong. Sexual pleasure is intrinsically good 
– an assertion that must be made in the face of Western Christianity’s insistence that 
sexual desire and pleasure are narcissistic, perverse, dirty, or dangerous. Equating sexual 
pleasure with the perverse, or constructing it as such, she suggests, has exacerbated 
misogynistic and erotophobic values to the detriment of growing our capacity to 
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experience, understand, and trust our erotic power.596 Heyward claims that the perversion 
of our erotic power in this way leads to “pornographic” values: the belief that eros 
separates us from God, is morally and spiritually reprehensible, is a reason for shame and 
guilt, and is revelatory of our selfishness and sin.  
Heyward maintains that learning to value the erotic and sexual pleasure as 
intrinsic goods necessitates the risk of participating in the kind of mutual sexual 
relationship described above. “In a sexually alienated social order, such a commitment 
constitutes a revolutionary act,” she insists.597 This is serious business. The risk in 
remaining complicit, of experiencing ongoing alienation from our erotic, sacred power, is 
participating in the production of “anti-erotic or pornographic” psyches and lives, where 
bodies and feelings are subject to domination, coercion, and violence.598 Heyward also 
asserts, “Any unequal power relationship is intrinsically abusive if it does not contain 
seeds both of transformation into a fully mutual relationship and of mutual openness to 
equality.”599 Like Lorde and Brock, Heyward believes that any kind of relating, including 
sexual activity, that does not realize or aim toward the mutual sharing of power retains a 
‘sadomasochistic’ character and can only be understood as anti-erotic or pornographic.  
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Tensions in the Feminist Theological Promise of Eros 
 
Neglecting Sex in the New Eros 
 My analysis of feminist projects grounded in a new theological vision for eros 
reveals that they have much broader aims in mind than the redemption of women’s 
sexual desire and pleasure. Lorde and Brock both state that they are expanding 
understandings of the erotic beyond sexual love. This in itself is not necessarily 
problematic. For example, Brock’s eros concerns itself with healing and the need to 
engage one another in ways that honor our primal interrelatedness – our erotic power – as 
the resource for developing as persons who are able to affirm our needs and our selves 
without harming others. Although she elaborates on the sensual dimension of the erotic 
and the unequivocal need to reclaim the body and its needs, she does not linger on the 
potential role of erotic power in sexual relationships and steers clear of exploring how 
this new way of thinking about Christian love applies specifically to women’s sexual 
experiences. Her goal, like Lorde’s, is to move the conception of the erotic beyond its 
association with the purely sexual, an association exacerbated by the lust of a male-
dominated society.  
 The lack of attention to women’s sexual experience in Lorde’s and Brock’s 
works, however, generates a tension. On the one hand, both rightly want to sever 
women’s historically essential ties to the sexual realm – ties that have exacerbated 
women’s association with all things “less than,” including nature, the material world, and 
the body. Recall the preference for the spiritual over the bodily in the Christian tradition 
and in the philosophical basis for eros addressed earlier in this chapter. It is not a stretch 
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to imagine that these feminist intentionally bracket an elaboration on women’s sexual 
experience in an effort to break from the patriarchal conflation of the feminine with the 
sexual. The absence of attention to women’s sexual experience more broadly in feminist 
theology could be accounted for by the same intent – to avoid reifying female inferiority, 
contempt, or suspicion in relation to the sexual.600  
On the other hand, these projects offer no redemption for female sexual life, 
including desire and pleasure. Lorde and Brock effectively lay the groundwork for a 
return to the erotic in female sexual experience. They encourage women to embrace their 
experience as a resource of practical wisdom, as a guide for living joyfully and justly in 
the world. They claim neglected aspects of female experience – the body, the senses, 
feelings, and intuition – as valuable resources for knowledge about the self and the world, 
which are essential for thriving and living community with others. Their new definitions 
of the erotic intentionally reclaim these historically demonized and belittled dimensions 
of human experience, treated as such precisely because of their association with the 
feminine. But despite all of these positives, neither Lorde or Brock return to sex! Is the 
explicitly sexual too risky or too dangerous to reclaim on woman’s behalf? Ignoring sex 
in a return to eros misses the opportunity to criticize male-centered interpretations of 
desire, sex, and pleasure and to speak on behalf of women’s sexual experience. For 
projects that look to effect healing and practical wisdom, how can a new definition of the 
erotic that neglects to address sex hope to offer healing and guidance to women for whom 
sex has been a less than joyful, satisfying, or healthy experience?  
                                                
600 The resistance may have been a silent response the growing emphasis at the time on the diversity of 
women’s experience. Thus, feminist theologians took care to resist speaking for all women their own 
particular social location, recognizing that sexual pleasure is particularly subjective and personal. This 
second hypothesis seems less likely since feminist were free to write about their experiences and just 
needed to be clear about their own historical social location. 
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Reconstructing eros to stretch and deepen beyond sexual love loses some of its 
force and relevance in our current context if scholars cannot return to its explicitly sexual 
dimensions. This leaves us wondering, how does this new definition of eros change sex? 
How does it change sex for women? What light does it shed on female desire and 
pleasure? The missing discourse on female sex and pleasure is even more curious to me 
because both of these women were writing at the height of the secular feminist “sex 
wars,” when other feminist scholars were wrestling with the role of sexuality and 
pleasure in women’s oppression and liberation. The social construction of female desire 
and pleasure and how to respond given aspects of this reality were huge issues in this 
debate. For Brock, especially because she is a theologian, to produce a book length 
manuscript on feminist eros and neglect a discussion on sex when secular feminists are so 
deeply invested in the topic, gives the impression that Christians still are unable to talk 
about sex and sexual pleasure.              
 
Eroticizing Mutuality in a Sadomasochistic Context 
 What Lorde, Brock, and even McFague fail to address is taken up with 
intentionality and intensity in Heyward’s work. Although she too expands the erotic 
beyond explicitly sexual experiences, she also invites readers to consider a new and 
challenging way of thinking about our sexual experiences in light of erotic power. Hers is 
not only a call to imagine the necessarily sacred character of sex and sexual pleasure, but 
to resist and reconsider the relational dynamics that turn us on and please us sexually. 
Heyward challenges us to consider a new way of relating in our intimate relationships by 
living into the phantasie of “genuine” erotic sexual experience.  
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 Drawing on her belief that sexuality is socially constructed, Heyward views the 
horizon of our sexuality as open, changing, and relationally dynamic – able to be shaped 
in the future, though grounded in the present.601 In Touching Our Strength and “Pleasure 
and Pain,” she adopts Dorothee Sölle’s concept of phantasie, a reality that is more than 
simple fantasy. “Phantasie,” Heyward explains, “is generated by the collective power of 
human beings actively to ‘imagine’ a present-future and, in so doing, to begin to create it 
among ourselves.”602 Thus, she charges her readers to press beyond sadomasochism by 
participating in sexual phantasie, recognizing ourselves and others, each as subjects of 
our own lives, capable of experiencing and sharing power in being touched, delighted, 
and moved by others without the need to objectify or be objectified.  
Living into this sexual phantasy, Heyward claims, recognizes that the greatest 
pleasure leaves tension reduction behind in favor of personal power that belongs to both 
partners “who know deeply that sharing common goods, such as pleasure and self-
esteem, generates more rather than less power and pleasure for all.”603 The solution for 
moving beyond the sadomasochistic shape of our culture – sexual phantasie – is 
necessarily political and spiritual. From a theological perspective, this is motivated by 
and increases erotic power, the movement of the sacred in us and between us, the love 
that takes the shape of justice in the world. 
 Unfortunately, the contradictions in Heyward’s work make the details of her 
solution difficult to imagine. For example, if the reader agrees with Heyward’s 
assessment of our reality, shot through and through with sadomasochistic dynamics that 
deform our lives and our sexual relationships, then her proposal for the “full eroticization 
                                                
601 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, 42.  
602 Heyward and Harrison, 144.  
603 Ibid.  
 271 
of mutuality” in our sexual phantasies takes on an eschatological character. At times in 
Touching Our Strength, Heyward tries to minimize the tension between the ideal and the 
real. She admits that it must be through our existing experience of sadomasochistic 
eroticism that we must reach toward mutuality.604 Therefore, erotic sex, insofar as it 
reaches toward power sharing, also entails “encountering brokenness and pain in the 
journey toward safety and tenderness,” Heyward explains.605 This gives the reader pause, 
confused about what this sexual experience actually looks like! In my read, Heyward 
wrestles with relegating eroticized mutuality in sex to the “already, but not yet.” 
Heyward’s solution to the social construction of sex and the substance of its 
pleasures – the need to eroticize mutual sexual relations – affects her larger proposal on 
two fronts. First, similar to Lorde and Brock, sexual acts in which power appears not to 
be shared – the use of pornography, leather practices, and various forms of 
sadomasochistic sexual practices – are relegated to the pornographic and cannot be 
conceived of as properly erotic. The problem with this is that many women  attest to the 
consensual use of these practices and to experiencing intense eroticism and pleasure in 
the practice. Regardless of the voice these women would give to these experience, the 
meaning is imposed from without. It’s pornographic.  
Second, suggesting as Lorde, Brock, and Heyward do that women can access their 
innate yearning for mutuality implies that there is an intrinsic good hidden within female 
sexual experience and female sexuality to which one can return. This yearning and the 
pleasure that accompanies it is intact and unaffected by external, social forces. Implicit in 
this claim is the denial of the very depths to which social and historical forces have 
                                                
604 Heyward, Touching Our Strength, 106 
605 Ibid, 108.  
 272 
constructed bodies, sexuality, sex, desire, and mostly eros itself. Foucault, who is clearly 
an influence on Heyward, argues that sexuality is historically constructed; however, he 
rejects the notion of a core to sexuality to which we can return. He also maintains that the 
concept of sexuality as central to human life is a construction itself. More so, as I have 
already touched on, Foucault’s commitment to a way out of the current sexual regime is 
ambiguous. But even scholars, like Mark Vernon, who argue that Foucault does imagine 
a way out through sexual pleasure, understand the acts and pleasures to be something 
novel – a creation of something new as opposed to a discovery of something essential, 
hidden, and original.  
 
Tensions in Idealizing Eros 
The essential character of eros – Lorde’s “power which rises from our deepest 
and non-rational knowledge,” Brock’s “fundamental power of life, born into us…the 
power of our primal interrelatedness,” and Heyward’s “embodied yearning for mutuality, 
the desire in every part of our being that seeks relationships” – may not be as radical as it 
appears on the surface. Kathleen Sands, a scholar with expertise in religious studies, 
American studies, and women’s studies, argues that Heyward misinterprets Foucault 
when she associates the historicity of sexuality with the radical freedom to shape our 
sexual future.606 Similar to my suggestion above, Sands points out that Heyward errantly 
assumes that although sexuality is historically shaped, somehow its normative structure – 
the pleasures generated by mutual sexual relations and justice-making – remains the 
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same.607 Sands insists that Heyward’s position denies the necessary link between sex and 
domination or abuse, predicated on the argument that conditions of finitude and patterns 
of social life shape and limit our physicality.608 In other words, sexuality is already 
shaped, and perhaps limited by, patterns of domination and submission.  
In fact, Sands impressively champions a critique of feminist eros theology that I 
am shocked to see dismissed in Christian sexual ethics that draw heavily from feminist 
eros theologies. Sands’ critique rests on what she calls the “ideal eros” promulgated by 
feminist theologians, including Brock and Heyward. Sands faults the theologians for an 
uncritical use of a view of eros borrowed from radical feminists, like Lorde, whose small 
essay, Sands argues, “has become virtually canonical” for feminist scholars of religion.609 
For this reason, Sands insists that feminist theologians missed participating in the 
feminist sex wars, where radical and pro-sex feminists debated the complex and 
controversial interpretations of eros. Sands asserts that both sides of the secular feminist 
sex wars oppose Heyward’s conclusions. Though radical feminists and pro-sex feminists 
have different solutions to the problem, both agree on the necessary link between sex and 
domination, which denies female sexuality its intrinsic goodness.  
Simply put, an ideal or essential eros is strongly aligned with the natural and not 
the social. The risk of idealizing eros is that it sets up a “good” that is beyond the 
influence of circumstance.610 Subsequently, an essential eros, which makes mutuality in 
sexual relationships possible, always remains untroubled and uncomplicated by the 
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potential conflicts of human needs and motivations that make relating mutually, or 
sharing power, at times challenging if not impossible.  
 
Between Essential Eros and the Pornographic: The Challenge of Tragic Eros 
For Heyward, the erotic is the divine, the sacred in us and between us. God is the 
desire for mutuality and the shared power between persons that affects justice. Thus 
because the erotic is wholly good and invulnerable, God is wholly good and invulnerable. 
In Heyward’s system there is erotic sex, and there is violence. There is good sex, and 
there is pornographic sex. The assumption is that when power is shared in sex, God is the 
substance of that connection, eliminating conflict and allowing all needs and desires to be 
fulfilled. If mutuality could just be eroticized, the most rewarding sexual pleasures would 
be the fruit of this sexual activity. Where eros abounds there is no room for sin. Sin in 
feminist eros theology describes social and structural sin, most recognizable in 
relationships where power is not shared but unequally distributed.  
Sands seizes on these claims – the need to align the erotic with power, the good, 
the moral, and the sacred – identifying within eros theology a theodicy. Theodicy, 
whether part of androcentric theology or, here, in eros theology, is a theological system 
that defends God, insists on God’s goodness and omnipotent nature, and assures Christian 
adherents that God and God’s goodness are ultimately victorious in the end. Sands argues 
that eros theology preserves a theodicy that redefines the good by embracing that which 
patriarchal Christianity has traditionally cast out as evil or inferior and then, identifies 
these formally inferior goods as divine or sources of divine revelation.611 Among Sands’ 
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most valuable critique of eros theology when it comes to moralizing about sex and sexual 
pleasures, is the problem she suggests with sustaining a theodicy. She correctly points out 
that insofar as truly erotic sex is completely disengaged from sin, it leaves us disengaged 
from the realities of life and its tragic character.612 
Tragedy, Sands maintains, touches the very core of our humanity, and sex, I will 
add, is not spared. Sands uses the term tragedy to “refer to stories or ways of telling 
stories that highlight conflicts of elemental goods and powers.”613 Tragedy is the 
possibility that the goods and powers that constitute the basic conditions of life for which 
we strive or against which we struggle will conflict given the individual vulnerability of 
each, as well as the conflicts that arise among them collectively.614 Human goods and 
powers are vulnerable to circumstance, and conflicts arise that although out of our control 
leave us suffering while seemingly innocently at fault.615 Sex strikes me as an elemental 
good or power that is continually subject to this kind of vulnerability. Though I have seen 
many clients who have suffered sexual abuse – a clear instance of pornographic as 
defined by Lorde, Brock, and Heyward – many other careseekers have brought sexual 
struggles that are more akin to Sands’ understanding of tragedy.    
For example, I once did couple’s counseling with a heterosexual couple struggling 
to keep their relationship together. There were many dimensions to their strife, including 
sexual problems. In time, I learned that  penile-vaginal intercourse without the use of a 
condom had been the most enjoyable for of sex for the male client. This couple enjoyed a 
mutually pleasurable sex life, in which the female partner often indulged her lover’s 
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desire for sex without the use of a condom because she was taking birth control pills. 
When the couple discovered that they were pregnant, a crisis ensued. They were not 
planning on having a baby, and the pregnancy put pressure on their relationship.  
Although this couple did not use the word “tragedy” to describe their experience, 
the application of Sands’ definition is illuminating, even pastoral. In some sexual acts our 
need for pleasure and resistance to reproduction meet head-on. Recognizing that pleasure 
can be good and that children can be good, goods in this case conflicted. The couple was 
left feeling confused, angry, and guilty. They did not want to have children at this point 
in their relationship, but they wanted to enjoy the intimacy of sex. They were victims of 
circumstance who participated in the outcome – an outcome for them that was not joyful 
or pleasurable. To idealize this experience as erotic or demonize it as pornographic does 
not capture the complexity of the pleasure, disappointment, and incommensurability of 
the goods involved. Thus, the denial of tragedy in sexual life (as in all of life) does not 
reflect lived human experience. Against feminist eros, my experience as a caregiver 
demonstrates that every struggle in sexual life cannot be attributed to domination or an 
imbalance in power dynamics.  
In response to the “ideal eros,” Sands advocates for a “tragic eros” – the 
recognition that we are fragile, embodied creatures, whose relationships always have the 
potential for conflict and suffering by the very nature of our existence as relational 
beings. Precisely because the human good is social and material, the possibility of 
tragedy must always exist, bringing with it the potential to diminish our capacities for 
love, trust, compassion, and loyalty.616 So too erotic desire and pleasure are “exposed to 
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the elements and vulnerable to tragedy.”617 Tragedy also means that moral goodness is 
vulnerable to circumstance, and that evil must be acknowledged as something capable of 
causal power, not just a privation of the erotic – a consequence of theodicy.618   
But the reality of tragedy should not provoke a state of hopelessness. In the 
context of tragedy, there is acceptance, but also protest, says Sands.619 Naming evil as 
part of the order of things may be incoherent, but it is conventionally the hallmark of 
tragedy – accusing the deities of evil.620 Because evil is real, it can be “protested with the 
force of one’s existence,” Sands explains.621 As a result, morality in tragic eros becomes 
a venture of fallible mortal beings. While feminist eros insists on a return to our primal 
nature of connectedness and looks toward sharing of power in mutual right relationship 
(the eschatological promise), Sands reminds us that tragedy “is concerned with the 
construction of meaning in the midst of the human story.”622  
Pastoral caregivers bear witness to the effects of domination and abuse. But they 
also bear witness to suffering that is the stuff of tragedy – the frailty that part and parcel 
of the human condition. Making meaning in the midst of this suffering and constructing 
the hope out of despair is the heart of pastoral theology and care. As Bonnie Miller-
McLemore contends of pastoral theology, we must “attend to the ‘messy, dirty, earthy 
side of life’: ‘life lived in engagement with this world, is messy, conflicted, rough, 
dynamic, and weather-beaten.’”623 Tragedy captures the realities of the present time and 
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moment, where Sands insists that we must to come to grips with feeling both victimized 
and at fault because although we may be undeserving of the damage done to us in tragic 
circumstances, we are ultimately corrupted by it.624  
In the context of “tragic eros” we realize that our desires may conflict with the 
desires of others and that these tensions can be experienced as suffering or delight. 
However, equating eros with the true and the good makes it difficult for feminists like 
Heyward to accept the reality of destructive or conflicted desire. Eros is ultimately a 
power that calls for moral choice and discernment, as is sex. Though Sands understands 
that Heyward’s intent is to infuse theology with the mystery of eros (and not impose a 
moral rule on sex), she opposes the conflation of the mystical and moral dimensions of 
sex, which she argues, “overburden sex with intrinsic moral reasoning and deprives it of 
the extrinsic moral discernment it requires.”625 Tragedy, Sands argues, is what helps us to 
honor the relative autonomy of sex and sexual pleasure, which has the potential to carry a 
variety of goods and powers. For this reason, to insist as Heyward does that sex should 
always express love or justice is a flawed moral demand.  
With respect to sexual ethics, Sands asserts that an “ideal eros” relegates feminist 
theological reflection on sex and sexual pleasure to one-size-fits all sexual ideals, and, 
consequently, keeps feminist theologians from better understanding the actual sexual 
experiences of women, from asking what function sex is really serving in their lives and 
their communities, and ultimately, from aiding in the cultivation of practical sexual 
wisdom. While the image or metaphor of caregiver as a moral guide may be up for debate 
in pastoral theology, the emphasis on understanding, context, community, and 
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participating in the cultivation of practical wisdom is central to the current pastoral 
theological paradigm. Thus, when it comes to suffering and flourishing in sexual 
experience, pastoral theology should be weary of idealistic proposals.  
 
Tragic Eros and the Tensions in Mutual Recognition 
To her credit, Heyward takes the conceptual steps that Tillich neglects, making 
serious efforts in her personal life to actualize her vision for erotic relationships, to 
realize power in mutual relating, and to resist relationships characterized by any kind of 
power differentials. She put her theory into practice. Not surprisingly, she struggled, and 
what I interpret as proof of the ambiguities of eros, she interprets as the challenge of 
living into erotic power in a sadomasochistic society. Heyward chronicles her experience 
in a book entitled When Boundaries Betray Us: Beyond Illusions of What is Ethical in 
Therapy and In Life. It includes her first-person recollections of her experience and 
analysis of her struggle, while exposing some of the problematic features of her demands 
on the erotic. 
Heyward actually drafted Touching Our Strength, one of the primary texts in my 
analysis above, in the midst of coping with a relationship that was failing to actualize the 
erotic power and potential she was adamantly convicted that it possessed. Soon after, she 
published Boundaries and pointed to her experience as proof of the difficulties in 
overcoming patriarchy’s resistance to mutual relating. In Boundaries, Heyward reveals 
her interactions and frustrations with her lesbian psychotherapist who refuses to cross the 
professional boundary from caregiver to friend. Heyward is adamant that maintaining 
such boundaries resists the flow of erotic energy and shared power and amounts to the 
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perpetuation of violence and abuse in a relationship that should be mutually empowering 
and healing. She aims to expose the problematic nature of boundaries in regards to the 
erotic, a form of separation that Heyward attempts to overcome by insisting that her 
therapist respond to her long after the termination of the therapeutic relationship. Her 
defiance of boundaries prompted critical responses from across professional and 
academic disciplines. 
While some critics of Heyward addressed her work with psychotherapeutic or 
professional ethics concerns, K. Roberts Skerrett saw Boundaries as “an account of the 
praxis that both inspired and was informed by Heyward’s theological ideas.” 626 In her 
analysis, Skerrett takes serious issue with Heyward’s conception of eros, an interpretation 
that enables and supports Heyward’s “right” to continue to push against the resistance 
offered by her therapist’s consistent “NO” to Heyward’s pleading for an erotic friendship. 
Heyward insists that her therapist, who is give the pseudonym “Elizabeth Farro,” is 
denying her own feelings, including sexual attraction and a desire for an erotic 
friendship/relationship with Heyward. Heyward by her own admission is emotionally, 
spiritually, and sexually attracted to Farro. Though Farro insists that she does not share 
these feelings and adamantly tells Heyward that they will never be friends, Heyward 
continues to send Farro poems and letters and to push Farro to engage her and admit her 
own yearning for mutual relationship. Farro tells Heyward that the pursuit is violating 
and abusive. 
The thrust of Skerrett’s critique is that Heyward’s theory of a boundary defying 
eros – at the level of phantasie – does not take seriously the very real tensions that exist 
                                                
626 K. Roberts Skerrett, “When No Means Yes: The Passion of Carter Heyward,” in Journal of Feminist 
Studies of Religion, 12 (spring 1996): 74.  
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between the self and the other.627 Interestingly, Skerrett’s analysis of Heyward and 
Harrison’s “Pain and Pleasure” comes from the version of this article that appeared in 
1989, in the edited volume Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse. Another version of this 
article appears in the edited text Sexuality and the Sacred, published in 1994. While the 
latter article never mentions Jessica Benjamin specifically, the former article, according 
to Skerrett, pointedly takes Benjamin to task for failing to recognize 1) the social nature 
of the self, 2) the importance of community to human well-being, and most importantly, 
3) the possibility of community without tension as the ground of the self.628 Heyward and 
Harrison are disappointed in Benjamin’s “Freudian pessimism,” exemplified, they say, by 
the ongoing conflict or choice between assertion and recognition, making the best hope 
for eros “a delicate balance” between dependency and autonomy that fails to reflect their 
vision for a “sensuous, eroticized culture.”629 Heyward and Harrison balk at any 
suggestion that there is a social need for any erotic repression.  
Correctly pointing out that Benjamin does in fact support the Heyward and 
Harrison’s first two critiques, Skerrett agrees that Benjamin’s proposal for an “erotic 
praxis of mutual recognition” is supportive of the tension between being recognized and 
recognizing, between asserting one’s self and respecting the other. In other words, as I 
explained in Chapter Three, deep erotic satisfaction in Benjamin’s proposal is based on 
“true differentiation,” being able to recognize the other without canceling out the self, 
and being to assert one’s self without canceling out the other. The erotic praxis of mutual 
recognition involves a self that engages with others as both “separate from” and “in 
                                                
627 Ibid, 79-80.  
628 Skerrett,  
629 Heyward and Harrison, “Pain and Pleasure: Avoiding the Confusions of Christian Tradition in Feminist 
Theory,” in Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse, eds. Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn, (New 
York: Pilgrim Press, 1989), 164-165. 
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common with” the self. Benjamin insists that this tension must be tolerated at the risk of 
boundary violation. Skerrett points out that Heyward and Harrison dismiss Benjamin’s 
proposal, insisting instead that any understanding of eros that presupposes tension 
between the self and other is sadomasochistic and must be challenged. Similarly 
Heyward and Harrison reject any sensual eroticism that is stimulated by playing with the 
tensions between self-assertion and recognition. They insist that Benjamin does not go far 
enough in breaking with patriarchal models of eroticism. 
Thus, Heyward’s conviction that the expression of genuine erotic power 
eliminates the tension between the self and other subsequently legitimizes her ongoing 
violation of Farro’s boundaries, continuing to assert herself over against Farro and failing 
to respect and recognize Farro’s feelings and desire to be left alone. Skerrett argues that 
Heyward herself succeeds in being complicit with models of eroticism perpetuated by the 
Western tradition. For example, ignoring women’s boundaries ignores a history of 
women’s bodied-selves being represented as “unbounded,” boundless flesh, with “barely 
a membrane to delineate a woman as subject,” Skerrett explains.630 Though she has 
additional critique to support this argument, Skerrett comes back to perhaps the most 
problematic dimension of Heyward’s eros – its lack of ambiguity and its denial of 
suffering. Heyward’s self-assertion, when it bumps up against Farro’s “NO” to an erotic 
relationship, generates both.  
An even deeper analysis of Heyward’s concept of erotic power challenges her one 
dimensional, static understanding of mutuality, or what Miller-McLemore calls “sloppy 
mutuality.” Though primarily concerned with the complexity of mutuality in 
relationships between children and adults, as well as in family systems, Miller-
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McLemore challenges “muddled understandings of mutuality” in a variety of 
relationships and circumstances, including “acts of lovemaking.”631 For Heyward erotic 
power is the substance of mutual relationships and mutual relating; however, her “ideal 
eros” subsequently idealizes mutuality, relegating any ambiguity to the abusive and 
pornographic. Miller-McLemore, however, skillfully teases out the complexity of 
mutuality in everyday life. While she supports mutuality as a “generic way to talk about 
the norm of Christian love,” her analysis, against Heyward and others, insists that 
“mutuality is an ideal in process and a term that resists essentialist definitions.”632 More 
so, “The fact that Christian love as mutuality cannot be fully realized in every 
relationship at every moment does not ipso facto rule that particular relationship abusive 
or wrong-headed.”633 
Miller-McLemore’s critique of essentialist definitions of mutuality takes into 
consideration the impact of temporary inequalities and “transitional hierarchies,” the role 
of duty, responsibility, authority, and sacrifice on the part of adults and a degree of self-
centeredness on the part of children, and the “inevitability of failure, harm, and 
reconciliation.”634 Again, though she concentrates on the parent-child relationship in 
fleshing out each of these points, some are pertinent to thinking about the variances in 
and between sexual relationships. For example, intimate partners routinely experience 
transitional or temporary imbalances of power in their relationships. This can be on 
account of illness, age, emotional maturity, different responses to transitions in the 
                                                
631 Miller-McLemore, “Sloppy Mutuality: Just Love for Children and Adults,” in Mutuality Matters: 
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633 Ibid.  
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marital or family life cycle, etc. Also, failure and emotional injury are prevalent in sexual 
relationships. I routinely saw clients, for example, who despite good intensions failed at 
times in their hopes for maximizing the physically intimate part of their relationship. The  
man who suffered from premature ejaculation or erectile dysfunction and his frustrated 
partner who felt deprived or responsible exemplified what for all intents and purposes 
was a mutual endeavor with “tragic” consequences.      
Miller-McLemore offers the wisdom of a pastoral perspective when she reminds 
her reader “…mutuality over the long haul means repeated failure and injury and hence 
leads almost inevitably to questions of paradox and grace.”635 Thus, it is not the mutuality 
in relationships is impossible, it is just difficult in the midst of the realities of daily life. 
Sex, insofar as it part of the routine of living and constantly exposed to the elements, will 
always present opportunities for failure, as well as opportunities for forgiveness and 
ultimately grace. It is hard work! Just has Heyward suggests that when we participate in 
the flow of erotic power in mutual relationships we “god,” Miller-McLemore conceives 
of mutuality in its verb form – “an always-evolving process rather than an object that 
people obtain.”636 Thus, with respect to sex, the bumps and pitfalls along the way do not 
always amount to abuse.   
In sum, Heyward, in her insistence on mutuality in sexual activity, assumes stable, 
equal, adult relationships. My knowledge of these kinds of relationships comes mostly 
from text books and not from my clinical practice, my family system, or even my own 
experience in friendships and intimate relationships. My experience echoes Miller-
McLemore’s and Benjamin’s assertions: participating in mutual relationships is not a 
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static state, it is an evolving process, a constant negotiation of tension between assertion 
and recognition, in which there are bound to be failures. Rarely are there prolonged 
periods of time relationships that exhibit the kind of stability and equality upon which 
Heyward insists. Miller-McLemore puts it well, even unknowingly channeling 
Benjamin’s psychoanalytic explanation of some of the unconscious dynamics in sexual 
activity, when she says that the subjects of mutuality include “the child in all of us.”637 
   
Here & Now: Beyond the Legacy, Stopping Short of the Eschaton 
  In the Christian tradition, sexual desire, sex, and sexual pleasure were all reasons 
for shame. To willingly indulge, especially and primarily for the sake of pleasure, 
amounted to serious sin, and exacerbated, first and foremost, the brokenness in one’s 
relationship to the divine. Frequent sex beyond what was necessary for procreation was a 
sure route to dirtying one’s body and soul, that which properly should be used to honor 
God. Nygren argued, as recently as the twentieth century, that eros did not have a proper 
place in Christian love.  
To the contrary, feminist eros theology succeeds in breaking the historical bonds 
that have bound sexual desire and pleasure to shame, defilement of body and soul, and 
separation from the God. In efforts to move past the association of the erotic with genital 
sexuality, as well as the feminine, Brock expands the meaning of eros love and minimizes 
the attention, positive or negative, given to sexual love. However, there is still reason to 
believe that proposals that regard eros as the standard for Christian love imagine that 
sexual experiences, which are open to the movement of erotic power, contribute to 
                                                
637 Herbert Anderson and Susan B. W. Anderson, Regarding Children: A New Respect for Childhood and 
Families, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 10-11, quoted in Miller-McLemore, “Sloppy 
Mutuality,” 133. 
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human flourishing. These experiences are positive, pleasurable, and not only benefit the 
individual, but also the community insofar as they encourage interpersonal relationships 
characterized by mutual care and concern.  
There is no question that Heyward’s vision for the erotic is affirming of sexual 
pleasure. For this she should be commended, especially given the resistance of her fellow 
feminist theologians. Her proposal also opens up to consider the sexual dimensions of 
other kinds of relationships, like friendships – another radical suggestion worthy of 
consideration. Heyward’s proposal pointedly demonstrates how sex and its pleasures can 
contribute to human flourishing, as well as prompt moral motivation and a desire to see 
justice actualized in the world. She maintains that how we treat and relate to our intimate 
partners has a direct bearing on how we treat and relate to others. Thus, to effect justice, 
mutuality in sexual experience must be eroticized and participation in the tension-filled, 
relational dynamic of domination and submission must lose its arousing and titillating 
qualities. When mutuality in sexual relationship is achieved, real erotic sex, far from 
separating partners from God, thoroughly embodies the presence and movement of the 
divine.  
Such a complete reversal of the understanding of eros, however, must give us 
reason for pause. These interpretations draw on women’s experience to invoke an 
essentialized interpretation of eros, one that is a natural dimension of human being, 
wholly good, and invulnerable to historical interpretations of sexuality. While I do not 
deny the experiences of feminists like Heyward, I argue that this theoretical eros 
struggles to touch practical ground in a context that at this present moment is aroused by 
and thrives on the negotiation of power.  
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In addition, an essential eros is an eros love without internal strife or conflicts of 
interests, desires, and needs. Supported by the tensions highlighted in Benjamin’s 
psychoanalytic perspective on mutual recognition, Sands’ philosophical and theological 
perspective on tragedy, and Miller-McLemore’s pastoral perspective on mutuality, I have 
argued that to assume that sharing power dissolves the contours of our individuality or 
that goods themselves cannot conflict in relation, idealizes the reality of life together. Our 
human frailty is a source of conflict and suffering and constitutes a condition of our 
relationality.  
I heartily agree with Sands that a  “seismic tension” lies at the heart of Heyward’s 
eros, namely the friction between her normative yearning for mutuality, which grounds 
all desire, and actual erotic sexual experience, which Heyward concedes is guided by the 
tensions between possessing and relinquishing power.638 In a fleeting moment, however, 
Heyward opens herself up to other ways of working within this dilemma, giving 
ambiguous support for sadomasochistic sexual experiences. Baring the intentional abuse 
of bodies and psyches, with or without consent, she imagines sexual sadomasochistic 
fantasy or activity as “struggling together in the tensions and pathos of being more or less 
in control of our lives, dreams and destinies,” an experience that seems to her “deeply 
human in an honest, poignant, even at times playful way.”639 A reader like myself begs 
her to say more. Unfortunately, Heyward does not unpack her insight.   
 The challenges of tensions and paradoxes that riddle our formative years and 
pervade our everyday, often mundane, activities – including sex and its pleasures – are 
critical to pastoral theology, which responds to and works to give meaning to the 
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suffering and ambiguity in our everyday experiences of life together. In the next chapter, 
I turn toward pastoral theology’s most fruitful and valued source for reflections on sex, 
sexual pleasure, and the meanings of and potentials for both – contemporary Christian 
sexual ethics. I wonder about the influences of feminist eros theology and its difficulties 
with tension and paradox. As I unravel the moves necessary to embrace sexual pleasure 
in an framework for Christian sexual ethics, I will keep mind the extent to which 
Christian sexual ethics is shaped by Heyward’s eros and how this might affect the 
inclusion and interpretation of sexual pleasure in a sexual ethic for the here and now. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
A PASSION FOR JUSTICE:  
SEXUAL PLEASURE AND CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN SEXUAL ETHICS 
 
 Since James Nelson’s foundational text, Embodiment: An Approach to Sexuality 
and Christian Theology (1978), theologians, biblical scholars, and those with an interest 
in theological ethics have tried to better understanding human sexuality. At the time, 
Nelson articulated a sexual theology, a theological anthropology that embraced 
embodiment, both as God’s ultimate relation to the world in Christ’s incarnation and as 
the foundation of what it means to be human. Being embodied meant we existed and 
related to one another in all of our beautiful, God-given physicality. Nelson leveraged a 
firm critique of the enduring hierarchy of the mind and spirit’s reign over the body 
perpetuated throughout Christian history. The body and its many pleasures, including 
sexual pleasure, needed to be reestablished as gifts from God, providing opportunities to 
grow in faith, friendship and love of neighbor. 
Embodiment set the tone numerous for attempts throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 
into the new millennium to better understand the richness, complexity, and spiritual 
nature of human sexuality and sexual experience. Many theological ethicists attributed 
responsibility for deforming and limiting the relationship between spirituality and 
sexuality to a collaboration between Platonic philosophy and Western Christian theology. 
They also demonstrated how many of these assumptions still undergird contemporary 
theological positions and practice. Some sought to provide new resources, some revived 
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doctrine already present in the tradition, and some did both to construct new frameworks 
and priorities for Christian sexual ethics as a whole.  
I applaud the work done by the scholars under consideration here. Their work is 
testimony to how truly misinformed Raymond Lawrence was when he argued, “There 
have been no giants in the field of sexual ethics in the five hundred years since 
Luther,”640 and, more so, that no major voice had reflected on sexual pleasure as a gift of 
God.641 To the contrary, these scholars make rich contributions to a loving and just 
approach to sexuality, including an affirmative stance on sexual pleasure. Many offer 
proposals that claim exactly what Lawrence contends has been missing, namely that 
sexual pleasure is a good gift from God.  
It will come as no surprise that James Nelson and Carter Heyward are 
foundational figures for all of the theological ethicists in this chapter. Nelson and 
Heyward paved the way for feminist, gay, and lesbian theologians and theological 
ethicists to affirm their own sexual pleasure, to demonstrate the essential ties between 
pleasure and spirituality, and to begin to see sexuality as a site where justice and love are 
necessarily bound to one another. Some of the scholars in this chapter take-on Heyward’s  
challenge by suggesting that personal sexual ethics must always motivate and concern 
justice-making in our political life as a community. Personal sexual pleasures, in other 
words, should inspire a passion for justice.  
In my assessments of these proposals, three interrelated themes emerge: 1) the 
importance of embodiment to theological anthropology, 2) the insistence on mutuality as 
a necessary quality of relationship, including sexual relationships, and 3) the necessary 
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relationship between personal sexual experience and a public commitment to social 
justice. Sexual pleasure is implicated in the context of each as it makes its way into the 
framework for a Christian sexual ethic for our time. Thus, this chapter is organized into 
three large sections, each covering one of the three themes – embodiment, mutuality, and 
justice – as I chart sexual pleasure’s rise from the definitive mark of original sin to an 
energy for liberation and transformation. 
I find these proposals radical and compelling; however, I am weary that where 
idealism abounds, subtle tensions fall to the wayside. In identifying these tensions it is 
not my intention to negate the valuable contributions of these resources – resources of 
which pastoral theology and pastoral care are in great need. Embracing our embodiment, 
advocating for mutual relationships, and maintaining a connection between sexual ethics 
and social justice are all crucial for a pastoral theological response to sexual suffering. 
My critical concern is that these proposals remain grounded in the here and now and are, 
therefore, sensitive to the particularities of individual sexual experience.  
 
The Gift and Grace of Embodiment 
 
Nelson on the Condition for Wisdom and Meaning-making 
 James Nelson’s Embodiment: An Approach to Sexuality and Christian Theology, 
is, in the very least, a footnote in almost every contemporary text that addresses Christian 
sexual ethics. 642 His early work anticipates later developments, including the eros 
                                                
642 Embodiment and a number of Nelson’s subsequent texts had a profound influence on Christian sexual 
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theologies explored in Chapter Three. In Embodiment, Nelson argues that Christianity 
needs to whole-heartedly embrace sexuality and embodied experience as God-given and 
good. In the preface, he challenges the historically unidirectional nature of Christian 
reflection about sexuality, namely the persistent question, “What does Christian faith 
have to say about our lives as sexual beings?”643 Though he maintains the importance of 
this inquiry, he argues that ample time deserves to be spent exploring a “companion 
query,” namely: “What does our experience as sexual human beings mean for the way in 
which we understand and attempt to live out the faith?”644   
This methodological approach to theological reflection – taking as one’s point of 
departure lived, embodied, human experience and trusting in its capacity for revelation of 
the things of God – resonates deeply with pastoral theological method. It is no wonder 
that I first encountered this book in a pastoral theology class entitled “Sexuality: Ethics, 
Theology, and Pastoral Practice.” The sexual ethicists in this chapter also take their lead 
from Nelson and his emphasis on the particularity of human sexual experience, a 
methodological move that in itself confirms the value of our embodiment as a source of 
spiritual and practical knowledge and wisdom.    
 Nelson redefines “sexuality,” broadening the concept in such a way that it has 
become foundational for Christian sexual ethics. Sex must be distinguished from 
sexuality, and the word sexuality, our sexuality, must be more deeply understood.645 
                                                
643 James B. Nelson, Embodiment: An Approach to Sexuality and Christian Theology, (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 1978), 8.  
644 Nelson ultimately sees his efforts in the text as moving toward a sexual theology, a term which he argues 
is more appropriate for capturing the multi-directional nature of the relationship between Christian faith 
and sexuality than the “too-narrow focus of traditional sexual ethics.” Ibid, 9, emphasis mine.  
645 Here he is critical of Freud (in his early work), whose reductionistic and thoroughly biological view of 
motivation for human behavior conceived of sexuality too broadly. Freud, who understood all human 
behavior to be undergirded by libidinal energy, the life force oriented toward the achievement of sexual 
pleasures, had an intense impact on cultural understandings of human motivation. However, Nelson argues 
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According to Nelson, sex is a biologically based need that is oriented toward procreation, 
pleasure, and the release of tension, typically via genital activity that culminates in 
orgasm. Sexuality includes sex, but is more comprehensive, constituting a very basic 
dimension of personhood. He explains,  
Sexuality is our self-understanding and way of being in the world as male 
or female. It includes our appropriation of attitudes and characteristics 
which have been culturally defined as masculine and feminine. It involves 
our affectional orientation toward those of the opposite and same sex. It 
includes our attitudes about our own bodies and the bodies of others. 
Because we are bodied-selves, our sexuality reminds us of our uniqueness 
and particularity: we look and feel differently from any other persons. 
Sexuality is a sign and symbol of our call for communion and 
communication…our need to embrace others, physically and spiritually. It 
expresses God’s intention that we find our authentic humanness in 
relationship. It is also intrinsic to our relationship to God…Sexuality 
involves much more than what we do with our genitals. It is who we are as 
bodied-selves who experience the emotional, cognitive, physical and 
spiritual need for intimate communion – human and divine.”646 
 
In Nelson’s weighty definition, one finds that sexuality is the essence of personhood – 
our biological sex, our sex roles, our sexual attraction, awareness of our body and the 
bodies of others, and our need for belonging, not only in human and divine community, 
but also as an integrated body-self. Our embodiment has a spiritual dimension insofar as 
it is God-ordained and the condition of our relationship with the divine. 
 In my analysis, Nelson’s definition resists the sole affiliation of sexuality with its 
cultural emphasis on biological sex, gender roles, and sexual orientation.647 Interestingly, 
his definition does this while continuing to embrace the definition of sexuality that 
                                                                                                                                            
that Freud’s theory lacked complexity and remained convinced of biologically rooted motivations for 
behavior. Ibid, 17. 
646 Nelson, 17-18. The importance of this definition for the field of Christian sexual ethics cannot be 
overstated.  
647 Scholars like Judith Butler and Mark Jordan have pointed out that culture has also reinforced a 
progression from biological sex to gender expression to sexual orientation that assumed to be linear and 
determinative/contingent/natural. For example, a biological male, expresses masculine traits and takes on 
male gender roles, and subsequently develops attraction for those of the opposite sex, women. 
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modernity has produced and that we, as a result, live into and out. In other words, as 
Foucault argues, modern society, with the aid of the sexual sciences, has constructed 
sexuality such that it feels naturally central to the human condition – a fundamental 
dimension of our personhood, even though historical and social forces and discourses 
constitute it. Nelson’s definition of sexuality suggests just this central, fundamental role – 
albeit with a theological framework. Sexuality reveals to us the divine intention that 
human beings are created for relationship. To be human is to be in communication and 
community with other human beings and God.  
Nelson’s God-ordained vision for sexuality is his more obvious theological 
anthropological claim. Less obvious is his suggestion that human beings are called to 
embrace others, attending to their physical and spiritual well-being. More so, human 
beings experience in their psyche, bodies, and souls the need for intimate communion. 
Taken together, sexuality is our grounds for recognizing that we need others, and they 
need us. We could say – borrowing from Jessica Benjamin – that it is the grounds for 
acknowledging that we desire others to recognize us, and, likewise, we are aware of the 
need that others have to be recognized. Though Nelson is not attending to power in this 
definition of sexuality, the language of “need” and the tension between our call to 
embrace versus our need to be embraced necessitates recognition of the presence of 
power that will need to be negotiated if both the needs of the self and the other are to be 
met. In contrast with later developments in scholarship, such as Heyward, it is interesting 
to see that in this formative definition of sexuality, Nelson is describing a tension – one 
that, given his definition, constitutes a basic dimension of personhood. 
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 Created for community and mutual embrace, sexuality, insofar as it indicates to us 
our created nature, is a good thing and a gift from the Creator with whom a relationship is 
also desired. Sexuality is necessarily bodily. Therefore, Nelson demands recognition of 
the import of the body and the need to conceive of the self as necessarily embodied – a 
body-self – a self that is one – not separate – from its flesh. “The carnal body, the flesh, is 
the means by and through which we can know objects, persons, and events,” Nelson 
stresses.648 In other words, our bodies are the condition for connection and relationship to 
others, as well as the medium through which we create meaning in and understand of the 
world. If there is a crisis in communities of faith with respect to sexuality, Nelson argues 
that it is firmly rooted in the denial of embodiment, or body alienation – the tendency to 
1) prioritize and value the mind or spirit over the good of the body, 2) devalue the 
sensations and feelings generated by the body, and 3) subordinate the body as a tool or 
instrument of the mind. As pointed out in Chapter Two, these sentiments were common 
among some of the most influential theologians with regard to sexual pleasures. Nelson 
adds that this fear/disdain/devaluation of the body comes to find expression in the 
subordination of women, who are identified with the body, feelings, and sensuality, while 
men lay claim to the more “worthy” traits of reason and spirit.649 These spiritualistic and 
sexist dualisms comprise what Nelson calls a state of sexual alienation. This alienation is 
the root experience of sin; consequently, one suffers from alienation within the self, from 
one’s neighbor and, ultimately, from God. 
Overcoming this alienation is sexual, urges Nelson. Not that we are saved by our 
sexuality, but that new life, transformation, and healing occurs when we live into our 
                                                
648 Nelson, 19-20.  
649 Though not the focus of Chapter Two, sentiments to these ends can be found in Augustine’s, Aquinas’ 
and Luther’s writings.  
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entire selfhood – our sexual body-selves. Overcoming spiritualistic and sexist dualisms 
can result in a literal resurrection of the sexual body. Here, Nelson emphasizes the 
importance of the Incarnation, as well as ongoing incarnation. He explains,  
The incarnation of God, the divine presence in and through human flesh, is 
always a miracle. We celebrate its decisive and normative occurrence in 
Jesus Christ. We also celebrate faith’s conviction that God’s incarnation 
continues to occur…It is the mysterious creativity and renewal of life 
itself, God’s power in our midst…the miracle of the body’s resurrection is 
all the more awesome because it occurs through human gestures, human 
words, human touch and caress, human intimacy…We experience new life 
of the body-self as a gift.650  
 
In other words, although Christ is a significant instance of God in human flesh, we 
continue to celebrate God made manifest in our flesh as we communicate God’s love to 
others in the only way we can – with the sounds, gestures, and movements of our bodies. 
As Nelson simply puts it, “It is in our discovery of what we really are.”651 The language 
of gift emerges here as a new, freeing, and joyful way for Christians to think about 
embodied, sexual experience. 
  
Nelson on Sensuality: The Physicality of Grace 
Affirming embodiment is a premise for affirming sexual and other bodily 
pleasures. Nelson’s pointed attention to sexual pleasure is most developed where he 
describes growth in sexual wholeness through God’s grace. He discusses pleasure in the 
context of sensuousness and points to the Christian tradition’s suspicion and rejection of 
eroticism, including the fear that celebration of sensuality will lead to depersonalized sex 
without love or sensual hedonism marked by the pursuit of pleasure for its own sake.652 
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But Nelson disagrees, and drawing explicitly on Fairbairn’s critique of Freudian drive 
theory, posits intimacy and connection as the motivating force in sexual experience. 653 
Pleasure is secondary, a gift that makes intimacy in sexual experience possible. Taken 
together, the gift of pleasure is actually the condition for satisfying the need originally 
pursued :connection and intimacy. Given this claim, it appears that Nelson is arguing that 
even if pleasure appears to be the motivation in sexual experience, such motivation belies 
an unconscious desire for connection, perhaps the connection that Nelson argues allows 
us to experience true personhood. In sum, Nelson suggests that sensuousness suggests a 
physiology to grace.654 In other words, incarnate grace, or grace experienced through the 
flesh, manifests itself in the sensuous body. Thus, we could say that Nelson introduces 
grace as part of a new theological discourse on sexual pleasure. 
It is important to note, however, that Nelson does not fixate on sexual pleasure; 
rather, he advocates for diffusion of sexuality throughout the entire body, resisting a 
genital focus that he says is indicative of alienated sexuality. He is drawn to the notion 
that sexuality is a mode of total intercourse with persons and nature – that the world itself 
is worthy of eroticization and indulgence in it movements, shapes, sounds and smells.655 
The movement away from aligning a definition of sexuality with genital sex – similar to 
the movement away from aligning the erotic with sexual desire and genital pleasure – has 
much merit. Still, we should keep in mind, per Foucault, that this broad understanding of 
sexuality reflects the larger contours of the modern sexual regime, in which sexuality 
                                                
653 Recall from Chapter Three that Fairbairn suggests that the primary motivation for human behavior – or 
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654 This is important because grace it typically considered for its psychological dimensions. Nelson, 86-87, 
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pervades the entire human being. What we have in Nelson is a discourse on sexuality that 
affirms some of the features of the dominant system for organizing sexuality in our 
current context. 
  My concern in this project is sexual pleasure – pleasure that is experienced in an 
intimate encounter that arouses the body and may or may not culminate in orgasm. After 
all, enlarging the scope of the definition of sexuality does not leave sexual activity 
behind. Sex remains one of many expressions of a holistic understanding of sexuality as 
defined by Nelson. Thus, my review of this scholarship continues to focus on what 
explicitly or implicitly is being theorized with regards to sexual pleasure in both a narrow 
and expanded sense – narrow in that I am concerned with the physical and emotional 
pleasure of sexual activity; expanded in that I am looking beyond the priority on 
heterosexual coitus as the “preferred” or only activity that results in sexual pleasure. The 
focus on sexual pleasure also resonates with Foucault’s advocacy for pursuing a 
discourse related to pleasure as a counter-discourse to or “way out of” the modern sexual 
regime. 
 
Gudorf’s Moral Priority on Pleasure(s) 
A focus on sexual pleasure is present in Christine Gudorf’s text, Body, Sex and 
Pleasure: Reconstructing Christian Sexual Ethics, published in 1996. Sexual pleasure, as 
articulated by Gudorf, is a positive force or power, God’s gift, and a source of God’s 
transforming grace, which builds up and affirms the personhood of each participant and 
confirms his or her status as a child of God, beloved by God.  It also partners to see 
themselves as conduits of God’s love to others.   
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The Problem 
In Body, Sex and Pleasure: Reconstructing Christian Sexual Ethics, Catholic 
theological ethicist Christine Gudorf focuses explicitly on sexual pleasure. She asserts 
that the lack of affirmation of our sexual pleasure, and perhaps pleasure more generally, 
is grounded in a profound disconnection from the body. 656 Like Nelson, she identifies the 
ongoing soul/body dualism still manifest in contemporary cultural and church teachings 
as a problem that continues to thwart embracing embodiment, including reclaiming 
sexual pleasure as a positive and necessary aspect of human sexual experience. The 
theological and philosophical legacy of the dualism between the body and the spirit puts 
everyone in a position to neglect, dismiss or even demonize his or her bodily needs.  
Like Nelson, Gudorf argues that the body needs need to be recognized as part and 
parcel of who we are, capable of communicating to others and ourselves how we are 
feeling and what we need.657 It is a source of knowledge about ourselves. Our bodies 
need rest, nourishment, physical closeness, the release of muscles tensions, etc. “We need 
body pleasure,” she proclaims, and this requires listening to our body about what it 
experiences as most pleasurable. 658 Gudorf’s assertions invert the theology and practice 
of those historical Christians who maximized physical and bodily suffering in an effort to 
deprive themselves of pleasure. She argues that bodily pleasure is good and not 
something that separates individuals from the things of God.  
Embracing the value and integral nature of the body to personhood, refutes 
cultural and theological insinuations that the drive for sexual pleasure is irresistible and 
                                                
656 Gudorf is a Catholic scholar with doctoral degrees in both religion and comparative sociology. 
657 Drawing on Freud, Gudorf also suggests that repressing or denying the body’s messages can be 
dangerous. 
658 Christine Gudorf, Body, Sex and Pleasure: Reconstructing Christian Sexual Ethics, (Cleveland: Pilgrim 
Press, 1994), 91, emphasis mine.  
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necessitates external parameters for restraint. Gudorf argues that this kind of thinking 
reinforces a body that is disconnected from the intentions and will of the individual. 
Recall the ongoing antithesis between sexual pleasure and control over the human will 
and reasoning, particularly Augustine’s sentiments that the power of lust causes 
individuals to lose control and to act irresponsibly. The toll is spiritual. Similarly, 
consider Freud’s initial (and more culturally available) assertions that the sexual 
impulse/libido presses for satisfaction/pleasure and necessitates the constraints of the 
external world, parents, religion, etc., requiring a degree of sublimation for the health of 
the individual and society.  
In actuality, to say that the sexual impulse in mature adults cannot be contained, 
delayed, or resisted does not do justice to our abilities to control our impulses and respect 
the wants and needs of others.659 Gudorf is critical that this belief supports the sexual 
harassment and rape of women, as well as excluding women from the pleasures of sex.660 
Informed by modern sexology, she makes the excellent point that in our intimate 
relationships, it is the “control of sexual pleasure – knowing when and how to post-pone 
sexual gratification, using techniques to build arousal in self and partner – which 
intensifies sexual pleasure for oneself and one’s partner.”661 Imagine preaching this 
                                                
659 In our culture, Gudorf argues, this false belief reinforces sex negative education. In Christian circles, 
young people are taught that even minor sexual pleasures (like hand-holding) paves the way for raging lust 
that will ultimately lead to sexual intercourse.  
660 Rejecting this historical, theological position, Gudorf draws positively on Freud, reminding the reader 
that the dominance of the pleasure principle in early childhood gives way to the reality principle, namely 
our ability to regulate our sexual impulses in the face of societal expectations. Apparently Gudorf is not 
concerned with the negative bent that Freud’s libido itself receives. She is a strong advocate for mutual 
sexual pleasure. However, there is nothing mutual about Freud’s libido. In fact, learning to live in 
community and participate in mutual relationships is always juxtaposed by the pervasive malaise or 
unhappiness that Freud argues is owed to the strength of the original impulse which has been sublimated. 
Mutual satisfaction for libido is not nearly as pleasurable as the satisfaction realized in gratifying the 
libidinal in its original form.  
661 Gudorf, Body, Sex and Pleasure, 85, italics in original. Still, the control Gudorf suggests is not the 
rigorous, obsessive control that the tradition insists is needed for raging lust. In fact, angst around the 
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corrective from the pulpit! Gudorf’s point is that a legacy of irresistibility with respect to 
sexual pleasure, one that casts it as highly problematic and in desperate need of 
regulation and control, perpetuates fear and angst and blinds us to the real, positive power 
manifest in our sexual experiences.  
 
The Resources 
Loving the body and embracing our embodiment, including bodily pleasures, 
requires relying on a number of theological and non-theological resources. Although 
Nelson does not start his theological reflection with traditional resources, he eventually 
returns to the Old Testament teachings of the goodness of creation and the New 
Testament proclamation of the divine incarnation in Jesus Christ to affirm embodiment.  
Like Nelson, Gudorf initially subordinates the tradition to human experience. She insists 
that Christians have maintained a degree of ignorance with regard to scripture’s attention 
to sexual issues. I agree with her that the Bible is a questionable resource on this front, 
and its interpretation requires serious discernment.662 Because the tradition contains such 
a negative legacy with regards to sexual matters, Gudorf asserts that ethics related to 
sexuality cannot start with the Christian sexual tradition. Though she does not disregard 
theological reflection entirely, but she insists on the importance of context for Christian 
sexual ethics, including scientific advancements and lived human experience.  
                                                                                                                                            
control of sexual pleasure can be cause for any number of sexual dysfunctions in relationships. Women, for 
example, often do not know that they have more control over their sexual response than they might realize. 
Men sometimes become fixated on control, which can lead to abuse or their own inability to experience 
sexual pleasure. 
662 Gudorf reminds the reader that parts of the Biblical text do not always square with the central message 
of the Bible. In some parts of the text, women and children are treated as property, patriarchal and 
misogynistic attitudes abound and women are not afforded any sexual autonomy. Ibid, 85. 
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Drawing on her Catholic heritage with respect to natural law, Gudorf points out 
that human biology, particularly a women’s clitoris, suggests that God intended for 
sexual activity, at times, to be primarily for pleasure.663 The biological sciences, the 
social sciences, and the experiences of human individuals and communities all make 
valuable contributions to understanding human sexuality and deserve consultation. 
Christian sexual ethics, she argues, must take seriously the consensus among these 
resources regarding reproduction, sexual response, sexual difference, and the 
development of sexual identity and orientation, for example.664  
Foucault, however, reminds us that these same resources also contribute to the 
sexual discourses that produce and organize sexualities, including sexual norms. One of 
my major frustrations with Gudorf is that she fails to include Foucault’s work, or even 
mention Foucault in her analysis of sexual pleasure. This surprises me since Foucault 
essentially argues that the meanings, morals, and truths “extracted” from sexual pleasures 
have been given over to discourses that have shaped our concept of sexuality. Gudorf 
does affirm the social construction of sexuality and is quick to point out that science is in 
no way infallible or value-free in its evolving and shifting conclusions regarding 
sexuality. However, she maintains that “science – all the scientific disciplines 
together…have revolutionized human understanding of our sexuality in the twentieth 
century…”665 This statement is sort of true, but there is much to be nuanced. Without 
using Foucault to more critically consider her resources, Gudorf’s analysis lacks, and she 
is unable to demonstrate the insight that would allow her critically assess her own 
proposal’s contributions to the current sexual regime.  
                                                
663 Ibid, 89.  
664 Ibid, 3.  
665 Ibid, 6-7.  
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From Pariah to Priority 
 In spite of this, Gudorf insists that the Church needs to openly affirm the 
goodness of sexual pleasure. As I have already demonstrated, many churches today 
appear to affirm sexual pleasure as part of God’s good creation, but then qualify their 
statements to keep sexual pleasure contained. Gudorf exclaims,  
Sexual pleasure feels good…from the pleasure of having our skin 
touched…to the ecstatic loss of self-consciousness in orgasm. It offers us 
happiness of acute well-being, freedom from suffering and joy because if 
offers the possibility of meeting a number of basic human needs.666 
 
On these grounds, she claims that sexual pleasure is a pre-moral good, meaning that at 
baseline it is good, before we morally evaluate its role in any particular situation.667 This 
does not mean that it leads to moral good in all cases, but rather it should be understood 
as one aspect of the general social good.668 She is careful to note that sexual pleasure as a 
pre-moral good does not mean that it is free from misuse, misinterpretation, and abuse.669 
Still, she advocates for lives and lifestyles that satisfy the human need for pleasure, from 
being outdoors, to cuddling babies, to enjoying art, to enjoying sex. A message from our 
bodies about what is pleasurable and what is painful – the wisdom of the body – are 
important.670  
                                                
666 Gudorf, “Sexual Pleasure as Grace and Gift,” in The Other Side,  34 (1998), 11.  
667 Ibid.  
668 Gudorf, Body, Sex, and Pleasure: Reconstructing Christian Sexual Ethics, 90.  
669 Gudorf, “Sexual Pleasure as Grace and Gift,” 12.  
670 From a philosophical perspective, her position with respect to pleasure is a form of moral utilitarianism, 
a middle position close to those of Aquinas and J. S. Mill, namely that “pleasure is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for goodness.” While agreeing with the experience of higher and lower pleasures, she 
rejects Mill’s and Aquinas’ methods of classification, arguing instead that higher pleasures have benevolent 
consequences for others. Sexual pleasures, rather than being lower pleasures, can serve to communicate 
respect, admiration, comfort and unconditional love that can free a person and a relationship for “heroic 
acts of love for the wider community.” Gudorf also argues that body pleasure communicates to us our own 
goodness. “That sense of self-goodness,” she explains, “is essential if we are to understand ourselves as 
beloved by God, and thus able to communicate God’s love to others.” Gudorf, Body, Sex, and Pleasure, 97-
98. 
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Via a correlational method that draws on science, social science, human sexual 
experience, and theology Gudorf is also led to define sexual pleasure as a gift and a 
grace. She maintains that while it is not irresistible, sexuality is still powerful. Thus, she 
calls Christians to recognize the power of sexuality in their lives, to take notice of the 
complex connections between how they understand themselves as sexual beings and how 
they express and satisfy their basic physical and psychological needs and desires. For her, 
sexuality is a positive force, “a source of transforming grace,” she says.671  
Gudorf distinguishes herself from other sexual ethicists by arguing that sexual 
pleasure should be the primary ethical criteria for evaluating sexual activity.672 Though 
Christians may want to prioritize intimacy and bonding in this conversation, she imagines 
that this effort evades the question of the goodness of sexual pleasure and fails to see how 
bonding and intimacy are normally dependent on mutual sexual pleasure.673 This is an 
interesting move, as it resists attributing the instrumental goodness to sexual pleasure that 
Foucault argues is so common in the contemporary sexual regime. Gudorf contends that 
outside of procreation, all the positive functions of sex are dependent on sexual activity 
being pleasurable. She insists that avoiding and demonizing pleasure has been destructive 
and unhealthy for our society, and we must admit that the reason we pursue sex is for the 
pleasure, whether the pleasure of passion or the pleasure of emotional intimacy.674  
Theologically, Gudorf returns to the Incarnation and draws on the love 
commandment to interpret pleasure’s goodness. Like Nelson, she insists that the reality of 
the Incarnation proclaims the goodness of the body and gives us reason to embrace bodily 
                                                
671 Ibid, 81.  
672 Ibid, 114.  
673 Ibid, 106.  
674 Ibid, 115.  
 305 
expressions of love. She also argues that the difficulties embracing pleasure stems from a 
theological misunderstanding of the love commandment, one that harps on the pitfalls of 
self-love and champions sacrifice in neighbor-love.675 On the contrary, Gudorf argues 
that Jesus’ injunction to love one’s neighbor as oneself tells us that the capability to love 
one’s neighbor begins with love of self.676 To understand the needs of the self and how 
those needs are satisfied, we must love our sexual selves.  
 
Implications For Our Sexual Ethic 
Among the important consequences, embracing embodied sexual pleasure in a 
theological context implicates and rejects the emphasis on procreation that I have already 
demonstrated to be so prevalent in the Christian legacy.677 Gudorf points out that a true 
affirmation of sexual pleasure calls for an end to procreationism, “the assumption that sex 
is naturally oriented toward the creation of human life.”678 Although many communities 
of faith would disagree that they support procreationism, she shows that it is a “broader 
and deeper phenomena,” which is cultural and often subconsciously pervasive. For 
example, “real sex” in our culture amounts to coitus, or penile-vaginal intercourse. Other 
activities, often lumped into the category of foreplay, are not assumed to be ultimately as 
satisfying as coitus.679 Priority on this kind of sexual activity, Gudorf argues, denigrates 
relationships in which coitus is not possible, including gay and lesbian partnerships, or 
                                                
675 See Mark 12: 30-31.  
676 Gudorf, Body, Sex, and Pleasure, 115.  
677 Augustine named it among the goods of marriage and condemned sexual intercourse that did not aim 
toward these ends. Aquinas found procreation to be the only reasonable cause for having sex, period. Even 
Luther called procreation, “the end and chief purpose of marriage.”  
678 Gudorf, Body, Sex, and Pleasure, 29.  
679 Ibid, 30.  
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partners who are disabled and/or elderly.680 In addition, coitus may not be the most 
satisfying sexual activity, particularly for women.681  
Christian doctrines that insist that marriage is the only appropriate context for sex, 
while endorsing artificial contraception, implicitly support procreationism. Recall that 
Augustine and Aquinas posited that sex was created for procreation, and as a 
consequence belonged in marriage, the context that could provide for the needs of 
offspring. But as I demonstrated in the Introduction, most communities of faith today 
support contraception, admitting that there are other ends to sex (like pleasure) aside from 
reproducing, while continuing to insist that marriage is the only “appropriate” context for 
sex. These traditional reasons for limiting sex to marriage and continually conflating all 
sexual activity with coitus are no longer compelling.682 My argument has been that they 
also belie ongoing distrust of sexual pleasure as a potential good in its own right.  
 
Embodiment, Justice, and the Role of Pleasure 
Pleasure in Same-sex Eroticism 
With respect to embodiment and sexual pleasure, queer theological scholarship 
points out that lesbian and gay sexuality has been maligned precisely because of its 
embodied focus on sexual pleasure. “Sexual pleasure remains at the heart of charges 
                                                
680 Ibid, 30.  
681 Gudorf cites sexual satisfaction research, including higher rates of orgasm among lesbian women, 
stronger orgasms from masturbation for women, and the high rates of women who do not experience 
orgasm through penile-vaginal intercourse. Ibid, 20-21.  
682 As for procreation, Gudorf sees no reason why it should not remain one of the many goods of sex. In 
fact, she is very concerned with developing a new reproductive ethic distinct from a new sexual ethic. The 
heart of her reproductive ethic, guided by her commitments to social justice, calls for a reduction in the 
world’s population effected by the voluntary commitment of individuals to replace themselves only. For 
further details and her own critical reflections on this proposal see Gudorf, Gudorf, Body, Sex, and 
Pleasure, 33-50.  
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against same-sex sexuality,” argues queer theologian Robert Goss.683 Some strands of 
Christianity, most notably the Christian Right, promote the perspective that homosexual 
sexual practices pose a great danger to society. Some within mainline denominations and 
communities that self-identify as evangelical or fundamentalist align homosexuality with 
hedonistic pleasure that poses a threat to Christian views on marriage and family, as well 
as to the emphasis on procreation in marriage. Goss points to lingering discomfort with 
sexual pleasure that finds its outlet in scapegoating queer sex. He argues  
What gay men represent is the unbridled lust of sexual pleasure, but 
underlying this representation of same-sex sexuality is a great amount of 
psychological projection and fear of human sexuality, especially when it is 
uncoupled from procreativity.684 
 
In other words, the condemnation of and lingering consternation around the affirmation 
and celebration of same-sex relationships belies a persistent struggle to shake the shame 
and guilt, and whole-heartedly embrace sexual pleasure apart from its reproductive 
potential.685  
Scholars like Goss argue that queer sexual pleasure needs to be recovered because 
in our current context it contains the potential for revelation on a number of levels. Goss 
insists that queer sex challenges our heterogendered system, supported by both cultural 
                                                
683 Robert E. Goss, “Gay Erotic Spirituality and the Recovery of Sexual Pleasure,” in Body and Soul: 
Rethinking Sexuality as Justice-Love, eds. Marvin M. Ellison and Sylvia Thorson-Smith (Cleveland: 
Pilgrim Press: 2003), 203. Goss takes issue at the perspective that gay sexuality narcissistically seeks only 
pleasure, and argues that gay Christians are claiming their sexuality as a gift from God, which furthers the 
argument that sexual pleasure is a blessing, and therefore binds sexuality to “justice-love.” Goss, 201.  
684 Ibid, 206.  
685 I have already explored how faith statements that proclaim the goodness of sex and sexual pleasure, 
alongside the possibility for procreation, only reinscribe procreationism because sex and sexual pleasure 
remain confined to heterosexual marriage. Marriage between opposite sex partners is typically grounded in 
“God ordained” roles and genital complementarity, primarily aimed at producing and rearing children; 
hence, an implicit procreative ideal undergirds certain examples that claim affirmation of sex and sexual 
pleasure. As I have argued, this is qualified affirmation. Therefore, although embracing sex and its 
pleasures outside of the necessity of procreation would seem to welcome the sexual pleasures of gays and 
lesbians, the emphasis on heterosexual marriage makes the issue of sexual pleasure central to the church’s 
opposition to same-sex sexual relationships. Goss argues that the restriction of sexual pleasure to 
heterosexual marriage denies “the right to sexual intimacy and pleasure to queers.” Goss, 203. 
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and conservative Christian ideas about sex, gender rules and roles, relationships, 
marriage, and family.686 He explains that, more threatening than any one sexual act, queer 
life “intentionally defines a pleasurable way of life and constructs cultural forms to 
support that way of life.”687 In other words, because queer life (and sex life) does not 
conform to the aforementioned norms; pleasure – bodily or otherwise – can be a guiding 
principle for one’s lifestyle. Recall that Gudorf comes to similar conclusions after 
arguing for the goodness of the body and the importance of valuing the messages from 
our body about what is pleasurable and what is painful. She, like Goss, supports an ethic 
that, in a broad sense, seeks to maximize our pleasure and minimize our pain, or oppose 
suffering and seek joy. 
 Interpretations of gay sex also strengthen the argument for a necessary 
relationship between sexual pleasure and spirituality. 688 Goss explains that some gay men 
experience a reintegration of sexuality and spirituality as intense sexual pleasure shatters 
individual subjectivities, resulting in the experience of communion. “The jouissance of 
gay love, the pleasure in the midst of sexual orgasm, becomes an epistemological mode 
for recovery of the body as spiritual,” he explains.689 Put differently, the experience of 
sexual pleasure for some gay men collapses any rigid distinction or hierarchy between the 
bodily and the spiritual.  
                                                
686 Ibid, 206.  
687 Ibid, 207.  
688 Lesbian feminist theologian Mary Hunt points out that while gay men have focused on their sexual lives 
as the locus of their liberation, lesbian feminists, who resists self-definition based on sexuality, centralize 
their relational commitments to other women – what Hunt calls female friendship. This way of self 
identifying is not based on sexuality activity and reflects a lesbian feminist commitment for individuals to 
be able to love whom they choose, free from heterosexist gender restraints. Mary Hunt, “Lovingly Lesbian: 
Toward a Feminist Theology of Friendship,” in Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for Theological 
Reflection, 2nd ed., eds. Marvin E. Ellison and Kelly Brown Douglas, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2010), 186.  
689 Goss, 207.  
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Because the Christian community can be hostile to gay sexuality, new spiritual 
paths to integrating sexuality and spirituality have emerged. Goss explains,  
From a queer Christian perspective, sexuality becomes the capacity for 
giving and receiving bodily pleasure…[including] comfort, mutuality, 
self-discovery, grace and love. For many gay men, it brings a convergence 
of jouissance and spirituality, the ecstasy of human and divine encounter. 
Simultaneously, it is a convergence of pleasure, certainly with another 
human being, but also, and significantly, with God.690  
 
Here, Goss gives voice to members of the gay community who delight in sexuality – in 
receiving and giving of physical pleasures – and experience within it God’s presence and 
pleasure. Instead of viewing gay sexuality as “unbridled lust,” he hopes that churches will 
someday see it for what it really is: “wide, erotic grace that rejoices in the pleasure of 
love and God.”691 
 
Embodiment, Race, and Injustice 
Claiming embodiment, taking seriously the unification of body and spirit, as well 
as sexuality and spirituality, also means recognizing the injustice that has been and 
continues to be perpetrated by maintaining and manipulating the traditionally hierarchical 
split between mind and the body, which Nelson calls sexual alienation generated by a 
spiritualist dualism. While Nelson argues that fear/disdain/devaluation of the body comes 
                                                
690 Goss, 207. Scott Haldeman, in his piece “Receptivity and Revelation, A Spirituality of Gay Male Sex,” 
presents a personal reflection on his sexual experience as the receptive partner in gay male intercourse, 
firmly owning his preferences, interpretations and conclusions. His piece, reminiscent of Mary Pellauer’s 
reflections on her experience of orgasm, are illustrative of the possibilities for considering gay sex as a 
spiritual practice. Haldeman finds sex revelatory in a sacramental sense. Sexual pleasures are “material, 
embodied, sensory experiences that mediate, but do not delimit in themselves, particular, partial and fragile 
aspects of divine reality, divine grace and divine love…akin to an icon through which one sees…something 
of the attributes of God.” It is about “mediated knowledge of God, about encountering God, in partial, 
momentary glimpses, through the act of encounter with my lover, ” he explains. Scott Haldeman, 
“Receptivity and Revelation: A Spirituality of Gay Male Sex,” in Body and Soul: Rethinking Sexuality as 
Justice-Love, eds. Marvin M. Ellison and Sylvia Thorson-Smith (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press: 2003), 221. 
691 Goss, 212.  
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to find expression in the subordination of women, who are identified with the body, 
feelings, and sensuality, he neglects to make similar attributions to race. Thus, along with 
spiritualistic and sexist dualisms, we find the pernicious dualism of race – the split 
between white and non-white individuals. As with the sexual alienation one suffers at the 
hands of sexism, for example, racism also encourages alienation within the self, from 
one’s neighbor and, ultimately, from God.  
The treatment of non-white individuals, especially blacks, and non-heterosexual 
individuals in the American context exemplifies these grave injustices. Targeting 
sexuality, because of its association with the body, has constituted “justification” for 
various forms of oppression, discrimination, and violence. Identifying the “other” with 
lewd, lascivious, and rampant sexual desires and behaviors also serves to distance 
oppressors from their own sexual needs and desires. Similar to Goss’ claims regarding 
queer sexuality, the lingering discomfort with sexual pleasure finds outlets in 
scapegoating the sexuality of non-white communities. However, unlike sexual 
orientation, race has a constructed embodied quality such that it runs skin deep – literally.  
The historical association of black embodiment with sensuousness, excessive 
sexual appetite, and sexual pleasure, alive and well in contemporary stereotypes and 
modes of exploitation, gives reason for pause and deeper consideration of what the 
redemption of sexual pleasure, and sexuality more broadly, means for the whole of the 
Christian community. 692 Womanist theologians in particular demand a critical analysis of 
                                                
692 Although this chapter focuses on the sexualization of African American bodies in a U.S. context, the 
sexualization of non-white bodies was a common practice of white, Europeans colonizers. Inferiority of the 
colonized was insisted upon by portraying non-Europeans as nonmonogamous and sexually promiscuous, 
with an extensive sexual appetite. Grace Jantzen argues that the colonizers' own promiscuous sexuality is 
projected onto the colonized, giving colonizers reason to justify the slave trade and sexual exploitation as 
“necessary for the progress of civilization.” Colonization, she suggests, had two major affects with respect 
 311 
what they argue is a distorted portrait of black sexuality informed by the cooperation of 
white culture and the Western Christian tradition. This sexist, heterosexist, racist, and 
classist alliance, they argue, has so profoundly affected and shaped the theology and 
practice of the Black Church that it has devastated black sexuality. 
White racist culture distorts black sexuality and black sexual pleasure, turning the 
black community in on its self, squelching the liberative forces available in black 
sexuality, and increasing sexual injustices within the black community. Pointing out that 
white culture is prone to simultaneous fascination and fear with respect to black bodies 
and black sexuality, womanist Kelly Brown Douglas argues that this fixation is indicative 
of white culture’s concern for white society and the structures that maintain it. “Indeed, 
the violation of Black sexuality by White culture is about nothing less than preserving 
White power in an interlocking system of racist, classist, sexist, and heterosexist 
oppression,” she explains.693 Preservation and control of white culture is maintained by 
controlling black sexuality.  
 
Sexuality, power, and racism 
Douglas concurs with Foucault, agreeing that, “…there is no better way to 
impugn the character and humanity of a people than by maligning their sexuality.”694 In 
                                                                                                                                            
to sexuality: “projecting the colonized people as the sexually perverse Other confirmed European ideals of 
good sex,” and “European ideals for good sex were imposed on the colonized countries and internalized by 
their people, despite the existing tension with their own traditional values.” Grace M. Jantzen, “Good Sex: 
Beyond Private Pleasure,” in Good Sex: Feminist Perspectives from the World’s Religions, eds. Patricia 
Beattie Jung, Mary E. Hunt and Radhika Balakrishnan (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 
8-9.  
693 Kelly Brown Douglas, Sexuality and the Black Church: A Womanist Perspective, (New York: Orbis 
Books, 1999), 12.  
694 Ibid, 23. Douglas explains that White cultural attacked Black sexuality in an effort to dehumanize Black 
men and women, which made them easier to enslave and treat as property and labor commodities. White 
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other words, because the contemporary regime centralizes sexuality and sexual identities 
and makes them constitutive of personhood, any condemnation of a particular sexuality is 
totalizing. It qualifies who you are at your deepest level and situates you in society 
according. Douglas agrees with Foucault that power is produced in this process, just as it 
disciplines those bodies and identities that it casts off from the norm. She also explains 
how Christianity contributes to giving sexuality a role in oppressing races of human 
beings. This project has already pointed out the hierarchical dualism between the body 
and the soul that lies near the heart of Christianity’s historical rejection and disdain of the 
material body and its pleasures. This dualistic thinking is also implicated in racial 
injustice, as Black individuals are portrayed as the antithesis of “authentic selfhood,” or 
whiteness, and as such, relegated to the lower half of these dualisms.695  
 As Douglas explains, identifying black individuals with the despised, sexualized 
body was justification for the need to control black bodies and imply inhumanity. White 
culture depicted Black sexuality as “carnal, passionate, lustful, lewd, rapacious, bestial 
and sensual.”696 Black men and women were imaged as over-sexualized, guided 
primarily by desires of the flesh. Douglas explains that stereotypes, constructed out of the 
fear of difference, supported the beating, castration, and lynching of black men, as well as 
the rape of black women by white men without liability. Black men were portrayed as 
sexual predators, “violent bucks,” whose large penises and sexual prowess were useful to 
the “slavocracy” in regards to reproduction, but posed a continual sexual threat to white 
                                                                                                                                            
cultural also honed in on black sexuality because of differences in skin color and physical attributes. 
Difference again provoked fear and the need for control.  
695 Ibid, 29. 
696 Ibid, 31.  
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women.697 Black women, regarded as promiscuous seductresses or “Jezebels,” suffered 
the responsibility for their own rapes and sexual harassment by white men, who claimed 
to be victims of the black woman’s seductive powers.698  Subjected to public nudity and 
inspection at slave auctions, as well as being bought and sold for their reproductive 
potential, Douglas argues that black women “were helplessly trapped in the mythology of 
being Jezebels by the very institution that demanded them to be precisely that.”699 This 
“Jezebel” stereotype also provided a foil for White, middle-class women’s sexual purity, 
allowing white men to exploit black women, while protecting white women’s innocence. 
 The impact of this kind of ongoing objectification and dehumanization of the 
black body has been devastating for the black community. Douglas argues that the 
stereotypes of the Jezebel and the violent buck live on in their contemporary 
manifestation of the “welfare queen” and “the violent black man.” Promiscuous, 
unmarried women, who have a lot of children and sit around waiting to collect 
government checks, characterize the former; the latter reflect the same image of the black 
male as a violent, sexual predator.700 These distortions permeate black lives and 
relationships and function to replicate the perpetrated injustice intrapersonally and 
interpersonally.  
 For example, the manipulation of sexuality affects black self-esteem. Black 
individuals experience anxiety, disdain and ambivalence about their bodies. Some feel 
ashamed, as Douglas suggests, left to “negotiate by themselves the burden of years of 
                                                
697 Ibid, 45-46.  
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humiliation heaped upon them by a White culture that suggests that Black physiognomy 
is a sign of inferiority and wantonness.”701 Womanists focus on intensity of this 
ambivalence for black women, who suffer doubly under the rule of racist patriarchy. 
Toinette Eugene explains,  
…persons of the rejected racial- or gender specific group begin to 
internalize the judgments made by others and become convinced of their 
own personal inferiority. Obviously, the most affected and thus 
dehumanized victims of this experience are black women.702  
 
In other words, black women as woman are deemed the lesser of the two sexes – 
responsible for the fall of “mankind” and tied to material existence – while their 
blackness signifies animality, filth, and promiscuity in the shadow of the white woman’s 
beauty, purity and chastity. Consequently, their womanhood and sexuality “[harbors] the 
pain of someone else’s devaluation of their color, hair, hips, noses, and basically the way 
they move, live, and have their being.”703 The impact that this devaluation has on black 
women (and men) frustrates self-love and paves the way in the black community, 
especially in the young, for self-destructive behavior.  
More so, manipulating black sexuality inhibits the black community from 
speaking honestly about sexuality. Sadly, this silence fails to be a remedy in the 
community for low self-esteem, sexism, heterosexism, and the spread of disease. Silence 
fails to institute healing, fails to tap the potential of black sexuality for liberative 
response, and blocks God’s intention for human sexuality to contribute to abundant life.  
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Thus, simply asking black communities to stand up and claim the goodness of 
their bodies and their sexuality, let alone their sexual desires and pleasures, minimizes the 
nefarious bind that this kind of oppression creates. Black communities face a dilemma in 
discussing sexuality publicly. They risk affirming white culture’s stereotype of the black 
community as obsessed with sexual matters. In this way, not only does white culture 
malign black sexuality, it grounds its discriminatory thoughts and practices in exactly that 
which Nelson insists should be affirmed and loved – the body-self and its sensuality.  
Tearing black sexuality and spirituality asunder 
Faced with the risk of reinforcing white culture’s stereotypes about black 
sexuality, Douglas insists that many in the black community adopt a “hyperproper” 
sexuality modeled on white culture and the body-negative narrative of the Western 
Christian tradition. Promoting hyperproper sexuality, however, negatively affects the 
wholeness of black spirituality. For example, Douglas points to black spiritual 
communities who still treat women as sexual temptations, invoking the “Jezebel” 
stereotype and upholding the double standard by scrutinizing women’s sexual activities 
and ignoring men’s sexual indiscretions.704 Rejecting sexuality tears away at the fabric of 
spirituality because both concern the relationship with the divine. Womanist Toinette 
Eugene defines spirituality as “the human capacity to be self-transcending, relational, and 
freely committed, [encompassing] all of life, including our human sexuality.” 705 As the 
Black Church seeks to distance itself from its sexuality, it succeeds in diminishing its 
relationship with God.  
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Womanist theologians, like Douglas and Eugene, argue that black spirituality, at 
its core, is not lofty spirituality that is cut off from the body, encouraging the hierarchal 
dualisms of male/female, white/black, soul/body, pure/sexual, etc. It is not a spirituality 
that supports racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, etc. It is not a spirituality that 
supports the fear of the body, sex, and pleasure and clings to procreationism and marriage 
to contain, restrict, and oppress the needs and desires of the black body.706 Eugene warns 
the Black Church,  
The tendency to opt for a spirituality which is unrelated to our black 
bodily existence or the temptation to become too heavily fixated at the 
level of the physical, material, or genital expressions of black love keeps 
us off balance and unintegrated in religiously real ways.707   
 
In other words, she presses the black community to seek a balance between and 
integration of the sexual and spiritual dimensions of their lives. Spiritual life is 
embodied life, and embodied life is necessarily sexual.  
 Womanists maintain that the Black Church can and must reclaim black sexuality 
if its goal is to contribute to the ongoing liberating mission of transforming the oppressive 
condition of the black community. Aspects central to black theology and spirituality are 
crucial for embracing black sexuality, and, as a consequence, the black body, its 
pleasures, and its capacities for liberative energy. Love and appreciation for the beauty of 
the black body is first evident in God’s good creation, which includes the goodness of all 
human bodies. Familiar with Nelson, Douglas explains that the body is also “the 
instrumentality of divine presence…It is the medium by which god is made ‘real’ to 
                                                
706 Eugene points to African heritage, which allows black Christians to understand spirituality as both “life-
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humanity, through which God interacts in human history.”708 The Black Church also 
affirms Jesus as the incarnate God, who irrevocably joins flesh and spirit, who implicates 
the body in spirituality.  
  
Beyond Heterosexist and Racist Dualisms 
Sexuality, who we are as body-selves in need of physical, spiritual, and emotional 
connection, is what makes human relationships and relationship with the divine possible; 
the body is the physicality of sexuality. All bodies are good, as they serves as the 
condition for relating to others and making meaning in the world. All humanity is made in 
the image of God.  
Theologizing from one’s sexual pleasure and recognizing the unified nature of 
sexuality and spirituality are goals for both the queer community and the black 
community. According to Goss, queer sexual pleasure needs to be recovered; he and 
other gay men, for example, do just this in their scholarship, interpreting their own sexual 
experiences as life-giving and thoroughly spiritual. Though Douglas indicates that the 
Black Church and community desperately need to embrace their own embodiment, 
including their sexuality, I had a difficult time finding theological scholarship by black 
male or female authors who write explicitly about their sexual experience and pleasures. 
Although both black and queer communities continue to suffer at the hands of racists, 
heterosexist patriarchy, I am curious if race – at least in the theological context – appears 
to generate greater risk when it comes to talking and writing explicitly and publicly about 
sexual pleasure. In evaluating the resources used for this project, I could not find 
anything in the black scholarship that reflected projects like Pellauer’s or Haldeman’s.  
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Recall that Kelly Brown Douglas testifies to the double bind imposed by white 
culture that black communities face talking about their sexuality. The black community 
risks confirming white culture’s stereotypes by celebrating their sexual-selves, including 
their sexual pleasures. Karen Baker-Fletcher, however, who notes the richness of the 
erotic in contemporary black women’s writings, gives an indication that resisting 
personal reflections like Pellauer’s and Haldeman’s is actually an assertion of freedom. In 
consideration of Eve Ensler’s “The Vagina Monologues,” Baker-Fletcher explains,  
It is not surprising that a Black woman did not write, ‘The Vagina 
Monologues,’…Historically our bodies have been forcefully displayed and 
spread for curiosity, amusement, observation, and consumption. To be 
private about sexuality is a freedom for which Black women are still 
fighting a great cost.709 
 
In other words, womanists claim their freedom to do, display, and play with their 
sexuality as they please, and will not be forced to participate in a sexual regime – say of 
eliciting their personal sexual pleasures – that has been the source of so much pain for 
them and their brothers and sisters.  
Perhaps what needs to be addressed before moving on is that the intersection of 
sexuality and race criticizes any simple inclusion of sexual pleasure in Christian sexual 
ethics. The black community may not have the privilege that white women and white 
non-heterosexual individuals possess, or they may be powerfully resisting the public 
production of discourse to these ends – a freedom and power they claim in their own 
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liberation. I would wager that a similar argument could be made for class, which cuts 
across race, gender, and sexual orientation.710  
My point is that reclaiming pleasure needs to be preceded by reclamation of the 
whole of black sexuality. There also needs to be accountability for how white culture and 
the Western Christian tradition have used sexuality in the service of racism. These efforts 
are an example of how social justice is related to sexual ethics, and why Christian sexual 
ethics must attend to more than personal sexual relationships. It raises the question of 
sexuality’s relationship to power in yet another way. Not only does sexuality function as 
a way to suppress power, but via sexuality power shows its productive character as 
certain forms of knowledge are organized and deployed in public discourse. This 
demonstrates that the personal is not easily isolable from the political – even when 
something as personal as sex is the subject.  
 
What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the Flock!: Mutuality in Sexual Pleasure 
 Carter Heyward heavily influenced Christian sexual ethics with claims that 
mutuality should be eroticized in all relationships, including sexual relationships. 
Mutuality in sexual relationships became an ethical mandate for “good” sex – sex that 
resisted using power dynamics to titillate and please. In the context of her eros theology, 
Heyward insisted that desires aroused and satisfied by any ratio of dominance and 
submission amounted to violence and the pornographic. Thus, mutuality in sexual 
experience is the second theme that emerges and is bound to sexual pleasure in 
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discussions that seek to affirm sexual pleasure, particularly sexual pleasure that has been 
ignored, denied, or maligned.  
Gudorf devotes an entire chapter to an insistence on mutuality as normative in 
sexual pleasure. Feminist contributors to this discourse also demand mutuality in sexual 
experience, and such insights are among the strongest contributions offered by queer 
theologians with respect to reconstructing Christian sexual ethics. It is clear that not only 
does pleasure need affirmation, but that mutuality in sexual relationships recognizes that 
the sexual pleasure of all participating parties needs to be affirmed. In this way, the 
affirmation of mutual sexual pleasure attempts to keep Christian sexual ethics from 
reinscribing dominant forms and interpretations of sexual pleasure – namely white, male, 
heterosexual pleasure.  
 
Gudorf’s Highest Priority 
 Mutuality in sexual pleasure is a non-negotiable for Gudorf and becomes 
foundational for sexual ethics as justice becomes the larger frame for interpreting sexual 
pleasure. Theologically, she supports mutual relations with the witness of Jesus’ ministry, 
one characterized by the inclusivity of women, children, the poor and sick, prostitutes and 
tax collectors – all of whom were welcome at his table. Mutuality is also supported by 
her interpretation of the love commandment explained in the prior section, one that 
balances the needs of the self with the needs of the neighbor, arguing that these needs 
inevitably "march together” and can be “mutually satisfied.”711 Taken together, to 
consistently exclude one from or deny one sexual pleasure is problematic. It objectifies 
one’s partner and deprives her of the goods of sexual pleasure mentioned above.  
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To further explain, Gudorf states,  
In sex, if one partner is consistently acting to please the other person 
without openness to receiving pleasure, the pleasure of both persons in the 
relationship decreases.  The active partner can over time become the 
controlling partner, which both partners can come to resent.712 
 
It is to this point that Gudorf explicitly engages Heyward and Harrison’s work on the 
intersections of pain and pleasure found in relationships characterized by domination and 
submission. Gudorf recognizes that the proposed problem, the eroticization of 
dominance/power, presents a challenge for the solution, the eroticization of mutuality –  
namely that there can be a distinction between what one might intellectually desire and 
what one actually finds arousing. Gudorf, however,  does not follow through with this 
critique! She simply moves on, embracing Heyward and Harrison’s solution and insisting 
that mutuality in sexual pleasure should be normative.713 
 
Female Orgasm Demands Recognition 
While Gudorf is sensitive to the ways that women have suffered alongside sexual 
ethics that vilify sexual pleasure or neglect a priority on women’s sexual pleasure, a 
number of feminist theologians and ethicists focus pointedly on the lack of attention 
given to women’s sexual pleasure, including the ways that this neglect is culturally 
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reinforced and how it deprives women of an increasing sense of well-being and self-
concern. Insistence on mutuality when it comes to sexual pleasure calls attention to the 
importance of women’s sexual pleasure in particular, as men’s pleasure is typically taken 
for granted in the priority on penile-vaginal intercourse. Recall that even one of the most 
progressive church documents, that of the ELCA, referred to the “…the greatest sexual 
intimacies, such as coitus…”714 In churches, as in culture, sexual intercourse is still 
prioritized, despite what women have had to say what stimulates and maximizes their 
own sexual pleasure.  
In her article “The Moral Significance of Female Orgasm: Toward Sexual Ethics 
that Celebrates Women’s Sexuality,”715 feminist theologian Mary Pellauer identifies 
difficulties that are particular to reflection on female orgasm. Paramount to 
phenomenological issues – that female orgasm can be brief and fleeting, difficult to 
remember or describe in the moment, and lacking in uniformity over subsequent 
iterations – is the reality that sexually active women cannot take orgasms for granted.716 
Drawing on data from the 1990 Kinsey Institute Report on Sex, Pellauer highlights the 
ambiguity related to female orgasm, from the experience of anorgasmia, to the difficulty 
defining and identifying orgasm, to the experiences of orgasms that are more likely the 
result of other types of stimulation besides coitus. Unlike men, orgasm for women does 
not come naturally, she insists. “We have to learn it.”717    
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Pellauer also points out that fresh reflection on female orgasm is complicated by 
female sexual experiences already interpreted in culture. Catholic scholar Patricia Beattie 
Jung, in her article “Sanctifying Women’s Pleasure,” elaborates on oppressive cultural 
and theological interpretations of female sexual pleasure. She criticizes Roman Catholic 
teaching with regards to sex as conflicted and unsatisfactory for affirming the necessity 
and good of women’s sexual pleasure. For example, although the procreative ends to sex 
are no longer primary to its unitive function, Roman Catholic theology continues to 
support conjugal coitus only. Drawing as both Gudorf and Pellauer do on statistics 
gleaned from women’s sexual experiences, Jung reiterates that coitus is not necessarily 
the most pleasurable (if at all) sexual activity for women. Unfortunately, the Church 
continues to view as “polluting” activities that prove to be more arousing, like direct 
stimulation of the genitals by hand or mouth or other kinds of rubbing.718  
As many feminists here point out, a theological perspective that only supports 
coitus cannot support female sexual pleasure. Such a perspective also fails to meet its 
own celebrated ends in many traditions – unity – which Jung argues, similar to Gudorf, 
cannot exist without shared pleasures and mutual delight.719 Furthermore, disregard for 
women’s sexual pleasure promotes ignorance to the pain that can be experienced during 
sexual intercourse.720 Thus, continuing to promote only the moral goodness of coitus or 
prioritizing coitus over other sexual acts neglects women’s pleasure. Neglecting women’s 
pleasure, and as such the experience of mutually pleasurable sexual activity, ironically 
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fails to contribute to the bonding between individuals [read: married] that the Church has 
come to prioritize above or alongside procreation.721 More so, it is worth pointing out that 
whether the emphasis is reproduction or bonding, the need for pleasure to have an 
instrumental goodness also resonates with the contemporary sexual regime – Foucault’s 
suggestion that value or meaning of sexual pleasure is dependent on the ends that it 
serves.  
In addition to critiquing the Christian tradition, Jung identifies social factors, 
institutional patterns, and cultural messages that contribute to the absence or distortion of 
sexual pleasure in the lives of women. For example, in the politics of research one finds a 
dearth of research into the sexual complaints of women alongside the plethora of funds 
and research devoted to male erectile dysfunction and impotence.722 Jung also argues that 
a social taboo against sexual pleasure is prevalent in public sex education. As an 
example, she focuses on the resistance to teaching masturbation – a frustration that I 
pointed out in my Introduction. This is particularly costly for women, who are less likely 
to masturbate and masturbate at a later age. Withholding or neglecting sexual self-
knowledge is more costly for women because, as Pellauer has already insisted, “women 
need to learn in particular what please them.”723  
Finally, Jung identifies the chronic forgetting and rediscovery of the clitoris as 
responsible for the devaluation of women’s sexual pleasure. She briefly traces some 
historical shifts in perceptions of women’s sexuality and capacity for sexual pleasure, 
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demonstrating the cultural impetus to minimize over and over again the gains made in 
identifying the clitoris as a pleasure center, as well as the superiority of clitoral 
stimulation by hand or mouth over against coitus. A fascinating and in-depth exploration 
into and critique of the chronic forgetting and rediscovery of the clitoris can be found in 
feminist philosopher Nancy Tuana’s article, “Coming to Understand: Orgasm and the 
Epistemology of Ignorance.” 
Despite the challenges, these feminists argue that female sexual pleasure holds 
potential and that its affirmation may constitute a moral imperative in sexual ethics. In 
other words, the insistence of mutual sexual pleasure in sexual acts would actually 
stipulate that women experience pleasure, namely orgasm. Pellauer, in attempting to 
determine the moral significance of female orgasm, candidly reflects on her own 
experience with orgasms. Her piece functions as a corrective to the negative discourse 
around and conclusions about sexual pleasure (read: orgasm), generated by the 
dominance of the male sexual experience in the Christian tradition.724  
What I most appreciate about Pellauer’s reflections is that they are exploratory 
and less proscriptive. She analyzes her own sexual experience as the starting point for 
considering the moral significance, and, hence, ethical ramifications for female orgasm. 
As she identifies themes of import, she interprets her orgasm as a pleasure that is 
quantitatively and qualitatively different than other sexual pleasures – she calls this 
ecstasy.725 Aware that her interpretations tend toward the mystical, Pellauer describes 
                                                
724 Pellauer’s method supports Nelson’s argument for a sexual theology and Gudorf’s insistence that sexual 
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725 Pellauer affirms sexual pleasures that do not constitute orgasm, like the physical pleasures that precede 
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orgasm/ecstasy as a quasi-mystical experience, captured by the blurring of boundaries 
between self and other and self and world.726 Orgasm sets itself apart from other sexual 
pleasures for Pellauer; it is distinct – more intense, more embodied, while simultaneously 
more disembodied, more unbounded, uninhibited, less controlled, more unifying with the 
other. She ponders if this “distinctiveness” warrants a priority.  
Jung is incensed that the absence of sexual pleasure for women is rarely 
recognized as morally troubling. Like Gudorf, she utilizes a Roman Catholic resource: 
the moral wisdom of the body.727 The clitoris, whose only function as a bundle of nerve 
endings is to provide a woman pleasure, gives credence, she says, to the intrinsic 
goodness of sexual pleasure. Drawing on Pellauer’s meditations on her experience of 
orgasm and Audre Lorde’s description of “the erotic,” Jung identifies self-love as part of 
what is at stake in women’s sexual pleasure. She highlights the connections women make 
between the experience of sexual pleasure and delight and their subsequence capacity to 
yearn for and demand joy – even justice – in other areas of their lives. It is the potential 
for increasing love of self, as well as joy, growth, and wholeness that accompanies the 
experience of and reflection on female sexual pleasure. This is precisely why Jung argues 
that denying it or demonizing it is a moral problematic.   
Jung concludes that female sexual pleasure has both intrinsic and instrumental 
value. Like Gudorf, she asserts that sexual pleasure is a premoral good for all men and all 
women. She emphasizes that silence on the part of Christians with respect to women’s 
sexual pleasure has sanctified the problem. Thus, women’s sexual pleasure is indeed a 
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moral issue. As a result, Jung challenges churches to break their silence regarding the 
absence of sexual pleasure for many women in their congregations, arguing that the 
discernment of women’s sexual pleasure as morally good necessitates further 
development and that such a premise must be communally nurtured and sustained.728  
Pellauer, who bases her conclusions on her own experience, is more conservative 
in her summations. Her essay was first published in 1993, seven years before Jung’s, and 
represents the first and one of the only first-person accounts of the experience of orgasm 
written by a feminist theologian. Pellauer refuses to generalize from the particularity of 
her experience and heartily affirms “a multiplicity in feminist sexual ethics that can at 
least match the multiplicity of women’s sexual experiences.”729 She encourages her 
colleagues to give attention to the themes she proposes and remains open about reflection 
on the sacred with regards to orgasm. In so far as she experiences orgasm as a “limit 
experience,” one that takes one to the edge of recognizable, lived experience and borders 
on transcendence, she finds religious issues inherent in orgasm.730 Still, the relationship 
between theology, ethics, and female orgasm remains a question for her.  
 Per Pellauer’s analysis, ethical language lingers as a problem for addressing 
female orgasm. Whereas Jung is convinced that sexual pleasure is a moral issue for 
women, Pellauer’s investigation indicates greater complexity tied to the ethics of sexual 
pleasure, particularly of placing a moral imperative on female orgasm. Although there are 
a multitude of goods associated with sexual pleasure, and women’s sexual pleasure has a 
history of being ignored or denied, the question: “should women have orgasms during 
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sex?” is complicated. The dilemma itself is gendered because we do not ask this question 
of men. For most men, having sex means having an orgasm. Pellauer exclaims, “…most 
men could not imagine having sex regularly, let alone for years, without orgasms.”731  
However, to say, “Yes, women should have orgasms during sexual activity,” does 
little to affect the healing of those suffering from problems related to their sexual health, 
like anorgasmia for example. To say, “No, women should not be obligated to have 
orgasms during sexual activity,” supports the deprivation that many women already 
experience when it comes to this intensely pleasurable experience. Pellauer’s point is 
well-taken, especially for those of us with experience in a clinical context, who are 
acquainted with sexual suffering, shame, and guilt on the part of women and their 
partners when it comes to the desire for sexual pleasure, especially orgasm. 
 Bypassing any moral mandate, Pellauer chooses to commit to the use of 
theological language toward description and personal meaning. In line with Gudorf and 
Nelson, she prefers the language of “gift” or “grace” – sexual pleasure experienced as an 
unmerited, gratuitous gift.732 Whether it is a gift from one’s partner or not, she recognizes 
orgasm as a gift given by her own body, as well as a gift from the “vagaries of culture,” 
including accurate sex education, feminist literature that makes knowledge available, and 
agents of healing in the community who make personal and social change possible.733 
Implicitly invoking the need for unity of body and spirit, Pellauer looks forward to 
further reflection on the gifts the body gives to the spirit.  
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sexual regime. 
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Mutuality and Same-sex Eroticism 
 Some queer scholars suggest that queer individuals, those whose gender roles and 
sex lay outside of the constructed norms of heterosexual, married coitus, bring fresh and 
transformative insight to this discussion. They take their lead from Heyward, who claims 
that it is the privilege of gays and lesbians to take seriously and actively what it means to 
love – the share power in their relationships. She makes the case that mutual sexual 
relationships are available largely in same-sex relationships, and discloses her doubt that 
“mutuality of common benefit” is possible between men and women in a sexist 
society.734  
Since, Alison Webster has argued that gay and lesbian relationships are possible 
models for the mutual relating, and that Christianity has much to learn from them as it 
looks toward reconstructing sexual ethics. “Lesbian and gay relationships at least hold the 
possibility of equality…the major inequality of gender is missing,” she explains.735 
Robert Williams contends that many heterosexual couples can and do achieve truly 
mutual relationships; however, he also suggests that without the societal role expectations 
that plague heterosexual couples, gay and lesbian partners organize their own system for 
decision making and the division of labor.736 In addition to cultivating expertise in mutual 
relating, Williams imagines that heterosexuals and the Church would have much to learn 
from those in non-heteronormative relationships.  
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Sexuality, Mutuality, and Race 
 While queer scholars draw on the unique ability for same-sex relationships, free 
from the cultural role expectations that plague heterosexual couples, which to function as 
models for the mutual relating, womanists explicate how the distortion of black sexuality 
promulgated and exploited by white culture and the Western Christian tradition has 
thwarted mutual relationships – replicating similar injustices interpersonally. For 
example, racism grounded in sexuality takes its toll on the relationships between black 
men and black women, as well as relationships between black “neighbors.”  
Womanist thinkers challenge the sexism found in the Black Church and in 
theological discourse. “Racism and sexism diminish the ability of black women and men 
to establish relationships of mutuality, integrity and trust,” explains Eugene.737 Black 
institutions that replicate the gender hierarchy found in white culture align themselves 
with the oppressive thought and practice that aims for the possession of power rather than 
the sharing of power. Mutuality in relationship is thwarted. Given the relationship 
between sexism and sexuality, confronting sexism would require the black community to 
address the daunting subject of sexuality.   
 Similar to black sexism, the Black Church and community mirror heterosexist 
white culture with condemnation of their black neighbors’ homoerotic expressions of 
sexuality. In her essay, “Black and Blues: God Talk/Body-Talk for the Black Church,” 
Douglas criticizes the Black Church for refusing to recognize lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transsexual (LGBT) equality as a civil rights issue, pointing to the perception in the Black 
Church that the LGBT body is sinful and not worthy of the rights and respect given to 
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non-LGBT bodies.738 Victor Anderson argues that the Black Church is far from silent on 
matters of sex and sexuality, and finds proof in the proliferation of discourse with respect 
to homosexuality out of the mouths of black clergy. In his opinion, “…there is no body 
(literally) more contested in Black churches than the curious body of the black 
homosexual.”739 Here the distain in the Black Church and community for same-sex erotic 
attraction, activities, and relationships make use of the same projective mechanisms that 
serve to alleviate angst with regards to sexuality in white culture. Again, mutuality 
among black neighbors is thwarted. 
 In Douglas’ analysis, the prevalence of homophobia and heterosexism in the 
Black Church and community is inextricably bound to black oppression, particularly the 
exploitation of black sexuality. Forced to choose between exemplifying the hypersexual 
stereotypes imposed by white culture or conforming to “hyperproper” sexuality – the 
heterosexual, male-defined white standard of sexual conduct – the Black Church has 
opted for the latter.740 Consequently, the Church sexualizes those individuals in the 
community it finds unacceptable and different, just as white culture sexualizes black 
people.741 “The Black Church,” Douglas insists, “seizes an effective tool of oppressing 
                                                
738 Douglas supports her claim with statistics showing that 70 percent of black voters in California 
supported Proposition 8 in 2008, a position also strongly supported by black clergy. She also notes that 
black clergy publicly named HIV/AIDS a “gay” disease, marginalizing LGBT individuals and blaming 
them for the spread of the disease. Kelly Brown Douglas, “Black and Blues: God-Talk/Body-Talk for the 
Black Church,” in Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for Theological Reflection, 2nd ed., eds. Marvin E. 
Ellison and Kelly Brown Douglas, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), 49. In Sexuality and 
the Black Church, Douglas reveals that in her 10 years of teaching at the Howard University Divinity 
School, “no topic [touched] more of a raw nerve than homosexuality.” Students expressed open disgust of 
gay and lesbian sexuality, calling it perverse, abominable, diseased and sinful. Douglas, Sexuality and the 
Black Church, 87 
739 Victor Anderson, “The Black Church and the Curious Body of the Black Homosexual,” in Loving the 
Body: Black Religious Studies and the Erotic, eds. Anthony B. Pinn and Dwight N. Hopkins, (New York: 
Pelgrave MacMillan, 2004), 297.  
740 Douglas explains that this effort is an attempt to desexualize black men and women, in the face of white 
culture’s attempts to sexualize them. Douglas, “Black and Blues,” 55.  
741Ibid, 58.  
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power, the sexuality of those it opposes, and maligns it.”742 In other words, the Black 
Church, in its efforts to resist its own oppression, to gain some power, draws on the 
power of sexuality to evoke a heterosexual privilege. They argue that gay black men and 
women pose a threat to the black family (already threatened and demeaned by white 
culture) and that their nonprocreative coupling colludes in the genocide of the black 
race.743 Black lesbians, who are sexually independent of men, also “betray black 
manhood,” threatening his ability to dominate the female body. Thus, black lesbians 
suffer tri-fold in the black community and in white culture by virtue of their gender, race, 
and sexual orientation.  
 In addition to embracing the love of the black body and total self-love, the 
reclamation of black sexuality is a call to live in mutual relationships where power is 
shared. In so far as relationships make manifest the love of God, the Black Church 
recognizes Jesus’ ministry as the paradigm for what it means to share the love of God. 
She explains,  
Essentially, Jesus was decidedly partial to justice and to those who were 
victims of any form of oppression...to live like Jesus…requires living a 
life characterized by loving relationships, those that are liberating, healing, 
empowering, and life-sustaining.744  
 
Here, Douglas brings together the affirmation of black sexuality with its relationship to 
living in just relationships, both thoroughly grounded in the Black Church’s theological 
                                                
742 Douglas, “Black and Blues,” 58. To further distance itself from the link between blackness and sexual 
deviance, the Black Church often dismisses homosexuality in its own culture, addressing it as “a white 
thing.” For an in depth discussion on homophobia and heterosexism in the black community, see Douglas, 
Sexuality and the Black Church, 87-108. 
743 Douglas draws out the sexism implicit in this homophobia. For example, gay black men, who are 
aligned with the effeminate, threaten black manhood, and strong black mothers are implicated in the 
creation of the gay black male. Douglas, Sexuality and the Black Church, 103.  
744 Ibid, 115; 118. Douglas also includes proof of this relational emphasis but pointing to the doctrine of the 
Trinity, where we find a God who is in God’s self internally and eternally relational as creator, redeemer 
and sustainer. This relationship is characterized by mutuality and reciprocity. Douglas, “Black Body/White 
Soul,” 110.  
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perspective. She adds the need to recognize God’s passion, not only as suffering, but as 
ardent love. “God’s passion,” she argues, “attests to God’s ardent commitment to life and 
hence God’s willingness to suffer so that life might flourish.”745  
For the Black Church, living passionately in this way suggests a more 
encompassing understanding of human passion, more than the desire for sexual activity. 
Douglas draws heavily here on Lorde’s notion of the “erotic” and Heyward’s insistence 
that loving relationships are just relationships. Living passionately means tapping into the 
“divine energy within human beings, the love of God, that compels them toward life-
giving, life-producing, and life-affirming activity and relationships in regard to all of 
God’s creation.”746 Recall that human sexuality is the vehicle through which passion is 
expressed; it is the condition of the possibility of mutual, loving relations. 
 
An Extensive Project of Moral Transformation: 
Sexual Pleasure and a Passion for Justice 
 
 Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, Carter Heyward’s interpretations of the 
erotic permeated the field of Christian sexual ethics. Her proposal for combating the 
“erotic split” – the eroticization of the tensions generated by top vs. bottom, giver vs. 
receiver, traditional male vs. female roles, being self-possessed vs. belonging to another – 
was extremely convincing to those seeking to make Christian sexual ethics more relevant 
in its response to the current cultural context and more justice oriented. Alongside the 
establishment of sexual pleasure as a good gift and grace from the divine, I have shown 
that the proposed eroticization of mutuality became a call that resonated for many 
Christian sexual ethicists. Justice was paramount in Heyward’s work and a crucial 
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746 Ibid, 120.  
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impetus to the eroticization of mutuality. As a result of her influence, the relationship 
between the affirmation of personal sexual pleasure and political commitments to justice-
making in the community, as well as the global context, grew in significance.  
 
Female Sexual Pleasure and Justice 
 The explicit relationship between sexual pleasure and concrete movements toward 
social justice is undeveloped in Gudorf’s text. She does theorize, however, that mutually 
pleasurable sexual experiences hold promise for both the individual and the wider 
community. Given that the value of sex is no longer attached to procreation, new 
symbolism must convey the meaning and value of sexual activity. Per Foucault we might 
suggest the need for a new discourse. In addition to participating in the generation of life, 
Gudorf suggests that sex should be implicated in sustaining life for the individual, the 
partnership and the community.747 Sex sustains life through bonding individuals together 
(usually in pairs) and becomes a symbol of our ability as embodied persons to experience 
union.748 In a nutshell, Gudorf says that this experience of sexual activity, in which we 
risk, commit, and share in pleasure provides the opportunity for us to reflect on union, to 
see its worth and to see its possibilities for enhancement and fulfillment. This is how 
one’s personal experience of sexual pleasure benefits the self and opens one up to others 
and the community at large.  
                                                
747 Again, Gudorf draws on her Catholic heritage, pointing to the sacramental system of practices and 
rituals that channel grace into nurturing individuals and relationships and bind individuals and communities 
of faith to God.  
748 Gudorf, Body, Sex and Pleasure, 131-132.  
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 Gudorf concludes that while sexual pleasure and the intimate bond cannot replace 
human need for justice and community, they contribute to the task of creating human 
community in two import ways.749 She explains,  
…sexual intimacy and bonding give us insight into what community is, 
how it meets human needs and how satisfying it can be; second they can 
be a great source of energy for the task of social change toward 
community.750  
 
In other words, as we grow into a good sex life, one abundant in the experience of mutual 
sexual pleasure, insight into what constitutes intimacy grows, as does our care and 
concern for our partners. Care and concern for our partners encourages degrees of 
intimacy with friends, family, and neighbors and energizes us to challenge those things – 
institutions, individuals, social beliefs and practices – that harm or discriminate against 
our lovers and others.    
Commitments to justice with respect to sex were also on the horizon for other 
feminist theological ethicists. Patricia Beatie Jung, for example, also understands sexual 
pleasure to have benefits outside of personal growth and wellbeing. Recall that like 
Gudorf and Lorde, she argues that the pleasure and joy in mutual sexual experience 
unleashes a women’s capacity to yearn for and demand joy in other areas of life. As such, 
sexual pleasure becomes an energizing source, a source of self-respect, which also 
“embodies and enables revolutionary challenges to many cultural assumptions about the 
place of women.”751 To this last point, awareness of justice for women on a larger scale, 
beyond the need for sexual pleasure, emerges as a consequence of the energizing power 
of pleasure. Also reminiscent of Gudorf’s claim, Jung argues that female sexual pleasure 
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not only grows self-love, but fosters other love as well. Desire draws us toward others 
and sustains relationships. In pleasing another and being pleased by another, lives are 
connected. Jung suggests that sexual pleasure inclines us not toward isolation, but 
“toward the world.”752  
Jung also adds that shared or mutual sexual pleasure expresses a way of relating 
that challenges the construction of self/other relating in our culture. Here, she cites 
Heyward and Harrison’s work to suggest that the experience of mutual sexual pleasure 
resists the dominant paradigm of relating characterized by power-over. “Mutual sexual 
delight discloses the possibilities of creaturely interdependence and reciprocal 
enhancement,” she concludes.753 Theologically, she supports reciprocity between 
neighbor-love and self-love – evidence of a creation that is made for communion. In sum, 
her argument suggests that mutual sexual pleasure can participate – perhaps as example 
or initiator – in eradicating all kinds of relations characterized by domination and 
submission. In so far as it discloses the possibilities, mutual sexual pleasure is a foretaste 
of a new way of living in community.  
  An eye toward justice frames the intent of Pellauer’s project insofar as it seeks to 
point out the value of women’s sexual experience – particularly orgasm – toward the 
construction of sexual ethics. She adds her belief that the wonder and joy of ecstasy 
intrinsically spills over into the world outside. However, she does not develop a justice 
ethic to these ends. In other words, Pellauer does not elaborate, as Gudorf does, on the 
virtues of personal sexual pleasure insofar as they encourage partners to extend 
themselves to the community as conduits of God’s love to others. Pellauer prefers to 
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refrain from further comment until the diversity of women’s sexual experiences are made 
known. In her conclusions, she suggests that women’s experience of orgasm, as well as 
women’s experience of sex without orgasm, are worthy of exploration in the 
development of feminist sexual ethics, providing “loci for examining a whole range of 
intertwined and complex goods in sexuality that have not been explored.”754 There is 
reason to believe that justice-making could be one.  
 The feminist emphasis on mutuality of pleasure in sexual experiences may not be 
all that is needed to support safety and flourishing in all female sexual experience. 
Feminist philosopher of religion, Grace Jantzen, argues that an assessment of current 
cultural interpretations of pleasure offer qualification and caution to the kind of pleasure 
being affirmed and promoted. Her suggestions also revive my feeling that discourse 
related to sexual pleasure remains relatively confusing. On the one hand, communities of 
faith are skeptical, silent or limited in the pleasure they affirm; on the other hand, culture 
prioritizes sexual pleasures – private sexual pleasures – in such a way that it drives the 
expectation and demand for experiencing pleasure in all sexually activities. 
 Jantzen centers justice in matters related to sex and sexuality, arguing, “...whereas 
Western feminists have rightly learned to celebrate sexual pleasure, we have not always 
been as quick to discern the wider issues of justice involved.”755 Here, she is concerned 
about the celebration of sexual pleasure becoming a private issue, colluding with the 
ideals of Western individualism and late capitalism and attempts to turn pleasure into a 
privately owned commodity. Sex as a commodity is dependent on it being pleasurable; in 
fact, Jantzen points out,  
                                                
754 Pellauer, 163.  
755 Jantzen, 3.  
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…we are pressured now to find sex pleasurable, to get it right every time, 
to suppose that intimacy depends on perfect sex…good sex as pleasurable 
sex has generated a new variety of compulsion, this time for achieving 
pleasure…this compulsory pleasure is intensely private, nobody else’s 
business.756 
 
Jantzen is concerned that getting caught up in the drive for personal pleasure, and 
expending time and resources to these ends, distracts feminist from other issues related to 
sexual justice. Focusing on private pleasure, stresses Jantzen, is bought at the expense of 
reproductive justice for all and proves unhelpful for women in other parts of the world or 
those positioned differently in the West.757 
 Jantzen distinguishes herself from Gudorf, Pellauer, and Jung by explicitly 
insisting on a connection between sexual pleasure and justice. She remains wary that 
proposals that focus on personal fulfillment and enjoyment risk turning a blind eye to 
new public policy that reintroduces Western domination.758 To be sure, Jantzen fully 
supports the celebration of sexual pleasure; however, she insists that such celebration 
should not be privatized to serve the purposes of capitalism.  In her conclusions she says,   
Sexual pleasure is not neutral, nor is it a biological given or a natural 
essence.  Sexual pleasure as Foucault has taught us, is, like sex itself, 
socially and discursively constructed.  Our attitudes toward sexual 
pleasure can be constructed to work for justice or against it, to enhance 
and empower or to demean.  Rather than focus exclusively on the private 
pleasures of sex, we need to combine the energy of our sexual pleasure 
with the power of our passion for justice.759   
     
                                                
756 Jantzen, 11.  
757 Jantzen, 3-4. Jantzen cites the following examples of public policy that falls to the wayside when 
personal, private sexual pleasure takes precedence: 1) pharmaceutical companies and beauty industries that 
market products aimed at increasing attractiveness and intensifying pleasure, 2) the continued sexual 
exploitation of poor women and children (at home and abroad), who become victims of prostitution, sex 
tourist, etc. 3) the exploitation of women and children in poor countries for fetal tissue or for organs for 
experimentation, and 4) the advances in genetic engineering that have opened the door to developing 
“ideals of perfection or desirable characteristics,” as well as the possibility of avoiding “defects” or 
“deviance.” Jantzen, 11-13.   
758 Ibid, 4.  
759 Ibid, 14.  
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Here, Jantzen, like many of the aforementioned authors, connects the energies associated 
with sexual pleasure to the drive for justice. At least that is my interpretation. For her, 
however, sexual pleasure must move beyond the private to affect the public and political. 
Failing to do so amounts to collusion with the powers and principalities of the present 
world.  
 Jantzen’s critique is more cautionary than it is critical of Gudorf, Pellauer, and 
Jung. He suggestions definitely presses them and other proposals to ask: To what extent 
does valorizing female sexual pleasure support Western decadence at the expense of 
neglecting other problems women face and public policies that support these issues?760 
For Gudorf and Jung, mutuality is the solution. Jung, who is aware of Jantzen’s critique, 
feels that her emphasis on mutual sexual pleasure – shared delight – is one way that 
individuals can come to connect with these other concerns. She also concurs that efforts 
to address the lack of pleasure for women have been private and individual, increasing 
the burden on women to work and perform. Jung aims to move away from this 
individualized perspective and toward the “social dimensions” of grace – toward ways 
that communities of faith can communally nurture, sustain, and enhance sexual pleasure 
for women.761  
Recall that Gudorf argues that mutual sexual experiences open individuals up for 
becoming conduits of God’s love to others. She too is sensitive to the privatization of sex 
and the temptations to retreat from the concerns of the public world to the private realm 
of sex, marriage, family, and friends. Her position, however, is to acknowledge that the 
unitive function of the pleasures of sex remain only a small part of our search for 
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community.762 Here Gudorf acknowledges that the fight for justice requires much more 
than what sexual pleasure can offer. Based her affirm of sexual pleasure apart from its 
unitive function, she also implicitly indicates that sexual pleasure need not always serve 
these ends.  
Pellauer’s piece is an initial step in providing some language and an interpretation 
of female orgasm, and only acknowledges that the experience of orgasm for women 
enlivens their appreciation for self and life more generally. Jantzen might push Pellauer 
to think more critically about how sexual energy reaches beyond satisfying the needs of 
the self; however, this criticism needs to be balanced with Pellauer’s bold attempt to 
reflect critically and constructively on her own experience of sexual pleasure.  
 
Same-sex Eroticism and Justice 
 Queer theologians construct the crisis with respect to sexuality in the Church and 
in culture to be first and foremost a justice issue. Their scholarship takes the next radical 
step in binding mutual sexual pleasure in particular to social justice issues more 
generally. More so, the theory and practice of Christian sexual ethics shifts its focus to a 
priority on justice and, according to Marvin Ellison, its renewal constitutes “an extensive 
project of moral transformation.”763  
 As with mutuality, Heyward’s work here was foundational. She claims that love-
making (in all its forms, including sex) should always be justice-making.764 Sexual 
                                                
762 Gudorf, Body, Sex and Pleasure, 133.  
763 Marvin Ellison, “Reimagaining Good Sex: The Eroticizing of Mutual Respect and Pleasure,” in 
Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for Theological Reflection, 2nd ed., eds. Marvin E. Ellison and Kelly 
Brown Douglas, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), 246.  
764 Heyward claims that it is the privilege of gays and lesbians to take seriously and actively what it means 
to love. Deprived of categories steeped in traditional romantic love (husband, wife, fiancée, marriage, 
bride, bridegroom), as well as symbols of romantic love (rings, weddings, public displays of affection) and 
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activity, if it is truly erotic, moves toward the mutual sharing of power in relation. Recall 
her argument that same-sex erotic activity and pleasure should serve as an enlightening 
resource for considering the relationship between sexual pleasure and mutuality, or 
sexual pleasure and justice, because queer participants are not restricted by 
heteronormative gender roles or scripts. In fact, some queer Christians use their sexual 
experiences to argue that sexuality is just as political an issue as it is a private issue. They 
see their intimate relationships – which in and of themselves stand outside of the 
oppressive structures of compulsory heterosexuality – as justice-making and part of a 
larger call to participate in realizing justice in the lives of all those limited by sexism, 
heterosexism, racism, classism, etc., as well as the political and economic structures that 
support all forms of oppression.   
 Heyward is the champion of this proposal. Recall her sentiments that where there 
is no justice between individuals or in communities, there is no love; and where there is 
no love, sexuality is perverted into violence and violation.765 She explains that for her 
being a lesbian is the best way of being a lover; for her, lesbian sexuality is loving 
sexuality. Doubting the possibility of true mutuality in heterosexual relationships, 
Heyward chooses to invest her energy and passion elsewhere. Because lesbian 
relationships may be mutual, she suggests that they offer a glimpse of a more just way of 
relating for all partners. Lesbian feminism opposes structures of male-dominance, 
including heterosexism, procreationism, and a social order (economic, religious, sexual, 
etc.) characterized by domination – always someone on top and always someone else on 
                                                                                                                                            
religious legitimation of romantic love (blessing relationships, celebrating or even acknowledging 
relationships), she argues that only “lover” remains as the descriptor for gay and lesbian individuals and 
those they love. As such, gay and lesbian voices speak from a place of being compelled to articulate the 
depths of what it means to love and to make love. Heyward, “Sexuality, Love and Justice,” 294. 
765 Ibid, 296.   
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the bottom. Heyward’s message is that justice for same-sex relationships is ultimately 
more than a concern for rights in private life.766 It is about overhauling the 
aforementioned oppressive structures. Mutual sexual relationships live out and exemplify 
this justice, as well as fueling the passion to liberate the self and others. 
 Recall that some gay Christian men write explicitly about their sexual pleasure 
and its revelatory and liberative capacities. In addition to insisting upon explicit 
celebration and affirmation of gay sexual pleasure in Christian contexts and culture, both 
Robert Goss and Scott Haldeman see a necessary relationship between their sexual 
activity and justice. Haldeman, in an approach that invokes Pellauer’s exploration of her 
own orgasms, describes the spiritual, ethical, and theological value of his experience as a 
receptive partner in gay intercourse. He describes four movements of anal intercourse: his 
vulnerable posture, his permeability, the experience of empting and being filled, and, 
finally, communion. In his description of each movement, he explains how his 
relationship to his partner, to others, and sometimes to God is shaped by the sexual 
experience.  
For example, with respect to his permeability, Haldeman must risk being 
offensive or even experiencing pain, but the risk can also lead to pleasure, intimacy, and 
healing. Permeability must be practiced in a relational context of deep trust, including 
open communication and respect for the boundaries between pleasure and pain. 
Haldeman also explains that the experience of permeability in his sexual relationship 
encourages him to take risks and listen across lines of difference, and to be more open 
and flexible attempting to live justly in communities of difference.767 Regarding the 
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theological value, his discussion of emptying and being filled serves his relationship with 
God. He delights in the image of an intimate approach of God and allows himself “the 
pleasure of being overwhelmed by God who delights in me and wishes my good.”768  
 Haldeman sums up his sexual experience as a receptive partner as, “feeling 
complete, whole, and yet yearning for more – more justice, more mutual respect, and 
more well-being for myself, my partner, communities near and far, and the whole 
world.”769 In this personal account, Haldeman’s sexuality and his spirituality are 
characterized by receptivity, which he practices in sex and his life. “It is shaping me,” he 
explains, “as other things I do shape me…”770 Like Pellauer, Haldeman is clear that he is 
not making a universal claim for the spiritual, theological, or ethical meanings inherent in 
gay sex. He does, however, challenge his readers to consider their own sexual practices 
and how these practices relate to their notions of self, community, and God (and visa 
versa). His is a practical plea to see the subtle relationships between our doings in our 
private, public and spiritual lives, reminding us, “…our doing shapes who we are 
becoming.”771 
The experience and the reflections of individuals like Haldeman support a sexual 
ethic, particularly a vision for sexual pleasure, which is inseparable from justice. Robert 
Goss, like Haldeman, refuses to recover gay sexual pleasure at the expense of social 
justice. “Sexual pleasure,” he insists, “is not morally neutral, for it can be pursued for 
narcissistic gratification alone or in order to extend justice-love.”772 With respect to the 
latter, he argues that sexual pleasure can become the foundation for moral discourse and 
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justice work. Similar to Haldeman, he encourages gay Christians to consider how their 
embodied pleasures might be intertwined with their spirituality and erotic justice.  
 Both Haldeman’s and Goss’s articles are published in Marvin Ellison and Sylvia 
Thorson-Smith’s edited text, Body and Soul: Rethinking Sexuality as Justice-Love. A 
professor of Christian Ethics and an ordained Presbyterian minister, Marvin Ellison 
draws on Nelson’s and Heyward’s work, in addition to his own experience as a gay man, 
to produce a book length proposal entitled Erotic Justice: A Liberating Ethic of Sexuality 
(1996).773 Ellison’s understanding of sexuality parallels Nelson and his notion of erotic 
desire reflects Heyward’s influence. He defines justice as “the ongoing, never-ending 
journey to remake community by strengthening relationship.”774 Justice-making is 
attention to how the wellbeing of individuals is affected by social power. To work for 
justice, therefore, is to correct “whatever harms people, other earth creatures, and the 
earth itself.”775  
Ellison’s goal is to outline an erotic ethic of “justice-love,” a phrase that he adopts 
from the Presbyterian study document, Keeping Body and Soul Together: Sexuality, 
Spirituality, and Social Justice (1991). “Justice-love” means seeking to be in right-
relationship with others and to working to set right all relationships, especially those 
characterized by domination and submission.776 The emphasis on pleasure and passion in 
                                                
773 Ellison has made a large contribution to the discourse surrounding the future of Christian sexual ethics. 
Selections of Erotic Justice: A Liberating Ethic of Sexuality appear in Sexuality [a reader] and the second 
edition of Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for Theological Reflection, published in the fall of 2010. 
Ellison is co-editor of the latter text with Kelly Brown Douglas. As a self-proclaimed “theological educator 
for justice,” Ellison is also co-editor of Body and Soul: Rethinking Sexuality as Justice-Love, which 
emerged after the Presbyterian Church rejected “Keeping Body and Soul Together,” a report connecting 
sexuality, spiritual and social justice presented to the Presbyterian General Assembly in 1991.  
774 Marvin Ellison, Erotic Justice: A Liberating Ethic of Sexuality, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1996), 2.  
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this text is expanded beyond the sexual experience of intimate partners, and, like Jantzen, 
Ellison resists reducing pleasure to private pleasure. He most definitively presents a 
comprehensive sexual ethic that binds pleasure and justice. 
The failure of the Christian tradition to provide reliable moral guidance that 
critically opposes essentialism and grasps the social construction of sexuality motivates 
Ellison. Noting that part of the problem rests in the dualism between the soul/spiritual 
and the bodily/sexual, he also criticizes the Christian perspective for uncritically passing 
on the received tradition as if it were “unassailable and permanently valuable moral 
truth.”777 Furthermore, as the tradition has resisted and reacted – uncomfortable with sex 
and fearful of conflict – against changing cultural patterns, its influence has diminished. 
Subsequently, communities of faith have strengthened their grip on the family and 
sexuality, while their emphasis on control and disconnection from the current cultural 
context weakens their moral authority on this front. Ellison agrees with Nelson that 
religious communities have not responded with creativity or compassion in the face of 
the sexuality crisis in our culture.778  
 In “Common Decency: A New Christian Sexual Ethics,” Ellison suggests that 
responsibility take the place of marriage and/or heterosexuality as morally normative for 
contemporary Christian sexual ethics.779 In this essay, he begins to develop the 
                                                
777 Ibid, 5. Also see Jordan, 4-19. 
778 Ellison, Erotic Justice, 5-6. Ellison is critical of traditional, libertarian and liberal messages about good 
and bad sex. Traditionalists morn the loss of and demand a return to traditional white, middle-class, 
heterosexual values – familial hierarchy, sex only in a marital, reproductive context, etc. Libertarians prefer 
a minimalist ethic that mandates consent, but is uncritical about the influence of context, power dynamics 
or social consequences. Liberals, although discontent with the traditional view, still have reservations about 
sex, women’s power and same-sex erotic relations and relationships. They retain relationship between 
sexual pleasure and danger that worries that inborn sinfulness can lead one down the slippery slope of illicit 
sexual desires. Ellison, Erotic Justice, 20-23.  
779 Ellison explains the confusion between normative and normal/natural that plagues a sexual essentialism 
position. This view point argues that sex is a natural force, fixed and unchanging, and biologically 
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framework for his larger contribution, Erotic Justice. Ellison explains how inequalities 
are eroticized and how sexism, for example, begins to feels natural in our very bodies. In 
other words, “Patriarchal sex makes gender injustice appear pleasurable.”780 
Heterosexism then demands conformity to sexism, and denies, shames, and punishes 
those who resist conforming to this “norm.” Ellison argues that the Church needs to 
recognize that neither homosexuality nor sex outside of marriage constitutes sexual 
injustice, but rather insistence on conformity to the unjust norm of compulsory 
heterosexuality and gender inequality.781  
Ellison’s proposal, an ethic of common decency, claims justice in sexual 
relationships as morally normative for Christians. Justice includes the recognition that sex 
is part of Christian spirituality, affirming our created purpose as lovers, “invited to relish 
in giving and receiving pleasure.”782 A justice perspective (1) celebrates all sexual 
relations when they deepen human intimacy and love, (2) requires relational fidelity as 
determined by the participants, (3) celebrates the plurality of intimacy needs and (4) 
respects differences. It learns from failures and rules out relations that abuse, exploit, or 
violate. Far from a simple sexual ethic of “no harm be done,” this ethic argues that good 
sex, including respect and pleasure, enhances one’s well-being and self-respect, and 
grows a desire to connect more justly with others. In “Common Decency,” Ellison is 
                                                                                                                                            
determined. Biology gives rise to natural expressions of sexuality. The heterosexual, reproductive 
partnership is seen as natural and normal given anatomical complementarity. What appears as natural, 
becomes normal and gathers moral weight in the “normative.” Drawing from Michael Kimmel’s work, 
Ellison explains that in sexual essentialism what is “normative,” or constructed and enforced through 
socialization, is taken to be “normal.” The normative, however, is “a product of moral discernment and 
deliberation, reflects a communal valuing of what is good, right and fitting. Normative judgments, 
including those made about sexuality, are subject to challenge and revision.” Ellison, Erotic Justice, 317.  
780 Marvin Ellison, “Common Decency: A New Christian Sexual Ethic,” in Sexuality and the Sacred: 
Sources for Theological Reflection, eds. James B. Nelson and Sandra P. Longfellow, (Louisville: John 
Knox Press, 1994), 237.  
781 Ibid, 238.  
782 Ibid.  
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already (re)introducing the need for Christians to embrace erotic power as intrinsic to 
humanness, as a power that often “enriches our connectedness to self, others, and God, 
and that in and of itself is the source neither of our salvation nor of our damnation.”783 He 
is shaped by interpretations of the erotic found in Lorde’s work and steeped in its 
theological renderings by Heyward. 
 Ellison goes on to draw together the concerns and insights of his contemporaries 
to articulate what he calls “a message of hope,” not only for addressing the crisis of 
sexuality in the Church, but also for facing the structural injustices that manipulate 
sexuality to eroticize injustice. In the introduction to Erotic Justice he takes up Heyward 
and Harrison’s insights to argue that the crisis with respect to sexuality in communities of 
faith and culture is located in the “eroticizing of dominant/subordinate social relations 
and in the distortion of love by racism, sexism and other injustices.”784 With an emphasis 
on the necessarily influential nature of the larger social order and its power relations on 
all aspects of human life, including eroticism, Ellison begins with the impact of structural 
injustice on self-understanding and our desire for intimate connection.  
Rethinking sexual ethics, therefore, requires a sexual ethic embedded in a 
framework of social justice. Ellison explains,  
…justice…is foundational to good loving…Our loving well requires that 
we pursue justice in all social relations, including those closest to our skin. 
Justice and love are tightly intertwined soul mates.785  
 
The goal is to actualize justice in all relationships by eroticizing equality and mutual 
respect. As the normative expression for all social interaction, relationships of equality 
                                                
783 Ibid, 237. 
784 Ellison, Erotic Justice, 1.  
785 Ibid, 2. Ellison defines justice as: the ongoing, never-ending journey to remake community by 
strengthening relationship; justice-making is sensitive to how well-being is enhanced or diminished by 
patterns of social power and powerlessness.  
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and mutuality challenge every social oppression.786 We embody – literally – justice in the 
context of right relationships, including those that are explicitly sexual.  
For Ellison, the path to eroticizing mutuality, which brings to mind Heyward’s 
proposal of phantasie, is to “imagine living by an ethical eroticism that enjoys life’s 
pleasures and at the same time prods us to pursue a more ethical world. The erotic can 
fuel our passion for justice.”787 Our imagination serves to move us past the reality that 
dominant/subordinate social relations are currently eroticized. When it comes to sexual 
arousal and sexual pleasure, my critique of Ellison parallels my critique of Heyward. I am 
unconvinced that we can phantasies or imagine our way out of those fantasies, cues, and 
sexual practices that feel so good now. I am also not convinced that doing so is necessary 
to oppose injustice in the world and advocate for the disenfranchised.  
 Taken together, eroticizing justice – Ellison’s proposal for renewing Christian 
sexual ethics – amounts to nothing less than breaking the eroticized link between pleasure 
and injustice on the largest of scales. He extends the invitation to individuals to begin the 
process of unlearning “the culturally inculcated eroticized desire for power as control,” as 
well “teaching the value of mutual vulnerability and interdependency in all our 
connections.”788 Hence, Ellison’s statement that renewing Christian sexual ethics 
amounts to an extensive project of moral transformation captures the priority on and 
sheer breath of working toward sexual justice for all in Christian sexual ethics – a move I 
whole-heartedly affirm. My resistance, however, clings to the necessary role attributed to 
personal sexual pleasures in advocating for this ethical framework.  
  
                                                
786 Ibid, 76.  
787 Ibid, 81.  
788 Ellison, “Reimagining Good Sex,” 246.  
 349 
Race, Sexuality, and Justice 
In the last two sections on embodiment and mutuality, I drew on womanist 
theology to show how black bodies and their desires have been maligned in such a way 
that black sexuality has been both distorted and used as justification for abuse, 
discrimination, and oppression. I pointed out that any simple inclusion of sexual pleasure 
into sexual ethics is complicated by the intersection of race and sexuality. White culture 
and the Western Christian tradition have subjected the black community to a double-bind. 
On the one hand, to speak about and celebrate their embodiment, especially sexual 
pleasure, is to confer constructed, racist stereotypes. On the other hand, to adopt a hyper-
proper approach to sexuality, one modeled on white sexist and heterosexist culture, 
enlists black sexuality in the service of proliferating sexism, heterosexism and even 
racism within the black community itself.  
From the start the theme of justice, in the form of reclaiming a black sexuality that 
loves beautiful black bodies (and their pleasures) holds spirituality and sexuality together. 
Recall the argument that the beauty of black sexuality has become so debilitated that, 
“The power of black sexuality to contribute to our liberating mission to change our 
oppressive condition has been weakened.”789 In other words, defacing black sexuality 
amounts to not only an injustice in itself, but also insofar as the potential of the power of 
black sexuality to embody justice and contribute to liberative causes is muted. Thus, a 
justice focus, demanding the reconciliation of black spirituality and sexuality to make 
energy available to address all forms of oppression, is central to black theological sexual 
ethics.  
                                                
789 Toinette, 105.  
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Womanist scholars like Douglas and Eugene look to the Black Church to affirm 
and encourage these hopes for the black community, resisting and refusing to allow white 
culture pleasure at the expense of black bodies. A number of black scholars and 
theologians are in agreement that sexuality is a contentious issue for black institutions, 
including the Black Church.790 These authors concur with Cornel West’s sentiments that 
black institutions like schools, families and churches have refused “to engage one 
fundamental issue: black sexuality. Instead, they [run] from it like the plague. And they 
obsessively [condemn] those places where black sexuality [is] flaunted: the streets, the 
clubs, and the dance-halls.”791 The history, roles, and goals of the Black Church, those 
things that make it so significant to black life, are what make injustices within this 
institution particularly problematic. Black sexism, the separation of sexuality and 
spirituality, anxiety around and disdain for the black body, procreationism, heterosexism, 
etc., all generate alienation internal to the black community.  
 In sum, not only do black individuals fail in a racist context to love and respect 
their body-selves, but discomfort with sexuality blocks the desire and potential for 
passion that would make the Black Church a community of mutuality and love, standing 
strong in opposition to racism and other forms of discrimination that target sexuality to 
oppress. Drawing on Foucault and his theory of discourse, Douglas calls for a sexual 
discourse of resistance.  
                                                
790 The focus through this paper concerns the black community in general, but addresses the Black Church 
in particular. Douglas explains that the latter reflects the rich complexity of the former. There is no single 
entity that represents the Black Church. The Black Church is defined historically and socio-culturally. 
Historically it grew out of black individuals’ resistance to white racial oppression, particularly slavery. 
Socially and culturally it influences values, shapes morals and is a critical source for black physical, 
emotional and spiritual well-being. Douglas, “Black and Blues,” 48. 
791 Cornel West, Race Matters, (Boston: Beacon, 1993), 86, quoted in Douglas, “Black Body/White Soul,” 
106.  
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According to Douglas, a sexual discourse of resistance in the black community 
draws on African cosmology that makes no distinction between the secular and the 
sacred, and, hence, rejects the antithesis between the flesh and the soul. It calls for 
“unadulterated self-love” that “empowers black men and women to celebrate and love 
their black embodied selves.”792 It condemns unequal power relations between black men 
and black women and rejects white family norms. A sexual discourse of resistance 
declares that homophobia is antithetical to black life and freedom.793 Lastly, it refuses to 
replicate in the Black Church and community white culture’s hierarchies of power that 
devalue women, racialized others, and those in same-sex erotic relationships. In fact, it 
holds white culture and the contribution of the Western Christian tradition accountable 
for the grievous sin of defiling the sexuality of non-white individuals. In Douglas’ words, 
“A discourse of resistance will stress that Black well-being is not fostered by adopting the 
oppressive, destructive, life-negating tools of White culture.”794  
 
 
 
 
                                                
792 Douglas, Sexuality and the Black Church, 75.  
793 Ibid, 107.  
794 Ibid, emphasis in text. Practical ways of encouraging the aforementioned transformation in the Black 
Church include “the creative use of sexually inclusive language for God as well as sexually inclusive 
images which serve to symbolize God.” Eugene, 111, emphasis in text. Douglas demands that the Black 
Church embrace “blues bodies,” those individuals whose stories pervade blues music. Blue music is an 
example of a form of resistance that subverts the stereotype of black bodies as hypersexual. Blues bodies 
are nonbourgeois (the black underclass), sensuous (express the body’s desires and feelings, including 
sexual feelings) and rejected (demonic on account of their sensuality). Douglas argues that as long as the 
Black Church rejects blues music it will reject blues bodies. Douglas suggests a new narrative to affirm 
black bodies and contest white norms – the signifying lament of the blues. The lament signifies protest 
against erotic sexuality as impediment to life, heteroerotic norms, the division of soul and spirit and the 
separation of the sacred and the secular in human experience. She powerfully concludes that “if the Black 
Church is to be a liberating, sustaining and life-affirming agent for all black bodies, then the church must 
be black and blue.” See Douglas, “Black and Blue”, 48-66.   
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Critical Analysis Toward Conclusions 
In this chapter I explored three themes that I identified as being crucial to the 
affirmation of sexual pleasure in contemporary Christian sexual ethics: embodiment, 
mutuality, and justices. Nelson’s Embodiment paves the way for scholars intent on 
wrenching Christian sexual ethics free from a legacy that continues to distort and hold the 
body, sex, and sexuality in contempt. As a function of our embodiment and its capacity 
for sensuality, there is a move in this scholarship to recognize sexual pleasure as a pre-
moral good, to demand it in all sexual relationships, and to firmly rid it of the angst 
generated by the Western Christian tradition. Some proposals gesture toward the potential 
for personal pleasures to have positive ramifications for loving one’s self, for growing in 
care and concern for one’s sexual partner, and for living into more just and mutual 
relationships with one’s neighbor, broadly defined. Mutual sexual pleasure becomes an 
ethical mandate for “good” sex. The voices of marginalized groups – those whose 
sexuality has been the grounds for their subjugation – centralize their own sexual 
experiences to more radically connect sexual practice to social justice. Grounded in the 
feminist theological recoveries of eros, these proposals reclaim sexuality, and, in some 
cases, view sexual pleasure as the site for potential liberation - literally.  
Heyward, another formative figure in the construction of contemporary sexual 
ethics, champions the necessity of both mutuality and justice in the context of sexual 
ethics and beyond. Mutuality, thus, creates the condition for justice. In the proposals in 
this chapter, mutuality is the standard for right relating and key to eliminating all 
relations characterized by domination and submission, subsequently tearing down the 
very foundations of sexism, racism, heterosexism, ageism, etc. According to many of 
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these scholars, mutuality in relationship, including mutuality in the context of sex, 
consists of sharing power – another contribution of feminist eros theology. Sharing 
power eliminates the tensions generated by “sadomasochistic” relating. The majority of 
these proposals insist on Heyward’s solution: the need to eroticize mutuality – to make 
“power-sharing” sexy and pleasurable. This should also be true for sexual activity. Recall 
that this solution is based on the argument that most, if not all, heterosexual sex derives 
its pleasure from the tensions generated by unequal power relations; in other words, 
power [read: power over] in our culture is eroticized.  
Because these scholars claim that the nature of the power exchange in sexual 
activity can/does translate into how one handles power in other relationships, and more 
so, that the joy of power-sharing in sex ignites a passion for mutual relating with all of 
humanity and creation, justice is ultimately the larger framework for interpreting sexual 
pleasure. Simply put, sexual pleasure that is the consequence of mutual sexual relating 
opens one up to the pleasures of and motivates one toward justice-making. For many of 
these scholars the relationship between mutual sexual pleasure and justice-making is an 
ethical expectation. It is also the heart of my critique. 
First, the discourse with respect to mutuality that stretches over these last two 
chapters is confusing at times. I argue that there is a conflation between egalitarian 
relationships in which mutual sexual decision-making takes place and mutuality in sexual 
activity itself. In the context of the latter, these authors argue that power differentials 
should cease to exist and titillate participants. As a result, the proposed solution to the 
problem of heteronormative sex – the eroticization of mutuality – forgoes the possibility 
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of mutual relationships where partners agree on using power differentials to maximize 
their pleasure.  
My second critique calls the possibility of mutuality as defined by these 
proposals, what I would call an idealized mutuality, into question. Drawing on 
Benjamin’s work in Chapter Three and Miller-McLemore’s work in Chapter Four, I want 
to reassert my argument that mutuality in the context of erotic desire and pleasure does 
not involve the elimination of tensions from proper mutual relating, sexual or otherwise. 
Tension, especially for Heyward and Beverly Harrison, is the problem, as it is always 
part and parcel of the arousing effect of eroticized power. But I would counter that 
tension is always the consequence of the continual negotiation of power and, perhaps, 
constitutive of the mutuality for which these proposals long – of my desire to be 
recognized by you, your power to recognize me and visa versa. The uncritical adoption of 
feminist eros theology by Christian sexual ethics leaves much of this work open to this 
critique.  
Pellauer’s honest recollections of her experience of power are provocative and 
generate the need for more complex analysis when generating discourse on pleasure, 
mutuality, and power. With respect to power, an implicit and explicit aspect of this 
discourse as a whole, Pellauer describes love-making toward orgasm as “a dialectic…of 
his power meeting mine, that is, he has this power because I respond to him and this 
response is mine.”795 She confesses, however, that this reality is more reasoned than 
experiential. This is the observation Gudorf makes, but fails to critique. The experience 
Pellauer describes consists of the power of his hand and his body arousing a response in 
                                                
795 Pellauer, 157.  
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her, and the nearer she comes to orgasm the more she feels his power.796 She does not 
experience it as the power of her own response. Pellauer surmises that this is due to the 
“power of connectedness between us…The tingle is neither in his hands nor in my skin, 
but only at the interface between them.”797 Still, phenomenologically, her experience of 
arousal and climax is “his power over her.”798 Pellauer steps back from her reflection and 
admits that this frightens her. She finds openness to his power difficult. However, she 
insists that her ability to “receive” this ecstasy is based on other factors in their 
relationship, including trust, growing mutuality, safety, and the ability to forgive one 
another.    
In my reading, the power Pellauer describes is personal – his power and her 
power, not necessarily shared power. Intellectually she says that it is his power that 
provokes arousal and her power that responds. Her experience, however, is that of his 
power over her and not the power of her own response. Pellauer is aware that to speak 
about power this way, as a feminist, is frightening, but that confidence and trust that her 
partner would never hurt her intentionally allows her to receive his power over her. She 
resists heterosexists assumptions that her pleasure is at the disposal of men, and points to 
the mutuality in the partnership, learning and hard work on the part of both partners. For 
orgasms, both partners are grateful.799  
These admissions on Pellauer’s part touch directly on the problem with “sloppy” 
definitions of mutuality. Miller-McLemore, who is familiar with Pellauer’s article, finds 
Pellauer exemplary in pointing to the difficulty (even possibility) of sustaining a mutual 
                                                
796 Ibid, 158.  
797 Ibid.  
798 Ibid. 
799 Pellauer introduces the language of luck, chance and accident here, and wonders what has happened to 
the use of such language in ethics. Pellauer, 160. 
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relationship the way that Heyward insists. Gudorf reflects Heyward’s slippery 
assumptions about mutuality when she argues that in mutual sexual pleasure the needs of 
the self and the needs of the other inevitably "march together” and can be “mutually 
satisfied.” But Miller-McLemore insists that desires, interests, or needs do not always – if 
rarely – align with perfection. This is certainly true of sex, even when it is characterized 
by mutual intensions. Mutuality as a process of negotiating power that is continually 
vulnerable to human frailties is an example of mutuality defined differently than shared 
power. It is a definition that better suits the goal for our sexual relations in the here and 
now, especially in a context where power in relation and the tension it breeds gives rise to 
our sexual desires and pleasures.   
Pellauer’s experience is more honest, more human, and more realistic. In addition, 
it is pleasurable! It is a quasi-mystical experience that opens her to the world. Most 
importantly, it is her experience, and she refuses to generalize from the particularity of 
her experience until “a multiplicity in feminist sexual ethics that can at least match the 
multiplicity of women’s sexual experiences.”800 She resists making ethical claims about 
her orgasm and encourages her colleagues to participate in the conversation – to reflect 
on their own experiences, as well as the relationship between power and mutuality. She 
also asks us to contemplate the difference between belonging and patriarchal ownership, 
suggesting that attention to trust, vulnerability, and openness may be helpful to this 
discussion.801 Pellauer’s approach has an openness about it that invites us to make 
meaning out of the particularities of our own sexual experiences. Interpreting sexual 
                                                
800 Pellauer, 158.  
801 Ibid.  
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pleasure is akin to generating one’s own practical sexual wisdom, an approach that I am 
more comfortable with given the diversity of sexual experiences. 
Related to the process of mutuality, and perhaps most pertinent for pastoral 
theology and care, is the reality of risk even in the most mutual of sexual relationships. 
This point assumes that mutuality can be thwarted by more than patriarchal domination. 
Tragedy and the incommensurability of element goods and powers are facts of life. In 
many of the aforementioned proposals the elimination of tensions in the eroticization of 
mutuality rightly aims to thwart violence and abuse. I argue that this move also attempts 
to eliminate risk, when at the most I suggest that it can only serve to mitigate it. 
Suggesting that risk in mutual relationships can be eliminated misunderstands the 
complexity of our theological anthropology. In sex, this hope ironically denies the 
potential for pleasure inherent in risk when trust, safety, and mutuality are part of the 
larger frame of negotiating sexual activity. This point touches on Benjamin’s explorations 
of the pleasures available to some in s/m fantasy and relationships. In regard to those who 
are in need of care, I am convinced that an ethic that denies the reality of risk will fail to 
meet all individuals where they are at and could function to misguide those in search of 
their own path to sexual flourishing.  
Finally, without resisting the claim of the goodness of pleasure, I question the 
burden placed on sexual activity and its pleasures to motivate and inflame one’s passion 
for justice. I have kept in mind Foucault’s reminder that discourse on sexuality – 
emerging from discourse on sexual pleasure – has productive power. Thus, how do these 
proposals contribute to the current sexual regime, and is their contribution in accord with 
their over arching hopes to see sexual justice supported by and manifest in the Church 
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and the larger community? In what sense might these proposals limit the sexual freedom 
for which contemporary sexual ethics so desperately advocates? Finally, what kind of 
guidance does this analysis give us for the place of sexual pleasure in Christian sexual 
ethics? What kind of guidance does it provide for pastoral theologians and caregivers 
faced with sexual suffering and the potential for sexual healing? These are the 
overarching questions I bring to my final analysis in the concluding chapter.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
PLEASURE, PARADOX, AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 
 
As this dissertation comes to a conclusion, a reiteration of the task at hand is 
warranted. It is not my intention as a result of my critical analysis of the discourses on 
sexual pleasure to offer a new framework for Christian sexual ethics or even to 
conclusively determine whether or not sexual pleasure should remain among the expected 
norms for “good sex” – though I think that my analysis raises some provocative questions 
regarding both concerns. Instead, my primary aim was to explore the discourse on sexual 
pleasure across disciplines to critique the grounds upon which contemporary Christian 
sexual ethics sought it fit to include sexual pleasure in its framework for sexual ethics for 
faith communities.  
I argued that the inclusion of sexual pleasure in Christian sexual ethics lacks 
consideration of the complexities and paradoxes that are deeply rooted in human life, 
relationships, and community. Using sociology, theology, psychology, philosophy, 
pastoral theology, and women’s studies, I demonstrated that whether socially constructed 
or inherent in our physiology, psychology, or spirit, the human condition – including our 
capacity for sexual pleasure – is fraught with tension. Christianity has long wrestled with 
paradoxical proclamations to capture the Christian adherent’s plight: “justified, yet 
sinner,” living in the “already, but not yet,” “innocent, yet at fault,” and fulfilled in 
Christ, yet desperately in need. Paradox is the hallmark of the Christian life that awaits 
the Parousia! Why would our hopes for sexual life fail to reflect paradox? Thus, one of 
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my biggest critiques in this project is the failure of some Christian sexual ethicists to 
acknowledge the implications of this reality for sexual activity in the here and now. For 
many individuals unrealistic ideals in sexual ethics will not effect sexual healing.    
The failure on the part of pastoral theology – which begins its reflection with the 
messy ruptures in our hopes for the good life – to consider the complexities of everyday 
sexual life is equally as aggravating. As I mentioned earlier, this void in pastoral 
theology, coupled with the idealism in Christian sexual ethics, concerns me because the 
scholarship in Christian sexual ethics often serves to fill the gap in pastoral theology and 
care for resources attending to sex and sexuality. Whether appropriating them as stand-
ins for pastoral theological texts or drawing from them as resources for the construction 
of a pastoral theology of sexuality, pastoral theology is remiss in critically analyzing and 
evaluating Christian sexual ethics vis-à-vis pastoral theology’s central concerns and 
goals.  
This is problematic on two fronts. First, pastoral theology, and consequently 
pastoral care and counseling, often begins with suffering and is sensitive to the tensions – 
imposed and fated – that afflict both the mundane and significant dimensions of human 
life. The field should be critical of proposals that bypass the impact of human fragility on 
sexual life. Second, pastoral theology attempts to balance attention to context and the 
particularities of individual suffering and flourishing with attention to larger justice 
concerns for faith communities and the greater public. Consequently, in addition to 
critiquing idealistic expectations for sexual life, the field should be concerned as to 
whether or not appropriated resources in Christian sexual ethics are sensitive to the 
tensions generated by context and diverse needs when sexual flourishing is a priority.  
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Complexifying Embodiment, Mutuality, and Justice 
To reiterate, I have great respect for contemporary Christian sexual ethicists who 
have attempted to cut sexual pleasure free from its historical association with sin and 
immorality. With some important qualifications I agree with the groundwork laid by 
theological ethicists to support a positive discourse on sexual pleasure, as well as sexual 
justice, in Christian sexual ethics. Embodiment, mutuality, and justice are crucial themes 
related to sexuality that have relevance in the clinical context and to the work of the 
Church in the community at large. For individuals like Heyward, Harrison, Ellison, Goss, 
and Haldeman, I support a vision for sexual pleasure that binds it to power sharing in 
sexual activity and concrete acts of social justice in the public realm. However, when it 
comes to supporting a discourse on sexual pleasure for all of God’s creation, especially 
as it relates to constructing a larger framework for sexual ethics, my qualifications are 
significant. 
 To the first theme, I support the move in Christian sexual ethics to embrace and 
value our embodiment, including the vision of a unified body, self, and spirit. The body is 
good insofar as it constitutes the conditions for our connection and relationship to others 
and the medium through which we make meaning in and understand the world. Still, the 
body is not without its limits and despite its crucial role in our relational and spiritual 
lives, one must keep in mind that under certain circumstances it can also be a source of 
suffering. For example, as part of the Nashville Alliance for Sexual Health (NASH) I was 
privy to case presentations by physical therapists who worked with women suffering 
from injuries to the muscles in their pelvic floor.802 These women presented a variety of 
                                                
802 The pelvic floor is the region that spans the area underneath the pelvis. The muscles in this area support 
the pelvic organs in the lower abdominal cavity, such as the bladder and uterus, and comprise the 
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symptoms, including lower back pain, incontinence, painful sexual intercourse, and 
difficulty having bowel movements, urinating, and walking. In addition to seeing 
urologists, gynecologists, and physical therapists, many were referred to counselors 
because the pain, embarrassment, and relationship issues resulting from their injuries 
made it difficult to embrace their embodied existence. At times their bodies inhibited 
them from completing the simplest of tasks and responsibilities, including participating in 
sexual activities. Thus, while we should value and revere our body-self as a gift from 
God, we must simultaneously recognize that for some, at various points in life, the body 
can be a source of profound suffering.  
With regards to the second theme, I support mutual relationships between 
individuals and, more specifically, between individuals in sexual relationships. However, 
there are many caveats to a mutuality ethic in sexual relations that resist idealism. I have 
used Jessica Benjamin’s, Kathleen Sands’, and Bonnie Miller-McLemore’s works to 
support a complexified understanding of mutuality, which I have applied to sex. First, the 
fragility of the body – even the deep connection between the body and the mind – on 
occasion frustrate sexual life. For example, the stress and fatigue of a long day or a 
vigorous workout can be a physiological and/or psychological barrier to sexual pleasure, 
even when sexual activity is desired and mutually agreed upon. Second, if mutuality is 
defined as sharing power, then sexual activity that stimulates and brings pleasure using 
power dynamics is deemed unethical. This definition is problematic for those who in the 
context of a mutual relationship agree to play with power to enhance the intimacy and 
                                                                                                                                            
foundation of  the core of the body. These muscles help control urination and defecation and are active 
during sexual activity, especially orgasm. These muscles can be injured as a result of certain athletic 
activities, bruising or breaking the coccyx or tailbone, or pregnancy, labor, or birth. Simon LeVay and 
Sharon M. Valente, Human Sexuality, (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, Inc., 1999), 555. 
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pleasure in their sexual experience. I suggest that mutuality in sexual activity as an 
ethical norm should have more to do with sharing decision-making power than with 
eliminating power play in actual sexual acts.  
Third, drawing on Benjamin’s and Miller-McLemore’s analyses most endemic to 
human being, mutual relation connotes a process and not a static state. A praxis of mutual 
recognition respects individuality and the conflict of needs and goods that often call for 
forgiveness, grace, and the intentional renewal of the tension between self-assertion and 
recognition. Failure to sustain the tension is inevitable. It is renewing the tension that 
allows for healing and perhaps moments of flourishing – sexual or otherwise. In other 
words, sexual partners may experience instances where they lose themselves in each 
other without loss of self or lose self-consciousness without the loss of awareness. This 
kind of sexual connection may (or may not!) be extremely delightful, but there is still 
much pleasure to be had in negotiating tensions in the in-between times and, for some, in 
playing with extremes. There is also, per the realities of “tragedy” and human frailty, 
sexual suffering in the midst of mutual relationships.  
In sum, my resistance to the insistence on mutuality bound to sexual pleasure in 
Christian sexual ethics is not a resistance to the importance and priority on mutuality in 
relationships. It is first, a resistance to simple, static understandings of mutuality, and 
second, a resistance to the proposed one to one correspondences between good sex and 
mutual power in relation and between sexual suffering and the absence of mutuality.  
On the last theme, justice related to sexuality is another crucial dimension of 
Christian sexual ethics with which I am in agreement. This argument is central in 
Douglas’, Heyward’s, and Ellison’s works. The Church must be cognizant of how 
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sexuality – black sexuality, queer sexuality, sexuality of the poor – is used to malign, 
oppress, and leverage power over these communities. Attacking sexuality makes it 
difficult for these populations to consider the spiritual dimensions of their sexuality and 
to envision their sexual pleasure as a gift and a grace. Being committed to sexual justice 
for all, however, does not necessarily obligate personal sexual pleasures to contribute 
toward these ends. While I would not discourage this goal for some, requiring sexual 
pleasure to effect social justice seems burdensome, especially from a clinical perspective, 
where I have seen many individuals – especially women – who are struggling to simply 
enjoy sexual pleasure for themselves and with their partners.  
In addition, insinuating that certain sexual pleasures do not participate in efforts 
toward social justice conflate our sexual activity with who we are – our identity - and 
what we stand for and are committed to in the world. According to contemporary 
proposals that support eroticizing mutuality and oppose the eroticization of power, if I 
prefer a little bondage in my personal sexual life, I am likely to develop a taste for 
oppressing my neighbor. But this is not true for everyone. In fact, many individuals who 
participate in more creative, less “vanilla” sexual experiences tend to focus more on 
freedom of choice than the restriction of rights. Some, like the subversive sex radical 
feminists I covered in Chapter Three, actually resignify practices like sadomasochism and 
leather practices by using them in unintended ways for the purposes of liberation.  
There is so much to be unpacked here. Contemporary Christian sexual ethics 
needs to engage and respond to these varying perspectives. Secular theorists, like 
feminists participating in the feminist sex wars, have done a much better job through 
debate of demonstrating the complexity of the relationships between sexual pleasure and 
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liberation and oppression. They also show us how individual experiences shape different 
opinions in regards to sexual activity. For example, Pat Califia, who insists that the 
meaning of sexual language and practice is context dependent, finds that s/m practices in 
her context maximize her agency and her pleasure as opposed to hurting her or rendering 
her powerless.  
In sum, the conflation of sexual activity with identity makes me worry that these 
proposals place an undue burden on our sexual activity to affect social justice. After all, if 
most of the time sex falls short of being ideal, it seems unfair to demand that it fit into a 
larger call for commitments to social justice. And, if no matter how we cut it, sex is 
constructed in our very bodies as a power exchange – to some degree – how can we 
expect it to be a source – even the source – of meeting the demands of an entire feminist 
ethic? This is precisely Sands’ critique of feminist eros – “Not only was eros to heal 
patriarchalism, it was also to ameliorate the whole panoply of other oppressions – racism, 
ecological depredation, class inequities and so forth,” she explains.803 Sands goes on to 
remind readers of feminist Gale Rubin’s caution against conferring an excess of 
significance on sex. Sands argues that claiming a necessary connection between eros and 
justice has given feminist theologians (and I would add theological ethicists) reason to 
exclude practices like s/m, fetishism, and pornography from sexual theologies.804  
 
 
 
 
                                                
803 Sands, “A Response to Marcella Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology,” 176.  
804 Ibid. 
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Coming Full Circle 
Recall that at the onset of this project I asserted that Christian sexual ethics has 
uncritically accepted and promoted a vision for sexual pleasure that lacks the complexity, 
tensions, and paradox demonstrated by the contributions of other disciplines. I have 
already explained how the emphasis on connecting personal sexual pleasures to social 
justice places an undue burden on sexual pleasure insofar as it must necessarily transcend 
the personal to the political. Before returning in this critical conversation to pastoral 
theology and bringing the commitments of pastoral theology to bear on what has been 
covered thus far, I want to briefly attend to the other two assertions in my thesis. 
First, I suggested that efforts to speak in positive ways about sexual pleasure from 
a theological perspective have erred in ways reminiscent of the Christian tradition. Just as 
Augustine constructed sexual pleasure as essentially irredeemable, untrustworthy, 
corrupted, and capable of corruption, Christian sexual ethics has grounded itself in a 
redemption of an eros that is essentially infallible, always trustworthy, salvific, and 
incorruptible. This ideal or essential eros, defined by an ideal understanding of mutuality 
that eliminates all tensions, failures, and the possibility of the conflict of needs and 
goods, draws sharp distinctions between what qualifies as truly erotic and what is 
relegated to the “pornographic.” For many, the insistence on eroticizing mutuality in 
sexual activity runs counter to the current eroticization of the tensions generated by 
power dynamics. Thus, the sexual activities of the majority are called into question by a 
Christian sexual ethic that affirms sexual arousal and pleasure in power-sharing only.  
Similarly, because the erotic is necessary theological – the Divine presence in and 
substance of mutual sexual relating – those sexual activities that are not properly erotic 
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alienate individuals from God. In an ironic twist, insisting on the ethical import of 
eroticizing mutuality in sexual experience mirrors the priority on and claims to the 
spiritual made by Augustine with respect to virginity and the chaste life. Intimacy with 
the Divine is maximized in eroticized mutuality as it was in practicing abstinence for 
historical Christians. For each respectively, all other sex or sex period separates us from 
God. In this way, implicit in any tolerance of “sadomasochistic” sexual relating for 
contemporary Christian sexual ethics is reminiscent of Augustine’s hopes for married 
intercourse. The former expects partners to move toward sharing power in sex, just as the 
latter expects married individuals to embrace chastity when the “ardor of youth cools.”805 
Efforts to speak in positive ways about sex from a theological perspective have 
also been congruent with the current sexual regime. Sexuality, as articulated by Christian 
sexual ethics, is central the human condition and to our identities as Christians who have 
been gifted with embodiment and sensuality, the physicality of God’s grace. While this a 
reversal of the centrality of sexuality to the human condition in Augustine’s interpretation 
of original sin and its punishment – positive as opposed to negative – continuing to 
position sexuality as foundational to personhood and identity complies with Foucault’s 
interpretation of the “history” of sexuality, the will to knowledge, the deployment of 
sexuality, and the production of power. In other words, by continuing to interpret 
sexuality as central to the self, Christians perpetuate the view of sexuality as a source for 
truths about the self, as well as the divine. Theological discourse about sexuality orders 
knowledge and makes claims on sexual behaviors that create and enforce norms and the 
proliferation of identities, which in turn create and exact disciplinary power. For good or 
for ill, Christian sexual ethics does just this – the centrality and spiritual import of our 
                                                
805 Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, 12.  
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sexuality necessitates a framework that ultimately constructs norms for sexual conduct 
with theological authority.   
 Contemporary Christian sexual ethics would not deny its desire to implement a 
framework for making ethical and moral decisions about sex. Ethicists like Heyward and 
Ellison and institutions like the Religious Institute, however, claim to turn away from 
judging specific sexual acts. Instead, the substance of sexual relationships is the primary 
ethical concern. For example, “right relationship,” a phrase repeated numerous times by 
Heyward, means living in mutual relationships and sharing power. Insofar as a sexual 
relationship exhibits “right relating,” Heyward claims to be satisfied. Ellison is more 
direct. In Erotic Justice he explains, “A mature sexual ethic focuses not on what must be 
prohibited…but rather on the quality of relationship, that pattern of respect and care, and 
how power is distributed and expressed.”806 In “Common Decency: A New Christian 
Sexual Ethics,” he clearly advocates for a focus on the substance of sexual relations – the 
quality of honesty, care, and respect that is present – as opposed to the form of sexual 
relations – who does what, with whom, under what circumstances.807 The Religious 
Institute pointedly states in its Religious Declaration, “Our culture needs a sexual ethic 
focused on personal relationships and social justice rather than particular sexual 
acts.”808 Taken together, the focus on the substance of relationships eliminates judgments 
made against sexual activities on the basis of 1) the gender of one’s partners, 2) the body 
                                                
806 Ellison, Erotic Justice, 83.  
807 Ellison, “Common Decency,” 236.  
808 See http://www.religiousinstitute.org/religious-declaration-on-sexual-morality-justice-and-healing, or 
the appendix. 
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parts involved, and 3) the marital status of participants. In other words, it resists the 
unjust norm of compulsory heterosexuality and gender inequality.809 
There are many positive things to say about this approach to sexual ethics, which 
I find appealing and advantageous for pastoral theology. However, the demands made 
upon sexual pleasure by these theorists – even the inclusion of pleasure period into a 
framework for sexual ethics – confounds the central aim of focusing on the relationship 
as opposed to the act and its circumstances. By including sexual pleasure in the form of 
the need to eroticize mutuality, these scholars reject as morally acceptable any sexual 
activities that use eroticized power to increase intimacy and sexual pleasure. Recall that 
Heyward insists that any kind of sexual activity that does not realize or aim toward 
mutual power-sharing retains a sadomasochistic character and can only be understood as 
anti-erotic or pornographic. This is further complicated and confused by her paradoxical 
claim that the sadomasochistic context of our culture implicates all sexual activities in 
producing pleasures that are experienced through domination and submission. Thus, new 
proposals that include sexual pleasure insofar as mutuality is eroticized end up focusing 
on and judging sexual acts, practices, and pleasures that play with, negotiate, or 
exemplify power imbalances.  
In my opinion this system is too dualistic – as if in sexual relationships we either 
share power or participate in the dominant/submissive paradigm that Heyward argues 
always constitutes violence and leads to injustice. My critique on this point does not try 
to avoid the problem of violence with respect to what goes on inside the bedroom. I am 
not talking about embracing sexual abuse and forms of domination that ignore or 
manipulate consent and repeatedly fail to negotiate the tension crucial to a praxis of 
                                                
809 Ellison, “Common Decency,” 238.  
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mutual recognition. What I am suggesting is a modification to simple dualistic notions of 
power, i.e. the eroticization of shared power is good, while the eroticization of power is 
bad. Where is the proof that power in and of itself is problematic?810 For example, if in 
sexual play we can mutually agree to use the tensions in power exchange to maximize 
sexual pleasure, is it not the eroticization of abusive power that most concerns us, where 
as the eroticization of power does not appear in and of itself to signal injustice? In many 
cases the eroticization of power signals the recognition of how deeply patriarchy has 
shaped our sexual desires and pleasures and seeks to capitalize on this reality by 
submitting it to control, safety, and mutual decision-making and implementation.  
Perhaps distinctions need to be made between abusive power and power 
imbalances that have benefits given other parameters like informed consent, trust, 
fidelity, etc. Secular feminists argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibility for 
partners in egalitarian relationships, committed to social justice work in their public life, 
to use eroticized power to make the most of their sexual experience, especially if 
eroticized power – given the enduring reign of heterosexist patriarchy – is what most 
often titillates. Thus, power can be eroticized in the context of a mutual relationship 
without calling this violence or insisting that subversive practices, like sadomasochistic 
sexual activity, are ideal, the only way out of sex that is either constructed from its 
foundations up or taken prisoner by patriarchy. In other words, the suggestion of 
eroticized mutuality, or being “turned on” by power-sharing, may exist now for some, but 
                                                
810 Foucault argues that power is everywhere and that it is always relational. “The omnipresence of power: 
not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under it invincible unity, but because it is 
produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.” 
Foucault, 93.  
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for others it is more reflective of a fantasy. I maintain that both eroticizing mutuality and 
eroticizing power deserve support, especially in a caregiving context.  
My point – the last in my three point thesis – is that proposals in Christian sexual 
ethics struggle to affirm sexual relationships and acts that eroticize pleasure and play with 
tensions to generate and/or maximize sexual pleasures. As such, Christian sexual ethics 
ironically reinscribe – albeit with a wider circle –sexual practices and pleasures that are 
acceptable, while delineating those that are not. Taken together, contemporary 
interpretations of sexual pleasure in contemporary Christian sexual ethics risk 
participating in the ongoing production of a sexual regime that regulates and controls 
specific sexual acts and pleasures, even as they claim to prioritize the nature of the 
relationships in which sexual activities occur.  
I conclude that the call to eroticize of mutuality is a theoretical attempt to 
eliminate tensions in the critical analysis of the flow of power through sexual pleasures 
themselves. I am not convinced that “imagination” or “phantasie” can reconcile the 
“essential goodness of sexual pleasure” with the thorough distortion of (some would 
argue the creation of) these pleasures in a patriarchal context. Trying to do so has put 
contemporary Christian sexual ethics in a position to monitor sexual pleasures, a role not 
uncommon to the Christian tradition. Thus, sexual pleasures continue to generate a 
degree of obsession and angst, even in progressive Christian contexts.  
This leads me back to the problem with essentializing eros, and subsequently 
sexual pleasure. Whether essentially good/redemptive or essentially bad/sinful, a black 
and white approach to erotic pleasure ignores the paradoxes and multiple shades of gray 
that capture the majority of sexual experience, causing Christians to either ignore, 
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marginalize, or demonize the sexual sufferings and joys that inhabit the spaces and 
experiences in-between. A close read of Heyward in Touching Our Strength and “Pain 
and Pleasure” – works that infuse constructive suggestions in contemporary Christian 
sexual ethics – reveals recognition of the paradox the plagues discourse on sexual 
pleasure. But she cannot hold the tension and pushes toward a resolution that in the face 
of diverse contexts and experiences remains highly theoretical at best.   
 
Pastoral Theological Reflections 
 
Returning to the Individual 
My pastoral theological sensibilities, arising from my knowledge of the field, as 
well as my personal and clinical experiences, embrace the paradoxes that grip daily life. 
The challenge of being in relationship is most fundamental and often the content of 
counseling sessions. The challenge of sustaining mutual relationships and the suffering in 
the breakdown of balancing self-assertion and recognizing others bring individuals, 
couples, and families to counseling. Sexual life, because of its resonances with primal 
desires and embodied satisfactions, is a playground (some times an abandon or abused 
one) for negotiating the needs of the self and the other. I agree with Benjamin that in sex 
it is the dynamic tension between assertion and recognition that makes mutuality 
possible. She argues that erotic satisfaction is attained through a praxis of mutual 
recognition of and with others. The erotic excitement of mutual recognition between 
selves is based on differentiation – others who are both separate from and in communion 
with us. But this erotic satisfaction is not achieved without tensions. Similarly, 
 373 
community is not achieved without tensions. It makes sense to me that even in the most 
mutual relationships we retain our subjectivity. There are still boundaries that even if 
crossed can be re-negotiated.  
Because we are individuals, we do not always desire the same thing, at the same 
time, in the same way that others might prefer. If we did, mutuality would not suffer the 
challenge of our individuality – the ways that despite being like all others and like some 
others, we are also like no other.811 The Christian community, in its affirmation of sexual 
pleasure, envisioning it as a gift and a grace from the Creator, cannot ignore the 
individual and her particularities. Pastoral theology, while it would fully support sexual 
justice in the community at large, does not lose sight of the individual. Pastoral theology, 
argues Miller-McLemore, in its study of experiences of suffering and its analysis of 
“what is at stake for particular individuals in particular situations…seeks a…corrective to 
theoretical or doctrinal abstraction.”812 I would add that it also seeks a corrective to 
generalizations across experience, always beginning its reflection with a commitment to 
empathy and understanding in particularity. Thus, one individual’s interpretation of her 
personal sexual experience may not be generalizable to others.  
In the proposals reviewed in Chapter Five the most pastoral theological 
approaches to a discourse on sexual pleasure are Pellauer’s and Haldeman’s personal 
reflections. I say “approaches” as opposed to “arguments” because neither makes an 
argument for the meanings – spiritual or otherwise – inherent in sexual pleasure. Instead, 
they interpret their own experiences of orgasm and share the wisdom gleaned. Pellauer 
refrains from making any moral claims with respect to female orgasm until the 
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particularities of other experiences are shared. Like Pellauer, Haldeman also resists 
making universal claims for the spiritual, theological, and ethical meanings inherent in 
gay sex. He challenges his readers to consider their own sexual practices and how these 
practices relate to their notions of self, community, and God. Recall that he encourages us 
to see the subtle relationships between our doings in our private, public, and spiritual 
lives, reminding us, “…our doing shapes who we are becoming.”813 Both theologians are 
provocative and call us to a similar exploration of our own sexual pleasure. They do not, 
however, make ethical demands based on their experiences with orgasm.  
While Pellauer (a straight, white female) and Haldeman (a gay, white male) value 
reflecting on their person sexual pleasure and contemplating its ethical significance, 
others reject an open exploration of this private, sometimes exploited, dimension of 
sexuality. For example, lesbian feminist Mary Hunt points out that while gay men have 
focused on their sexual lives as the locus of their liberation, lesbian feminists, who resists 
self-definition based on sexuality, choose to centralize their relational commitments to 
other women – what Hunt calls female friendship.814 She explains the reclamation of the 
word lesbian as “women loving women without fixating on the presence or absence of 
genital activity to define it.”815 Consequently, the choice to love women is a personal 
with political ramifications. However, according to Hunt, whether or not friends are 
                                                
813 Haldeman, 229.   
814 Hunt, 186.  
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and heterosexist, maintained by the exclusion of women and homosexuality, where women are defined by 
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women, and they love themselves as women. “To be a lesbian,” Hunt elaborates, “is to take relationships 
with women radically seriously, opening oneself to befriend and be befriended, so that by loving, 
something new may be born. When all women are freed to have this experience, then, and only then, can 
we say that any women are free.” Ibid,184. 
 375 
sexual partners remains a private matter. She is adamant about the distinction, insisting 
that lesbian feminists are entitled to private lives like everyone else.816  
Recall that womanist Karen Baker-Fletcher makes a similar case for the rights of 
black women to do, display, and play with their sexuality as they please, arguing that 
possessing this agency is an assertion of freedom in the face of a racist culture that has 
historically “forcefully displayed and spread for curiosity, amusement, observation, and 
consumption” the sex of black bodies.817 Baker-Fletcher interprets some of the silence on 
the part of the black community as intentional and selective, a way of resisting 
participation in a sexual regime that has been the source of so much pain, discrimination, 
and exploitation.   
  For these scholars, whose contexts differ from Pellauer’s and Haldeman’s, an 
explicit discourse on sexual pleasure as it relates to sexual ethics is intentionally absent. 
Hunt focuses more broadly on the meaning, transformation, and pleasure that are 
available in friendship. From her lesbian feminist perspective it is not sexual pleasure that 
motivates the desire for working toward the alleviation of oppression constructed and 
maintained by patriarchy. She argues that focusing on sexual activity misses the point 
that the relational dynamics of domination and submission are the unmovable foundation 
of heterosexual relationships and institutions. Thus, for Hunt, rethinking sexual ethics 
requires a priority on the “sexual” nature of all relationships, particularly friendship.818  
                                                
816 Ibid, 186.  
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818 According to Hunt, lesbian feminism, women who take their friendships with other women seriously, is 
a model of relating that exhibits mutuality, concern for the whole community, honesty, and other qualities 
that make it advantageous for theological reflection. Friendship becomes the standard for just relating in all 
relationships, including (but never exclusively) intimate relationships. A priority on justice in relationships 
guides the sexual ethics that emerge from this perspective.       
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For Baker-Fletcher, the wisdom of eros found in the writings of black women – 
perhaps including but not limited to sexual pleasure – holds the key to liberating and 
loving black sexuality. She insists, “[My] essay rejects white feminist, post-modern 
arguments that ‘this is essentialist’ as a nonagenda item for Black women who find 
healing in acknowledging a common history in relation to the transatlantic slave 
trade.”819 In other words, Baker-Fletcher claims that eros as a resource is healing and 
transformative for the black community. She rejects the critique that I have leveraged 
against feminist eros. Her sentiments are invaluable for pastoral theology going forward 
on two fronts. First, Baker-Fletcher (and Hunt) demonstrate that sexual pleasure need not 
be a resource for Christian sexual ethics given her experiences in the black (and lesbian) 
community. Second, Baker-Fletcher challenges pastoral theology to continue to consider 
eros, as articulated by womanists, as a resource for sexual ethics.  
The reason for explicating the differences in Pellauer’s, Haldeman’s, Hunt’s, and 
Baker-Fletcher’s works is to argue that context matters when it comes to considering how 
and if discourse on sexual pleasure should factor into Christian sexual ethics. The role of 
sexual pleasure in flourishing, in suffering, in spiritual life, in motivating social justice, 
and in constructing sexual ethics cannot escape the personal. These particularities, I 
argue, include and stretch beyond gender, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and class to 
family dynamics, temperament, biological constitution, culture, and all the facets of life 
that make each individual unique. I am inclined to consider discourse on sexual pleasure 
in pastoral theology and care as emergent, constructed by the careseeker at his or her 
discretion in the context of a caregiving relationship, as opposed to determined by an 
external, apriori ethical framework. This approach is not a stretch for pastoral theology, 
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whose strength lies in making meaning in the midst of the human story by reflection on 
concrete experiences of suffering, flourishing, and life in the interim.  
  
Good-Enough Sex  
I argued earlier in this project that the goal of power-sharing in sex, or eroticizing 
mutuality in sexual activity, was an attempt to eliminate risk in sexual encounter. In 
Heyward and Harrison’s efforts to abolish abuse and violence in sexual life, they 
champion mutual vulnerability. But they write as if mutual vulnerability eradicates the 
possibility of wounding. Insofar as risk has the potential to put us at the mercy of 
suffering, this is a valiant effort. Ideally we want to avoid suffering at all costs! However, 
if we understand mutual exchange as a constant negotiation of power, a giving and 
receiving, then we have no choice but to allow for a degree of risk – the chance, the 
possibility, and the probability that precisely because we have entered into a relationship 
grounded in trust and enhanced by vulnerability, any faltering of reciprocal recognition 
may be an occasion for wounding. Recall, once again, that according to Benjamin and 
Miller-McLemore the breakdown of mutual exchange or failure to reciprocate will occur. 
Finding out why and renewing the tension is part and parcel of the task of relating.  
 Theoretically then, with respect to “good sex,” I suggest that the reality of risk 
means that any ideal notion of truly “good” sex is intermittent, if not at times totally 
unpredictable. This is exactly what Heyward fiercely opposes. She contends that if self-
other dynamics are “fated to bear the mark of the tension between self-possession and 
other-possession, then good sex can be at best an occasional, even accidental, striking of 
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a delicate balance.”820 I think that Heyward is right on! Risk means that our “sex” – 
whatever our context - is only ever “good-enough.”  
The idea of “good-enough” sex, however, is not entirely novel. For example, 
David Scharff, who uses ORT to interpret adult sexual life, considers Winnicott’s concept 
of the “good-enough mother” paradigmatic for “good-enough sex.” “The good-enough 
mother,” Winnicott says, “is one who makes active adaptation to the infant’s needs, an 
active adaptation that gradually lessens, according to the infant’s growing ability to 
account for failure of adaptation and to tolerate the results of frustration.”821 Put 
differently, a good-enough mother regularly provides for and is in tune with her baby’s 
physical and emotional needs; however, though she does the best she can, she is prone to 
occasional failures. While these failures frustrate the baby, they also provide the infant 
with the opportunity to cope with frustration, to self-sooth, and eventually to make 
objects real though the integration of their good and bad aspects. Mom (or any primary 
caregiver) is good enough because she gives the infant exactly what is needed and wanted 
most of the time. In Winnicott’s theory occasional failures are highly valued because they 
provide the opportunity for growth, integration of one’s world, and individuation.  
 Scharff says that similar to the goals of the good-enough mother in childrearing, 
“reasonable goals for sexuality are that it be a useful and on the whole enjoyable part of a 
…relationship that is capable of containing and facilitating the average amount of conflict 
and frustration, giving at some times exactly what is needed and wished for.”822 Here, 
Scharff considers that good-enough sex has similar qualities to good-enough mothering. 
On the whole, good-enough sex will be enjoyable, at times providing exactly what is 
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desired and needed. Sex is good enough in that it can withstand and contain the 
occasional failure, which provides the opportunity for couples to hold together the 
realities of the good and bad aspects of their partners and themselves. 
 Though Benjamin does not use the term “good-enough sex,” the praxis of mutual 
recognition that she proposes captures the tensions that permeate all erotic union. 
Because we are constantly negotiating moments of self-assertion and other-recognition, 
most sex to some degree is good-enough. For some, sexual pleasure is heightened by 
sadomasochistic fantasy and role playing, where increasing the risk of recognizing the 
other and failing to be recognized generates deep satisfaction when the other survives 
destruction, ultimately reinforcing the subjectivity of both partners.  
Pastoral theology recognizes that the fragility of the human condition and the 
challenge of mutuality extends into the sexual arena. I previously suggested that trying to 
eliminate risk in mutual relationships misunderstands the complexity of our theological 
anthropology. In sex, this hope ironically denies the potential for pleasure inherent in risk 
when trust, safety, and mutuality are part of the larger frame of negotiating sexual 
activity. Recall that Pellauer’s attributes her ability to experience and enjoy her spouse’s 
“power-over” her to other factors in their relationship, including trust, growing mutuality, 
safety, and the ability to forgive one another. Haldeman, aware of the contentious nature 
of claiming the “receptive” position in sex, argues that all human thought and behavior is 
ambiguous – some potentially life-giving, while others are potentially destructive. For 
this reason, all behavior is in need constant reflection and reform, and sex, he says, like 
other practices, involves risk.823  
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Pastoral theology might consider that in a larger framework of trust, growing 
mutuality, safety, and the ability to forgive one another, perhaps it is our brokenness 
(whether manifest in a propensity to dominate or submit) that allows for pleasure in 
sexual activities with those we trust and with whom we feel safe. Because I take seriously 
Miller-McLemore’s critique of “sloppy” mutuality and her argument for mutuality as a 
life-long process, pastoral theology can interpret failures in sexual relating as 
opportunities for growth as individuals and in our intimate relationships as a whole. 
Failures also give us perspective with respect to the limits of the goods that sex can offer 
us. In this sense, pastoral theology can argue that good-enough sex is the best sex.  
 
Lingering Concerns and Future Research 
 As pastoral theology turns its attention toward reflecting further on sexual 
experience and the potential discourses emerging on sexual pleasure, the following issues 
tempt a pastoral theological response. Recall that Gudorf argues we must admit that the 
reason we pursue sex is for the pleasure, whether the pleasure of passion or the pleasure 
of emotional intimacy.824 In some instances this is true. In other cases, connection, 
attachment, or security trumps a quest for pleasure. “Make-up sex” is notorious for 
reestablishing connection and security – for communicating without words that 
“everything is ok,” “I forgive you,” or “I love you.” Pleasure may reinforce these 
feelings, but not necessarily. Sands’ points out that sex seeks out many goods, “from 
deepening a relationship, to satisfying lust, to offering comfort, from making babies to 
making money.”825 More so, she argues, “Lust can go with love, but they are not 
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intrinsically connected, nor even intrinsically compatible.”826 Furthermore, some in 
sexual-minority communities, like queer leather communities for example, use sexual 
practices as way to solidify identity. Thus, practices like s/m have little to do with sexual 
pleasure at all.827 How can pastoral theology articulate and interpret that the reasons we 
pursue sex are multiple and contingent? Can pastoral theology support the multitude? 
Recall that I demonstrated in the Introduction that most communities of faith 
today admit that there are other ends to sex (like pleasure) aside from procreation, while 
continuing to insist that marriage is the only “appropriate” context for sex. I argued that 
confining sex to marriage belies ongoing distrust of sexual pleasure as a potential good in 
its own right. Can pastoral theology still make a case for marriage as a good context for 
sex, one that is no longer grounded in a procreative ethic or fear of sexual pleasure? Can 
marriage be salvaged as one among a number of arrangements that can establish 
parameters that create a context for good-enough sex as articulated above? To what 
extent does marriage insofar as it covenants for commitment, trust, steadfastness across 
time, and space for failure encourage good-enough sex?828 
If pastoral theology is convinced that truly focusing on the substance of a 
relationship should be the grounds for sexual ethical norms, it must cease evaluation of 
sexual acts. Thus, it would embrace s/m and alternative sexual expressions. Doing so 
could also dissolve an emphasis on monogamy, redefine traditional definitions of fidelity, 
and raise provocative questions about prostitution and the creation and consumption of 
pornography – both issues that even the most progressive proposals in Christian sexual 
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ethics tend to avoid. How will pastoral theology respond to the sexual pleasures that are 
tangled up in pornography, prostitution and [role] play? Is it pastoral theology’s 
obligation to do so? In other words, what is the role of pastoral theology in reflecting on 
and implementing sexual ethics?  
 Finally, not all proposals in contemporary Christian sexual ethics prioritize 
pleasure or necessarily include it in new frameworks for sexual ethics. In Just Love, for 
example, Margaret Farley includes the following in her framework for a sexual ethics 
based on norms of justice: do no unjust harm, free consent, mutuality (of desire, action, 
and response), equality of power, commitment, fruitfulness, and social justice.829 While 
there is a lot to discuss here, note that pleasure is not among the seven points of Farley’s 
framework. Rather, she says, “…we may in terms of this framework say things 
like:…freedom, wholeness, intimacy, and pleasure are values to be affirmed in 
relationships marked by mutuality, equality, and some form of commitment.”830 In other 
words, pleasure can be affirmed when a sexual relationship is mutual, equal, and 
committed in some way, but this is not a necessity. Sands asks, “…why cannot 
sex…without pleasure…be good enough sex?”831 Because there are many motivations for 
sex, Farley and Sands indicate that pleasure is not necessarily prioritized (as it is for 
Gudorf) or even necessary (as it is in the Religious Institute’s Declaration). What kind of 
guidance should pastoral theology offer with regards to the place of sexual pleasure in 
Christian sexual ethics? And should sexual pleasure remain among the expected norms 
for “good sex”? Does answering these questions even fall into the purview of pastoral 
theology? 
                                                
829 Farley, 216-232. 
830 Ibid, 231.  
831 Sands, “A Response to Marcella Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology,” 177. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Religious Declaration on Sexual Morality,  Justice, and Healing 
 
Sexuality is God's life-giving and life-fulfilling gift.  We come from diverse religious 
communities to recognize sexuality as central to our humanity and as integral to our 
spirituality.  We are speaking out against the pain, brokenness, oppression and loss of meaning 
that many experience about their sexuality. 
  
Our faith traditions celebrate the goodness of creation, including our bodies and our 
sexuality.  We sin when this sacred gift is abused or exploited.  However, the great promise of our 
traditions is love, healing and restored relationships. 
  
Our culture needs a sexual ethic focused on personal relationships and social justice rather than 
particular sexual acts.  All persons have the right and responsibility to lead sexual lives that 
express love, justice, mutuality, commitment, consent and pleasure.  Grounded in respect for the 
body and for the vulnerability that intimacy brings, this ethic fosters physical, emotional and 
spiritual health.  It accepts no double standards and applies to all persons, without regard to sex, 
gender, color, age, bodily condition, marital status or sexual orientation. 
  
God hears the cries of those who suffer from the failure of religious communities to address 
sexuality.  We are called today to see, hear and respond to the suffering caused by sexual abuse 
and violence against women and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons, the HIV 
pandemic, unsustainable population growth and over-consumption, and the commercial 
exploitation of sexuality. 
  
Faith communities must therefore be truth-seeking, courageous and just.  We call for: 
·         Theological reflection that integrates the wisdom of excluded, often silenced peoples, and 
insights about sexuality from medicine, social science, the arts and humanities. 
·         Full inclusion of women and LGBT persons in congregational life, including their 
ordination and marriage equality. 
·         Sexuality counseling and education throughout the lifespan from trained religious leaders. 
·         Support for those who challenge sexual oppression and who work for justice within their 
congregations and denominations. 
  
Faith communities must also advocate for sexual and spiritual wholeness in society.  We call for: 
·         Lifelong, age-appropriate sexuality education in schools, seminaries and community 
settings. 
·         A faith-based commitment to sexual and reproductive rights, including access to voluntary 
contraception, abortion, and HIV/STI prevention and treatment. 
·         Religious leadership in movements to end sexual and social injustice. 
  
God rejoices when we celebrate our sexuality with holiness and integrity.  We, the undersigned, 
invite our colleagues and faith communities to join us in promoting sexual morality, justice, and 
healing. 
  
Updated January 2010 
From: http://www.religiousinstitute.org/religious-declaration-on-sexual-morality-justice-and-
healing 
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